field of international trade. However, due to
conflicting national interests such as data sovereignty
among different countries, international legal rules
exhibit a characteristic of multi-track parallelism. The
current international regulatory framework primarily
involves countries embedding their own cross-border
data rules into trade agreements, resulting in a
"fragmented" landscape of global cross-border data
governance. Among different trade agreements, there
exist both competitive clauses and a gradual trend
toward integration.
2.1 The "Principle + Exception" Model
in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
The World Trade Organization (WTO) currently
lacks specialized regulations addressing cross-border
data flows. Over the past few decades, Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs) have gradually emerged as a key
platform for discussing data governance issues. By
establishing new rule frameworks for emerging topics
in digital trade, FTAs have to some extent alleviated
many of the contradictions faced by the WTO's
multilateral trading system (Burri, 2017). Currently,
FTAs attempt to reconcile the tension between trade
liberalization and sovereign regulation through a
balanced design of “the free flow of data principle”
and “exception clauses”. The varying emphases of
different agreements also reflect the strategic
intentions of the dominant countries involved.
The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS
FTA) is the world's first free trade agreement that
explicitly incorporates rules on the free flow of data
in its e-commerce chapter. In contrast, the CPTPP
elevates the language on cross-border data flow rules
from the shall endeavor phrasing in KORUS FTA to
the legally binding "shall," thereby increasing the
mandatory nature of these obligations. Article 14.11
of the CPTPP clearly articulates the obligation of free
data flow, prohibiting parties from restricting cross-
border data transfers and stipulating that signatory
states are obligated to permit transboundary data
flows via digital channels, with specific provisions
for sensitive personally identifiable data, provided
such transmissions align with authorized commercial
operations of registered entities. These binding
obligations codify prohibitions against data
territorialization mandates and other measures that
hinder foreign digital services.
CPTPP’s cross-border data provisions also
incorporate exceptions to obligations, permitting
member states to implement restrictive measures for
achieving "legitimate public policy objectives,"
provided they meet the two conditions of "non-
discrimination" and "necessity." It treats "essential
security interests" as non-justiciable exceptions,
granting contracting parties’ greater autonomy. The
innovation is reflected in Article 14.13, which
explicitly prohibits data localization requirements
through a "negative list" approach while allowing
sensitive sectors like finance to retain certain
regulatory flexibility. Although CPTPP's soft dispute
settlement mechanism limits the enforceability of its
rules, compared to other agreements addressing
cross-border data disputes, CPTPP has already
established relevant provisions that can be submitted
to its dispute resolution mechanism.
The USMCA’s digital trade provisions (Chapter
19) establish robust frameworks for enhancing cross-
jurisdictional data interoperability, while its
counterpart in the CPTPP (Article 14.13.1) affirms
the sovereign right of member states to develop
localized technical compliance frameworks for
critical information technology assets-particularly
addressing communication security and sensitive
information protection protocols.
In contrast, Article 19.12 of the USMCA explicitly
abolishes the exception in the CPTPP that allows
parties to impose ‘computing facility localization’
requirements, permitting only central banks to retain
data storage requirements for financial regulation.
However, the USMCA exhibits prominent
characteristics of data hegemony. Article 19.16
imposes restrictions on algorithmic transparency
obligations, prohibiting member states from
demanding the disclosure of source code or
algorithms. This essentially represents the U.S.
exporting rules of data hegemony to maintain the
competitive advantage of its technology firms. Under
such a model, Latin American countries may be
forced to relinquish their digital sovereignty and
become subordinate to the U.S. data economy.
Chapter 12 of the RCEP core provisions
demonstrates an inclusive approach toward the
developmental disparities among member states.
Article 12.15 requires contracting parties to endeavor
to avoid imposing unnecessary restrictions on cross-
border data flows, though it does not establish
mandatory standards. Meanwhile, in addressing
disputes over cross-border data flows under RCEP,
the actual resolution proves challenging, as RCEP
merely stipulates that disputing parties should engage
in consultations to resolve the issue (Lando, 2022).
Paragraph 3 of Article 12.14 further expands the
scope of security exceptions, permitting unilateral
measures based on "essential security interests," with
other contracting parties barred from raising
objections. RCEP's flexible framework makes it the