Political Risks Motivate Japan to Seek Ever More Global Trading
Partners
Tao Huang
Revelle College, University of California San Diego, La Jolla, U.S.A.
Keywords: Geopolitics, Trade Friction, International Strategy, Diplomcy.
Abstract: 2024 has become a historic turning point for Japan. Shigeru Ishiba dramatically became the country's 102nd
and 103rd prime minister in 43 days. Less than 2 months are left for the newborn Japanese government to be
prepared for the second Trump administration's strike after the trust crisis's chaos. The world is paying close
attention to how the Ishiba administration will deal with the Japan-U.S. relationship and its actions on other
international affairs. After world war , Japan made astonishing economic growth through foreign trade and
was known as a trade-oriented nation. Nowadays, foreign trade is increasingly correlated with politics. This
paper is researching whether international political risks would have either a positive or negative impact on
Japans foreign trade. With graphs, figures of quantitative indicators, case studies, and supportive opinions
from other researchers, the work is committed to providing a clearer vision of both the source of the risks and
the level of the influences in terms of foreign trade. At the moment, foreseeable political risks are threatening
on economic partnerships and the growth of trade scale.
1 INTRODUCTION
The last months of 2024 should be considered a
turning point for Japan when looking back on those
spotlighted events that occurred near the end of the
year. Donald John Trump won the 2024 presidential
election and would be back to his chair in the White
Palace on January 20, 2025. Previous Abe
administration has already experienced Trump’s
strong protectionism da-ting back to the period of the
first Trump administration. Unquestionably Trump’s
return will cast a shadow on Japan-US economic
partnership over the next four years. Shigeru Ishiba
was reelected as 103rd Prime Minister, 8 days after
the House of Representatives under his party was
dissolved and 43 days after he was elected as 102nd
Prime Minister. The next few months will be crucial
for the 2-term prime minister to prove his leadership
and reform a new well-served Japanese cabinet before
he moves his hands onto other challenges.
Fumio Kishida, the former prime minister,
emphasized that the time has come for “historic
economic and social transformations” in the World
Economic Forum’s virtual event, the Da-vos Agenda
2022. “There has been an overreliance on competition
and self-regulation to con-strain the excesses of
market forces,” he added. “This must change
(Oblaković, 2023).” During his comparatively short
tenure of 3 years and a half, efforts on reform of
liberal democratic capitalism were converted into
evident but temporary economic recoveries from
COVID-19 shock and reinforced bilateral
cooperation with the U.S., EU, and Indo-Pacific.
On 27 September 2024, a few days right before
the election victory, Ishiba Shigeru was in-troduced
as an advocate of the NATO Asian version with
hostility by Russian media. Whether he continues
with the economic policies of his predecessor or
attempts to deploy some varia-tions, the newborn
Japanese government must review cautiously on
international circum-stances before taking any action
that may have an impact on the international order.
And in today’s world, economic activity is highly
correlated with politics. Political consequences can
have either positive or negative influence on
economic activities. To avoid these risks of ten-sion,
economists strive to identify the source of the risks
and propose alternative solutions or countermeasures.
Huang, T.
Political Risks Motivate Japan to Seek Ever More Global Trading Partners.
DOI: 10.5220/0013985000004916
Paper published under CC license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Public Relations and Media Communication (PRMC 2025), pages 5-12
ISBN: 978-989-758-778-8
Proceedings Copyright © 2025 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda.
5
2 ANALYSIS OF JAPAN’S
FOREIGN TRADE
2.1 The Current Status of Japan’s
Foreign Trade
In 2023, Japan is the fifth in total international trade,
following behind China, the U.S., Ger-many and
Netherlands (JETRO, 2024). Because of a shortage of
natural resources, Japan im-ports most of its fuel
resources, such as crude oil, and industrial raw
materials. On the other hand, its economic growth is
partially generated from processing and
manufacturing these materials for exports, fully
taking advantage of its high-tech industries.
The 21st century ushered in an era of economic
globalization. New categories of biotech-nology and
renewable energy such as wind-solar power
generation have emerged, causing rap-id innovations
in both industrial and business environments.
Competition with the rise of emerging countries such
as China leads to the promotion of free trade
agreements (FTAs) be-tween countries. Meanwhile,
with the task of getting rid of the economic downturn
due to COVID-19 shock, Japan’s trade structure has
undergone various changes to arrive at what it is
today.
Japan's main exports include automobiles,
semiconductors and other electronic parts, steel,
automobile parts, and semiconductor manufacturing
devices, and main imports include crude oil, LNG
(Liquefied Natural Gas), pharmaceuticals,
semiconductors and other electronic parts,
communication devices, clothing and accessories.
