#Kamitidaktakut:

Revisit the Truth of Security on Social Media after the Surabaya Blast

Ganesh Cintika Putri

and Shafira Elnanda Yasmine

Research and Development Unit, Ministry of Law and Human Rights of Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia

Keywords: terrorism, security, social media, post-truth, Indonesia

Abstract: Several hours after a bomb blast in Surabaya, the internet was flooded by the hashtag #kamitidaktakut (we

are not afraid) and #surabayaorawedi (Surabaya is not afraid). International media claimed that the attack

was the worst in a decade suffered by Indonesia, highlighting the involvement of women and children as the

attackers. The Indonesian government was urged of the necessity to impose a Terrorism Law even though

the draft received criticism due to the distortion of human rights values. In such circumstances, the public

displays a different response as depicted in social media, stating that the public is not afraid. The research

question proposed is ‘How does the public, as the targeted victim of terrorism, offer an alternative narrative

when responding to a recent terror act in Surabaya?’ We employed post-truth as the main perspective to

analyse the issue. In the post-truth era, objective reality is no longer relevant. Instead of being sensed,

community and information exchanges in social interaction play a great role in truth construction. Social

media has become a platform for truth contestation. This article argues that the public’s engagement in

social media shows the citizen’s spontaneous effort to combat the feeling of being terrorised by considering

the attack to be irrelevant. The data was collected through observations on internet platforms and through a

literature review. The conclusion reached was that while the government signifies the ‘state paranoia’ by

imposing a controversial counter-terrorism policy, the public had succeeded in delivering the message that

they are not afraid, thus rendering the attack insignificant.

1 INTRODUCTION

Indonesia was once again projected as a haven for

terrorism following the last bombing wave in

Surabaya last May. The deadly suicide bombings hit

the second-biggest city, aimed at vital places such as

the Catholic Church and Police Headquarters

(Hermawan, 2018), while another premature

explosion took place in a flat in Sidoarjo. The

Time’s magazine claimed that the attack was the

worst in the decade suffered by Indonesia,

highlighting the involvement of women and children

as the attackers (Hincks, 2018). The event took place

just before Ramadhan, the holy month for Muslims,

and served as a wake-up call for both the

government and society that terrorism never sleeps.

President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) condemned the act

and stated that “This is the act of cowards,

undignified and barbaric” (Hincks, 2018). Moreover,

Jokowi stressed the urgency to legalise the Law on

Terrorism as soon as possible. The draft itself had

long been considered polemic in nature compared to

the national legislative process due to its lack of

human rights measures.

Existing studies mostly see terrorism issues as a

conflict between terrorists and states, which are then

defined as executive, armed forces and the police.

Subhan (Subhan, 2016) and Johnson’s (2016)

studies, for example, analyse periodisation based on

changes in the pattern of terrorism that have led to

differences in governmental responses from 1998

through to 2016. Meanwhile, Febrica (Febrica,

2010) limited their study to a shorter period in the

Megawati and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono era,

which identified to what degree the two Presidents

conducted securitisation in response to terrorism.

Seniwati went further by discussing how the United

States influenced the government's response in

Indonesia (Seniwati & Alimudin, 2016).

This paper argues that a mere highlight on the

government’s response would only deliver a partial

insight into the counter-terrorism strategy. As

Putri, G. and Yasmine, S.

Kamitidaktakut.

DOI: 10.5220/0008819902470254

In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Contemporary Social and Political Affairs (ICoCSPA 2018), pages 247-254

ISBN: 978-989-758-393-3

 2019 by SCITEPRESS – Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All r ights reserved

247

mentioned by Thetford, terror should be publicised

by its perpetrators to create fear (Thetford, 2001).

There is a lingering gap in addressing the question of

social media becoming a truth contestation platform

for a group that has been influenced by a terror act.

Previous studies are lacking in the portrayal of how

terror acts are directed not only at the state but also

to every human living in it – which is society.

Particularly for Surabaya, this shocked the

citizens since it was the first time that such an attack

had rocked the city. The recent terrorist events

sparked a widespread reaction and flow of

information via social media. However, the public

response created a common pattern: to deliver the

message to the terror perpetrators that the public

were not terrorised. Hours after the first bomb

blasted in Santa Maria Tak Bercela Catholic Crunch,

social media was flooded by the hashtag

#Suroboyoorawedi (Surabaya is not afraid). Since

terrorism aims to spread terror, the simplest anti-

thesis would be saying that the public was not afraid.

