occurred after the Kishida administration decided to
aid Ukraine with nonlethal military equipment.
Céline & Eva, both senior researchers on the Japan
program from CSDS, states, “As European and
Japanese firms withdraw from Russia, the importance
of ensuring resilient and ethical value chains and re-
ducing dependencies on China and Russia have
become key (Céline, 2022).” It is since 2023, China
no longer maintains the position of Japan’s largest
exporter. Trade between Japan and Russia is
shrinking as well because of the worsening
relationship. The unforeseeable end of the war, the
regime changes of Kishida onto Ishiba, Trump’s
attitudes, and reactions from Russia, China, and the
EU, any of these factors can carry out another storm
onto the Japan-EU relationship in near future.
4 CONCLUSION
At the moment, political risks from the U.S and China,
two major trading partners of Japan, are threatening
both economic partnerships and the growth of trade
scale. Japanese econo-mists have been concerned
about the complexity of global situation after the re-
appointment of Trump. On one hand, Japan-US trade
frictions are considered disastrous enough to let the
efforts of the Kishida administration to stabilize the
economic partnership with the Biden ad-ministration
be in vain. On the other hand, Trump is disruptive on
international order due to his advocacy of
protectionism. His return is also threatening the
economic partnerships be-tween Japan and China.
Though the level of impact depends on how Ishiba
administration is involved in Trump’s anti-China
actions, certain persecuted conflicts unavoidably cast
a shad-ow on the economic partnership between the
two Asian powers.
Hence, the rest of time before the formal return of
Trump is crucial for Ishiba administra-tion to
determine the standing position. The growing trade
scale of Japan and EU can not eliminate the huge
negative impact from a slump of trade with U.S. and
China. As men-tioned, no considerable economic
benefits is guaranteed through the alliance of Trump’s
anti-China strategy nor by a reinforced trade
partnership with the second Trump administration as
Trump has already suggested imposing additional
tariffs on Japanese cars.
In this perspective, “China risk” is not an
idiosyncratic troublemaker as many Japanese re-
searchers describe but a much milder conflict due to
contradictions on values. On the contra-ry, China
could become one of Japan’s reliable allies to combat
protectionism with its market scale and resources.
China's government’s promise to resume imports of
aquatic products from Japan implies China is not
willing to prohibit any foreign trade as well if
unnecessary. The global situation on international
trade policies motivates Japan to seek ever more
bilateral agreements with its largest trading partners,
and so does China.
Rome wasn’t built in a day. History of the
relevance of the Japan-EU relationship can be even
dated back to the 1991 Joint Declaration. The
successful Japan-EU partnership through a long
process of negotiation provides experience for future
diplomacy. To deepen international economic
integration in response to the rise of trade
protectionism, more strategic alliances are required to
create economic vitality for the island country.
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