Figure 1 shows China, the U.S., and the European
Union (EU) took most of the share of Japan’s foreign
trade in 2023. Though exports to the U.S. were over
that of China, the largest sum of trade (sum of exports
and imports) was still from China because of high
dependencies on importing necessities from China.
Source: Trade Statistics of Japan
Alt Text for the figure: Figure 1 displays Japan’s major trading partners’ share of sum of foreign trade in 2023.
The figure shows China, the U.S., and the European Union (EU) took most of the share in 2023.
Figure 1. Share of sum of foreign trade in 2023
2.2 Tasks and Challenges
2.2.1 Trade Friction
Trade friction occurs between two countries due to an
imbalance between exports and im-ports. Japan has
had trade friction with the U.S., one of its major
trading partners, over beef, oranges, textiles, steel,
televisions, automobiles, and semiconductors. Each
time it has oc-curred, the two countries have resolved
it through negotiations and adjustments. Bilateral
trade talks on resolving trade frictions between Japan
and the U.S. are considered to occur more frequently
after Trump’s return.
Recently, in trade with resource-rich and
agricultural countries, there have been problems such
as export restrictions on mineral resources like rare
metals. Crops grown by Japanese farmers are
19.97%
15.06%
10.32%
3.15%
51.50%
China U.S. E.U. United Arab Emirates Others
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becoming difficult to be sold in domestic due to the
influx of agricultural products with lower prices from
oversea.
2.2.2 Economic Partnership Agreement:
FTA/EPA/TPP
After world war , Japan made astonishing
economic growth through foreign trade and was
known as a trade-oriented nation. The government
must ensure the premise of trade liberaliza-tion to
continue its business partnerships in the long term
with countries and regions around the world.
World Trade Organization (WTO), the
international organization, is obliged to make rules
and regulations to promote trade liberalization.
However, the WTO, which has many members, has
not made any progress in creating new rules to
accommodate economic globalization. In recent years
there has been a trend to conclude free trade
agreements (FTAs) and economic partnership
agreements (EPAs), which determine rules through
agreements among the trade participants. Japan has
been actively promoting FTAs and EPAs through
bilateral trade con-versations since 2002.
In 2010, the U.S. began to promote negotiations
for an EPA in the Pacific Rim region, which is known
as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP).
Like other EPAs, it deter-mines the rules necessary
for coordinating trade activities across borders. Japan
joined the TPP after discussions with the government.
However, Trump won the presidential election in
2017 and decided to withdraw from the TPP later.
Once paused by the withdrawal of America, TPP
eventually came into effect on December 30, 2018,
with the participation of 11 countries ex-cluding the
U.S..
Besides the TPP, Japan has concluded more
agreements such as the Japan-EU Economic
Partnership Agreement, the Japan-U.S. Trade
Agreement, the Japan-U.S. Digital Trade Agreement,
and the Japan-U.K. Comprehensive Economic
Partnership Agreement. On Janu-ary 1, 2022, the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP) agreement, which in-cludes the 10 ASEAN
countries including China, South Korea, Australia,
and New Zealand, claimed a new era for newborn
Asian economic partnership.
2.2.3 Summary
Saori Katada, a professor of international relations
from the University of Southern California, states,
“Japan is actively pursuing new free trade agreements
to enhance its economic security and resilience
against a hostile global trade environment, having
already established major FTAs covering 80 percent
of its trade (Katada, 2024).” She accurately
summarizes Japan’s ef-forts to improve the
conditions of trade globalization. In other words,
Japan is attempting to reveal its leadership and taking
advantage through conducting a new international
order, which is also related to the reform of liberal
democratic capitalism advocated by the Kishida
administration and the theoretical basis of Asian
NATO advocated by Shigeru Ishiba.
3 POTENTIAL POLITICAL
RISKS ON JAPAN’S FOREIGN
TRADE IN 2024
3.1 International Political Incidents
Donald John Trump won the 2024 presidential
election and will be formally back to his chair in the
White Palace on January 20, 2025. The newborn
Japanese government led by Shigeru Ishiba is forced
to be prepared for foreseeable Japan-US trade
frictions once after getting rid of a temporary trust
crisis. It has come to a turning point for Japan not only
because of the up-coming Trump administration.
International affairs such as China issues, Russia-
Ukraine wars, Indo-Pacific affairs, and the G7
conference are all intensely involved in the future
inter-national trade environment for Japan. In this
section, potential political risks with 3 major trading
partners are analyzed with facts, figures of
quantitative indicators, graphs, and sup-portive
opinions from other researchers to forecast the
prospect of Japan's foreign trade.
3.2 Case Study
3.2.1 Trump’s Disdain for Multilateralism
In terms of trade policies, Japan has a deep concern
about the upcoming Trump administra-tion, which is
considered to be averse to multilateralism. During the
previous tenure of Trump, the former president
withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade
agreement and expressed dissatisfaction with the
operation of the World Trade Organization.
