German Foreign Policy on Russia: Analysis of Public Opinion and

Media on Crimean Annexation Sanctions

Sandrina Salsabila and Siti Rokhmawati Susanto

Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Airlangga

Keywords: Germany, Russia, Crimea, Ukraine, Ostpolitik, Public Opinion, Media

Abstract: German and Russian relations at first to be the most important component for the fate of Europe and is

known for its strategic partnerships. Germany has a policy of Ostpolitik, the term framework underlying the

relationship of openness Germany towards Russia which Germany has always prioritize relations with

Russia. This is indicated by a symbiotic relationship that is mutually beneficial to the economies of both

countries. However, Germany's policy is starting to fade since the Russian intervention in the Ukrainian

crisis that led to the annexation of Crimea by Russia. Germany began turning around its policy into the

sanctions imposed through the European Union. Behind it, the upheaval in the German society between the

pro and cons of Russia's sanctions. By using the constructivism perspective, the proposition in this article

suggests that the social construction built by the public opinion through the media takes part in shaping the

reality of the Russian sanctions. Furthermore, this paper analyzes how public opinion and the media can

influence the dynamics of German policy and sanctions against Russia by using the level of public opinion

and media analysis.

1 INTRODUCTION

Before the cold German foreign policy towards

Russia post Crimean annexation, the relationship

between these two countries became a crucial

component in shaping the fate of Europe. After the

Cold War, Germany adopted a cooperative approach

in foreign policy vis-à-vis Moscow in the late 1960s

(Krumm 2012: 114-123). Germany's more open

attitude toward negotiation and diplomacy is

essentially one of the elements in Ostpolitik.

Ostpolitik is a special framework term in German

policy towards Russia based on the idea that

economic and political engagement with Moscow

will lead to positive changes both within the Soviet

Union (Russia) and in bilateral relations during the

Cold War. After the Cold War, the German

government adopted a similar posture toward post-

Soviet Russia, with a stronger emphasis on

promoting change through strengthening the

economy. In Ostpolitik it is explained that

Germany's policy towards Russia after 1991,

precisely post-reunification of West Germany and

East Germany, reflects the reinterpretation of the

policy of "change through restoration of relations"

which is seen to have made unification possible,

together with gratitude for its acceptance of German

unification , 2014: 2). The German elite has always

believed that peace and stability in Europe can only

be achieved with Russia, not to be the opposition of

this. This perception is related to the peace of the

German political elite after the Second World War

and the guilt of Germany towards Russia because of

Nazi crimes at the time. At the same time, Russia

has become an important market for German exports

where Germany is Russia's third largest trading

partner, after China and the Netherlands and Russian

companies are largely German suppliers of primary

energy (Meister, 2014: 2). While Jeman itself is also

one of the largest investment suppliers in Russia.

This is evidenced by the large amount of FDI from

Germany that goes to Russia. As in the industrial

sector, the majority of the largest FDI suppliers in

automotive manufacturing entering Russia come

from Western European countries, especially

Germany (Ersnt & Young, 2013: 19).

The German leader indicated a "strategic

partnership" in this connection by seeing the

successful trade relations between the two countries

as profitable politics and has resulted in a symbiotic

relationship between politics and business in

Russian-German policy. However, Russia's Russian

policy has never been driven by the economy alone.

568

Salsabila, S. and Susanto, S.

German Foreign Policy on Russia: Analysis of Public Opinion and Media on Crimean Annexation Sanctions.

DOI: 10.5220/0010280400002309

In Proceedings of Airlangga Conference on International Relations (ACIR 2018) - Politics, Economy, and Security in Changing Indo-Paciﬁc Region, pages 568-574

ISBN: 978-989-758-493-0

The German and Russian economic partnership is

underpinned by vision as a modernization partner

that includes knowledge transfer, general projects,

workshops and training programs in areas such as

health and demographic policies, energy efficiency,

infrastructure, education and research, and legal

cooperation. German economic stakeholders argue

that this cooperation helps Russia to support

modernize and diversify the economy and encourage

the growth of small and medium-sized businesses in

Russia. As foreign investment increases,

liberalization and privatization of Russia's economy

is an important prerequisite for modernization. Thus,

German policy has German investment objectives

and knowledge transfer should help modernize the

Russian economy, while the Russian government

improves conditions for investment by strengthening

the rule of law, adopting European standards,

economic liberalization, investing in education and

research, and eradicating corruption (Meister, 2014:

2). All these reforms should lead to democracy, less

corruption, and more of a European Russia.