The social media stream, however, also provides

a pattern related to the phenomena that the truth was

not for taken for granted. Thus, the research question

proposed is how social media creates and obscures

the dominant narrative when responding to

Surabaya’s recent bombings. In this research, the

authors believe that truth has been produced and

reproduced through the various messages spread in

society, particularly on social media. The truth

perceived would further influence the decision and

behaviours of related parties: in this paper, the

Government and the public. We employed post-truth

analysis to reveal the connection between social

media and public resistance to terrorism.

2 RESEARCH METHOD

This research was mainly conducted using a

literature review and discourse analysis to capture

the government and public’s response regarding

Surabaya Bombings. The references were limited to

social media, public engagements, post-truth,

constructivism, terrorism and counter-terrorism.

Post-truth was applied to determine an alternative to

the dominant narrative prevailing in society on

terrorism. We analysed the outreach of the tweets

using Tweetreach to measure engagement and the

spread of terror-related tweets after the Surabaya

attack. By seeking out an alternative discourse in

analysing the impact of the terror act in society, we

hope to contribute by providing a complete image in

this particular counter-terrorism study.

3 FINDING AND DISCUSSION

3.1 Social Media: A Contestation Space

for Narratives

The world has witnessed the massive growth of

technology and the development of social media

over the past decade. Social media has emerged as a

potential research field which can uncover broad

social phenomena. It can capture the millions of

invisible interactions in a network and provides a

readable pattern of social reactions. Social media has

increasingly been used by citizens in the local up to

the global scale to spread real-time event news,

particularly in a crisis. Information scattered in

social media diffuses in various forms such as

supporting social resilience and spreading

information. On the other hand, social media can

also play a disruptive role by informing the public of

inaccurate details and being a platform for

antagonist commentary (Burnap et al., 2014).

However, social media is not yet a coherent

academic discipline or a distinctive intelligence

tradecraft, even though it features intersections

between various disciplines ranging from computer

sciences to ethnography, communication and brand

management (Bartlett and Reynolds, 2015).

Specifically discussing terrorism, social media

analysis focusing on how society reacts to terror and

the reflection is less popular compared to how social

media is used as a tool to expand the radicalism

which leads to terrorism. However, many attempts

have been made in drawing relations between the

reactive response in social media and the goals of

terrorism as perceived by society. Burnap et al

(2014) published research on the social media

reaction after the Woolwich terrorist attack,

specifically analysing the reactions shared on

Twitter. This study measures the sentiment and

tension expressed in tweets quantitatively and has

predicted the information flow size and survival of

the terrorist event. It suggests that the social factors

explained the largest amount of variance in the

content factors and temporal factors. Therefore, to

create a large information flow regarding the

terrorist event, social features played a crucial part.

The research proves that the opinion/emotional

factors of tweets are statistically important in major

socially disruptive events such as terrorism.

This argument was supported by Careless, who

stated that social media is a digital space where

billions of people interact in an unlimited manner.

Nowadays, people can share and talk about the same

issues through retweeting, tagging and hashtagging.

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Facebook, Twitter and Instagram suddenly become a

new space to argue, debate and sometimes

consolidate. As essentially free, virtual non-

hierarchical tools that facilitate user-generated

knowledge, these online spaces may be powerful

applications for talking – or "typing" – back to the

dominant narrative and giving voice to counter-

discourse (Careless, 2015).

Social media is defined as user-controlled and

user-created because of its easiness and openness of

use. This tool can be transparent, flexible and

democratic, in which participation, collaboration,

and knowledge sharing can be forced through a

simple application. Even for those who actively

participate in the digital space –digital citizenship,

with the individuals known as netizens - they have

the opportunity to become engaged in advocating for

themselves or their society. Social media, like any

other democratic channel, provides a wider space for

questioning inequitable social, cultural, and political

systems that serve the interests of a dominant

minority, but that are embedded in everyday

practices (Careless, 2015). This characteristic allows

critical discourse to challenge the dominant

ideology. But because of its flexibility and

accessibility, social media can become a discourse-

controller while at the same time, becoming a

counter-discourse tool.

3.2 Mapping the aim of terrorism

Many terrorist acts have put the weight of

justification on the cliché saying stated that "One

person's terrorist is another person’s freedom

fighter." Such a definition leads to a highly

contested debate related to the goal of terror groups.

Fortna (2015) defines terrorists as a group that

employ a campaign of indiscriminate violence

against public civilians to target a wider audience

with the main goal to coerce the government into

making political concessions. What makes terrorism

horrible is the intentional targeting of civilians and

the randomness of the attack. Therefore, it is clear

that the aim of the terror is not limited to the victim

of the violence, but rather, it is to send a message to

the masses. For Wilkinson and Stewart, terrorism is

generally viewed as a specific method of struggle

that can be executed by various actors. Terrorism is

also highlighted as the weapon of the poor because it

aims to address political changes but is not

supported by adequate costs to achieve the goal

(Özdamar, 2008).

