Fiscal Decentralization and Public Services: Deli Serdang Regency
Government Education Sector Expenditure
Mohammad Ridwan Rangkuti, Marlon Sihombing, Heri Kusmanto and Hatta Ridho
Universitas Sumatera Utara, Indonesia
Keywords: Fiscal Decentralization, Public Services, Education Expenditure, Education Personnel, School Buildings,
Pure Enrolment Rate
Abstract: This research was conducted in Deli Serdang Regency, with the aim of obtaining an overview of the problems
in the Fiscal Decentralization Policy and Public Services in the Education Sector. How is the Education
Service in Deli Serdang Regency? Are Education Services related to Deli Serdang Regency Government
Education Expenditures? The research paradigm used is the Constructivist Paradigm, with Qualitative
Research Methods. Data were collected through in-depth interviews, discussions with several district
informants, DPRD, sub-district, schools (SD, SMP), and community leaders. In addition, data were also
collected through literature study, document study, and secondary data. The results of this study can be
concluded, as follows: First, that Public Perception of Services in the Education Sector in Deli Serdang
Regency is still bad; Second, mandatory spending on education spending is still focused on education
personnel (teachers), not much for infrastructure spending (physical/building), as well as for increasing the
NER (pure participation rate). Based on Bartley and McLoughlin (2015), "Political incentives to provide
increase where services offer..." "High visibility: outputs are physically visible or problem has high public
profile." physically visible to the public. For the Government, measurable output will facilitate control and
encourage greater spending allocations. Physical school buildings (SD, SMP) in the Regency are a service
sector with measurable output (measured), and easy to see by the community (high visibility). In addition, the
development of education infrastructure (SD, SMP) is still a concern of the Government, so that it will
encourage an increase in the allocation of spending on education infrastructure.
1 INTRODUCTION
This study aims to determine the public's perception
of public services in the Education Sector of Deli
Serdang Regency Government; as well as the linkage
of problems in the Public Service in the Education
Sector of the Deli Serdang Regency Government with
the Education Sector Expenditure of the Deli Serdang
Regency Government. As well as, community
participation in the Education Sector in Deli Serdang
Regency.
The emergence of a sense of regional
dissatisfaction due to the strong control of the State
(Central) over the management of SDA (Natural
Resources) in the Region, as well as the insensitivity
of the Center to the existence of development gaps
between regions (Java-Outer Java), has encouraged
the emergence of a strong desire from the Regions for
distribution power/authority between the Center and
the Regions. Various proposals for Fiscal
Decentralization have actually been made since the
early 1970s. However, the main elements of Fiscal
Decentralization were never realized (Delay, et.al,
1995; Devas, 1997; Rohdehwold, 1995).
The dissatisfaction felt by this region, then
peaked, triggered by the economic crisis and political
upheaval that occurred from mid-1997 to early 1998.
The economic crisis was marked by the weakening of
the Rupiah exchange rate against the US dollar,
followed by soaring inflation rates (77 ,63%) in 1998.
There was an increase of 66.53% from the previous
years. As a result, there was a political crisis during
the Soeharto era. Demonstrations took place
everywhere. The community was dissatisfied with the
current situation at that time. The political situation
got worse when the Government made a number of
policies which were deemed illogical and not in favor
of the people. For example, the reduction of fuel
subsidies. Meanwhile, violence occurred on a broad
Rangkuti, M., Sihombing, M., Kusmanto, H. and Ridho, H.
Fiscal Decentralization and Public Services: Deli Serdang Regency Government Education Sector Expenditure.
DOI: 10.5220/0011564700003460
In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Social and Political Development (ICOSOP 2022) - Human Security and Agile Government, pages 219-232
ISBN: 978-989-758-618-7; ISSN: 2975-8300
Copyright
c
2023 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda. Under CC license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
219
and massive scale. Violence is caused by a feeling of
injustice in society.
The economic crisis and political upheaval that
occurred at that time forced Suharto to resign as
President of the Republic of Indonesia. Since then,
there has been a change from the Suharto
government, which was known to be authoritarian
and centralized, to a democratic and decentralized
Reform Government. Indonesia is undergoing a phase
of fundamental change in political life and
governance.
One of the changes that occur is the
implementation of Regional Government and the
political system. There has been a change in the
pattern of relations between the Central Government
and Regional Governments. This change is known as
Regional Autonomy. The government responded to
the growing demands for Regional Autonomy
(Decentralization) by quickly discussing and
approving 2 (two) laws (UU) in April 1999 and
setting January 1, 2001 as the start of the
implementation of Regional Autonomy
(Decentralization).
The implementation of Regional Autonomy and
Fiscal Decentralization which came into effect on
January 1, 2001 has implications for the delegation of
authority/affairs between the Center and the Regions
in various fields. This delegation of authority is
regulated in Law No. 22/1999 on Regional
Government; and Law Number 25 of 1999
concerning Financial Balance between the Central
and Regional Governments. This Law in its
subsequent development underwent changes, with the
issuance of Law Number 32 of 2004 concerning
Regional Government, and Law Number 33 of 2004
concerning Financial Balance between Central and
Regional Governments.
Decentralization according to Law Number 33 of
2004 is the transfer of government authority by the
Government to an Autonomous Region to regulate
and administer government affairs within the system
of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. In
Law Number 33 of 2004 it is stated that the
establishment of the Law on Fiscal Balance between
the Central Government and Regional Governments
is intended to support funding for the transfer of
affairs to the Regional Government as regulated in the
Law on Regional Government.
Based on Law Number 33 of 2004, the Balancing
Fund consists of the Revenue Sharing Fund (DBH),
the General Allocation Fund (DAU), and the Special
Allocation Fund (DAK). The provision of Balancing
Funds is intended to reduce the vertical fiscal
disparity between the Central Government and
Regional Governments, and also to assist the Regions
in financing their authority.
