appropriately placed in the public domain for free use
by the public. Humans are the masters of the earth,
copyright can only be granted to human beings, as for
machine-generated "by-products" can only be used as
a public resource for human beings, but do not have
the qualification of the subject of the right. Because
the machine always lacks subjective consciousness
and understanding, and does not have the ability to
bring infringement lawsuits, it is the most appropriate
arrangement to place the generated products in the
public domain. As Judge Yates, who holds the natural
law theory of property, argues, the value of the
abstraction itself does not constitute a sufficient
condition for property, the idea automatically enters
the public domain after it is published, and an
individual cannot exclusively own it, and the idea
does not constitute a person's exclusive property, and
there is no conflict between the author receiving a
reward for his labor and his inability to obtain a
copyright (Drahos, 2017). Although placement in the
public domain helps to promote knowledge
dissemination, reduce copyright barriers, and lower
the cost of public access, its potential negative effects
cannot be ignored. Due to the lack of copyright
incentives, the quality of generated works may vary,
which in turn affects the overall knowledge
ecosystem, leading to the phenomenon of bad money
driving out good money, dampening the enthusiasm
of AI investors and the enthusiasm of natural authors
for creativity, and is not conducive to the orderly
operation of the copyright law system.
2.2 Attribution to the Developer
According to the theory of developers' enjoyment,
developers indirectly decide the birth of AI products,
and AI can produce results because developers design
the program framework and algorithm template, and
AI itself is the fruit of developers' labor. In order to
guarantee the seamless functioning of the copyright
law system, granting copyright to creators can
effectively address the issue of the products' subject
matter being allowed within the parameters of the
current copyright law. It can also give developers
sufficient rewards and lower the possibility of ethical
risks. It can also reduce possible ethical risks and
maintain the smooth operation of the copyright law
system. However, the design of the attribution of
rights is not logically valid. Firstly, in terms of the
source of the generation, the developer decides the
birth of the AI software, but the generation of the AI
generation does not originate from the developer, but
from the AI with the ability of deep learning, and
there is no necessary causal relationship between the
developer and the generation directly. Second, in
terms of subjective intent, the developer lacks the
subjective intent to create the AI generator, and the
developer's purpose is to design the AI software, not
to directly produce the AI generator. Thirdly, from
the perspective of economic incentives, treating
developers as authors of artificial intelligence
products may be seen as overly motivating, as the
development of artificial intelligence software often
requires significant investment in manpower,
resources, and finances. If attributed to developers, it
will dampen investors' investment enthusiasm and
hinder the circulation of artificial products. For
example, buyers and transferees of artificial
intelligence may lack incentives due to the inability
to obtain copyright.
2.3 Attribution to Artificial Intelligence
Authors in copyright law include two categories, one
is natural person authors and the other is unit authors.
The progressive freeze and the growing person in the
topic of natural people are examples of how the scope
of civil law has historically tended to broaden. There
are currently precedents pertaining to artificial
intelligence and its rights, such as the United States
using a Google driverless car with using artificial
intelligence system recognized as the "driver", Japan
granting a pet robot Palo household registration, and
Saudi Arabia granting citizenship to the artificial
intelligence robot Sophia. A few scholars believe that
this shows that artificial intelligence may also become
the subject of rights. However, in terms of the current
situation, artificial intelligence to becoming the
subject of rights, there are still many obstacles, and
the author prefers to deny the subject status of
artificial intelligence.
First, there is a lack of basic theoretical support
for civil law. People's National Code provides for
three types of civil subjects, such as natural persons,
legal persons and unincorporated organizations,
which are in fact a collection of human beings.
Although artificial intelligence increasingly
embodies the characteristics of human-like, but
artificial intelligence is ultimately a cold machine, so
people's national law has not recognized artificial
intelligence as the subject of rights, copyright law as
a branch of civil law, should not be added without
authorization as the subject of the rights of artificial
intelligence, even if the artificial intelligence by the
future law to give the qualification of the subject of
the law, it is still necessary to safeguard the human
subject status and the right to control the system level,