Analyzing Blockchain Consensus Mechanisms for Double-Spending
Attack Prevention
Jiasong Ye
a
Engineering Department, Shenzhen MSU-BIT University, Shenzhen, China
Keywords: Blockchain, Consensus Mechanisms, Double-Spending Attacks, Cryptocurrency.
Abstract: With the rapid development of blockchain technology, cryptocurrency transactions face increasing security
risks, particularly from double-spending attacks. This paper explores the effectiveness of various blockchain
consensus mechanisms in preventing these attacks. It examines the principles and applications of Proof of
Work (PoW), Proof of Stake (PoS), and Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) mechanisms, evaluating their
advantages and limitations. The paper provides a comprehensive classification and comparison of these
consensus methods, focusing on their strategies for countering double-spending threats. Through a blend of
theoretical analysis and methodological research, the study identifies the strengths and weaknesses of existing
mechanisms. Experimental results show that while PoW offers strong security, it is hindered by high energy
consumption and mining power centralization. In contrast, PoS and DPoS reduce energy consumption and
improve network flexibility but grapple with issues like power centralization and governance efficiency. This
research provides valuable insights for future improvements in blockchain consensus mechanisms and
enhances the security of cryptocurrency systems.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the Internet era, electronic payments have become
the mainstream method for daily transactions.
However, this reliance brings potential privacy risks
and data security issues, leading to public scepticism
about the ability of third-party institutions to protect
data. In the absence of a trust mechanism, there is an
urgent need for a new way for parties to conduct
transactions to ensure security and privacy (Kim et.al,
2008). Blockchain technology emerges as a solution
to these problems. Many institutions regard
blockchain as a key breakthrough for future
technological development, believing it has the
potential to fundamentally transform existing
business models. In 2008, a researcher under the
pseudonym “Satoshi Nakamoto” first proposed the
concept of digital cryptocurrency (Nakamoto, 2008).
He then introduced the concept of Bitcoin (Guth and
Leymann, 2018), marking the birth of blockchain
technology. Unlike the traditional monetary system,
where a central bank holds centralized control, the
Bitcoin system distributes the responsibility of
maintaining the ledger and issuing currency among
a
https://orcid.org/0009-0008-1157-3396
all participants. The primary issue that consensus
mechanisms in cryptocurrency systems address is
determining ownership as the currency circulates
(Pass and Shi, 2016).
Cryptocurrency consensus mechanisms can be
divided into permissionless and permissioned types
(Cryptape, 2016). In permissionless mechanisms,
Proof of Work (PoW) is the most representative
protocol, where all nodes have equal rights.
Permissioned protocols include Proof of Stake (PoS)
and Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS), which are
applied in different scenarios based on the
authorization levels of nodes. The success of Bitcoin
is not only attributed to these consensus mechanisms
but also built on the foundation of early decentralized
digital currency systems such as b-money (Fujuan
et.al, 2024) and hashcash (Back, 2002), which first
realized a fully decentralized electronic cash system.
However, due to the network's decentralized nature,
the system is also vulnerable to malicious attacks,
such as double-spending and denial-of-service
attacks, which could disrupt its normal operation
(Mehar et.al, 2019). Studying Bitcoin's PoW
mechanism has played a crucial role in addressing the
432
Ye and J.
Analyzing Blockchain Consensus Mechanisms for Double-Spending Attack Prevention.
DOI: 10.5220/0013525500004619
In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Data Analysis and Machine Lear ning (DAML 2024), pages 432-437
ISBN: 978-989-758-754-2
Copyright © 2025 by Paper published under CC license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
issue of double-spending (Miller et.al, 2015). Before
the advent of blockchain technology, double-
spending could only be prevented through centralized
means. Bitcoin, through its decentralized PoW
mechanism, provided a novel solution, effectively
preventing this issue.