The act of terrorism has been used as a form of

communication with targets that symbolise the goal

of the attack. As mentioned by Thetford(2001), “…

[T]he terrorist needs to publicise his attack. If no one

knows about it, then it will not produce fear. The

need for publicity often drives target selection; the

greater the symbolic value of the target, the more

publicity that the attack brings to the terrorists and

the more fear that it generates.”

Given the characteristics, terrorism is believed to be

a social construction rather than a physical fact,

constituted through discourse. Even though the

terror is real and performed by real people, the

interpretation of such actions could be different.

Thus, it influences policy implications because the

interpretation could draw a conceptual foundation in

the policy-making process (Spencer, 2012).

The terrorist act that happened in Surabaya was

highly associated with symbolism to promote fear.

In analysing the Surabaya blast, we could not

override the riots that happened in Mako Brimob,

committed by the cell where Aman Abdurrahman,

Jamaah Ansharut Daulah’s (JAD) leader was jailed

for his association with the planning and the funding

of the Thamrin Bomb in early 2016. The riots

happened several weeks before the bombings in

Surabaya. The JAD leadership was then diverted to

Zainal Anshori, East Java’s JAD leader. However,

Anshori was captured in April 2017 due to his

involvement in funding arms moving from the

Southern Philippines to Indonesia. This information

has been confirmed by Tito Karnavian, the chief of

Indonesian National Police. Karnavian claimed that

the legal system underwent by the JAD leaders

evoked the rage of JAD members in Jawa Timur

(Sumandoyo, 2018). Surabaya’s terror was

perceived as an effort to send messages to the wider

audience that JAD could not be ruled out.

What makes the Surabaya blast different from the

previous attacks that happened in Indonesia is the

actor’s involvement, which acts as another display

of symbol to promote fear. The first bomb that

happened in Bunda Maria Tak Bercela Catholic

Church was executed by a whole family consisting

of the father, mother, and three children. The third

bomb that exploded in Mako Brimob also involved

the husband, wife and children, even though the

youngest child happened to survive.

Abdurrahman, who was sentenced to death last May,

stated that the involvement of children in suicide

bombing was a "barbaric act using the name of

Jihad" (BBC, 2018). The JAD leader believed that a

mom that leads her child in the way to detonate

suicide bomb is an act that could never be

undertaken if a person truly understands Islam and

the guidance of Jihad, as he stated in his Pledoi.

Kamitidaktakut

249

However, a clear message was sent to the worldwide

audience regarding the attack. Family, as the most

intimate group in social interactions, could not

prevent the spread of radicalism. Instead, the family

plays a vital part in providing a perspective to

children about the use of violence. This kind of

attack is new, and the involvement of family

members was out of the range of any of the

predictions before the terror attack happened in

Surabaya.

3.3 Surabaya Attacks: The State of

Paranoia

After the bombing, the police, military and the

executive's responses illustrate a similar pattern of

behaviour. Karnavian declared a joint operation

countering terrorism with the military called

Koopsusgab (Komando Operasi Khusus Gabungan).

This operation was directly approved by the

President and by the Presidential Special Staff

member, Moeldoko, without any specific time limit

to completing the operation. The team, which

included personnel of the Army’s Special Forces

(Kopassus), the Navy’s Denjaka specialised squad

and the Air Force’s Bravo 90 special force, would be

put on standby and should be ready to be mobilised

any time that terror threats emerged (Jakartapost,

2018). Although the joint force was first designed to

assist the national police, this team will be

commanded by the TNI commander while any

further tasks of special command will be discussed

later. Jakartapost claimed that the police looked

unconfident at the idea of tackling terrorism, and so

called the military for help. Tito’s statement and

Moeldoko’s act followed a recent string of terrorist

attacks that thrust the country into a state of

paranoia. Moreover, the revitalisation of the joint

team did not require any regulation while the

parliament was still debating the military’s

involvement in the counter-terrorism act.

The urgency of involving the military in

countering terrorism was implied in the President

Jokowi's speech. Jokowi urged the House of

Representatives to expedite the deliberation of a

draft revision to the 2003 Terrorism Law. The

President even raised an ultimatum to issue a

regulation (Perppu) to apply to the Terrorism Law if

the House failed to ratify the amendment by June

(Amnesty International, 2018). For two years,

human right activists have strongly campaigned

against the law as it grants direct military

involvement in counter-terrorism operations and

internal security matters. There is a huge insecurity;

if the law tends to threaten human rights in these two

aspects, then first, the vagueness of some of the

law's wording could be used by the authorities to

restrict the freedom of expression, association, and

peaceful assembly or it could be further misused to

label peaceful political activities as terrorism.

