The Influence of Groups in Foreign Policy Formulation: Analysis of

Israel’s Policy on Iran’s Nuclear Agreement

Tisa Larasati and I. Gede Wahyu Wicaksana

International Relations Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Airlangga

Keywords: Israel’s foreign policy, group level of analysis, rational policy model, Iran nuclear deal

Abstract: As a critical actor in the issue of Iran’s nuclear deal, Israel’s foreign policy is rather different from many

others’: Israel disagrees with both Iran’s nuclear deal and their nuclear development in general. Israel’s

foreign policy, then, becomes interesting to discuss, especially by analyzing the factors that influence the

decision making of their policy. In this article, therational policy model derived from the group level of

analysis is used to analyze and elaborate the decision making process of Israel’s foreign policy toward Iran’s

nuclear deal. This article argues that the result of Israel’s decision making process for their foreign policy is

influeced by group actors surrounding Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu which are the Inner

Cabinet and the Security Cabinet. This article finds that even though there is indeed influence from group

actors in the decision making process of Israel’s foreign policy, said influence is rather complementary

because decisions issued by the group actors heavily depend on several particular factors that cannot be

explained by the group level of analysis.

1 INTRODUCTION

Behind the Joint Comprehensive Action Agreement

(JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1 countries

(China, France, Russia, Britain, the United States and

Germany) that have been implemented, there is still

disagreement over Iran’s nuclear development. In

general, this is due to the distrust, scepticism and fear

of the state that the existing agreement is not an

effective form of prevention against Iran. Saudi

Arabia, for example, as a Middle East country is seen

most likely to use nuclear weapons because it

considers Iran as an enemy and threats to the position

of regional hegemonic positions and to its own

internal monarchy (Einhorn and Nephew 2016, vii).

The disagreement also came from Israel, the actor

who best accentuated the negative response, when

Israel was actually increasingly free from security

threats with the deal (Gillon 2017). Israel’s strong

refusal of the JCPOA agreement also struck me as

seeing that the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) has confirmed that Iran has complied with the

terms of the deal by dismantling and removing 2/3 of

its centrifugal, reducing the 98% uranium stock by

sending 25,000 pounds of uranium out of the country,

and giving open access to its nuclear facilities-

something that Iran had never done before (Gillet

2017).

Based on the background, the author draws the

research question: Why did Israel formulate foreign

policy to refuse Iran’s nuclear development and

JCPOA agreement? To answer that question, the

author will first map explanandum and explanans in

this article. Explanandum of the case study is Israeli

policy against Iran’s nuclear issue itself. Then, the

explanation is described further by using group-level

analysis. More specifically, the author uses a rational-

policy model in that group's variables. The author

argue that Israel’s foreign policy, which is oriented

towards denial of any nuclear development, was

formulated because of the great influence of group

actors around Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin

Netanyahu.

2 GROUPS VARIABLE IN LEVEL

OF ANALYSIS

To analyze the policy of a country, there are a number

of variables in the level of analysis that can be used;

one of them is the group variable. In a group variable,

a country’s foreign policy is not only formulated by

an individual but by a group of individuals or

602

Larasati, T. and Wicaksana, I.

The Inﬂuence of Groups in Foreign Policy Formulation: Analysis of Israel’s Policy on Iran’s Nuclear Agreement.

DOI: 10.5220/0010280900002309

In Proceedings of Airlangga Conference on International Relations (ACIR 2018) - Politics, Economy, and Security in Changing Indo-Paciﬁc Region, pages 602-608

ISBN: 978-989-758-493-0

different decision units at different times following

the issues being discussed. The existing unit decisions

vary in size; structured in a formal or inadequate

manner, having various good names, the junta, the

cabinet, the coalition, the parliaments-but whatever it

is called, they formulate collective foreign policy. Of

the many decision units, the highest position is held

by a person or a group that is in a position when he

can not only take policy but also can prevent the

occurrence of foreign policy reversal efforts by other

groups within the government (Breuning 2007, 86).