As blockchain technology advances and the value
of cryptocurrencies increases, attacks on these
systems have become more prevalent. In August
2010, a hacker exploited a vulnerability in Bitcoin's
code, creating over 18 billion Bitcoins, leading to
Bitcoin’s first hard fork. This marked the first major
attack on a PoW-based cryptocurrency. Since then,
attackers have increasingly targeted blockchain
mechanisms and ecosystems. For example, in 2012,
the Bitcoinica exchange was hacked, leading to the
theft of customers' Bitcoin keys, and in 2016, a smart
contract vulnerability on Ethereum caused the failure
of The DAO project, prompting another blockchain
fork. In 2018, Bitcoin Gold suffered a 51% attack,
and other cryptocurrencies like Beauty Chain and
Monacoin faced losses due to smart contract
vulnerabilities and selfish mining attacks. These
incidents underscore the risks in blockchain
applications. Researchers, including Satoshi
Nakamoto, have long warned of threats like the 51%
attack (Karame et.al, 2012). As computational power
centralizes, the risk of such attacks grows. To address
these vulnerabilities, this paper explores consensus
mechanisms in cryptocurrencies, particularly their
role in preventing double-spending attacks. By
categorizing different consensus models, the study
provides theoretical and practical insights to improve
cryptocurrency security.
2 METHODOLOGY
In the comprehensive examination of the
cryptocurrency landscape, addressing security
threats, particularly double-spending attacks, is
paramount. This paper focuses on analyzing the
consensus mechanisms used in cryptocurrencies and
explores their vital role in preventing such attacks. To
achieve this, an extensive literature review and
detailed case studies are conducted to classify and
evaluate different consensus mechanisms, such as
PoW, PoS, and DPoS. Each mechanism's strengths
and vulnerabilities are analyzed in relation to
security, revealing how they either mitigate or expose
systems to double-spending risks. Lastly, the study
compiles a set of targeted preventive strategies and
practical recommendations that enhance the
resilience of cryptocurrencies against various security
threats. These measures aim to safeguard users' assets
and maintain trust in digital transactions. The
research process, outlined in Figure 1, follows a
structured approach that includes reviewing current
practices, analyzing vulnerabilities, and proposing
actionable solutions.
Figure 1: The pipeline of this study (Picture credit:
Original).
2.1 Blockchain Technology and
Related Background
Blockchain technology originated in the late 1970s
when a computer scientist named Ralph Merkle filed
a patent for hash trees, also known as Merkle trees
(Merkle, 1987). These trees are a computer science
structure that links blocks through cryptography.
Blockchain is a distributed ledger technology that
records transaction information in a decentralized
manner, thereby eliminating the reliance on
centralized authorities. It forms an immutable data
chain by linking blocks in chronological order, where
each block contains a series of transactions,
timestamps, and the cryptographic hash of the
previous block. Each block includes several
transaction data and a hash value pointing to the
previous block to ensure the integrity and security of
the data (Lei and Gang, 2016). The data on the
blockchain is consistent over time because it cannot
be deleted or modified without network consensus.
Thus, blockchain technology can create immutable
ledgers to track orders, payments, accounts, and other
transactions. The system's built-in mechanisms
prevent unauthorized transaction entries and create
consistency in the shared view of these transactions
(Yidong and Xiaotong, 2012). Other characteristics
of blockchain technology include open consensus,
where anyone can participate in the blockchain
network, and each node has a complete copy of the
database, making the network open and transparent.
It is thrustless, requiring no reliance on a trusted third
party, as nodes collaborate according to rules, making
the system public and transparent, and difficult to
deceive other nodes. Anonymity links users' identities
to their public key addresses rather than their real
identities, enabling users to trade and use blockchain
anonymously. Traceability means that transaction
data carries timestamps, allowing each transaction to
be traced back to its origin, ensuring data integrity
and transparency.