Political Risks Motivate Japan to Seek Ever More Global Trading Partners
7
Source: Trade Statistics of Japan
Alt Text for the figure: Figure 2 displays the trade statistics (in billion dollars) between Japan and the U.S. under
the first Trump administration from 2017 to 2021. The figure consists of three indica-tors: statistics of import,
export and trade deficit.
Figure 2. Trade between Japan and the U.S. under first Trump administration
Source: Trade Statistics of Japan
Alt Text for the figure: Figure 3 displays the trade statistics (in billion dollars) between Japan and the U.S. under
Biden administration from 2021 to July 2024. The figure consists of three indicators: statistics of import, export
and trade deficit.
Figure 3. Trade between Japan and the U.S. under Biden administration
604
579
499
597
1037
1022
845
994
433
443
346
396
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
2017-2018 2018-2019 2019-2020 2020-2021
Unit: Billion Dollars
Import Export Trade Deficit
788
774
435
1223
1357
697
435
583
261
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
2021-2022 2022-2023 2024.01-2024.07
Unit:Billion Dollars
Import Export Trade Deficit
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Figure 2 and Figure 3 incompletely describe the
difference in trade volume between the first Trump
administration and the Biden administration. The
trade deficit of 2024 could be rough-ly predicted as a
number around 500 billion and thus the average
annual trade deficit under the Biden Administration
would be a number over 500 billion accordingly.
Compared with the average annual trade deficit of
404.5 under the 1st Trump Administration, an
approximately 20 percent decline in trade deficit is
foreseeable to occur during the second Trump
administra-tion if “American First” doctrine revives.
Regarding bilateral trade talks, Trump has
suggested imposing additional tariffs on Japanese
cars. Not only additional direct tariff on Japanese
products is considered a negative factor on Japanese
exports to America, but it is also worried that exports
to China will be limited under the probable requests of
participation in anti-China actions by the Trump
administration.
Nor is Trump’s “America First” policy entirely a
bad thing for Japan. “A phase-two bilateral trade deal,
building on the one negotiated by Trump and Abe in
2019 (mainly to restore lost U.S. agriculture sales in
Japan as a result of Trump’s decision to pull out of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership) is possible (Goodman,
2024)”, mentioned by Matthew P. Goodman, the
senior vice president for economics. But then he also
adds, “IPEF is likely dead in the water, and other
forms of affirmative U.S.-Japan economic
cooperation in Southeast Asia do not appear to be on
the horizon. (Goodman, 2024)” No considerable
economic benefits is guaranteed through the alliance
of Trump’s anti-China strategy nor by the trade
partnership with the sec-ond Trump administration.
3.2.2 “China Risk” Matters
Though exports to China have no longer ranked at the
top since 2023, the solid business part-nership
between the two Asian powers continues to be studied
by economists from both coun-tries. Hideaki Kishida,
a researcher from MGSSI, claims that because of the
connection, China risk should be evaluated more
cautiously. In his report, “China risk is broken down
into three categories. First, as external risks to
Japanese companies’ China business (macro risks),
there are China dynamics and international
community dynamics, then as internal risks to China
business (micro risks) there are managerial and
operational risks (Kishida, 2022).” In brief, China
risk is categorized as either nation-perspective force
majeure or contradictions on com-mon values.
Source: Trade Statistics of Japan
Alt Text for the figure: Figure 4 displays how trade statistics of food exports to China is affected by the discharge
of treated wastewater from July 2023 to December 2023. The figure consists of two indicators: statistics of food
exports (in billion dollars) and calculated range (in percentage) of de-cline compared with data before the
discharge.
Figure 4. Declining food exports to China after the discharge
Jul. Aug. Sep Oct. Nov. Dec.
Food Exports
1.254173 0.922054 0.66129 0.67402 0.578545 0.704103
Range of Decline Compared
with Data before the discharge
0% 33% 59% 58% 68% 55%
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
Unit: Billion Dollars
Food Exports Range of Decline Compared with Data before the discharge
Political Risks Motivate Japan to Seek Ever More Global Trading Partners
9
On 24 August 2023, Japan formally began the
discharge of treated wastewater into the Pa-cific
Ocean, sparking protests in the region and China to
expand its ban on all aquatic imports from Japan.
Exports in the category of food, especially marine
products, were significantly re-duced accompanied
by voiced concerns from various governments.
Among the countries op-posed to the discharge, the
Chinese government is considered to overreact by the
Japanese side as China claims a complete prohibition
of all marine products imports.