Second, the law erodes safeguards against arbitrary

detention and against torture and other ill-treatment,

as well as expanding the scope of the application of

the death penalty (Amnesty International, 2018).

Nonetheless, only twelve days after the bombing,

Indonesia's parliament unanimously approved the

controversial anti-terrorism law after prolonged

deliberations since 2016. The insecurity of human

right abuse was then anticipated by presidential

decree in which the new anti-terrorism law allowed

for military involvement so long as the police

requested it and the president gave their approval.

Right after the attacks, the President declared the

issuance of the regulation in lieu of the law (Perppu)

on terrorism if the House failed to ratify the

amendment by June. The President’s eagerness to

pass the law signifies the state paranoia which

indicates an unclear policy in combating terrorism.

This act put the public in distress as the police were

unable to handle the attacks and the only way to

solve the problem was by giving the military greater

authority. Even though the Islamic State in Iraq and

Syria (ISIS) has been identified as an international

terrorist organisation, Indonesia is not one of the

core ISIS operational target. Therefore, military

involvement in countering terrorism was

unnecessary, even though it is threatening national

security (Tempo, 2018). Terrorism-related crimes

are regulated in the Criminal Code that lies within

the domain of the police. Undermining human rights

enforcement for the sake of counter-terrorism

indicates the state’s inability to manage the terror

act. Instead, it confirms the paranoia endured by the

state.

3.4 #kamitidaktakut: Grassroot's

Responses in the Era of Post-Truth

This paper argued that #Surabayaorawedi is the

manifestation of the counter truth that emanated

from the grassroots movement. Jokowi’s speech

right after the attacks was a truth pinned down by

the government. The government had the power to

symbolise the attacks and define what the attack

was. This definition could simply be traced back by

examining the government’s responses after the

attacks. The government perceived the Surabaya

attack to be a dangerous threat which terrorising

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national security. Terror or terrorism has multiple

definitions but what makes it different from other

violence is its emphasis on terror. As Dwicahyo

stated, any terrifying message that scares society as a

consequence of an attack can be as powerful as the

actual act of violence (Dwicahyo, 2015). The police

and government’s inability to tackle the attacks

strengthens the terror itself.

In the middle of terror – supported – indirectly -

by the government, the Surabaya people offer

another perspective. Instead of being trapped in a

state of panic and paranoia, the Surabaya people

declared that they are not afraid of terrorism. The

distinct reaction displayed by the public emerged as

a platform that underlies the process of truth

creation, proposing a counter-narrative for the

prevailing discourse implemented by the

government. Therefore, post-truth analysis is

essential in understanding the public response

regarding the terror.

The idea of post-truth is nothing new. Andrew

Kirkpatrick proclaimed post-truth to be the morbid

actuality of the postmodern condition where there is

no single truth (Kirkpatrick, 2017) In the other word,

the truth is perceived as something relative. For

those who embrace postmodernism as something to

celebrate, this relativism of truth is perceived as a

triumph over domineering, homogenising and

oppressive discourse in which the truth is emanating

from the individual's perspective. It does not mean

that post-truth leads to the absence of truth, but

inverse to this, it leads to the proliferation of truths.

Kirkpatrick compares this multiplicity of truth to the

marketplace of ideas. When truth becomes a

product, as it has in the marketplace of ideas, street

hawkers are bound to emerge in order to sell specific

truths. The public's denial of a specific truth simply

implies that there is a better product on the market.

The idea is that the offering of truth will never be

perceived by the masses if no partial truth has been

trusted before. In Foucault's terms, truth can only be

perceived as long as the subject, and the object is in

the same discourse (Foucault, 2002). For example,

in the authoritarian regime, there was only a single

truth since the supreme leader had huge power when

it came to dominating the discourse. But, in the era

of post-truth, every single individual has got the

access to be involved in the contestation of truth.

If post-truth is perceived to be a celebration of

democratisation, it means that individuals have the

choice whether or not to believe or counter the

dominant narratives and to create their own truth –

Derrida called this method deconstruction

(McIntyre, 2018). This truth will then compete in the

middle of the so-called marketplace of ideas. In this

stage, rationality and expertise are no longer

relevant. The only thing that is relevant is how much

power does the subject has. How then can an

individual with limited power be able to compete in

the marketplace of ideas and offer a new truth?

