
In summary, SCAM represents a significant advance-
ment in the field of secure cache management. By
effectively balancing performance optimization with
robust security measures, it effectively addresses the
evolving requirements of contemporary computing
environments.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was supported in part by Indo Japanese
Joint Lab Grant and AI powered adaptive cyber de-
fence framework sponsored by NSCS(Government of
India), Security of futuristic technology sponsored by
MEITY(Government of India) and ISRO Respond.
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