These two laws are known as the Regional
Autonomy Law. The two laws are the legal basis for
the implementation of Fiscal Decentralization in
Indonesia. Law Number 32 of 2004 has the core of
the division of authority and functions (power
sharing) between the Central and Regional
Governments. Meanwhile, Law Number 33 of 2004
regulates the distribution of financial resources
(financial sharing) between the Center and the
Regions designed using the principle of money
following the authority (money follow function). This
means that the transfer of regional authority is also
accompanied by the transfer of financing sources
previously held by the central government (Mahi et
al, 2001).
Financing/Funding adheres to the principle of
money follows function, which also means that
financing follows the functions of government which
are the obligations and responsibilities of each level
of government.
With the enactment of Law Number 32 of 2004,
there will be an expansion of the authority of the
Regional Government. Meanwhile, Law Number 33
of 2004 will create an increase in regional financial
capacity. Therefore, Regional Autonomy is expected
to be a bridge for Regional Governments to
encourage economic efficiency, efficiency of public
services so as to encourage regional economic
growth, as well as improve the welfare of local
residents through various multiplier effects of
decentralization which are expected to be realized
(Khusaini in Ladjin, 2008).
The main objective of Fiscal Decentralization is
to improve public services. Dillinger (1994) in
Hirawan (2007), that the implementation of
Decentralization in various parts of the world found
that the trigger for this policy was the desire or effort
to obtain better public services.
The policy of decentralizing revenues and
expenditures is part of a way to increase public sector
efficiency, reduce budget deficits, and increase
economic growth (Bird, 1993; Bird and Wallich,
1993; Bahl and Linn, 1992; Gramlich, 1993; and
Oates, 1993 in Zhang). and Zou, 1998).
According to Law Number 33 of 2004, that the
sources of financing for the implementation of
Regional Government consist of Regional Original
Income (PAD), Balancing Funds, Regional Loans,
and Other Legitimate Income. Regional Original
Income (PAD) is Regional Revenue sourced from
Regional Taxes, Regional Levies, results of separated
regional wealth management, and other legitimate
ICOSOP 2022 - International Conference on Social and Political Development 4
220
Regional Original Income, which aims to provide
flexibility to the Regions in digging for funding in the
implementation of autonomy. regions as an
embodiment of the principle of Decentralization.
To follow up on the authority of the regions in
increasing PAD, Law Number 28 of 2009 concerning
Regional Taxes and Levies was issued. Law Number
28 of 2009 regulates the authority of the Regional
Government to collect local people in order to obtain
funding sources for Regional Development.
The Balancing Fund is a regional funding sourced
from the APBN which consists of the Revenue
Sharing Fund (DBH), the General Allocation Fund
(DAU), and the Special Allocation Fund (DAK).
DAU is a fund sourced from the APBN which aims
to equalize financial capacity between regions, which
is intended to reduce inequality in financial capacity
between regions through the application of a formula
that takes into account the needs and potential of the
regions.
Based on Law No. 33 of 2004, the DAU needs of
a region (province, district, city) are determined using
the fiscal gap concept approach and basic allocation.
The fiscal gap is calculated based on the fiscal need
minus the regional fiscal capacity. In other words, the
DAU is used to close the fiscal gap that occurs due to
regional needs that exceed the potential revenue of
the region concerned. Usually, the distribution of
DAU for regions with relatively large capacity will be
smaller, on the other hand, regions with relatively
small capacity will receive relatively large DAU. For
the concept of basic allocation, DAU is calculated
based on the number of Civil Servants (PNS) in the
Region.
To reduce inequality in financing needs and tax
control between the Center and the Regions, DAU is
given to regions at least 26% of net domestic revenues
(Ndadari and Adi, 2008).
The Balancing Fund, apart from being intended to
assist the Regions in funding their authority, also aims
to reduce the gap in the sources of Government
funding between the Center and the Regions, as well
as to reduce the funding gap of Inter-Regional
Government funding. These three components of the
Balancing Fund constitute a system of transfer of
funds from the Government and form a unified whole.
The transfer policy of the Central Government to
the Regional Government has actually been going on
since the New Order era. The amount of transfers
from the Central Government to Regional
Governments during the New Order was carried out
in 3 (three) forms, namely: (1) Autonomous Regional
Subsidies (SDO); (2) Presidential Instruction
Assistance; and (3) Project Contents List (DIP). The
Autonomous Region Subsidy (SDO) is intended to
support the routine budget of the Regional
Government to help create a financial balance
between levels of government. About 95% is used to
finance the salaries of government employees in the
regions. Others are used for other purposes, namely
subsidies for routine expenditures in the field of basic
education, remuneration for rural employees,
subsidies for the operation of hospitals in the regions,
and subsidies for financing the training of
government employees. SDO is categorized in the
Central Transfer which is specific (specific grant),
because the Regions do not have the authority to
determine the use of SDO. The purpose of this
transfer has been determined by the Central
Government. Since the 1999/2000 fiscal year, in
order to clarify the budgets managed by the Central
and Regional Governments, the term Regional
Routine Fund (DRD) has been used as a substitute
name for SDO. All components and mechanisms in
SDO are the same as those in DRD.
Inpres assistance is intended to provide regional
development assistance, both general and specific in
nature, which is given by Presidential Instruction. The
purpose of the Presidential Instruction is to achieve
equity, especially in terms of employment
opportunities, business opportunities, and
participation in development. The basis for providing
assistance is the handing over of some affairs to the
regions and the limited financial capacity of the
Regional Government to finance these affairs. For the
1999/2000 fiscal year, the budget managed by the
regions was known as the Regional Development
Fund (DPD) as a substitute for Presidential
Instruction Assistance. Meanwhile, the Project List
(DIP) is classified into in-kind allocation. Although
the funds flow to the regions, they are not included in
the regional government budget. Meanwhile,
subsidies (SDO) and assistance (Inpres) can be
categorized as intergovernmental grants because they
are part of the Regional Government Budget.
