International Legal Regulation of Cross-Border Data Flows in Digital
Trade
Zhuangzhuang Jin
Civil, Commercial, and Economic Law School, China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing, China
Keywords: Cross-Border Data Flow, International Regulation and Governance, Data Sovereignty.
Abstract: This paper examines the international legal regulation of cross-border data flows in digital trade, focusing on
the fragmented nature of the current global regulatory framework and its core controversies. By analyzing
provisions in key free trade agreements (FTAs), the study highlights the role of the "principle + exception"
model in reconciling tensions between trade liberalization and data sovereignty. It further explores the
governance logic of regional frameworks and their implications for global rules. The research identifies three
distinct governance models: the U.S. prioritizes free data flow, the EU emphasizes human rights protection,
and China balances security with development. Conflicts among these models complicate international
coordination. The paper argues that China should construct a new global digital governance paradigm by
refining domestic legislation, aligning with high-standard international rules, and conducting regional
innovation experiments.
1 INTRODUCTION
The disruptive innovations brought about by current
digital technologies are reshaping the global economic
and trade system. A new generation of information
and communication technologies, underpinned by big
data, cloud computing, 5G networks, and artificial
intelligence, is sweeping across the world. This has led
to the rapid development of a data-centric global
digital trade ecosystem. While cross-border data flows
serve as the foundation for global digital trade growth,
countries around the world currently hold divergent
stances on this issue. For instance, the United States
advocates for unrestricted cross-border data flows,
whereas the European Union maintains reservations
about complete freedom in this regard, emphasizing
that data should flow under secure conditions and
prioritizing data regulation and protection. Within the
evolving architecture of multilateral trade governance,
novel transnational regulatory frameworks are
crystallizing to enable seamless circulation of digital
assets across jurisdictions. Contemporary trade pacts
increasingly incorporate dedicated digital economy
modules that pioneer innovative governance
mechanisms for transboundary information exchange
paradigm shift redefining the contours of global data
governance. This institutional transformation
intersects with China’s escalating strategic
requirements for international data interoperability,
positioning the establishment of secure and efficient
transnational data transfer protocols as a pivotal
institutional challenge in the digital transformation
era.
China formally applied to join the CPTPP in
September 2021 and applied to join the Digital
Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) in
November 2021. This paper employs comparative
research, case studies, and literature review
methodologies to focus on the international regulatory
framework for cross-border data in digital trade
agreements. It analyzes how current international
regulations govern cross-border data in digital trade
and explores a potential "third way"-a "Chinese
approach"-between the U.S.-EU-led "free flow"
model and the "sovereign control" path advocated by
developing countries.
2 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
UNDER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS
With the continuous globalization of digital trade,
cross-border data flow has become a key issue in the
Jin, Z.
International Legal Regulation of Cross-Border Data Flows in Digital Trade.
DOI: 10.5220/0014394100004859
Paper published under CC license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Politics, Law, and Social Science (ICPLSS 2025), pages 619-624
ISBN: 978-989-758-785-6
Proceedings Copyright © 2026 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda.
619
field of international trade. However, due to
conflicting national interests such as data sovereignty
among different countries, international legal rules
exhibit a characteristic of multi-track parallelism. The
current international regulatory framework primarily
involves countries embedding their own cross-border
data rules into trade agreements, resulting in a
"fragmented" landscape of global cross-border data
governance. Among different trade agreements, there
exist both competitive clauses and a gradual trend
toward integration.
2.1 The "Principle + Exception" Model
in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
The World Trade Organization (WTO) currently
lacks specialized regulations addressing cross-border
data flows. Over the past few decades, Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs) have gradually emerged as a key
platform for discussing data governance issues. By
establishing new rule frameworks for emerging topics
in digital trade, FTAs have to some extent alleviated
many of the contradictions faced by the WTO's
multilateral trading system (Burri, 2017). Currently,
FTAs attempt to reconcile the tension between trade
liberalization and sovereign regulation through a
balanced design of “the free flow of data principle”
and “exception clauses”. The varying emphases of
different agreements also reflect the strategic
intentions of the dominant countries involved.
The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS
FTA) is the world's first free trade agreement that
explicitly incorporates rules on the free flow of data
in its e-commerce chapter. In contrast, the CPTPP
elevates the language on cross-border data flow rules
from the shall endeavor phrasing in KORUS FTA to
the legally binding "shall," thereby increasing the
mandatory nature of these obligations. Article 14.11
of the CPTPP clearly articulates the obligation of free
data flow, prohibiting parties from restricting cross-
border data transfers and stipulating that signatory
states are obligated to permit transboundary data
flows via digital channels, with specific provisions
for sensitive personally identifiable data, provided
such transmissions align with authorized commercial
operations of registered entities. These binding
obligations codify prohibitions against data
territorialization mandates and other measures that
hinder foreign digital services.