Analyzing Blockchain Consensus Mechanisms for Double-Spending Attack Prevention
433
2.2 Consensus Mechanisms and
Double-Spending Attacks
2.2.1 PoW Module
This is the most widely used consensus mechanism,
initially implemented in Bitcoin. It relies on
computational power to solve complex cryptographic
puzzles. The first node to solve the puzzle gains the
right to add a new block and receives a corresponding
reward. This mechanism ensures network security by
requiring significant computational resources,
making it extremely costly for malicious actors to
control the network. The PoW mechanism is based on
competition among miners to solve cryptographic
puzzles that require substantial computational power.
The solution to this puzzle, known as the "proof,"
needs to be verified by the network before the block
can be added to the chain. The security of PoW is
reflected in its high computational cost and economic
penalties for double-spending attempts. An attacker
would need to control more than 51% of the network's
computing power to alter the blockchain, which is
nearly impossible for a large network like Bitcoin.
2.2.2 PoS Module
Unlike PoW, PoS selects validators based on the
number of tokens they hold and are willing to stake
as collateral. Validators are chosen to propose and
verify new blocks based on their staked assets,
reducing the need for extensive computational
resources. PoS aims to address the energy efficiency
issues of PoW and mitigate the "nothing-at-stake"
risk through penalty mechanisms. The PoS
mechanism allocates block validation rights based on
the amount of tokens held by validators. The selection
of validators follows a pseudo-random process,
considering factors such as the age of the staked
tokens and randomness. PoS reduces the
computational burden associated with PoW and
ensures network security through economic
incentives. Validators' staked assets are at risk, and if
they are found to behave maliciously, such as
attempting a double-spending attack, their staked
assets will be forfeited.
2.2.3 DPoS Module
DPoS introduces a voting system where token holders
elect a small number of representative nodes to verify
transactions and generate new blocks. This
mechanism maintains decentralization while
improving efficiency and transaction speed.
However, DPoS poses a centralization risk when
voting power is concentrated among a few large
stakeholders. DPoS builds on PoS by introducing an
election mechanism, where token holders vote to
elect a small number of witnesses to verify
transactions. This reduces the number of nodes
involved in the consensus, improving transaction
throughput and reducing latency. However, this
mechanism also introduces the risk of centralization,
as a few large stakeholders may dominate the network
through the voting process.
2.3 Double-Spending Attacks
Double-spending is one of the most threatening attack
forms in blockchain, referring to the situation in
digital currency systems where the same digital asset
is improperly used multiple times due to the
duplicability of data. In simple terms, it means the
same amount of digital currency is spent twice or
more.
Reasons for double-spending attacks include: 1.
Rapid Successive Transactions: Attackers may
quickly submit multiple new transactions before the
initial transaction is confirmed, attempting to double-
spend and make it difficult for the system to detect
and prevent this behavior in time;2. Use of Multiple
Identities: Attackers may use multiple identities to
submit transactions, increasing the chances of a
successful double-spending attack;3. Control of
Multiple Nodes: Attackers may try to control multiple
nodes or participate in multiple mining pools to
increase the probability of a successful double-
spending attack. For example, conducting a 51%
attack to control the entire blockchain network,
enabling the attacker to publish fraudulent
transactions and thus perform a double-spending
attack. Types of double-spending attacks include:1.
Finney Attack: The attacker privately mines a block
containing another transaction. Once the initial
transaction is confirmed, the attacker publishes this
privately mined block, effectively performing a
double-spend and successfully stealing funds;2. Race
Attack: The attacker broadcasts another transaction to
part of the network while simultaneously mining a
block that does not include that transaction. If the
alternative transaction is confirmed before the
legitimate one, the attacker can successfully double-
spend;3. Vector76 Attack: This attack targets
cryptocurrencies that rely on the BIP16 payment
protocol variant. By exploiting vulnerabilities in the
payment protocol, the attacker can execute a double-
spending attack.
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2.4 Prevention of Double-Spending
from the Perspective of Consensus
Mechanisms
In PoW, nodes compete to solve complex
mathematical problems, granting them the right to
add blocks to the blockchain. Bitcoin’s
decentralization ensures that transaction legitimacy is
collectively verified, and only when the majority
agrees is a transaction confirmed. To counter double-
spending, PoW relies on dispersing computational
power across the network. By making it economically
unfeasible for attackers to control over 51% of the
network’s computing power, PoW deters such
attacks. Additional security is achieved by increasing
transaction confirmation requirements and total hash
rates, which raise the cost of reorganizing the chain.
