investigated in this article by reviewing empirical
evidence and looking at real-life case studies.
According to the results, Zero Trust is effective in
preventing both internal and external assaults on a
network. This makes it a proactive and flexible
security architecture that can be used with modern
networks.
Cyber threats, especially those made more
sophisticated by AI developments, are becoming
more complicated and sophisticated, and
conventional security measures are not keeping up.
Brady D. Lund, et al., 2024, The zero-trust
cybersecurity methodology, which helps businesses
reduce their exposure to risk by adhering to the "never
trust, always verify" philosophy, is described in this
article. This paper delves into the practical
implementation of zero-trust principles in settings
like schools and libraries, where a lot of information
is exchanged. It emphasizes the significance of three
practices: continuous authentication, least privilege
access, and breach assumption. The former takes into
account the possibility of a breach and uses multiple
checkpoints to limit its spread, while the latter ensures
that users only have access to what they specifically
need. This research determines possible directions of
research that can contribute to the protection of
vulnerable organizations.
Hongzhaoning Kang, et al., 2023, The need to
adapt to changing security requirements has become
increasingly difficult for traditional perimeter-based
network security approaches due to the frequency of
cross-border access. The guiding principle of this
new paradigm in cybersecurity, zero trust, is to "never
trust, always verify." Zero Trust is a cybersecurity
model that has a new approach following a "Never
trust, always verify" principle. By doing away with
the lines that normally separate an organization's
internal network from its external network, it hopes to
mitigate security concerns associated with attacks
from within. However, studies on zero trust are in
their early stages, and further study is needed to help
academics and industry professionals better
comprehend the paradigm. This article begins with a
discussion of cybersecurity trust before moving on to
zero trust's history, ideas, and ideals. Within the
framework of zero trust accomplishments and their
technological implementations in Cloud and IoT
settings, the features, strengths, and shortcomings of
the current literature are examined. Lastly, the notion
and its existing obstacles are examined to bolster
future development and use of zero trust.
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Theoretical Structure
System resilience and cyber security are two
overlapping issue categories. Cyber resilience
analysis may make use of several metrics that were
originally developed for other areas. Rather than
measuring mission assurance, security metrics often
center on security practices and capabilities (i.e.,
capabilities supporting the security objectives of
confidentiality, integrity, availability, and
accountability) or metrics relating to asset loss.
Figure ES-3 shows that most metrics for system
resilience are based on a time-based model of
disruption and recovery, which presupposes that
detection and reaction can be executed promptly.
However, when sophisticated cybercriminals plan
attacks, these tasks become much more difficult.
The following are the limitations presented in the
existing approaches, such as:
• The integration of very stringent access controls
of Zero Trust with the specific TTPs as per
MITRE ATT&CK matrix is not going to be
easier to implement as it needs considerable
skills and resources, given the complexity in
implementation. It could certainly add to
associated costs and prolonged timelines for
implementations, even more for organizations
lacking matured security infrastructures.
• The integration between Zero Trust and MITRE
ATT&CK would require monitoring, updating,
and maintaining them. Keeping ATT&CK
updated with threat intel poses a burden on IT
budgets and resources, along with constant
verification and monitoring of user, device, and
network activities.
• Both Zero Trust and MITRE ATT&CK would
require constant monitoring of user activities,
endpoints, and network traffic. As a result,
security teams would be inundated by a wide
array of false positives, alert overloads, and the
ingrained need to modify their detection
systems, which piled up together could
contribute to a considerably huge operational
handicap.
• While the MITRE ATT&CK Matrix updates
this knowledge of new attack techniques on a
regular basis, there are sometimes occasions
where, in real time, they cannot really represent
the latest, most advanced, or unique threats. This
can also create challenges in response to such
attacks. Consequently, organizations could find