balance incentives with punishment, guiding them to
transition from a passive safe harbour role to that of
an active gatekeeper.
To this end, this paper suggests constructing a
hierarchical liability system. On the one hand, a
procedural safe harbour from criminal liability should
be established for all platforms. This means explicitly
stipulating that if a platform establishes and
effectively implements clear and convenient channels
for infringement complaints, deals with illegally
disclosed information in a timely manner within a
reasonable period after receiving a valid notice, and
lawfully preserves relevant records while cooperating
with judicial investigations, it can be exempted from
the most severe criminal liability. This mechanism
aims to incentivise platforms to fulfil their basic
content management obligations through positive
reinforcement, rather than through the constant threat
of criminal punishment.
On the other hand, for large social media
platforms with significant social mobilisation
capacity, a higher level of special preventive duty
should be imposed. This requires them not merely to
passively notice and takedown, but to use their
technological advantages to proactively provide
warnings and identify trending events that could
trigger large-scale human flesh searches or
cyberbullying. They should also actively take
intervention measures such as traffic limitation and
pop-up warnings to prevent the uncontrolled
escalation of harmful consequences (Kiritchenko,
Nejadgholi & Fraser, 2021).
4.3 Establishing a Coordinated System
of Governance and
Multi-Stakeholder Participation
Given the limitations of criminal punishment, it is
essential to construct a governance network in which
multiple legal instruments and social forces act in
concert to achieve the comprehensive prevention and
control of online personal information disclosure.
This system first requires breaking down internal
barriers between the state's legal instruments by
strengthening the effective connection between
administrative penalties and criminal justice. A fluid
mechanism for case referral and information sharing
should be established among the Cyberspace
Administration, public security organs, and
procuratorial organs. For acts that are clearly illegal
but do not yet constitute serious circumstances, the
Cyberspace Administration should impose timely
administrative penalties in accordance with laws such
as the Personal Information Protection Law. This
would form a tiered and smoothly connected public
law liability system. At the same time, civil remedy
channels must be vigorously expanded. This can be
achieved by lowering the threshold for victims to
defend their rights, explicitly supporting their claims
for emotional damages, and exploring the
establishment of fast-track adjudication mechanisms
for online tort cases. Civil compensation can provide
victims with the most direct economic relief and
psychological solace, a function that criminal
punishment cannot replace (Calzada, 2022).
Finally, the effective operation of legal
instruments must be supplemented by broad social
co-governance. The work of governance must extend
to the societal level. Through sustained rule of law
publicity and digital literacy education, public
awareness of the importance of personal information
protection and the harms of cyberbullying must be
raised. This will cultivate a healthy and rational
online culture at its source and reduce the occurrence
of infringing acts (Mandrescu, 2025).
5 CONCLUSIONS
As a complication of the digital era, the malicious
disclosure of personal information online has become
a substantive threat to citizens' rights and social order.
Through a systematic study of the Crime of Infringing
on Citizens' Personal Information within the Chinese
Criminal Law, this paper finds that although criminal
law provides a core regulatory tool, its judicial
application still faces profound theoretical dilemmas.
This research has reached the following core
conclusions. Firstly, regarding the illegality of the
secondary use of publicly available information, the
determining factor is not the public status of the
information itself, but rather whether its processing
exceeds the legitimate and proper principle of
purpose limitation, thereby infringing upon the
individual's right to informational self-determination.
Secondly, the determination of serious circumstances
must shift from traditional, quantitatively-biased
standards towards a substantive judgment framework
that also considers qualitative factors such as the
sensitivity of the information and the harmful
consequences for the victim. Finally, in confronting
collective online behaviour, the liability of core actors
can be pursued through an adaptive interpretation of
joint criminality theory, and the criminal liability of
platforms can be ascertained by defining the
platform's knowing state of mind.
However, the most important conclusion is that a
singular model of criminal sanctions has functional