CPTPP’s cross-border data provisions also
incorporate exceptions to obligations, permitting
member states to implement restrictive measures for
achieving "legitimate public policy objectives,"
provided they meet the two conditions of "non-
discrimination" and "necessity." It treats "essential
security interests" as non-justiciable exceptions,
granting contracting parties’ greater autonomy. The
innovation is reflected in Article 14.13, which
explicitly prohibits data localization requirements
through a "negative list" approach while allowing
sensitive sectors like finance to retain certain
regulatory flexibility. Although CPTPP's soft dispute
settlement mechanism limits the enforceability of its
rules, compared to other agreements addressing
cross-border data disputes, CPTPP has already
established relevant provisions that can be submitted
to its dispute resolution mechanism.
The USMCA’s digital trade provisions (Chapter
19) establish robust frameworks for enhancing cross-
jurisdictional data interoperability, while its
counterpart in the CPTPP (Article 14.13.1) affirms
the sovereign right of member states to develop
localized technical compliance frameworks for
critical information technology assets-particularly
addressing communication security and sensitive
information protection protocols.
In contrast, Article 19.12 of the USMCA explicitly
abolishes the exception in the CPTPP that allows
parties to impose ‘computing facility localization
requirements, permitting only central banks to retain
data storage requirements for financial regulation.
However, the USMCA exhibits prominent
characteristics of data hegemony. Article 19.16
imposes restrictions on algorithmic transparency
obligations, prohibiting member states from
demanding the disclosure of source code or
algorithms. This essentially represents the U.S.
exporting rules of data hegemony to maintain the
competitive advantage of its technology firms. Under
such a model, Latin American countries may be
forced to relinquish their digital sovereignty and
become subordinate to the U.S. data economy.
Chapter 12 of the RCEP core provisions
demonstrates an inclusive approach toward the
developmental disparities among member states.
Article 12.15 requires contracting parties to endeavor
to avoid imposing unnecessary restrictions on cross-
border data flows, though it does not establish
mandatory standards. Meanwhile, in addressing
disputes over cross-border data flows under RCEP,
the actual resolution proves challenging, as RCEP
merely stipulates that disputing parties should engage
in consultations to resolve the issue (Lando, 2022).
Paragraph 3 of Article 12.14 further expands the
scope of security exceptions, permitting unilateral
measures based on "essential security interests," with
other contracting parties barred from raising
objections. RCEP's flexible framework makes it the
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first data flow regulation encompassing China, Japan,
South Korea, and ASEAN. However, its relatively
low common standards have raised concerns about
weak enforceability. For instance, Indonesia has
reinforced localization requirements through its
Personal Data Protection Law, creating potential
conflicts with RCEP provisions.
Although the Digital Economy Partnership
Agreement shares similarities with the CPTPP in
terms of cross-border data flow rules, it adopts a
modular architecture that allows countries to
selectively join specific modules, thereby reducing
the difficulty of rule adoption. Moreover, DEPA
actively promotes the establishment of a standardized
framework for digital trade technical exchanges and
advances the application of standardized API
interfaces.
2.2 Clashes among Regional and
Plurilateral Agreements
Regional governance agreements attempt to strike a
balance between data sovereignty and trade
liberalization by establishing shared values and
mutual recognition mechanisms for rules. However, in
their practical implementation, prominent institutional
competition conflicts have emerged among different
regional agreements.
The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) exemplifies a human rights-first approach,
requiring non-EU countries to demonstrate "adequate"
data protection standards for cross-border transfers.
However, GDPR’s stringent compliance costs have
driven small and medium enterprises (SMEs) out of
European markets. The invalidation of the EU-U.S.
"Privacy Shield" in the Schrems II case underscored
fundamental conflicts between U.S. surveillance laws
(e.g., the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) and
EU privacy principles. Despite adjustments under the
2023 Privacy Shield 2.0, the 2024 FISA amendments
re-expanded U.S. surveillance powers, further
destabilizing transatlantic trust.
