Hybrid Influence on Rescue Services

Harri Ruoslahti

and Ilkka Tikanmäki

1,2 b

ResLab, Laurea University of Applied Sciences, Vanha maantie 8, Espoo, Finland

Department of Warfare, National Defence University, Helsinki, Finland

Keywords: Hybrid Influence, Rescue Services, Disinformation, Hybrid Threats.

Abstract: Society may face significant threats from hybrid influence, which blends physical, psychological, and

technological methods to disrupt, manipulate, or confuse members and actors of society. Rescue services,

which are an integral part of society, may become affected by or even a direct target for hybrid operations.

This study examines the impacts of hybrid influence on rescue services. The need for enhanced situational

awareness, coordinated responses, and resilience-building measures becomes emphasised. Hybrid influence

and hybrid war, situational awareness, and responses to hybrid threats were investigated using a structured

literature review. The findings highlight the significance of comprehensive security models and international

cooperation in effectively tackling hybrid threats. It is recommended to conduct further research to deepen

our understanding and develop robust strategies and practical secure knowledge management and information

sharing systems to protect rescue services from hybrid influence.

1 INTRODUCTION

The war in Ukraine shows examples of Russia

launching second military assaults on civilian targets

that seem to be timed to when rescue services are at

work (Kauranen, 2023). This research examines the

dangers that hybrid influence can pose to rescue

services, which are a crucial component of national

safety and security.

Information warfare and psychological operations

strategies may, especially in the cyber domain, use

social media and other digital platforms for

information warfare (Hiruni, 2024). Techniques to

combat misinformation and disinformation on public

opinion and against national security are called for to

wage impactful information warfare (Bateman &

Jackson, 2024). One analytical and risk-based

framework is the Multinational Capability

Development Campaign (MCDC), which is based on

“defender’s critical functions and vulnerabilities;

attacker’s synchronized use of multiple means and

exploitation of horizontal escalation; and linear and

nonlinear effects of a hybrid warfare attack” (Cullen

& Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2017, pp. 7–8).

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9726-7956

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8950-5221

(Tagarev, 2018) suggests a model that draws

inspiration from Colonel John Warden's 'Five Rings

Model', originally intended to plan air campaigns. It

presents the enemy system in five concentric rings,

representing (from the centre outwards) leadership,

organic essentials of the system, infrastructure,

population, and fielded military. Warden analyses

each ring as a set of nested models of the same type,

considering the connections between rings and sub-

rings. The analysis is designed to find weaknesses, or

centres of gravity, in the enemy system that can result

in its strategic paralysis when attacked. (Warden,

1988, 1995).

The research question (RQ) of this study is: How

does hybrid influence target rescue services?

The study uses a systematic literature review to

examine hybrid threats, the approaches taken to

combat them, and the implications for rescue

services. The next sections are Hybrid threats and

influence, which discuss hybrid threats, followed by

the Method that explains how this literature review

study has been conducted, Results of the literature

review, and Conclusions that draw from the previous

sections and offer suggestions for further research.

378

Ruoslahti, H. and Tikanmäki, I.

Hybrid Inﬂuence on Rescue Services.

DOI: 10.5220/0013707000004000

Paper published under CC license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

In Proceedings of the 17th International Joint Conference on Knowledge Discovery, Knowledge Engineering and Knowledge Management (IC3K 2025) - Volume 2: KEOD and KMIS, pages

378-384

ISBN: 978-989-758-769-6; ISSN: 2184-3228

2 HYBRID THREATS AND

INFLUENCE

The Security Committee of Finland (2018) defines

hybrid influence as the act of using various

complementary means and exploiting the weaknesses

of the target to achieve one's own goals. The use of

hybrid influence can include economic, political, or

military means. Identifying hybrid influences can be

a challenge. Hybrid influence can be created with,

e.g. technology or social media and its methods can

be employed simultaneously or in a manner that

follows each other. (The Security Committee, 2018.)