The central and regional financial balance policy
is a derivative of the Regional Autonomy policy as
the delegation of part of the government's authority
from the center to the regions. The more authority
delegated, the greater the costs required by the
Region. Therefore, in the management of
decentralization, the principle of efficiency becomes
a provision that must be implemented. Budgets for the
implementation of government tasks or public
services must be managed efficiently, but produce
maximum output. Another important thing that must
be understood is that Fiscal Decentralization in
Indonesia is Fiscal Decentralization on the
Fiscal Decentralization and Public Services: Deli Serdang Regency Government Education Sector Expenditure
221
expenditure side which is funded mainly through
transfers to the Regions (Rochjadi 2006, in Badrudin
2012).
The implementation of Fiscal Decentralization in
Indonesia since 2001 has been marked by the process
of transferring financial resources in the form of
transfers to Regional Governments and in a fairly
large total amount to the Regions.
Balancing Funds (DBH, DAU, and DAK) are
provided by the Center in the form of transfers to
Regional Governments. DBH and DAU are classified
as unconditional transfers. Meanwhile, DAK is
classified in the form of conditional transfers
(Azwardi, 2007 in Ndadari and Adi, 2008).
Since the commencement of Fiscal
Decentralization in 2001, the Balancing Fund
provided to the Regions in the form of transfers
amounted to Rp. 81.1 trillion. In 2012, the Balancing
Fund of Rp. 411.2 trillion. In 2020, Transfers to
Regions and Village Funds (TKDD) will reach Rp.
856.94 trillion. This TKDD consists of transfers to the
Regions in the amount of IDR784.94 trillion, and
Village Funds in the amount of IDR72.00 trillion.
The implementation of Fiscal Decentralization in
Indonesia since 2001 has resulted in various impacts
in several locations. Such as, DBH, DAU, DAK,
PAD, Regional Shares, Regional Loans, Fiscal
Capacity, APBD, Regional Government, DPRD,
Public Services, Regional Expansion (DOB), and
Regulations.
Identification of producing regions (by origin
principle) is often delayed due to delays in providing
calculation data. The distribution of DBH is based on
the realization that is only known in the following
year, thus causing the problem of underpayment.
There are many regional proposals to get profit
sharing that have not been regulated in the law, for
example export taxes, plantations, oil and gas
processing areas. DAU Basic allocation which is
calculated based on the salaries of PNSD, causing
inefficiency in regional personnel expenditures. DAU
formulations and policies that are automatically
allocated to New Autonomous Regions (DOB)
encourage regional expansion. The results of the
DAU allocation can only be informed to the Regions
in November (after the determination of the APBN at
the end of October) making it difficult for the Regions
to prepare the APBD. DAK has confusion regarding
the focus of DAK, equalization, national priority, or
support for regions with low fiscal capacity. Rigid
and often late DAK technical guidelines make it
difficult for regions to implement DAK activities.
Provision of Companion Funds is considered
burdensome for some regions. Determination of
recipient regions and the amount is unpredictable and
can only be informed to regions in November (after
the determination of the APBN at the end of October)
making it difficult for regions to prepare APBD.
Meanwhile, PBB, only 18 of the 492 Regions that
have collected Rural and Urban PBB (PBB-P2) as a
Regional tax in 2012, although the transfer deadline
is until January 2014. By the end of 2012 50.2% of
Local Governments are ready to collect PBB -P2,
which in terms of potential has covered 91.3%. Some
regions are constrained by the small potential of PBB-
P2, the readiness of human resources, facilities and
infrastructure, and other supporting devices.
Case of Regional Share ownership. For example,
the case of Newmont's shares in West Nusa Tenggara
(NTB). Central and Regional vertical conflicts over
the (single) ownership of Newmont Nusa Tenggara
Barat shares. The Central Government, Regional
Government (NTB), and the DPR are competing for
a 31% stake in Newmont, a multi-national company
operating in the copper and gold mining sector. The
DPR tried to block the Government's purchase of
Newmont shares, by asking BPK for assistance to
support their claim (Rahardjo, 2012: 26). In general,
this share ownership conflict is not only for economic
reasons, but rather for reasons related to elite political
interests.
Regarding Regional Loans, the Regions have not
dared to make regional loans to finance part of the
regional expenditure needs in the APBD. Even so,
regional income is still not sufficient to finance the
increase in regional spending in the APBD, and it is
possible for regions to make regional loans.
The Fiscal Decentralization Policy has been
implemented for 20 years, but the capacity or fiscal
capacity of the regions (Kabupaten/City) is not
sufficient in helping to finance regional expenditure
needs in the APBD. As a result, regional dependence
is very high on fiscal transfers from the center
(APBN).
The management of the APBD should be
determined no later than December 31 before the
current fiscal year. However, in 2012, 524 regions,
which set the APBD on time, were only 274 regions
(52% regions). In 2011 there were only 211 regions
(40%) and 2010 as many as 214 regions (41%). The
largest proportion of regional expenditures is
personnel expenditure, with the proportion above
40% (for Provinces in the range of 25% and for
districts/cities in the range of 51%) and continues to
increase until 2011. It was only in 2012 that personnel
expenditures decreased in proportion to total
expenditures. The proportion of capital expenditures
ICOSOP 2022 - International Conference on Social and Political Development 4
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increased in 2011 and 2012, where the proportion of
capital expenditures was above 20%.
Another growing phenomenon is the increasing
flexibility of regencies/municipalities to add to the
budget for regional personnel expenditures in the
APBD which is sourced from the fiscal transfer
budget, particularly the DAU budget. There are
indications that the Regency/City Regional
Government cannot be regulated/not subject to the
Government above it. That the fiscal decentralization
policy was issued within the framework of
strengthening regional fiscal capacity to help boost
the regional economy and regional economic growth
(GDP).