Breuning (2007, 89) describes that three are

approaches in managing advisory systems at the

executive level: (1) formalistic, (2) competitive, and

(3) collegial. The formalistic approach underscores

the existence of a hierarchical structure with a clear

chain of command. In this approach, it is explained

that their respective counsellors inform leaders about

aspects of a problem according to their expertise and

under the jurisdiction of their department. Leaders

who use this approach are the kinds of leaders who

seek to create a regular decision-making process by

prioritizing analysis and how to make the “best”

decision (Breuning 2007, 89). However, the

formalistic approach has the disadvantage that a

leader does not know whether there is a piece of

information that is intentionally left out or distorted

when he receives it. This weakness can be overcome

by the second approach of a competitive approach

that explains how leaders, in managing executives,

access information from multiple sources (Breuning

2007, 90). In this approach the potential for conflict

is possible; this is because how advisors have a high

role in the decision-making process, so there is a

tendency for counsellors who provide incomplete or

impartial information. This approach, if used

properly, can result in creative, politically acceptable

solutions, and can be done bureaucratically. Different

from a competitive approach, the focus of a collegial

approach is on taking advantage of a competitive

approach-that is, the number of sources of

information-and focusing the use of that information

through teamwork rather than competition. To ensure

that a collegial approach works well, according to

Breuning (2007, 91), a balance between diversity of

opinions, mediation of differences, and

encouragement of the group; and herein lies the

difficulty of the approach itself.

After describing these three approaches, Breuning

(2007, 95-96) outlines three models to explain the

processes of foreign policy making in a country: (1)

rational policy model, (2) organizational process

model, and (3) bureaucratic political model. The

rational policy model assumes that foreign policy is

made as if a single rational decision maker analyzes

strategic issues and, once the problem has been

successfully defined, selects the policy response of

the options. The process of decision-making in this

model is divided into four steps: (1) identification of

national interests, (2) identification of options, (2)

cost/benefit analysis of options, and (4) selection of

best policy alternatives that serve the interests. The

weakness of this model lies in how this model does

not take into account the possibility of distorting

information in complex advisory systems consisting

of individuals, departments, and agents; this model

also does not take into account the identification of

national interests that do not have to be openly

(Breuning 2007, 96). Meanwhile, the organizational

process model sees the government as a collectively

coordinated organization centrally above, each

having expertise in its field of priority and different

perceptions.Breuning (2007, 97) writes that the

decision-making process of this model departs from

(1) the termination of preference by experts and

organizational interests, towards (2) adaptation of

standard operational procedures (SOPs), to ultimately

produce (3) the feasibility of determining policy

choices. According to this model, inadequate policy

responses are not the result of failure to evaluate the

risks and benefits of each option objectively but from

the existing organizational weaknesses. The final

model, the bureaucratic political model focuses on the

role of individuals within government organizations,

explains that individuals have specific roles: (1) they

lead, or work within, a particular agency or

department; and (2) they are placed at specific

locations within a hierarchical structure of the agency

or department (Breuning 2007, 97). Bureaucratic

political models emphasize that the advisory and

priority advisors are shaped by the organization and

their personal ambitions and interests; so policy

becomes the end result of complex bargaining action

at various levels-be it hierarchically or horizontally.

In a government cabinet as a small-group decision

unit, the prime minister can become a dominant figure

even though the responsibilities of cabinet members

as government executives are collective. Breuning

(2007, 99) also noted that small groups such as

government cabinets have a tendency to resemble

think tanks and command centers. In think tanks, a

reliable group of advisers will usually use the

information even if it is incomplete to jointly

construct representations of a foreign policy issue,

determine the significance of the problem from other

problems, and debate ways to respond. Meanwhile,

the command center uses the role of think tank to

choose from a set of available options, evaluate them,

The Inﬂuence of Groups in Foreign Policy Formulation: Analysis of Israel’s Policy on Iran’s Nuclear Agreement

603

choose the most possible, and ultimately formulate a

decision. The command center is where the advisors

formulate foreign policy action. The similarity of the

think tank and command center is how the small

group has the same function of involvement in the

real action of the formulation of the decision itself. In

addition, they also have additional functions that are

(1) helping the government to show that they are a

group working together for the national interest, (2)

as a refuge, and (3) functioning as ‘smoke screens’

behind the informal group that performs the real

action of the formulation of the decision itself

(Breuning 2007, 100-101).