In the Pacific region, APEC stands as a highly
representative regional framework. Its APEC Cross-
Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) system achieves mutual
recognition of privacy protection through voluntary
participation mechanisms, enabling enterprises to
reduce compliance costs by obtaining dual
certification under both CBPR and GDPR. The CBPR
system does not seek to overturn domestic legislation
on personal data protection across nations, but rather
acknowledges differences in legal systems, social
values, and development paths among countries, given
their diverse national conditions and the inherent
complexity of privacy protection. The CBPR system
emphasizes interoperability of data governance
mechanisms among nations, aiming to facilitate cross-
border data flows while safeguarding privacy rights.
Nevertheless, specific regulatory obligations
embedded in these agreements—notably the mandate
for participating nations to implement proactive
measures minimizing non-essential barriers to cross-
border digital transmissions-demonstrate substantive
alignment with American data governance paradigms
when analyzed through the prism of transnational data
exchange objectives.
This is particularly evident in recent years as U.S.-
China competition in the digital value chain has
intensified. The U.S. being a global leader in digital
technology and the digital economy, faces minimal
impact on its data sovereignty security from the
growth of cross-border data flows worldwide.
Leveraging its advantages in digital trade, the U.S.
advocates for free and open digital trade
internationally, opposing data localization policies. It
even enforces long-arm jurisdiction through
agreements like USMCA to suppress and exploit the
growth of digital trade in other countries, while
adopting unequal openness strategies toward nations
whose cross-border data flows might threaten its
digital hegemony. In September of the same year, the
U.S. Department of Commerce announced sweeping
restrictions barring domestic enterprises from
engaging in commercial interactions with WeChat and
TikTok, with additional prohibitions targeting
financial infrastructure integration specifically
forbidding American businesses from operating
payment platforms leveraging WeChat's ecosystem.
Subsequently in January 2021, the Trump
administration escalated these measures through an
executive order outlawing financial engagements with
eight Chinese digital payment systems, notably
encompassing Alipay and WeChat's financial services
arm. When digital enterprises from other countries
expand internationally, the U.S. imposes restrictions
under the pretext of national security threats. Such
practices challenge the CBPR system's goal of secure
and efficient free data flows and cast a negative impact
on global digital trade.
3 RULE CHARACTERISTICS OF
MAJOR COUNTRIES AND
REGIONS
The United States adopts a model that prioritizes free
flow with supplementary exception-based restrictions.
International Legal Regulation of Cross-Border Data Flows in Digital Trade
621
It has consistently advocated for the free flow of data
by promoting cross-border data flow agreements it
champions, such as the CBPR and USMCA,
leveraging its technological advantages to maximize
benefits during the rapid development of the global
digital economy. However, the cross-border data free
flow promoted by the U.S. is not entirely liberalized;
in practice, it employs diverse exception clauses and
restrictive measures like negative lists. For instance,
Chapter 19 Digital Trade of the USMCA establishes
horizontal exceptions and negative list annexes for
cross-border data flow. By leveraging its domestic
technological edge in the international digital market,
the U.S. secures a dominant position, extracting
profits from developing countries through cross-
border data flows. It also exploits its technological
superiority to penetrate developing markets,
disrupting local industries and reinforcing its
monopolistic dominance (U.S. Department of
Commerce, 2025). Additionally, the U.S. imposes
stringent controls on the export of core technologies in
the digital economy supply chain and on foreign
acquisitions of domestic internet companies. The
discrepancy between its international advocacy and
domestic policies reflects a degree of double standards
(Xia & Zhang, 2024).
The EU model demonstrates characteristics of
prioritizing human rights protection, with both
internal safeguards and extraterritorial jurisdiction.
The EU places significant emphasis on human rights
protection, which is linked to Europe's tradition in
this regard. The foundational framework for
European human rights protections traces its origins
to 1953, when the intergovernmental organization
enacted its seminal human rights charter-formally
titled the Convention for Safeguarding Fundamental
Liberties and Human Dignity-now universally
acknowledged as the ECHR. Article 8 of this
convention stipulates the right to respect for private
and family life. The EU actively employs legislative
measures, such as the 1995 EU Data Protection
Directive, to establish standards within the Union that
prohibit member states from restricting the free flow
of personal data within the EU on grounds of data
protection, thereby reducing the costs of intra-EU
data transfers. However, for transfers of personal data
to regions outside the EU, the EU imposes
restrictions, requiring non-EU governments to
provide adequate data protection before allowing
their operations within the EU. This adequacy
protection measure, in practice, creates barriers to
cross-border data flows, hindering the development
of digital trade and, to some extent, constraining the
full growth of the digital economy.
The China model emphasizes digital sovereignty
while balancing security and development. In 2016,
China clarified its data localization measures of local
storage and outbound assessment for cross-border
data flows through Article 37 of the Cybersecurity
Law, highlighting data sovereignty and security.