In addition, there are obstacles to fiscal
implementation in regional governments, such as the
lack of competence of regional leaders, politicians,
and regional officials in implementing regional
revenue instruments. Central supervision of local
governments is still weak. This can be seen from the
implementation of the Regional Regulation on Taxes
and Levies that is less effective.
The implementation of Fiscal Decentralization is
always colored by the number of corruption cases
appearing in the regions. Corruption is perpetrated by
public officials. Literally, corruption means
rottenness, ugliness, depravity, dishonesty, bribery,
immorality, deviation from chastity. There are
indications that corruption is increasing after fiscal
decentralization in the implementation of regional
autonomy. And there are many cases of corruption in
the regions, as a result of which good and quality
public services as an effort to improve people's
welfare are disrupted. The idiom that emerged later
was that fiscal decentralization and regional
autonomy were nothing but a transfer of negative
externalities (inefficiencies) from the Central
Government in the New Order era to Regional
Governments (Pemda) in this Reformation era.
Corruption in Indonesia has become a national
problem that has taken root from the lowest layers of
the government structure to the highest levels. The
APBN and APBD in Indonesia are still considered to
lack supervision in their implementation, causing
budget inefficiencies. So far, the public budget has
always leaked both in terms of revenue and
expenditure.
Fiscal decentralization has encouraged the
emergence of criminal acts of corruption because it
provides opportunities for local governments to
manage the potential benefits of their regions. For
perpetrators of corruption in the regions, in addition
to the APBD, the budget that is often the target of
corruption is the regional expansion budget (Saputra,
2012). One recent case is the corruption of the APBD
by 45 members of the Malang DPRD against funds
used to build public facilities. This deserves mutual
attention from the central government and the
community because the APBD is the fundamental of
the regional economy (Putra, 2018).
Fiscal Decentralization from the Center to
Regional Governments, whether in the form of DAK,
Bansos (Social assistance), and other budgets, is only
enjoyed by local elites. For example, the executive,
and the legislature. Meanwhile, the local community
has not yet enjoyed the benefits.
The implementation of the Musrenbang in the
regional development planning process tends to be
carried out only to fulfill a formal process based on
regulations, and even seems to be a ritual process as
if community involvement in development planning
has actually taken place. This condition certainly has
an impact on the government's budgeting process,
which tends to be status quo, unresponsive to
dynamic community desires or expectations, in line
with the dynamics that occur in the community.
Participatory budgeting and discourse on good
governance, which are the slogans of the government
in the reform era, should place people not only as
objects of development, but also as subjects of
development.
DPRD does not fight for fiscal policy for the
benefit of the community, but only fights for personal
aspirations, businessmen, and the interests of political
parties. DPRD as a legislative body (the organizing
element of Regional Government), People's
Representatives in the regional power structure, do
not consider the issue of political stability as an
important issue, they should encourage the
Musrenbang mechanism to be more effective. As a
result, this fiscal policy only benefits a few people,
and public services do not increase.
Economic impact on a national basis (aggregate),
per capita transfers are increasing very sharply from
year to year. The occurrence of a reduction in the
level of poverty and unemployment. Some regions
with very high per capita transfer rates have actually
experienced a higher reduction in poverty than other
regions. Fiscal decentralization has actually had a
catch-up impact for underdeveloped regions.
Local Public Services: Education and Health.
There has been an increase in the output of public
services in the regions. For example: education output
(Pure Enrollment Rate/Elementary School NER)
increased in all provinces. Health Output (Infant
Mortality Rate/IMR) decreased significantly in all
provinces in Indonesia.
Fiscal Decentralization and Public Services: Deli Serdang Regency Government Education Sector Expenditure
223
A number of cases show that Fiscal
Decentralization does not have an impact on the
community in economic development and public
services. Local communities do not have influence
and control over regional fiscal policies. Local
government services to the community have not been
maximized.
Furthermore, from a number of cases it shows that
the dependence of the regions is even higher on the
central government. The emergence of the practice of
dynastic politics in the Region. The phenomenon of
the emergence of a strong desire of local elites to form
a New Autonomous Region (DOB). The emergence
of new autonomous regions is not based on a desire
to improve people's welfare, but rather as a way to
obtain fiscal transfers from the center. The highest
number of new autonomous districts/cities were born
compared to provincial new autonomous regions.
With the increasing number of new autonomous
districts/cities through the expansion process, the
budget for fiscal transfers to the regions will be even
greater. Regency/City DOB will depend heavily on
fiscal transfers from the Center. The Parent Province
does not provide financial assistance to new
autonomous regions in its territory.
Bappenas and UNDP (2008), stated that the
overall financial performance of the newly created
regions appears to be lower than that of the control
regions, due to a number of problems in regional
finances. Among other things, the greater fiscal
dependence in the new regions, especially new
autonomous regions, is persistently related to the
large allocation of capital expenditures in the new
regions.
The role of the central government's finances in
the development of the new regions is still very large.
With regard to fiscal decentralization and regional
autonomy, the expansion should be able to encourage
the independence of regional governments in carrying
out development in their regions through optimizing
sources of regional economic growth. The allocation
of central government funds should be an incentive
and initial capital for the new autonomous region
government to optimize its own income, so that in
time it can reduce dependence on central government
finances.
In reality, Central Government funds as the
implementation of fiscal decentralization, for new
autonomous regions, cannot be absorbed and
managed properly because of the political stability in
the new autonomous regions which is not well
established and conducive to the current government.
Sjafrizal (2008), the political aspect that often
arises in the expansion of regions is in the form of the
desire of several political figures to get new positions,
both as Regional Heads and Deputy Regional Heads
as well as DPRD members in the expansion areas.
