Design of Ecological Environmental Protection Incentive Model: Based on Game Theory and from the Perspective of Collusion

Yi Cao, Xueru Wen, Xueru Wen

2024

Abstract

Abstract: The coordinated development of river basins requires prioritizing ecological considerations despite persistent institutional challenges. To engage stakeholders in ecological and environmental protection, it is crucial to define the responsibilities and authority dynamics between the central government, local government, and enterprises. Incentive-compatible mechanisms must be established across administrative units to harmonize environmental protection efforts, promote unified approaches, and contribute to sustainable basin development. The central-local government relationship resembles a principal-agent dynamic. To achieve optimal risk allocation, the central government must exert influence on the local government, enforce contractual obligations, and establish incentivized frameworks. "Free riding" behavior by local governments in ecological protection arises from vested interests. By employing rational game theory, it becomes apparent that an integrated supervisory mechanism allows the central government to maximize basin environmental utility. Aligning standards among the three government levels and increasing the costs of illicit activities by enterprises are essential measures to deter collusion.Based on these analyses, several key policy recommendations emerge. Firstly, elevate the importance of environmental protection performance in the assessment and evaluation of all government levels. Secondly, establish a comprehensive environmental protection coordination organization at the basin level. Thirdly, optimize industrial structure adjustment policies while considering resource and environmental constraints. Fourthly, gradually implement a regional emission trading market within the environmental regulation framework. Lastly, enhance grassroots government enforcement capacities regarding environmental protection laws. Implementing these policies facilitates the coordinated development of river basins, providing a robust framework for ecological and environmental protection. It ensures sustainable and harmonious basin development while mitigating the adverse impacts of human activities.

Paper Citation

in Harvard Style

Cao Y. and Wen X. (2024). Design of Ecological Environmental Protection Incentive Model: Based on Game Theory and from the Perspective of Collusion. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Environmental Science and Civil Engineering - Volume 1: ICESCE; ISBN 978-989-758-764-1, SciTePress, pages 118-129. DOI: 10.5220/0013574400004671

in Bibtex Style

@conference{icesce24,
author={Yi Cao and Xueru Wen},
title={Design of Ecological Environmental Protection Incentive Model: Based on Game Theory and from the Perspective of Collusion},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Environmental Science and Civil Engineering - Volume 1: ICESCE},
year={2024},
pages={118-129},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0013574400004671},
isbn={978-989-758-764-1},
}

in EndNote Style

TY - CONF

JO - Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Environmental Science and Civil Engineering - Volume 1: ICESCE
TI - Design of Ecological Environmental Protection Incentive Model: Based on Game Theory and from the Perspective of Collusion
SN - 978-989-758-764-1
AU - Cao Y.
AU - Wen X.
PY - 2024
SP - 118
EP - 129
DO - 10.5220/0013574400004671
PB - SciTePress