In a case study of Israel’s foreign policy on the

issue of Iran’s nuclear deal, the authors used a rational

policy model to analyze the formulation of policies

undertaken by the Israeli government. The author

argues that Israel’s foreign policy on the Iranian

nuclear issue, which is oriented in the absence of any

nuclear development, was formulated because of the

influence of group actors around Prime Minister

Benjamin Netanyahu. Some of the most significant

group actors are the Cabinet of Security and the Inner

Cabinet of Israel.

3 CASE STUDY OF IRAN’S

NUCLEAR AGREEMENT AND

ISRAEL’S PERSPECTIVE

The talks aimed at preventing Iran from developing

and starting a nuclear weapons competition

eventually resulted in a Joint Comprehensive Plan of

Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1 countries

on July 14, 2015. The JCPOA is aimed at reducing

Iran’s uranium holding capacity and redesigning a

plutonium production reactor which has been planned

by Iran, as well as eliminating Iran’s capability to

produce fissile material for nuclear weapons for the

next ten to fifteen years; all done to ensure that Iran’s

nuclear program is only used for harmless purposes.

In its implementation, JCPOA needs the help of the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to

monitor the implementation of the agreement because

the IAEA is perceived to be able to ensure Iran's

compliance; then instead, JCPOA requested a

temporary suspension of nuclear-related sanctions

granted to Iran by the United States, the European

Union, and the Security Council (Katzman and Kerr

2016, 1). The Iranian parliament agreed that the

JCPOA agreement would be effective on October 18,

2016, later known as Adoption Day. Subsequently,

there was the Implementation Day warning on

January 16, 2016 after the IAEA ensured Iran’s

compliance with its nuclear-use regulations set forth

in JCPOA. Three components in Iran’s nuclear

program are included in the points of agreement,

namely (1) the production of physical materials

through the enrichment of uranium, (2) weapons

focused on the conversion of fissile material to

nuclear weapons, and (3) the production of the

delivery system, can bring weapons to the target that

has been selected (Kuperwasser 2015, 11).

There are a number of different reactions to Iran’s

nuclear deal in the Middle East. Israel-more

specifically, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu-

has the most vocal negative voice among other

countries, even though Israeli high-level officials

have been consulted during the deal negotiations and

are working with the United States in order to ensure

the enforcement of Iran’s compliance. Turkey and

Egypt have a general positive response because they

do not burden the resolution of Iran’s long-standing

nuclear issue and accept how the JCPOA allows Iran

to defend its enrichment program; this contradicts the

likes of Israel, some Gulf states, and the United States

opposition to the deal. The Gulf Cooperation Council

(GCC) member states-as a coalition of the United

States-have also endorsed Iran’s nuclear deal openly,

including during a summit of the United States-GCC

Summit in Riyadh in April 2016. Even so, there are

still some countries in the East Middle, mainly Arab

Sunni countries, who object to the deal. Their

concerns include: (1) existing agreements will only

gain time and not prevent Iran from possessing

nuclear weapons, (2) the agreement does not improve

Iranian behavior that makes the Middle East unstable

and will aggravate conditions, and (3) the existing

agreement puts the traditional coalition of the United

States in the Middle East at an unfavorable position

(Einhorn and Nephew 2016, vi).