Deterring hybrid influence is very difficult

because hybrid adversaries “deliberately circumvent

detection and escape responsibility” while defenders

lack “either the capability or the willingness to

respond” and “proper understanding of both the

incentive structure and weak spots of rival actors”,

which is why they seem to be “unable to design

tailored and effective policies that hit the opponent

where it hurts” (Bertolini et al., 2023, p. IV). The vital

functions of society are secured by implementing

legislation that is based on and confirmed by

agreements and voluntarily supplemented strategic

tasks (The Security Committee, 2018).

National resilience is essential to tackle hybrid

threats, which may involve a diverse range of hostile

activities, such as cyberattacks, disinformation,

attempts to cripple critical infrastructure, economic

and energy pressures, or illicit warfare (Szymański,

2020). Information influence, for example, is a

systematic activity which aims at achieving changes

in the information and opinion environment of the

target by modifying information (The Security

Committee, 2018). To counter such attacks, it is

necessary to improve situational awareness, maintain

rapid response capabilities, and enhance intelligence

sharing with foreign partners (Szymański, 2020).

Crisis management in hybrid warfare is a

sophisticated and multidimensional challenge

(Tikanmäki & Ruoslahti, 2025).

3 METHOD

This study investigates the impacts of hybrid

influences on rescue services through a structured

literature review. The structured literature review

method provides systematic identification,

evaluation, and synthesis of existing research on the

topic.

Table 1: Articles selected for this study.

Author(s) &

date

Publication title

Publication

channel

(Simola, 2022)

Effects and Factors of

the Hybrid Emergency

Model in Public

Protection and Disaster

Relief

PhD

dissertation

(Simola et al.,

2021)

Emergency Response

Model as a part of the

Smart Society

Academic

article

(Tikanmäki &

Ruoslahti, 2021)

Interdependence of

Internal and External

Security

Academic

article

(Bertolini et al.,

2023)

Ten Guidelines for

Dealing with Hybrid

Threats – A Policy

Response Framewor

Academic

article

(Hordiichuk et

al., 2024)

Countering Russia’s

Hybrid War

Academic

article

(Puustinen et al.,

2020)

Security Cafés: a

deliberative democratic

method to engage

citizens in meaningful

two-way conversations

with security authorities

and to gather data

Academic

article

(Tiimonen

& Nikander,

2016)

Interdependence of

Internal and External

Security – Will the

operational culture

change with the

operational

environment?

Governmental

report

(Köykkä, 2024)

Development of

Preparedness Planning

for the Wellbeing

Services County of

Central Finland (2024)

Master’s

Thesis

(Jauhiainen,

2023)

Implicitly Resilient?

Comparing the

Resilience Objectives of

Finnish Comprehensive

Security Model and the

NATO Baseline

Requirements for

Resilience

Master’s

Thesis

(Fjäder, 2021)

Sensemaking Under

Conditions of Extreme

Uncertainty: From

Observation to Action

Academic

article

(Security

Committee,

2025)

The Security Strategy

for Society Government

Resolution

Governmental

report

The data collection process was conducted as a

comprehensive search of academic databases. The

search "hybrid influence" AND "rescue services"

provided a surprisingly low number of 11 hits in

Google Scholar. All these eleven sources were

included in the final sample, which consists of six

(n=6) academic articles, one doctoral dissertation

(n=1), two (n=2) master’s theses, and two (n=2)

Governmental reports. The following table contains

Hybrid Inﬂuence on Rescue Services

379

the final sample of the eleven publications used in this

study (Table 1).

Because of the scarcity of peer-reviewed academic

articles, government reports and even the two

master’s theses were included in the final sample. All

eleven documents were read in detail, and relevant

data were extracted for analysis to identify pertinent

themes that help understand how hybrid influence can

threaten rescue services.

The inclusion criteria for the literature review

consisted of the following: 1) publications that

concentrate on hybrid influence and its effect on

rescue services, 2) academic or governmental reports

that have been peer-reviewed or otherwise verified

(e.g. graded), and 3) publications written in English.