Abdullah (2011), the majority of the new
autonomous regions formed after the reform failed to
achieve the goal of people's welfare. The formation of
the New Autonomous Region generally only benefits
a few local elites. The majority of the New
Autonomous Regions failed, because in fact political
reasons were more dominant than other reasons. It is
evident that it is the elite who are pushing for regional
expansion. However, its orientation is to pursue
political and economic gains (in this case the fiscal
flexibility granted by the center). Political gain by
controlling the government and economic gain by
controlling development projects in the Region. The
division of territory is made into the business of
political elite groups in the regions who just want
positions and positions in government. The euphoria
of democracy and the growth of political parties is
used by this elite group to voice their “aspirations”,
namely to encourage the expansion of the
government. Meanwhile, transfer funds to the regions
in nominal terms continued to increase, and when
viewed from the growth point of view, growth was
always positive. The increase in transfer funds to the
regions was caused by an increase in the salaries of
civil servants, an increase in revenue for profit
sharing, and the addition of the number of new
autonomous regions, and so on. The addition of the
number of New Autonomous Regions will certainly
increase the budget burden for the central
government, this can be seen from the increase in the
number of transfer funds to the regions through the
General Allocation Fund (DAU).
Central-Regional Financial Balance Pattern. The
issue of implementing Fiscal Decentralization is
related to the Central-Regional balance pattern. The
current pattern of central-regional financial balance is
still not acceptable to all parties. Many parties see that
the pattern of Central-Regional financial relations is
not yet good, especially in the implementation of
policies. The Center needs to continuously evaluate
and refine its implementation of the Central-Regional
financial balance pattern policy.
The journey of fiscal decentralization in Indonesia
still has various weaknesses and shortcomings both in
concept and in implementation. There are still various
kinds of conflicting regulations that cause the
implementation of decentralization in Indonesia to
not run well.
Deli Serdang Regency is one of the regencies in
North Sumatra Province. Deli Serdang has an area of
2,808.91 sq km, with a population of 1,886,388
ICOSOP 2022 - International Conference on Social and Political Development 4
224
people. In 2015 Deli Serdang Regency had 22 sub-
districts and 394 villages/kelurahan. Of the 394
villages, they can be grouped into 148 urban (urban)
villages and 246 rural (rural) villages.
Deli Serdang Regency is also an area that has a
strategic position because it is directly adjacent to the
city of Medan. Part of the Deli Serdang area is a
business area because it is located directly adjacent to
the outskirts of Medan City. In addition, a number of
national projects are located in Deli Serdang
Regency. For example, KNIA Airport (Kuala Namu
International Airport), MEBIDANGRO project, Lau
Simeme Dam, Dls. Deli Serdang Regency covers the
coastal area of the Malacca Strait, plantation areas,
and mountainous areas. Some tourist areas are in
mountainous areas. For example, the Sibolangit
Tourism area.
Since the commencement of Fiscal
Decentralization in 2001, the National Balance Fund
given to regions in the form of transfers amounted to
Rp. 81.1 trillion. In 2012, the Balancing Fund of Rp.
411.2 trillion. In 2020, Transfers to Regions and
Village Funds (TKDD) will reach Rp. 856.94 trillion.
This TKDD consists of transfers to the Regions in the
amount of IDR784.94 trillion, and Village Funds in
the amount of IDR72.00 trillion.
Since 2001 Deli Serdang Regency has received
the Balancing Fund. For the last 4 (four) years (2018,
2019, 2020, 2021) Deli Serdang Regency has
received the Balancing Fund. TKDD FY 2020 Deli
Serdang Regency received as much as IDR
2,417,551,946,000 - This Balancing Fund was
allocated in the Deli Serdang Regency APBD, both in
Regional Revenue and Expenditures. Both direct
shopping and indirect shopping. Deli Serdang
Regency RAPBD for FY 2018, amounting to Rp.
3,733,345,654,763, FY 2019, amounting to Rp.
4,016,480,823,937,-. FY 2021 amounting to Rp.
3,999,683,294,443.00., And, Deli Serdang Regency
RAPBD TA. 2022 amounting to
Rp.4,202,535,350,834.00.
However, the Fiscal Decentralization which has
been implemented by the Deli Medium Government
since 2001, in its implementation, has caused various
kinds of problems in public services in the
community. This can be seen in various kinds of
reactions that arise in the community for a number of
public services in Deli Serdang Regency. Both
services in the field of education, health, and
infrastructure. Such as, Road Infrastructure and
Irrigation.
Especially in services in the field of Education, for
example. Based on reports from a number of online
media, school buildings were damaged and students
did not go to school to go to sea, in Karang Gading
Village, Labuhan Deli District. (Source: Visiting a
remote school in Deli Serdang, the roof was destroyed
and some students skipped to go to sea Kompas.com
- 07/25/2016, 08:57 WIB).
Meanwhile, in the coastal area of Deli Medium
Regency, a high number of children dropping out of
school was also found, especially in the coastal area
of Deli Serdang Regency. And this condition is
recognized by the Education Office of Deli Serdang
Regency. (The Number of Children Dropping Out of
High School on the Deliserdang Coast, This is the
Government's Step Tuesday, June 29, 2021 | 23:37).
According to the Secretary of the Education Office,
Yusnaldi, the high dropout rate in coastal areas is due
to economic factors. Because children work to help
their parents' economy as fishermen, laundry
workers, to work in chicken coops, housemaids, and
some other menial jobs. In addition to economic
factors, this includes children who are involved in
drugs at school. Usually they are dismissed from
school, some are rehabilitated at special drug
rehabilitation sites, but they do not receive education
services and eventually drop out of school. Children
who have legal problems. Then the inmates do not get
educational services and eventually drop out of
school. The Deliserdang Regency Government will
provide access to inclusive education for children
who experience social and marginal problems,
namely children in coastal areas, children living in
rehabilitation and children living in prisons.
In addition, public services in the field of road
infrastructure in Deli Serdang Regency also face a
number of problems. People complain about poor
road infrastructure. Poor road infrastructure in
Namorambe Subdistrict, Percut Sei Tuan.