Facing increasingly intense international data market
competition, China has adopted tiered and classified
management based on the Data Security Law and the
Personal Information Protection Law. In 2020, China
joined RCEP and formally applied for CPTPP/DEPA
in 2021, gradually aligning domestic cross-border
data management measures with international high-
standard rules (Wang, 2024).
4 CHALLENGES AND
RESPONSES IN
INTERNATIONAL
COORDINATION
4.1 Challenges
First, the boundary between security exceptions and
public policy exceptions (Li, 2025). Most agreements
permit restrictions on data flows based on national
security or public policy grounds. However, the
specific scope remains contentious, as exemplified by
RCEP's explicit stipulation that "essential security
interests" shall be determined by each contracting
party, whereas CPTPP requires restrictive measures
to comply with the principle of proportionality.
Secondly, the legitimacy of data localization
requirements (Tan, 2022). Most countries with digital
technology advantages advocate restrictions on data
localization, aiming to establish an open and free
international order for cross-border data flow. By
leveraging their technological or economic strengths,
these countries seek to enhance their position in
global cross-border data flow regulations, dominate
upstream industries, and reap the dividends of the
digital era. In contrast, countries with relatively
weaker digital market competitiveness tend to adopt
data localization strategies, restricting foreign
enterprises from entering their domestic digital
markets and prioritizing the security of national
digital sovereignty. According to credible data, by
2021, 62 countries worldwide had implemented 144
restrictive measures related to data localization (Cory
& Dascoli, 2021). To this day, the conflict between
free data flow and data localization remains
unresolved.
Third, there is a conflict between privacy
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protection and the liberalization of data flow. The
divergence between the GDPR and U.S.-style
regulations clearly reflects the tension between
safeguarding privacy rights and pursuing economic
benefits from data. In the global development of
cross-border data flow, both free data movement and
data privacy protection are indispensable. However,
how to reconcile free data flow with data privacy
protection remains an unresolved issue.
4.2 Responses
Although the Chinese approach has achieved certain
results thus far, when facing the challenges and
opportunities brought by cross-border data, China
still needs to actively and deeply participate in the
international institutional framework, carefully
examine its own institutional status quo, and proceed
with optimization from the following aspects.
First, accelerating the process of improving
domestic legislation. As the nation places greater
emphasis on cross-border data, the number of
relevant domestic regulations has been increasing.
However, it must be clearly recognized that China is
still in the initial stages of legal governance for cross-
border data, with imperfections in areas such as
jurisdictional scope and enforcement design for
cross-border data governance. The Data Security Law
should explicitly stipulate "ensuring the orderly and
free flow of data in accordance with legal provisions,"
while the Personal Information Protection Law
should refine provisions on outbound security
assessments, certification, and contractual
mechanisms. Open pilot programs should be
established, developing Hainan Free Trade Port as a
"data special zone" and the Yangtze River Delta as a
"data hub," while creating a negative list for cross-
border data. Permits should be granted in areas such
as game exports and data processing to reduce
corporate compliance costs.
Second, China must actively promote alignment
with international rules. Currently, China has joined
the RCEP and has applied to join the CPTPP and
DEPA. China needs to immediately begin organizing
domestic regulations to align with relevant provisions
of DEPA and CPTPP, making preparatory efforts in
advance to prevent conflicts between domestic and
foreign regulations and facilitating a smooth
transition between domestic rules and the "principle
+ exception" model. China should also enhance its
international discourse power, firmly opposing long-
arm jurisdiction and vigorously advocating a
governance model based on consultation and joint
development.
Third, regional innovation experiments should be
conducted. China can explore a classified regulatory
system for full-process cross-border data governance
in the Shanghai Free Trade Zone or the Guangdong-
Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, establishing
offshore data centers and international data-specific
channels. Leveraging these advantages, China should
propose initiatives from its own perspective on digital
development, security governance, and mutual
recognition of standards, gradually testing fairer,
safer, and more sustainable dispute resolution
mechanisms, improving arbitration technology, and
establishing compensation funds.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper analyzes the fragmented international
regulatory system governing cross-border data flows
and its core controversies. Key challenges include
ambiguous exceptions, data localization disputes, and
unresolved privacy-free flow conflicts. To counter
Euro-American dominance, China must adopt an
"internal-external linkage" strategy: improving legal
adaptability domestically while promoting
multilateral cooperation. This approach will help
establish a secure, efficient, and inclusive global
digital governance paradigm, critical for advancing
China’s digital economy and fostering global equity.
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