Relevant data was extracted for analysis after a

thorough review of the selected documents. The

analysis was designed to identify key themes and

patterns that are related to hybrid influences and their

impact on rescue services. The MCDC (Multinational

Capability Development Campaign) framework

(Cullen & Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2017, pp. 7–8)

formed a basis for data extraction and guided the

analysis. This framework concentrates on the

essential functions and weaknesses of the defender,

the coordinated use of various tactics of the attacker,

and the linear and non-linear outcomes of hybrid

influence and warfare.

4 RESULTS

The very low number of hits (n = 11) indicates that

the hybrid influence related to rescue services is a

topic that has been little researched. However, based

on the sample, three themes could be identified:

hybrid influence and hybrid war, situational

awareness, and responses to hybrid threats.

Hybrid threats, hybrid operations or grey zone are

terms used to refer to exploiting vulnerabilities of a

country that is seen as an adversary to pursue political

objectives by simultaneously employing military and

non-military instruments below conventional military

thresholds (Bertolini et al., 2023) in a coordinated

way and use novel, difficult-to-predict methods and

tactics (Security Committee, 2025). Simola (2022)

argues that “Internal and external security can no

longer be separated traditionally. This trend forces us

to think about overall security differently” (p. 21).

According to (Hordiichuk et al., 2024, p. 112)

“The range of domains and spheres of hybrid threats

is extremely broad. To contain such attacks and not

violate the critically important foundations of the

state's functioning, Ukraine needs to create an

effective mechanism of resilience”. The operational

environments of internal and external security are

constantly changing and converging, making a

distinction between them increasingly difficult

(Tikanmäki & Ruoslahti, 2021, p. 429).

4.1 Hybrid Influence – Hybrid War

Rival states increasingly use hybrid tactics, such as

coordinated and synchronised use of violent and non-

violent instruments of power to execute cross-domain

activities below the threshold of conventional armed

military conflict to circumvent direct detection and

attribution, to exploit the vulnerabilities of their

opponents and influence democratic processes

(Bertolini et al., 2023). Hybrid threats influence

security with a variety of means, e.g., military and

political influence, and influence strategic

information systems that have multi-level societal

causations (Tiimonen & Nikander, 2016).

Means of governmental hybrid influence have

increased (Tiimonen & Nikander, 2016), and

Finland’s Security Committee report lists terrorist

attacks, critical or symbolically significant sabotage

or reconnaissance of targets, influencing the climate

of opinion, and incitement to violent riots and

cyberattacks as examples of hybrid actions (Security

Committee, 2025). Hordiichuk, Andriianova, and

Ivashchenko (2024), who studied 130 Russian hybrid

influence campaigns against Ukraine, identify hybrid

influence campaigns as involving information or

psychological warfare, weaponising energy

resources, nuclear intimidation, using food as a

weapon, undermining hydroelectric stations, and

cyberterrorism (Hordiichuk et al., 2024).

(Security Committee, 2025, p. 20) states that:

“Hybrid threats set new kinds of requirements for the

operations and collaboration of authorities. Hybrid

threats can, for example, take the form of terrorist

attacks, sabotage of critical or symbolically significant

targets, intelligence gathering, manipulation of public

opinion, instrumentalised migration, provocation of

violent riots, or cyberattacks”.

A primary aim for hybrid influence is to destabilise

and change political decision-making (Simola et al.,

2021). Each hybrid influence campaign may contain

information or cognitive, cyber, financial-economic,

international-political, diplomatic, military, and other

(environmental, social, and religious) influences

(Hordiichuk et al., 2024). Preparedness against

disruptions of essential utilities, such as use of

premises, heat, and electricity, can be strongly related

to hybrid and cyber threats (Köykkä, 2024).

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The usage of hybrid warfare aims to achieve a

cumulative effect (Hordiichuk et al., 2024) and

“Citizens have the right to get the correct information

about the happened disaster” (Simola, 2022, p. 97).

Hybrid threats change, and so should the policies of

security authorities be actively evaluated. This

requires appropriate situation awareness, reviewed

competencies of these authorities, and up-to-date

national legislation that enables security authorities to

act against threats (Tikanmäki & Ruoslahti, 2021).