Although this sounds good in theory, but in reality,

this idea is at odds with the interests of the Russian

political elite. Until the violation of Russia against

international law in the annexation of Crimea and

separatist military aggression in Donbass, the

territory of Ukraine, which destabilize the principle

of Ostpolitical fundamentals that made Germany

furious and spun the direction of its foreign policy.

2 GERMAN-RUSSIA RELATION

DURING MERKEL REIGN

Reframing the Crimean conflict that broke out in

2014, for the first time Germany demonstrated its

leadership stance through the EU in an international

crisis. After the annexation, the German

government, represented by Chancellor Angela

Merkel and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter

Steinmeier, insisted that Russia's actions in this

over-aggressive Crimean annexation were

unfortunate and have damaged what has been a

"peace order" for the past 70 years. This is because

what Russia is doing is not just a political

intervention to support the Crimean separatist

referendum of Ukraine, but also military aggression

equipped with combat weapons. This is certainly a

threat to Germany. Initially, during the annexation,

Merkel remained in constant phone contact with

Putin, advising Putin to withdraw his aggression

from Ukraine while the West could still help save

the country. Merkel gave a stern warning that Russia

would be under severe financial sanctions if Putin

refused to comply with this warning. Although the

imposition of these sanctions will harm the German

and European economies themselves, but these

sanctions will bring down the Russian economy

much deeper and Putin can not expect Russian-

German pro business to veto this action (Rinke,

2014: 7).

German foreign policy towards Russia during the

crisis of Ukraine was formed by the interaction of

domestic and external factors. External factors

pushed Berlin to take a critical stance. The United

States and some EU member states, particularly

Poland and the Baltic states, immediately took up

hardliners vis-à-vis Russian policy. Initially, Merkel

and Steinmeier sought to resolve the Crimean crisis

through negotiations. When this strategy failed,

German leaders led efforts to impose sanctions on

Russia. Violent sanctions against this Russian action

include economic sanctions targeting (1) capital

markets (limiting certain trade expenditures

'contracts, equity or similar financial instruments'),

(2) defense sector (arms embargo), (3) use of

multiple goods ( embargo on the use of dual goods

and technology), (4) the oil industry (certain

technology embargoes related to deep water, the

Arctic and oil); Russia's release at the G8 Summit in

Sochi in June 2014; suspension of EU-Russia talks

on visa matters and the New Testament; first travel

ban and asset freeze for 21 Russian individuals; and

much more (Raik et al, 2014: 4).

According to the Council of Europe, the main

objective of EU sanctions against Russia is to bring

about a change in the actions of Russia in Ukraine,

namely the annexation of illegal territory and the

deliberate destabilization of neighboring sovereign

nations. With Russia becoming the EU's biggest

neighbor and important trading partner, this is the

most challenging EU sanctions policy to date, as

well as its foreign policy in general. The EU has

been drawn into a geopolitical confrontation with a

large regional power. Although arguably lacking a

clear strategy, the EU has used its economic power

in unprecedented ways and with major strategic

implications. However, by 2016 easing sanctions

against Russia will gradually be realized if there is

"substantial" progress on the Ukrainian issue. A day

earlier, German Weekly Der Spiegel published a

story showing that German Chancellor Angela

Merkel is considering raising some early sanctions,

such as tourism restrictions, in return for Moscow's

cooperation on local elections in eastern Ukraine. As

Steinmeyer said in the Wall Street Journal:

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569

“In the light of substantial progress, a gradual

relaxation of the sanction tools must be

possible.”(Steinmeyer in Thomas, 2016)

From these statements it can be seen that Merkel

and Steinmeiyer have given the possibility to ease

sanctions for Russia.

3 MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION

LEVEL OF ANALYSIS IN

FOREIGN POLICY

Media and public opinion are important elements in

determining foreign policy regarding understanding,

use, basic assumptions, and the advantages and

disadvantages of media analysis and opinion levels.