Meanwhile, people in Namurambe and Percut
Seituan sub-districts complained about poor road
infrastructure. Thus, disrupting the economic
activities of farmers in the distribution of agricultural
products. Damage to road infrastructure due to trucks
carrying excavated goods C. (Residents of
Deliserdang Complain about Poor Road
Infrastructure Wednesday, Antara, March 16 2016
8:49 WIB).
Likewise, damage to road infrastructure occurred
in the Biru-biru District to Bandar Baru, Sibolangit.
And the road in Biru-biru District, from Srilaba
Village to Penen, was badly damaged. About 30
comm long. (Alternative Blue-blue Road -
Bandarbaru Damaged. Analysis, Friday, 11 Nov 2016
17:31 WIB). (Sumatra City Post. Com, Blue-Penen
Road, Deli Serdang Regency, was badly damaged
Tuesday, 15 December 2020 / 17.25.00 WIB.
Fiscal Decentralization and Public Services: Deli Serdang Regency Government Education Sector Expenditure
225
Damage to road infrastructure also occurred in
Patumbak District, Patumbak Kampung Village,
which is on the outskirts of Medan City. The road is
muddy, muddy and waterlogged. (The Bad Section of
the Medan Deli Serdang Border Road The road
connecting Deli Serdang Regency and Medan City,
North Sumatra, is damaged.
Damage to road infrastructure also occurred in Sei
Semayang Village, Sunggal District. People plant
banana trees in the middle of a damaged road as an
outburst of emotion because the road has been left
damaged for a long time. (A hole like a puddle, a
damaged road in Deli Serdang is planted with banana
trees by Datuk Haris Molana – detikNews Friday, 11
Jun 2021 18:26 WIB). The damaged road
infrastructure in Sei Semayang Village, is being
addressed by the Sunggal sub-district head and will
be repaired as soon as possible. (Broken Road Planted
with Banana Trees and Residents Fishing, Camat:
Repaired Next Month, Tribun-Medan.Com,
Saturday, June 12 2021 12:05).
Meanwhile, farmers' irrigation infrastructure was
also damaged. Irrigation gate valves in coastal areas
to prevent sea water from entering farmers' land are
damaged. As a result, sea water enters the farmers'
rice fields. Farmers' irrigation in mountainous areas,
Gunung Paribuan Village, Gunung Meriah District
was damaged by landslides. (Republika.Co.Id, Deli
Serdang Farmer Complains of Damage to Seawater
Preventing Valve. Friday 12 Feb 2016 10:07 WIB).
Saturday, January 23, 2021 - 07.06). As well as,
damage to the village irrigation canal due to
landslides in Gunung Paribuan Village, Gunung
Meriah District. (metrokampung.com, January 22,
2021).
Services in the health sector also cause many
problems. Community groups held demonstrations at
the DPRD Office and the Deli Serdang Regent's
Office, regarding the poor health services in Deli
Serdang Regency. They questioned the construction
of the Bangun Purba Health Center, and the services
of the Tanjung Rejo Health Center, Deli Serdang.
(Daily.com analysis, Aspirations not responded,
Mass seals Deli Serdang Regent's Office Thursday,
13 Aug 2020 19:39 WIB).
Observing the initial information obtained from a
number of online media, it can be concluded
(temporarily) that there are a number of problems in
public services in Seli Serdang Regency. Starting
from services in the fields of Education, Health to
Infrastructure services. Such as, Road and Irrigation
infrastructure. The public responds to this poor public
service in various forms. Starting from complaints to
the mass media, the action of planting trees and
fishing on the road. Until, the demonstration to the
Office of the Regent and DPRD Deli Serdang. And
the distribution of public service problems that arise
includes a number of villages in several sub-districts.
Starting from Percut Sei Tuan District, Pantai Labu
District, Batang Kuis District, Labuhan Deli District,
Sunggal District, Biru-biru District, Namurambe
District, Sibolangit District, Patumbak District,
Bangun Purba District, Gunung Meriah District.
2 RESEARCH METHODS
The research paradigm used is the Constructivist
Paradigm, with Qualitative Research Methods. Data
were collected through in-depth interviews,
discussions with several district informants (Regional
Secretary, Assistant, Head of Agency, Head of
Service), DPRD (Budget Agency), District (Branches
of Service), Schools (SD, SMP), and Community
Leaders (Kabupaten). In addition, data were also
collected through literature study, document study,
and secondary data.
3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
3.1 Public Perception
Based on reports from a number of online media,
services in the field of education, for example. School
buildings were damaged and students who did not go
to school went to sea in Karang Gading Village,
Labuhan Deli District. (Source: Visiting a remote
school in Deli Serdang, the roof was destroyed and
some students skipped to go to sea Kompas.com -
07/25/2016, 08:57 WIB).
Meanwhile, the number of children dropping out
of school in Deli Serdang Regency is quite high,
especially in the coastal area of Deli Serdang
Regency. The information was obtained from the
results of the Deli Serdang Regency regional
leadership meeting in June 2021. As later released by
the following online media:
Angka Anak Putus Sekolah Tinggi di
Pesisir Pantai Deliserdang, Ini Langkah
Pemerintah
DELISERDANG | Pemerintah Kabupaten
Deliserdang yang dipimpin oleh Bupati Deliserdang
Ashari Tambunan membahas tentang langkah
menekan tingginya angka anak putus sekolah yang
tinggal di daerah pesisir pantai Kabupaten
Deliserdang.
ICOSOP 2022 - International Conference on Social and Political Development 4
226
Pertemuan digelar di lantai II Kantor Bupati
Deliserdang yang di ikuti oleh sejumlah pejabat
Pemkab Deliserdang diantaranya Sekretaris Dinas
Pendidikan Deli Serdang
Yusnaldi M.PD, Asisten III Dedi Maswardy, Kepala
Bappeda Ir. Remus Hasiholan Pardede, Kadis
Kominfo Dr. Dra. Hj. Miska Gewasari, MM. dan
Kabag Orta Drs. Syahrul M.Pd, Selasa (29/06/2021).