4.2 Situational Awareness

Coordination of activities and collaboration between

actors is crucial because hybrid influence can

extensively challenge society (Security Committee,

2025). Increasing the competences of actors to

identify hybrid influences is required, as it is key that

hybrid influence becomes identified already in its

early forms (Tiimonen & Nikander, 2016). Different

officials should actively detect hybrid acts and

communicate these to other public officials in society,

so that functions in society cannot become easily

exploited, or adversaries can operate secretly

(Jauhiainen, 2023).

Situational awareness and situational picture

require that the same information becomes

simultaneously usable and understood in the same

way by all participants (Simola, 2022). The situation

picture describes the common security situation with

an analysis of the current situation and an assessment

of the future situation (Tikanmäki & Ruoslahti, 2021)

so that decision support systems track key incidents

and the progress and optimisation of response

activities (Simola et al., 2021).

Situation and emergency response centres and

organisations build common situation awareness

against cyber threats, and a commonly understood

situation picture is needed to detect inner and outer

threats for efficient command-and-control

functionalities that combine hybrid sensor

technology, open-source intelligence tools, and

artificial intelligence solutions to forecast and detect

threats (Simola, 2022). However, detecting and

deterring a hybrid aggressor can be very difficult, as

hybrid adversaries aim at deliberately circumventing

attribution and escaping responsibility (Bertolini et

al., 2023).

Methods that increase capabilities to identify,

understand and assess sudden and gradual changes in

one’s strategic operating environment can promote

situational awareness of hybrid influence (Fjäder,

2021). Deterring hybrid aggression can, however, be

difficult for several reasons, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Reasons why deterring hybrid aggression can be

difficult (Bertolini et al., 2023).

Reasons why deterring hybrid aggression can be

difficult

Hybrid adversaries deliberately circumvent detection

and escape responsibilit

No clear shared rules regulate acceptable behaviou

Defenders lack either the capability or the willingness

to respon

Defenders lack a proper understanding of both the

incentive structure and the weak spots of rival actors

and are consequently unable to design tailored and

effective

olicies that hit the o

onent where it hurts

Defenders are not able to convincingly communicate

counte

-h

brid

olicies beforehand.

The design and execution of counter-hybrid policies

often come with potential second- and third-order

effects that are not always immediately clear, and a

robust

Understanding of their escalatory dynamics is lacking,

which serves as an impediment for defenders to execute

counte

-hybrid responses

Deterring hybrid aggression can be difficult

(Table 2) because hybrid adversaries deliberately try

to circumvent detection and attribution of

responsibility, as there are no shared rules that would

deter their behaviour. Finland’s Security Committee

(2025) notes the importance of maintaining trust in

the administration and promoting critical media

literacy and digital information literacy in the

population as a means of ensuring preparedness

against hybrid influence.

Societies and organisations may lack either

capabilities or even the willingness to respond against

the hybrid aggressor, or they lack understanding of

the incentives and weak spots of the rival actor, which

makes them unable to design effective policies to

counter in ways that hurt the opponent. Furthermore,

lack of understanding of the dynamics of escalation

may impede defender counter-hybrid responses,

communicating counter-hybrid policies, and seeing

what the potential second- and third-order effects may

be (Bertolini et al., 2023). Russia has demonstrated

that its war strategy in Ukraine has been based on

exhaustion, and that it uses all possible instruments

and combines hybrid warfare with military

aggression, its main type of influence (Hordiichuk et

al., 2024). Rapid and up-to-date networked

information sharing between national and

international actors is required to build situational

awareness, which is integral to the international

operational security environment (Tiimonen &

Nikander, 2016). Finding out, especially technology-

related risks and scenarios that may expose the vital

Hybrid Inﬂuence on Rescue Services

381

functions of society to hybrid threats and risks,

becomes essential (Simola et al., 2021).