Israel, although not a participant of the deal,

remains an influential major actor in the dynamics of

existing discussions and is affected by the impacts of

the development of Iran’s nuclear program. During

this time, Israel continues to be consistent in shaping

a strategy of coercion or coercion against Iran’s

program because Israel sees that the current

agreement is being seen as a form of victory and the

first step of Iran’s efforts to become a regional

hegemony. Israel believes that the Iranian regime will

only replace its views or objectives and release

nuclear aspirations if coerced by a combination of

preventive measures, economic sanctions, and

credible military threats (Kuperwasser 2015, 8). The

combination is the best way to block the nuclear

program and ensure that there is no need to use any

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604

direct military action. The stronger the military threat,

the less likely that military action will actually take

place; and the stronger the pressure on Iran, the more

likely it will be that Iran will approve more significant

concessions. Moreover, Israel sees that such forms of

coercion can encourage, convince, and change Iran’s

perceptions into how they do not have enough

capability to become nuclear weapon state.

Kuperwasser (2015, 24) states that the Israeli

strategy requires a combination of direct action and

pressure while accompanied by the involvement of

the international community-especially the United

States in order to exert pressure on territories outside

the scope of Israel’s strategy through direct action.

Despite a number of differences, cooperation with the

United States is a fundamental component of Israel's

strategy. Although Israel and the United States share

a common goal-that is, to prevent Iran from acquiring

nuclear weapons-and working together to achieve this

goal, both have different views on some issues-which

then result in different behavior toward threats,

nuclear concessions to Iran, and regional roles Iran.

While Washington wants to prevent Iran from

developing nuclear weapons, the prevention form

Jerusalem wants is for Iran not to have any capability

to produce nuclear weapons (Kuperwasser 2015, 8).

The difference in both positions can also be seen in

2012 when the tensions between Israel and the United

States increased because the Obama administration at

that time did not approve of Israel’s plans to launch a

military strike against Iran while at the same time the

United States was running diplomacy between P5+1

and Iran (Parsi 2017). In the end, Israel up until now

insisted on its stand to disagree with Iran’s nuclear

development despite the adaptation of the JCPOA

agreement.

4 ANALYSIS OF ISRAEL’S

FOREIGN POLICY

FORMULATION

To see the decision unit in the formulation of Israeli

state policy, it is necessary to understand the Israeli

political system first. Like a country that embraces a

multiparty parliamentary democracy system in

general, Israel has three branches of government:

executive, legislative, and judicial. The executive

branch is headed by the prime minister who has the

highest power in government as head of government

because the role of the president in Israel as a head of

state is merely ceremonial. Therefore, Prime Minister

Netanyahu becomes the ultimate decision unit in the

Israeli context. Meanwhile, Israel’s legislative branch

consists of a Knesset (parliament of Israel) consisting

of 120 members of parliament-in which the prime

minister also becomes the leader of the Knesset

coalition. 120 Knesset MPs also came from various

parties, provided that the lead party coalition must

hold at least 61 seats out of the 120 available.

Subsequently, the judicial branch consists of courts

and the Supreme Court, which based its work on a set

of Basic Laws that functioned like constitutional law

in general. In addition to these three branches, there

are also two groups as a decision unit that has an

important role in the Israeli government is the

Security Cabinet and Kainet Dalam.

The first decision unit was the In Cabinet

composed of Israeli political figures with different

backgrounds as Netanyahu’s chief advisor. The first

figure in this group is Ron Dermer as Israel’s

ambassador to the United States who is also

Netanyahu’s believer. The Post (2017) reported that

Dermer was instrumental in setting up Netanyahu’s

controversial speech to the US Congress in 2015 as

part of Israel’s effort to subvert Iran’s nuclear deal at

the time being fought by former US president Barack

Obama. Jerusalem Post in May 2016, Dermer did not

seem to regret his actions even though the speech

dropped his reputation as an ambassador by stating

that,

“In my eyes, the prime minister fulfilled a

fundamental moral obligation to speak out about a

potential threat [by Iran] to the survival of our

country. This was a sovereign right that the Jewish

people were long denied, and the failure to exercise

that right would have been a gross dereliction of his

duty as prime minister of Israel” (Jerusalem Post

2016).