Dalam paparannya, Sekretaris Dinas Pendidikan
Yusnaldi menjelaskan, tingginya angka putus sekolah
di kawasan pesisir pantai disebabkan faktor ekonomi.
Karena anak bekerja membantu ekonomi orang tua
sebagai nelayan, tukang cuci, sampai bekerja di
kandang ayam, pembantu rumah tangga, dan
beberapa pekerjaan kasar lainnya. Selain faktor
ekonomi juga termasuk anak anak yang terlibat
narkoba di sekolah, Biasanya diberhentikan dari
sekolah, sebagian di rehab di lokasi rehabilitasi
khusus narkoba, tetapi mereka tidak mendapat
layanan pendidikan dan akhirnya putus sekolah. Anak
yang mengalami masalah hukum. Kemudian menjadi
warga binaan tidak mendapatkan layanan pendidikan
dan akhirnya putus sekolah , Sebut Yusnaldi. Adapun
langkah-langkah yang diambil Pemerintah Pemkab
Deliserdang nantinya adalah menyediakan akses
pendidikan inklusif bagi anak yang mengalami
masalah sosial dan marjinal yaitu anak kawasan
pesisir, anak penghuni rehabilitasi dan anak penghuni
lapas.
In addition, public services in the field of road
infrastructure in Deli Serdang Regency also face a
number of problems. People complain about poor
road infrastructure. Poor road infrastructure in
Namorambe Subdistrict, Percut Sei Tuan.
Based on the online media coverage above, as
well as the results of interviews with several
community leader informants, it can be concluded
that public perception of the Education Sector Service
in Deli Serdang Regency is still bad.
3.2 Fiscal Fund Balancing Fund and PAD
Since the commencement of Fiscal Decentralization
in 2001, the National Balance Fund given to regions
in the form of transfers amounted to Rp. 81.1 trillion.
In 2012, the Balancing Fund of Rp. 411.2 trillion. In
2020, Transfers to Regions and Village Funds
(TKDD) will reach Rp. 856.94 trillion. This TKDD
consists of transfers to the Regions in the amount of
IDR784.94 trillion, and Village Funds in the amount
of IDR72.00 trillion.
Since 2001 Deli Serdang Regency has received
the Balancing Fund. For the last four years (2018,
2019, 2020, 2021) Deli Serdang Regency has
received the Balancing Fund. Balancing Fund
originating from DBH (Profit Sharing Fund) Taxes
and DBH SDA (Natural Resources). Also, DAU
(General Allocation Fund) and Physical DAK
(Special Allocation Fund). TKDD FY 2020 Deli
Serdang Regency received as much as Rp.
2,417,551,946,000 - with details of Rp.
2,105,274,617,000 - for transfers to the Region and
Village Fund of Rp. 312,277,329,000-.
This Balancing Fund is allocated in the Deli
Serdang Regency APBD, both in revenue and
expenditure. Both direct shopping and indirect
shopping. The Deli Serdang Regency 2018 Budget
Draft, amounting to Rp. 3,733,345,654,763, with an
indirect expenditure composition of Rp.
2,077,978,733,759. (55%), and direct spending of Rp.
1,688,379,519,365. (45%). The 2018 FY regional
income is projected to be Rp. 3,733,345,654,763. or
increased by Rp. 234.917.232.730. (6.7%) compared
to the 2017 PAPBD realization of Rp.
912,593,775,000. Regional Revenue for FY 2018,
consists of: PAD of Rp. 1,000,927,060,000. There
was an increase of IDR 88,333,285,000 (9.7%)
compared to the 2017 PAPBD of IDR
912,593,775,000. The balancing fund is projected to
be IDR 2,277,174,628,000, and other legitimate
regional income is projected at IDR 455,243,966,763.
The Deli Serdang Regency Budget for the 2019
fiscal year, amounting to Rp. 4,016,480,823,937,
with the composition of indirect expenditures of Rp.
2,000,496.35,123 (49.8%), and direct expenditures of
Rp. 2,015,984,472,814. (50,2). TA regional income.
2019 is projected to be Rp. 3,986,480,823,937, or an
increase of Rp. 345,900..902,127 (10%) compared to
PAPBD for FY 2018. Regional income for FY 2019,
consists of: PAD of Rp. 1,168,365,751,320 or an
increase of Rp. 242,843. 226,241 (26%). The
balancing fund is projected to be IDR
2,063,665,999,250, and other legitimate regional
income is projected at IDR 754,449,073,367.
FY 2020, the realization of Deli Serdang Regency
Revenue in the Year, amounting to Rp.
3,335,349,826,580.82, consisting of: PAD, Balancing
Fund, and other legitimate income. Regional
Expenditure Realization, amounting to Rp.
2,770,409.994,709.19, consisting of: Operational
Expenditure, Capital Expenditure and Unexpected
Expenditure. Transfer realization, amounting to Rp.
503,751,226,013.00, which consists of Transfer of
Regional Tax Revenue Sharing, and Transfer of
Financial Aid to Villages. Receipt of Rp. 83,358,701.
Financing Income, amounting to Rp. 4,3300,000.00.
Fiscal Decentralization and Public Services: Deli Serdang Regency Government Education Sector Expenditure
227
Excess Budget Financing (SiLPA), amounting to Rp.
140,217,596.42.
Deli Serdang Regency Budget Draft FY2021,
with a projected regional income of Rp.
3,999,683,294,443.00., consisting of: PAD, transfer
income, and other legitimate regional income.
Regional expenditures amounted to Rp.
4,026,683,296,443, consisting of: operating
expenditures, capital expenditures, unexpected
expenditures and transfer expenditures. Regional
financing receipts amounting to Rp.
45,000,000,000.00. Meanwhile, regional financing
expenditures are Rp. 18,000,000,000.00, so that the
net financing is Rp. 27,000,000,000.00.