Standardised procedures are needed so that public

safety organisations can keep the same level of

situational awareness at every administrative stage,

and this also aids information sharing between other

countries (Simola, 2022), as European Public safety

actors, e.g., law enforcement agencies, need a

common shared situational picture so that cross-

border operations and cooperation have a reliable

platform (Simola et al., 2021). However, it is

unrealistic to effectively try to protect against all

threats, so clustering and prioritising challenges can

help rationally allocate available resources to build a

balanced protection system (Hordiichuk et al., 2024).

4.3 Coordinated Responses to Tackle

Hybrid Threats

Fundamental risk factors can cause domino effects if

not detected (Simola, 2022) and security actors

should improve their cooperation and become

organised among all relevant actors to best detect and

respond to hybrid threats (Tikanmäki & Ruoslahti,

2022). There is a need for cooperation models with

dialogue between national and international actors, as

“the interdependence of internal and external

security, which has become closer with the change in

the international operational environment” (Tiimonen

& Nikander, 2016, p. 9). When combating a hybrid

influence, society needs coordination and situational

awareness and consideration of the impacts of the

possible response measures on the hybrid actor and

overall security environment (Security Committee,

2025).

Tackling hybrid threats requires coordinated

hybrid responses (Simola, 2022), and software-based

artificial intelligence systems can help provide

analysis and search for functionalities in the virtual

world (Simola et al., 2021). In Finland, ministries and

relevant agencies notify the Situation Centre of all

exceptional incidents, situations, disturbances, or

threats relevant to situational awareness (Security

Committee, 2025), while e.g., the national resilience

system of Ukraine aims to ensure a high level of

readiness of society and the state to respond to a wide

range of threats (Hordiichuk et al., 2024).

For organisations to be able to respond to threats,

a comprehensive, analysed, and shared situational

picture from different actors is needed (Security

Committee, 2025). Knowledge levels for

preparedness and situational understanding become

increased and strengthened through the exchange of

information within authorities and across

organisational boundaries (Tikanmäki & Ruoslahti,

2021). Building resilience strengthens members of

society against hybrid and grey zone threats, which

are threats during uncertain times between peace and

war (Jauhiainen, 2023).

To prevent and respond to hybrid threats and

resulting emergencies, the e.g. Ukrainian response

model includes risk assessment as the timely

identification of threats and vulnerabilities, effective

strategic planning and crisis management with

protocols for crisis response and recovery, effective

coordination and clear interaction between security

and defence, state, territories, business, civil society,

and population, and spreading necessary skills and

knowledge, and maintaining reliable channels of

communication between these throughout Ukraine

(Hordiichuk et al., 2024).

Strategic foresight, a scenario-building approach

to identify and understand possible futures, can be

used as a tool to build strategies against threats

(Fjäder, 2021). Hybrid threats may be addressed in

five stages: preparation, detection & attribution,

decision-making, execution, and evaluation to

provide central and local authorities with

comprehensive identification, assessment, and

prioritisation of threats and risks (Bertolini et al.,

2023). National, regional and EU-wide common

information sharing systems and databases can help

enhance cooperation between authorities, strengthen

security (Tikanmäki & Ruoslahti, 2021). Finland’s

Comprehensive Security Model, a preparedness

model based on cooperation between authorities and

an all-of-society approach, help combat constantly

broadening threat perceptions, including hybrid

threats (Jauhiainen, 2023).

Hybrid influence can be countered in stages:

Preparation, Detection and attribution, Decision-

making, Execution, and Evaluation, with ten steps and

32 actions that help guide the defender (Bertolini et al.,

2023). Preparedness and managing disruptions in

society call for a strong integration of different societal

actors, including businesses and nongovernmental

organisations; voluntary organisations are important

for societal “preparedness, implementing security

practices and reinforcing crisis resilience” (Tiimonen

& Nikander, 2016, p. 13). Preparedness and the close

collaboration between various actors create the needed

prerequisites to help respond to threat situations and

disruptions, including hybrid warfare (Security

Committee, 2025).

Comprehensive security is Finland’s hybrid

solution against hybrid threats (Jauhiainen, 2023).