From the above quote, it is understandable that

Dermer considers it commonplace when a prime

minister when he undertakes his duty to voice the

dangers brought by Iran through the development of

its nuclear program (Tibon 2017); and it implies

Dermer’s support for Netanyahu in that context. It

also shows both Dermer and Netanyahu’s closeness

and Dermer’s influence over Netanyahu’s decision.

Still in the Inner Cabinet, the second influential

figure is Yoav Horowitz, Netanyahu’s chief of staff

who in October 2017 called on the Jewish National

Fund to provide 1.14 billion dollars for defense and

military budgets in order to prevent Iran’s nuclear

threat against Israel (Asharq Al-Awsat 2017). The

third figure is Dr. Jonathan Schachter, Netanyahu’s

foreign policy adviser who always attends a cabinet

meeting on Israeli foreign policy issues (Jerusalem

Post 2017). In a speech he delivered in May 2015,

The Inﬂuence of Groups in Foreign Policy Formulation: Analysis of Israel’s Policy on Iran’s Nuclear Agreement

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Schachter expressed the same worries as Netanyahu:

that Israel's most important issue at the time was not

conflict with Palestinian or terrorism but Iran's

nuclear issue. Schachter emphasized that Netanyahu

“can not only move on” in rejecting Iran’s nuclear

development and, like Netanyahu, he showed

skepticism over the then-design JCPOA agreement

(Jerusalem of Gold t.t.). The fourth figure is Eli

Groner as director general of the Prime Minister’s

Office responsible for the design and implementation

of all domestic policies. The author sees that

Netanyahu chose Groner because as a former

economic attache in Washington, Groner is certainly

familiar with all aspects of Israel-US economic

relations; and this consideration is urgently needed

given the economic relation of both could be an

aspect affected by the decision taken by Netanyahu,

especially those not in harmony with the US decision.

The fifth figure is Eliezer Toledano, Netanyahu’s

military secretary since 2015, who is in charge of

providing the latest news on security issues and stony

military operations and in coordination between state

intelligence and state security agencies. The last

figure is Eitan Ben-David as chairman of the National

Security Council who has many duties in

coordination between Israel and the United States

National Security Council especially related to

cooperation and assistance. Of course, it makes sense

that Netanyahu’s Cabinet contains political figures

who have a big role in the aspect of national defense

and security and/or relations with the United States

because, according to the rational policy model,

foreign policy is largely determined by the national

interests of the country itself, and Israel’s national

interest in this case is protection of its national

security from Iran's nuclear threat.

The next decision unit is the Security Cabinet of

Israel consisting of 14 members of government

figures including Prime Minister (concurrently

Minister of Foreign Affairs), Minister of Defense,

Minister of Internal Security, Minister of Justice,

Minister of Finance, Minister of Interior, Minister of

Transport, Minister of Construction, Minister

Immigration, the Minister of Energy and Water

Resources, the Attorney General, and the Head of the

Security Council. Under Israeli law, the Security

Cabinet has primary responsibility in making

decisions to attack Iran despite the existence of a

precedence allowing all members of the Israeli

executive cabinet to approve decisions made by the

Security Cabinet (Kern and Reed t.t.). Since the

JCPOA-related negotiations are still adaptable to the

drafting process, the Israeli Security Cabinet has

voiced disagreement over the terms of the agreement

in April 2015 (Al Jazeera 2015). The Security Cabinet

also shared the view of Netanyahu over Iran’s

ambitions to become a major force through nuclear

use and this can be seen from Israel Defense Minister

Avigdor Liberman’s statement in October 2017 after

an Iranian antibalistic missile test:

“The ballistic missile that was fired by Iran is not

only a provocation and a slap in the face for the

United States and its allies — and an attempt to test

them — but also further proof of the Iranian

ambitions to become a world power and threaten

countries in the Middle East and all the countries of

the free world” (Times of Israel 2017).