Moreover, random block production mechanisms,
such as Bitcoin-NG and Greedy Heaviest Observed
Subtree (GHOST), add unpredictability to block
creation, making it harder for attackers to exploit the
system. PoS introduces stake locking and penalties
for malicious behavior, such as attempting double-
spending attacks. Validators must lock tokens as
collateral, and if caught acting maliciously, they lose
their stake, significantly raising the cost of attacks.
Validators are also selected randomly, preventing
attackers from predicting or controlling the block
production order. Additionally, PoS utilizes a
committee of validators to approve blocks, further
decentralizing control and making it difficult for an
attacker to succeed with double-spending. DPoS
focuses on node management and supervision. Token
holders elect supernodes to verify transactions, and
malicious nodes can be replaced via voting if
necessary. Real-time monitoring and dynamic
penalties ensure that nodes exhibiting harmful
behavior are immediately penalized. Observer nodes
provide an additional layer of oversight, reporting any
abnormal actions to the community, ensuring a fair
and secure blockchain system through collective
governance.
3 RESULT AND DISCUSSION
3.1 Comparative Analysis of Consensus
Mechanisms
Table 1 summarizes the double-spending prevention
measures in permissionless and permissioned
consensus mechanisms. In permissionless systems
like PoW, security is achieved through
decentralization and the distribution of computational
power. By making it costly for an attacker to control
over 51% of the network, PoW reduces the risk of
double-spending. Additional measures include
multiple block confirmations, increasing the network
hash rate, and randomizing block generation through
mechanisms like Bitcoin-NG and GHOST. Despite
its strengths, PoW faces challenges such as high
energy consumption, long confirmation times, and
the risk of mining pool centralization, which could
increase vulnerability to attacks. Permissioned
mechanisms like PoS and DPoS take a different
approach. PoS raises the economic cost of attacks by
requiring validators to lock tokens as collateral and
randomly selecting validators to prevent attack
planning. However, PoS risks centralization due to
wealth accumulation. DPoS enhances security
through elected supernodes and real-time node
monitoring, but faces potential issues with vote
manipulation and centralization.
Table 1: The double-spending prevention measures.
Mechanism
Type
Preventive Measures Specific Characteristics
PoW 1. Increase transaction confirmation count Increase the difficulty of reorganizing the chain within
a short
p
eriod of time for attackers
2. Increase network total computing power Raise the economic cost of controlling 51% of the
com
p
utin
g
p
ower
3. Encourage mining decentralization Avoid concentration of computing power in a few
mining pools, reducing single entity control risk
PoS 1. Staking lock-up and penalty mechanism Lock up tokens as collateral, punish malicious actors
b
y deducting part or all of the collateral
2. Random selection of validators Difficult to predict validators, enhance unpredictability
a
g
ainst attackers
DPoS 1. Node election and replacement
mechanis
m
Token holders vote to elect and replace malicious
nodes, strengthen network resilience
2. Node behavior monitoring and dynamic
p
enalty mechanism
Monitor node behavior, revoke eligibility and deduct
collateral from malicious actors
Analyzing Blockchain Consensus Mechanisms for Double-Spending Attack Prevention
435
Table 2: Advantage and disadvantage of different methods.
Consensus
Mechanis
m
Type Advantage Disadvantage
PoW No
authorization
1. Decentralization, any node has the opportunity
to participate.
2. The cost of a 51% attack is high, reducing the
risk of double-spending attacks.
3. The number of transactions confirmed
improves security.
4. Increasing network computing power reduces
the risk of being attacked.
5.Randomized block mechanisms increase
un
redictabilit
.
1.High energy
consumption issues affect
sustainability.
2.Longer transaction
confirmation times affect
user experience.
