to $76 post-acquisition (Sainato, 2018). That
immediate price cut was intended to shake off Whole
Foods’ “Whole Paycheck” label and draw in shoppers.
It worked initially – Whole Foods traffic accelerated
by 25% in the first two days Amazon owned it
(Misamore, 2017). In addition to prices cutting,
Amazon moved with speed to integrate Whole Foods
into the Prime fold. In a matter of months, Whole
Foods shoppers enjoyed additional perks as Amazon
Prime shoppers, such as greater discounts and cash
rebates for shopping with the Prime Visa card in
stores. These actions prompted Amazon’s tens of
millions of Prime shoppers to shop at Whole Foods,
merging the two companies’ loyalty systems.
Amazon also leveraged Whole Foods stores to grow
its own in-house businesses by rolling out Prime Now
and device displays (Chen, 2018). Amazon installed
pickup lockers and improved inventory systems but
preserved Whole Foods' brand name and employees
(Blanding, 2018).
3.3 Strategic Impacts
The Amazon-Whole Foods takeover delivered a mix
of successful and challenging results in subsequent
years. On the plus side, Amazon gained from an
immediate physical store base that supported
omnichannel strength. The take-over shook up the
grocery sector – players like Walmart and Kroger
accelerated digital grocery efforts in response to
Amazon’s move into physical grocery (Misamore,
2017). Whole Foods had the consumer traffic and
funding from Amazon: post-acquisition, Whole
Foods enjoyed higher revenue from flooded-in Prime
shoppers and online shopping, driving Amazon’s
overall grocery expansion (Whole Foods Market,
2017). A strong early stock market reaction delivered
a further encouraging indicator: as reported,
Amazon’s share value lifted on news (adding billions
to the value), suggesting investor support (Abrams &
Creswell, 2017). Whole Foods’ reduced prices and
Amazon-assisted advertising attracted new shoppers
– early traffic increases of 25%-plus in the stores, if
maintained in part, paid off in extra market share
(Sainato, 2018). Nonetheless, merging data and
knowledge started to pay dividends: Amazon is
mentioned to have leveraged Whole Foods’ shopping
behaviour in order to bespoke offers and make food
retail analytics better (Misamore, 2017). The take-
over proved out a strategy that retail strategists call
“omnichannel” retail – combining internet and offline
capabilities. By 2018, Amazon was piloting formats
like Amazon Go unmanned stores and expanding out
into wider grocery delivery, driven by insights
through Whole Foods (Chen, 2018).
3.4 Risk Exposure
On the flip side, not all was hunky dory. Whole Foods
had integration headaches and did not at once reverse
fortune. In early 2018 (mere months post-acquisition),
Whole Foods in fact reduced sales estimates, and
announced a chain of store closures due to issues like
inventory problems that emerged post-merger
(Sainato, 2018). These glitches illustrated that
marrying Amazon's efficiency-oriented systems to
Whole Foods was not easy. Some Whole Foods
customers and suppliers suffered – there were reports
on stricter inventory and merchandising practices (as
Amazon overlaid its data-oriented paradigm), which
resulted in sporadic stock shortages and less-
customer-informed in-store experience, leading to
criticism from long-time Whole Foods consumers
(Sainato, 2018). In wider financial sense, Amazon’s
synergy gamble was still to be repaid: the substantial
goodwill on Amazon’s books (equating to some $9
billion from the deal) meant Amazon required
substantial performance gains from Whole Foods to
make the outlay worthwhile (Misamore, 2017). By
year’s end in 2019 and thereafter, Whole Foods was
still relatively low-performing in Amazon’s kingdom,
and the upscale niche was such that Amazon could
not make dramatic format changes without harming
the brand. Some warned that Amazon and Whole
Foods would not enjoy “clear overlap” in capabilities
– Amazon is a strength in low-cost, efficient delivery,
whereas Whole Foods founded success on premium
commodities and in-store experience (Blanding,
2018). This imbalance created the risk that expected
synergies (most notably on the cost side) would be
harder to realize than anticipated. In fact, academic
research on M&A suggests that when two companies
possess highly divergent cultures or competitive
approaches, integration dilutes what was supposed to
make the target successful (or the buyer delivers less
value-add than anticipated) (Gelfand et al., 2018).
Hence, one consequence of the Amazon–Whole
Foods saga was a wiser realization that synergy was
not going to happen on autopilot. Amazon had
incremental gains – added grocery market saturation
and valuable customer data – but total transformative
“disruption” of North American grocery retaling has
had a longer, less sudden unfolding than initially
expected. To this writer, as of some post-merger years,
Whole Foods remained functioning in some measure
independently as a freestanding Amazon-owned
chain, servicing its organic niche, with Amazon