3.2.3 European Union-Reliable Business
Partner in Response to Protectionism
Based on the EU-Japan Economic Partnership
Agreement (EPA) issued on 1 February 2019, the EU
has become one of the most reliable trading partners
of Japan. The largest trade agreement signed by the
two powers in the middle era of the first Trump
administration is considered a milestone, in response
to trade protectionism. The relevance of Japan-EU
rela-tions is precisely analyzed by PAULA
CISNEROS CRISTÓBAL from the form of bilateral
re-lation framework to the negotiation process of the
EU-Japan EPA. In conclusion, she com-ments,It
represents a significant boost for trade exchanges on
both sides and will particularly affect the future of
important sectors such as the agri-food and
automobile sectors, liberalizing them (Pérez, 2021).”
Both Japan and the EU are dedicated to the
elimination of trade barriers and expansion of
cooperation beyond the field of economics.
Source: Trade Statistic of Japan
Alt Text for the figure: Figure 5 displays the trade statistics (in billion dollars) between Japan and the EU. from
2019 to 2023. The figure consists of three indicators: statistics of import, export and trade deficit and records the
growth of trade partnership between the two powers after the EU-Japan EPA was issued.
Figure 5. Trade between Japan and EU since 2019
Figure 5 shows despite disastrous years of
experiencing COVID-19 shock, both exports and
imports between the two powers have been growing
steadily year by year since the launch of EPA. The
economic benefit is evident, and so is in other
perspectives. “The title ‘Econom-ic Partnership
Agreement’ rather intends to emphasise that the
cooperation goes beyond trade and should be viewed
as a strategic partnership including cooperation on
many levels (Frenkel, 2017),” commented by
Michael Frenkel and Benedikt Walter, German
researchers from WHU. The in-depth cooperation
also contributes on acceleration of the economic
recov-ery and innovation of medical support for the
two powers to combat the pandemic crisis.
However, despite the pandemic crisis, the Japan-
EU relationship is now facing new chal-lenges due to
the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022. Structural upheaval
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Import
651 525 633 767 766
Export
600 433 514 627 695
Trade Deficit
-51 -92 -120 -140 -71
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
Unit: Billion Dollars
Import Export Trade Deficit
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occurred after the Kishida administration decided to
aid Ukraine with nonlethal military equipment.
Céline & Eva, both senior researchers on the Japan
program from CSDS, states,As European and
Japanese firms withdraw from Russia, the importance
of ensuring resilient and ethical value chains and re-
ducing dependencies on China and Russia have
become key (Céline, 2022).” It is since 2023, China
no longer maintains the position of Japan’s largest
exporter. Trade between Japan and Russia is
shrinking as well because of the worsening
relationship. The unforeseeable end of the war, the
regime changes of Kishida onto Ishiba, Trump’s
attitudes, and reactions from Russia, China, and the
EU, any of these factors can carry out another storm
onto the Japan-EU relationship in near future.
4 CONCLUSION
At the moment, political risks from the U.S and China,
two major trading partners of Japan, are threatening
both economic partnerships and the growth of trade
scale. Japanese econo-mists have been concerned
about the complexity of global situation after the re-
appointment of Trump. On one hand, Japan-US trade
frictions are considered disastrous enough to let the
efforts of the Kishida administration to stabilize the
economic partnership with the Biden ad-ministration
be in vain. On the other hand, Trump is disruptive on
international order due to his advocacy of
protectionism. His return is also threatening the
economic partnerships be-tween Japan and China.
Though the level of impact depends on how Ishiba
administration is involved in Trump’s anti-China
actions, certain persecuted conflicts unavoidably cast
a shad-ow on the economic partnership between the
two Asian powers.
Hence, the rest of time before the formal return of
Trump is crucial for Ishiba administra-tion to
determine the standing position. The growing trade
scale of Japan and EU can not eliminate the huge
negative impact from a slump of trade with U.S. and
China. As men-tioned, no considerable economic
benefits is guaranteed through the alliance of Trump’s
anti-China strategy nor by a reinforced trade
partnership with the second Trump administration as
Trump has already suggested imposing additional
tariffs on Japanese cars.
In this perspective, “China risk” is not an
idiosyncratic troublemaker as many Japanese re-
searchers describe but a much milder conflict due to
contradictions on values. On the contra-ry, China
could become one of Japan’s reliable allies to combat
protectionism with its market scale and resources.
China's government’s promise to resume imports of
aquatic products from Japan implies China is not
willing to prohibit any foreign trade as well if
unnecessary. The global situation on international
trade policies motivates Japan to seek ever more
bilateral agreements with its largest trading partners,
and so does China.
Rome wasn’t built in a day. History of the
relevance of the Japan-EU relationship can be even
dated back to the 1991 Joint Declaration. The
successful Japan-EU partnership through a long
process of negotiation provides experience for future
diplomacy. To deepen international economic
integration in response to the rise of trade
protectionism, more strategic alliances are required to
create economic vitality for the island country.
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