Although the Security Cabinet retains its position

in rejecting the JCPOA to date, in its dynamics there

are some Cabinet members who disagree on Iran-such

as the Interior Minister and Minister of Transport-and

can prevent Netanyahu from attacking Iran; this can

be seen from how until now Netanyahu has not issued

a decision to attack Iran. This is an example of the

second and third steps in the decision-making process

based on a rational policy model that is the

identification of options and cost/benefit analysis

after successfully identifying the state's interest: the

attack on Iran is not the only option to be elected even

in harmony with the state’s interest; and although

Netanyahu had a strong stance in the plan of attack,

there were influential group actors-though not

specific to what extent-and could change their stance

and prevent Netanyahu from deciding to ultimately

strike Iran. The decision not to attack can also be seen

as an alternative policy that is still in line with Israeli

national interests.

The final decisions of the unit, namely the

ultimate decision unit, are Israeli Prime Minister

Benjamin Netanyahu. In addition to the fact that he is

the head of government who has a share in the internal

government unit decision, the Security Cabinet and

the Cabinet, Netanyahu’s position as ultimate

decision unit can also be seen from how Netanyahu

chairs the Likud Party as a majority government in

the Knesset. The influence of group actors has finally

been translated by Netanyahu into its international

activity in the last five years through speeches before

the UN General Assembly. In 2012, Netanyahu stated

that Iran’s nuclear program is the world’s biggest

threat that can only be prevented by “clear red lines”;

even, Netanyahu added in his speech that he has

prevented Iran from developing its nuclear weapons

“for more than 15 years” (Times of Israel 2012). One

year later, Netanyahu reminded the world to “not be

fooled by the Iranian regime” and emphasized that

what Iran developed was a nuclear weapon (Times of

Israel 2013). The same sentiment is expressed in

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606

2014, but this time Netanyahu added that regional

peace is still possible (Haaretz 2014). In 2015,

Netanyahu’s controversial speech to the US Congress

explicitly stated that Iran's nuclear program was “very

bad” and that the world would be better “without it”

(Calamur 2015) .Two years later in 2017, Netanyahu

again warned Iran of “serious danger” of engaging

with Israel (Times of Israel 2017). This shows the role

of Netanyahu as the ultimate decision unit in the

Israeli government that is seen by the rational policy

model as the key actor of foreign policy formulation

itself.

5 CONCLUSION

The process of formulating Israel’s foreign policy that

does not agree with either Iran’s nuclear deal or

development is generally influenced by a number of

factors; one of which is the Israeli internal group

actors. In analyzing it, the authors used a rational

policy model derived from the level of group analysis

of two of Netanyahu’s closest group of actors namely

the Inner Cabinet and the Security Cabinet. Through

the model, it is known that the influence of the Inner

Cabinet Netanyahu which contains political figures

by having a big role in aspects of national defense and

security and/or relations with the United States are in

harmony with Israel’s national interest, namely

protection of Israel’s national security from all forms

of Iran’s nuclear threat. In the Security Cabinet, it can

be seen that the opinions of several different figures

from Netanyahu’s opinion of attacking Iran

ultimately influenced Netanyahu’s policy of not

attacking Iran until today. The final result of these

influences was then translated by Netanyahu as the

ultimate decision unit in government through his

speeches at international level. In the end, the authors

found that the influence of group actors on Israeli

foreign policy formulated by Netanyahu is more

inclined to be complementary, since the small

decisions issued by the group actors also depend on a

number of other factors can not be explained by the

level of group analysis in this article.

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of Israel. Tersedia di

https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-convenes-

security-cabinet-to-discuss-iran-missile-threat/.

Diakses 13 Desember 2017.

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