3.Mining concentration
may lead to centralization
of computing power and
increased risks.
PoS Authorization 1. Staking currency as collateral increases the cost
of malicious behavior.
2. Randomly selecting validators reduces
predictability for attackers.
3. The validator committee mechanism enhances
securit
y
.
1.It may lead to a “rich get
richer” phenomenon,
increasing centralization
risks.
DPoS Authorization 1. Selecting super nodes increases flexibility.
2. Real-time monitoring of node behavior quickly
eliminates malicious nodes.
3.Improve network anti-attack capabilities.
1.Centralization risks,
voting manipulation
issues.
2.Weakening the
efficiency of community
governance.
Overall, the PoW mechanism provides robust
security against double-spending attacks, but its
drawbacks in terms of energy consumption and user
experience are evident. In contrast, PoS and DPoS
excel in terms of cost-effectiveness and flexibility,
but they also face challenges such as power
concentration and governance efficiency. Future
consensus mechanisms may combine these strengths
to form hybrid models that achieve higher security,
efficiency, and sustainability, further reducing the
risk of double-spending attacks. Table 2 summarizes
the strengths and weaknesses of PoW, PoS, and DPoS
in preventing double-spending attacks.
3.2 Future Development Directions
The future of blockchain consensus mechanisms may
evolve towards hybrid models that combine the
advantages of PoW, PoS, and DPoS to enhance the
security, efficiency, and sustainability of blockchain
networks. Initially, the decentralized computing
power of the PoW mechanism can be used to ensure
network security and resistance to attacks, preventing
double-spending in the early stages. Then, the PoS
staking mechanism can be adopted, allowing token
holders to lock their tokens as collateral to reduce
energy consumption and resource usage. Finally, by
introducing DPoS’s fast election and voting
mechanisms, the transaction validation speed and
network efficiency can be improved.
To mitigate the high energy consumption of PoW
and the centralization issues of PoS and DPoS, new
mechanisms may incorporate randomness in
validation and dynamic node adjustment strategies,
such as randomly selecting validators and using
multi-layer consensus structures to decentralize
validation power. These strategies aim to ensure
decentralization and flexibility, enhancing the
system's security and resistance to attacks. The
development of the blockchain ecosystem will be a
significant trend in the future. As blockchain
technology integrates with existing financial systems,
compliance and regulation will become key factors.
This will drive developers to consider legal and
regulatory requirements when designing consensus
mechanisms, thereby reducing the risk of double-
spending attacks and increasing user trust. Finally,
community participation and governance models will
gradually evolve. Future consensus mechanisms will
place greater emphasis on community governance by
designing fair and transparent election mechanisms
and governance structures to enhance user
engagement and trust in the network. This shift will
foster a more secure, efficient, and fair blockchain
network, making malicious behaviors such as double-
spending more difficult to execute. In conclusion, the
future development of blockchain will rely on
technological advancements, community
governance, and ecosystem refinement to achieve
higher levels of security and sustainability.
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4 CONCLUSIONS
This paper has analyzed the effectiveness of different
blockchain consensus mechanisms—PoW, PoS, and
DPoS—in preventing double-spending attacks.
Through detailed examination of their strategies and
application scenarios, it is evident that each
mechanism offers distinct advantages and drawbacks.
PoW provides robust security but suffers from high
energy consumption and risks related to the
concentration of computational power. PoS and
DPoS, while improving network efficiency and
reducing energy usage, face issues of centralization
and governance inefficiencies. Future research will
explore hybrid consensus mechanisms that blend the
strengths of PoW, PoS, and other emerging methods
to enhance blockchain security and scalability.
Further investigation will focus on optimizing these
mechanisms for specific applications, improving
transaction speed while minimizing risks of double-
spending. Additionally, enhancing governance
structures within the blockchain ecosystem will be
essential in creating a more secure, efficient, and
sustainable digital currency network. This approach
aims to strengthen the foundation for future
blockchain systems and their security protocols.
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