Being prepared against uncertain threats, society and

its members need to collectively improve capabilities

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382

of monitoring, identifying and making sense of

relevant changes and sufficiently and proactively

preparing for them (Fjäder, 2021). The hybrid

emergency response model can generate and gather

essential data and combine it into an understandable

form for first responders and rescue unit operations

(Simola, 2022).

EU-level comprehensive information exchange

solutions and architectures are being developed and

implemented to better face global security challenges

(Tiimonen & Nikander, 2016). The European Union

(EU) has sector-specific mechanisms for crises and

disruptions, including the EU Hybrid Toolbox, Cyber

Diplomacy Toolbox, and Union Civil Protection

Mechanism (UCPM) “to enable the EU to efficiently

support its member states in crisis management”

(Security Committee, 2025, p. 54).

Up-to-date practices and competences for

“information acquisition, influence, and preparedness

of the national security actors have become a subject

of examination in security environment development,

for example, in connection with preparedness for

terrorism and responding to hybrid threats”

(Tiimonen & Nikander, 2016).

5 CONCLUSIONS

Hybrid influences can encompass various strategies

that blend physical, psychological, and technological

methods that target first responders, rescue services,

and firefighters with the aim of disrupting,

manipulating, or confusing the operations. These

hybrid threats can come from state and non-state

actors, such as terrorists, hackers, and even hostile

governments.

Hybrid threats may influence security in many

ways, aiming to destabilise the functions and

coherence of society. Influence may be military or

political, aiming at strategic multi-level societal

causes. Hybrid operations, be they terrorist attacks,

sabotage, incitement to violent riots, or cyberattacks,

would influence the operations of rescue services.

Hybrid threats set novel requirements for authority

operations and collaboration.

Because hybrid influence can extensively

challenge society, collaboration between actors and

coordination of activities become crucial. The same

simultaneous information is needed for all

participants so that they understand the situation in

the same way. Standardised procedures are needed to

assist public safety organisations in keeping needed

levels of shared situational awareness and further

study and development is recommended in this field.

Maintaining trust in administration, e.g. the

rescue services, is needed to ensure preparedness

against hybrid influence. However, hybrid

adversaries try to deliberately circumvent detection

and attribution, which makes deterring hybrid

aggression difficult and highlights the need for

information sharing and shared situational awareness

throughout the phases of addressing hybrid threats:

preparation, detection & attribution, decision-

making, execution, and evaluation.

This study shows the need to develop intelligence

systems that are specifically designed for rescue

services and other security authorities, which, with

the use latest artificial intelligence solutions, can help

search for, identify, and analyse cues of hybrid

influence against these actors. The actors of the

society need coordination, situational awareness and

understanding of the impacts of possible hybrid

measures on them and the overall security

environment. Society and its members need to

collectively improve capabilities to monitor, identify

and make sense of relevant changes to proactively

prepare against uncertain threats.

The study acknowledges its disadvantages of

relying on a modest sample size and the absence of

peer-reviewed academic articles on hybrid influences

on rescue services. The focus or study object is timely

and is deemed interesting for future research updates.

Considering the importance of rescue services to

society, it is surprising that there is so little research

on what impact hybrid influence could have on them.

The contribution of this literature review is that it

brings a basis for future field research. Further study

will be needed and is recommended to appropriately

identify studies, reports, and articles that can provide

deeper critical discussion of the relationship between

potential hybrid influence and rescue services and

what means are needed to counter them. This study

has made inferences on how hybrid influence may

threaten rescue services, from how hybrid influence

threatens society in general. Further research is also

recommended on gaining further understanding of

how to identify, attribute, and build situational

awareness of hybrid threats. The topic of hybrid

influence is important to our society, and further

understanding of why and how rescue services are

affected by hybrid influence will be needed.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Acknowledgements are paid to the “Improving rescue

services preparedness for hybrid threats” project,

funded by the Fire Protection Fund and conducted in

Hybrid Inﬂuence on Rescue Services

383

collaboration with the Finnish Association of Fire

Officers. The views expressed are those of the

authors, and the granting authority cannot be held

responsible for them.

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