material misstatements. The reason why Kangmei
Pharmaceutical was reluctant to switch partners may
be due to the consideration of lowering the audit fee
because auditors are risk-oriented; when companies
experience increasing risks, such as rapid growth,
organizational instability, and financial complexity,
the audit cost will increase due to the extra work
performed by the auditors (Bentley, Omer, & Sharp,
2013). Based on the information above, Kangmei
Pharmaceutical has the above characteristics since it
grew rapidly as of 2018, and in that single year, it also
had complex transactions such as consolidations.
Hence, the management had incentives to reduce the
audit cost for not switching audit partners for a long
time, even though the accounting industry
recommends that firms regularly switch audit
partners every five to ten years to avoid familiarity
risk. Since Zhengzhong Pearl River has been
Kangmei’s audit partners for almost twice the
recommended time frame, their audit failure is
foreseeable. Therefore, the external audit failure is
another vital evidence that the IA quality of Kangmei
Pharmaceutical is seriously inadequate, as the audit
committee should have monitored and prevented such
events by notifying the board beforehand.
3.3 Assessment of the Corporate
Governance and Internal Control
Subsequently, susceptors also point out that the
controller of Kangmei Pharmaceutical deliberately
selected those who were too old to maintain sufficient
supervision and empowerment to be the audit
committee members to undercut its function when
committing fraud, leading to questions about
Kangmei’s corporate governance and control. In
1999, The Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) listed
various factors from the board’s characteristics that
could affect the audit committee’s effectiveness, such
as composition, independence, knowledge and
expertise, effectiveness, power, duties and
responsibilities, and the association between board
characteristics and earnings manipulation and fraud
(Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2004). By
closely investigating Kangmei’s board structures,
there is a high functional overlap between the
controllers and the top management. The board
chairman, Ma Xingtian, also worked as the
company's CEO, with his wife, Xu Dongjin, the top
manager, meaning they monitored their own work.
Compared to the Ma couple, none of the other
shareholders own more than 5% of the company
shares, which means Ma has dominant control over
the decision-making and financial forecasting of the
entire company, and other executives cannot
counteract his irrational movements (Li, 2024).
Furthermore, the ownership structure has created
conditions for the Ma couple, as major shareholders,
to fully control the board decisions. Since they have
authority over the appointment, removal, and
compensation of members of the supervisory board
and audit committee through the shareholders’
meeting, the audit committee virtually have no
supervisory to effectively constrain the Ma couple as
they were not independent directors (Liang, 2021),
which led to serious internal control deficiencies and
a lack of corporate governance within the company.
Another indication is that the three audit committee
members held positions in Kangmei Pharmaceutical,
which significantly deteriorated the independence, a
crucial factor in the audit committee’s ability to
confront management and effectively collaborate
with external auditors (Cohen et al., 2004),
consequently minimizing control effectiveness.
3.4 Assessment of the Fraud Risk
Eventually, from the theoretical framework, these
control weaknesses provide board incentives and
opportunities for the Ma couple to manipulate the
company’s earnings and falsify the financial
statements over many years.
Applying the fraud triangle theory, the external
incentives mainly came from the financial pressure
since the company was rapidly growing. By the end
of the second quarter of 2018, Kangmei
Pharmaceutical had tripled its total assets compared
to five years ago through investment. As of December
31, 2018, the company had borrowed nearly 29.1
billion Chinese yuan (CNY), and the top ten
shareholders of Kangmei almost pledged all their
shares (Wang, 2021). As a result, pressures to obtain
more funds for its operating activities and debt
covenant is the Ma couple’s primary incentive for
financial fraud. On the other hand, the opportunity
factors are also displayed internally. According to the
previous analysis, a malfunctioned internal audit team
lacking effective corporate governance and control
opens the gate to misrepresentations in financial
statements since neither the internal supervision nor
the external audit detection was very effective in this
case. Finally, the Ma couple also had a fluke mind in
that they justified their misconduct to external factors
like the company’s rapid growth rather than their
incentives, while the executives from the audit
committee also had similar accuse as the extreme
ownership and equity structures did not provide them
enough motivation to perform their duties (Wang,
2021). Ultimately, all three factors contribute to a
series of Kangmei’s financial fraud.
Likewise, under the GONE theory, the Ma
couple’s excuses could be easily punctured since the
company's rapid growth is not a natural movement.