There are some basic assumptions held by this

public opinion LoA. Firstly, the Liberal Wilsonian

assumptions that believe that public opinion should

have an effect on the policy making process,

especially in a democratic country where society

also has control over the elite in the country (Foyle,

1997). In this case the public also plays a role in the

supervisor of the passage of the policy, so that when

there is a discrepancy and misappropriation, public

opinion will appear in order to change government

policy. The second assumption believes that public

opinion is a representation of the interests of society

as a whole and the public has a good understanding

so that these opinions and interests will directly

influence the policy to be formed (Neack, 2008).

The third assumption, when there are events in the

global realm that affect the public life aspect in

general it will lead to public opinion or can be said

there will be a reaction from the public (Neack,

2008). Given this reaction or public opinion, it

shows that civil society is not a passive actor, and

demands a tangible response to his interests

conveyed through public opinion.

The fourth assumption relates to mass media. As

stated before, the existence of mass media can

accommodate public opinion so that it really reaches

the policymakers. In addition, in fact mass media

can direct or even form public opinion on certain

issues. Thus public opinion can not be separated

from the existence of mass media. Furthermore,

regarding the use of public opinion LoA, the use or

understanding of public opinion LoA can be done

through two ways, ie top-down and bottom-up

models (Neack, 2008). In the top-down model is an

effort by the government of a country in developing

public opinion, so it can be said public opinion can

not be separated from government influence or

formed by the government. Thus existing public

opinion also tends not to be contrary to government

policy. This top-down model generally exists in

authoritarian countries. While the second model,

bottom-up is an opinion that tend to be purely

derived from the public, the government can not

impose its will, so the influence on public opinion of

this second model actually happens from the bottom

(society) upwards (government or policy maker).

4 CONSTRUCTIVISM IN MEDIA

AND PUBLIC OPINION

FORMATION

Constructivism, which has the assumption that mass

media is not just a message channel, but as a subject

constructing reality, views, biases and parenting. In

this case, the mass media is seen as a social

construction agent that defines reality. Similarly,

information or news that is read and heard from the

mass media not only describes the reality, and shows

the source of information but also the construction

of the media itself. Through a variety of instruments

owned, the media helped shape the reality. It does

not indicate the real reality, but illustrates how the

media play a role in constructing reality. The

information that appears in the human mind is not an

event, but rather something translated by the human

mind and mind after it occurs. An information in the

media is not synonymous with the facts of events but

rather an attempt to reconstruct facts within the core

framework of events. This is in reality the result of

reality construction by using language as the basic

tool, and language can determine what the reflection

will be packed about the actual event. The

construction of reality often makes an event by

adding a positive picture as well as a negative

picture. Most events can lead to allegations that can

not be separated from the conflict of events that

occurred. Conflict occurring in a place can affect to

other places caused by things that are less clear.

According to Schudson (1995, 141-142), the

information or news available in a medium is the

result of a social construct that always involves

views, symbols and values, how reality is made

news depending on how that fact is understood and

understood. If the process of meaning always use the

symbol elements of certain values then it is

impossible news is the face or reflection of a reality

itself, then the same event may produce different

news because of differences in how to see in this

ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations

570

way of framing, but the difference is in reality

finally considered something reasonable.

5 TOP-DOWN MODEL OF

MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION

ANALYSIS

Although German Chancellor Angela Merkel looks

tough to defend her sanctions against Russia, yet

beyond that, the upheaval that divides the German

society into pro and contra is just the background to

this policy's imbalance. Parties in the outline can

draw the picture that they are a business community.

In analyzing the voice of the people in Germany, the

first author used a top-down model, namely by

reviewing the results of a survey conducted by the

German government on Russian sanctions. Quoting

from a Sputnik media, the Russian-German

Chamber of Commerce (AHK) announced on

October 28, 2016, the survey found that 86 percent

of German companies operating in Russia believe

that EU sanctions against the country are not in line

with their goals and urgent "German-led" the EU to

immediately lift this sanction. Of these, 46 percent

of respondents wanted delinquent measures removed

immediately, and 40 percent wanted gradual

appointment. Sanctions against EU-Russian relations

have affected 58 percent of the 800 member

companies surveyed. According to the survey, the

biggest impact lies in the financial markets, and

trade in the use of multiple goods. The results also

show that 32 percent of respondents rated the

economic situation in Russia as stable, and almost

half expected economic growth to decline slightly in

2017. According to German companies, the main

factors affecting business are the unpredictable

economic situation, excessive bureaucracy and

inflation ( Sax, 2016).