Deli Serdang Regency APBD Draft TA. 2022,
Regional Income of Rp.4,202,535,350,834.00
consisting of: PAD, transfer income, and other
legitimate regional income. Regional expenditures
amounted to Rp.4.229,535,350,834.00, consisting of:
operating expenditures, capital expenditures,
unexpected expenditures, and transfer expenditures,
regional financing receipts amounting to
Rp.45,000,000,000.00. Meanwhile, regional
financing expenditures are Rp. 18,000,000,000.00 so
that the net financing is Rp. 27,000,000,000.00.
For more details, the Deli Serdang Regency
Balance Fund (2018-2021), see Table 1 below:
Table 1: DAU, DAK, DBH, Deli Serdang Regency
(2018-2021)
REGENCY BALANCED FUND. DELI
SERDANG 2018-2021
2018 2019 2020 2021
DBH
PAJAK
67.901.641.7
42,00
58.101.539
.036,00
62.265.354.1
32,00
51.723.141.4
18,00
DBH SDA
2.338.865.90
2,00
1.144.676.778,00 3.787.195.86
5,00
3.991.671.50
9,00
DAK
(Regular
Physical
:
Education
, Health &
Family
Planning)
31.552.035.0
00
(education)
18.614.912.0
00 (Health
&
Family
Planning)
DAK
(Physical
Assignme
nt:
Sanitation
,
Environm
ent,
Forestry)
Meanwhile, in 2021 Deli Serdang Regency will
only receive Regular Physical DAK. Regular
Physical DAK covers the fields of Education, Health
and Family Planning. Education consists of PAUD,
SD, SMP, SKB. Health includes basic services,
referral services, pharmaceutical services and
consumables, improving health system readiness, and
family planning.
Revenue from PAD (Regional Original Opinion)
of Deli Serdang Regency in the last four years, seen
from the realization rate has increased. Except for
2020, there was a decrease due to reasons related to
the Covid-19 Pandemic. See Table 2 below.
Table 2: PAD of Deli Serdang Rgency (2018-2021)
Meanwhile, the number of schools in Deli Serdang
Regency is 1,914 schools. The number of schools
consisted of 52 MA schools, 190 MI schools, 148
MTs schools, 915 elementary schools, 1 SDTK, 2
SKB schools, 136 SMA schools, 2 SMAK schools,
127 vocational schools, 329 junior high schools. 1
school, SMPTK 1 school, SMATK 2 schools, SPK
SD 4 schools, SPK SMA 1 school, and SPK SMP 4
schools.
Meanwhile, the number of teachers and education
personnel in Deli Serdang Regency is 20,322 people.
SD 11, 779 people, SMP 4,590, and SMA 1,912
people. See Table 3 below.
Table 3: Teachers and Education Personnel of Deli Serdang
Regency
Center for Data and Statistics Kemendikbud.
Note: Residual Data is the Total GTK that does not
match the Reference Table.
Reg
i
o
n
a
l
O
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
Reve
n
u
e, De
l
i
Se
r
d
a
n
g Rege
n
c
y
YEAR 2018 2019 2020 2021
RESUM E 573.010.351.004,9
6
849.286.151.151,00 729.648.594.488,68 825.375.281.296,75
SD 11,
7
7
9
SM P 4,
5
9
0
SM
A
1,
9
1
2
SM K 1,
9
7
8
SD L B 1
7
SM PL B
0
SM L B
0
DATA RESIDU
4
6
T
O
T
A
LLY
2
0
,
3
2
2
ICOSOP 2022 - International Conference on Social and Political Development 4
228
Services in the Education Sector in Deli Serdang
Regency, seen from the 2019 Pure Participation Rate
(APM) indicator, shows that SD (95.03) and SMP
(70.82). See Table 4 below.
Table 4: Pure Partiviation Rate (APM) of Deli Serdang
Regency in 2019
BPS-National Sosio Economic Survey 2019
Based on the information above, Deli Serdang
Regency's Balancing Fund and PAD (Regional
Original Income) for 4 years (2018-2021), mandatory
spending on Education Sector is still focused on
Education Personnel (teachers), has not touched
infrastructure spending much (physical/building) and
Increasing NER (Pure Participation Rate).
Richard Batley & Claire Mcloughlin (2015: 275-
285), suggest several characteristics of public
services related to politics. Public services that are
high visibility always receive political intervention.
See Table 5 below:
Table 5: The political effects of service characteristics
Richard Batley & Claire Mcloughlin (2015).
Bartley and McLoughlin (2015) mention, "Political
incentives to provide increase where services offer..."
"High visibility: outputs are physically visible or
problem has high public profile." Political incentives
in providing a service sector will increase if the output
of the service is physically visible to the public. For
the Government, measurable output will facilitate
control and encourage greater spending allocations.
Physical school buildings (SD, SMP) in the Regency
are a service sector with measurable output
(measured), and easy to see by the community (high
visibility). In addition, the development of education
infrastructure (SD, SMP) is still a concern of the
Government, so that it will encourage an increase in
the allocation of spending on education infrastructure.
4 CONCLUSIONS
Based on the discussion of the results of previous
research, it can be concluded as follows: First, that
Public Perception of Services in the Education Sector
in Deli Serdang Regency is still bad; Second,
mandatory spending on education spending is still
focused on education personnel (teachers), not for
infrastructure spending (physical/building) and
increasing the NER (pure participation rate).
Bartley and McLoughlin (2015) stated,
"Political incentives to provide increase where
services offer..." "High visibility: outputs are
physically visible or problem has high public profile."
Political incentives in providing a service sector will
increase if the output of the service is physically
visible to the public. For the Government, measurable
output will facilitate control and encourage greater
spending allocations. Physical school buildings (SD,
SMP) in the Regency are a service sector with
measurable output (measured), and easy to see by the
community (high visibility). In addition, the
development of education infrastructure (SD, SMP)
is still a concern of the Government, so that it will
encourage an increase in the allocation of spending on
education infrastructure.
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