Thus, it provides a space for social media to take

part. Zarzalejos claimed that Trump winning was

influenced by the power of tweeting (Zarzalejos,

2017). For those who are sceptical of post-truth, the

‘Twitter strategy' was seen of as the winning of

hoaxes and lies. For those who were an optimist in

post-truth, social media was perceived as the new

democracy channel.

Figure 1: Tweet from Cabinet Secretariat

Source: thejakartapost.com, 2018

In the recent Surabaya blast, social media has

become a crucial battlefield in both spreading and

countering the terror. Social media has provided

accessible information and updated details about the

newest situation and victims. Indonesian netizens

have responded to the attack by hashtags aimed to

counter the intention of spreading terror (Andipita,

2018). The Indonesian Twittersphere was

immediately flooded by resilient hashtags about the

incident such as #BersatuLawanTerorisme and

#KamiTidakTakutTeroris. Some of them are written

Kamitidaktakut

251

in the Javanese language, stating

#SuroboyoOraWedi or #SuroboyoWani.

#Suroboyoorawedi has played a vital part in creating

civic engagement to address the issue.

Figure 1 stated that “circulating photos of the

bombing victims on social media is what the

terrorists expect us to do to spread fear among us.”

Even though the tweet was officially published by

the Cabinet Secretariat Official account, the picture

received a massive response regarding retweets and

likes from Twitter netizens (Andapita, 2018).

Figure 2. Response from Netizen

Source: Twitter, 2018

As shown in Figure 2, Twitter has been host to

volatile statements from its netizens. Surabaya’s

football team twitter account said the following:

“For all parties who have a bad intention to

Surabaya… don’t mess with the city of heroes. You

disrupt the crocodile - an animal that represents the

symbol of Surabaya city -, Surabaya is not afraid!”

The tweet engagement reached 4.797 retweets and

3.050 likes. Another Twitter user put up a post

showing a billboard picture in the city. The billboard

reads, “Teroris jancuk!” (Fuck terrorists), stating

that the Surabaya netizen’s response in counter-

terrorism was highly resilient. Faktuals.co (Setyanto,

2018) analysed the Twitter hashtag #Suroboyowani

and found that in 5 minutes, 100 tweets were posted

containing the hashtag. Also within 5 minutes, the

100 tweets had reached 63.077 accounts with a total

81.235 impressions.

Another impression of the related hashtags was

that they had a wide number of engagements. In

Graphic 1, we employed tweetreach to analyse the

reach of a tweet and its counter-terrorism specific

hashtags. The tweets were analysed in July 2018,

approximately six weeks after the attack. However,

the public still shows a high amount of engagement

with posts related to terrorism. We searched for

#kamitidaktakutteroris (we are not afraid of

terrorists) and #lawanterorisme (fight against

terrorism) and found 4.501 and 245.721 exposure

points for both hashtags respectively.

The question that social media has tried to

uncover in the relation to the truth contestation

encompasses how we are living in the middle of a

remarkable increase in our ability to share, to

cooperate with one another, and to take collective

action, all outside of the framework of traditional

institutions and organisations (Obar, Zube and

Lampe, 2012). Under the framework of the debate of

truth, the public refuse to acknowledge that

terrorism creates disruption to the city. Admitting

that terrorism has succeeded in spreading mass fear

only serves the interests of the terrorist. The public

response through social media, when analysed,

showed the contrary. Social media activity

represents a collective action taken right after the

bombings: sending the message that people are not

afraid, which renders the act of terror as having

failed to terrorise the public.

Figure 3: Related hashtags engagement on Twitter

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4 CONCLUSIONS

The Surabaya blast resulted in a diverging response

from the government and from society. If the

dominant narrative mentioned the urge to use full

force to counter the terror act, then Surabaya’s

citizen responded to the counter terrorism by

flipping back the idea of terror. The flexibility

brought in by social media was successfully utilised

to counter the dominant narrative.

#kamitidaktakutteroris or #surabayagakwedi,

hashtags that went viral, implied public resilience in

responding to the terror act. Twitter provides a

platform for Surabaya’s people to send messages

stating that the terror was no longer relevant. What

the public perceived became a mainstream view that

eventually formed a prevailing narrative in society.

Finally, this paper does not necessarily claim that

the tweeting strategy successfully defeats the

dominant narrative regarding terrorist attacks.

Community efforts to popularise #surabayagakwedi

and #kamitidaktakutteroris have, instead,

successfully provided an alternative narrative

responding to the terrorist attacks in Surabaya,

united in a public engagement saying, “we are not

afraid!”.

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