Long before, in February 2016, Interfax, the

Russian news agency reported that German

companies in Russia have complained of an

increasing sustainability slump from the business

climate in Russia and forecast negative

developments in the economy by 2016. However,

they will not abandon the Russian market and

supporting the lifting of sanctions against Russia,

according to an annual survey of business climate in

Russia, conducted by the German-German Chamber

of Commerce (AHK) and the European East

European Economic Committee. The survey was

conducted in January of 2016 and interviewed 152

German companies operating in Russia. The survey

results are presented in Berlin on February 19, 2016

in a "Conference on The Improving of the Image of

Russia in Germany" meeting. Mostly, exactly as

much as 88 percent of companies that support the

removal of these sanctions. The details are 60

percent of respondents choose to lift directly from

sanctions, 28 percent want to eliminate gradual

restrictions, and only 10 percent choose to keep the

sanctions regime, the other two percent support

further strengthening (Interfax, 2016).

But the Ukrainian Today a Ukrainian-owned

mass media report that nearly half of Germans in

favor of the idea of sanctions against Russia over

Ukraine, imposed in the summer of 2014, according

to the Bertelsmann Foundation survey published by

Wirtschaftswoche in 2016. A sociologist says social

media can provide the impression that Germany is

against sanctions, given its pro-Russian activity. As

many as 44 percent of Germans support the

restrictions that are used as sanctions against Russia.

46 percent of respondents favored extending

sanctions imposed in the summer of 2014, while 16

percent still believed that sanctions should even be

tightened and only 27 percent of respondents voted

to lift sanctions (Ukraine Today, 2016). Another poll

conducted by the German government research

institute, Infratest Dimap in November 2014,

interviewed 1,000 Germans over the age of 14. The

survey results show that 58 percent of Germans feel

threatened by Russia's foreign policy and 48 percent

do not accept or legally recognize the annexation of

Crimea by Russia. Although as many as 39 percent

of other Germans legally recognize this annexation,

it does not mean Germany considers Putin's actions

justified. A case example in a Dimap Infratest

survey conducted in August found that 80 percent of

Germans blame Putin for escalating the conflict in

eastern Ukraine (Noack, 2014). This difference of

opinion is suspected from East Germany which

argues that German government policy is too anti-

Russian, whereas on the contrary, West Germany

believes that the German government is too kind and

friendly towards Russia (Ukraine Today, 2016).

Although there is a bias between surveys that have

been imposed by German government agencies, but

Merkel remains at its founding. He responded that it

was too soon to clear this sanction. This is supported

by the statement of Foreign Minister of Germany,

Frank-Walter Steinmeier which was launched in the

Wall Street Journal:

“We believe it is still right and necessary to keep

up the pressure but at the same time to apply

sanctions against Russia in an intelligent way.

German Foreign Policy on Russia: Analysis of Public Opinion and Media on Crimean Annexation Sanctions

571

Sanctions aren’t an end in themselves.”(Steinmeyer

In Thomas, 2016).

6 BOTTOM-UP MODEL OF

PUBLIC OPINION AND MASS

MEDIA ANALYSIS

In addition, by reviewing the voice of the people by

using a bottom up public opinion analysis model, the

author uses the opinion article of a journalist from

the German Deutsche Welle mass media, Bernd

Johann related how German foreign policy should be

directed in this Crimean conflict. Bernd Johann in

this regard does not say anything about how the

continuation of Russian sanctions should be

addressed, but he gave his opinion on the error on

the side of Ukrainian leaders. He said that the EU

should react to the dire situation in Ukraine with

sanctions against those responsible for the violence.

He observed months of protests that occurred in the

Crimean society to make all those who were

involved in the conflict, but this escalation is the

main responsibility of the President of Ukraine,

Viktor Yanukovych. He has rejected any dialogue

effort with the protest movement and sees only the

bloodshed result of his political power in his palace

(Johann, 2014). Bernd insists in his opinion article

entitled "High Time for Sanctions in Ukraine" that

Germany and Europe can not allow such a thing to

happen without a harsh response. European

politicians have been trying to urge Yanukovych to

commit to dialogue for months. But diplomacy will

not reap anything if the regime refuses to consider a

political solution.

"It is time for Europe to impose sanctions on

Ukrainian politicians and officials responsible for

the violence. There should be a travel ban to the EU

and their EU bank account should be frozen.

Nobody wants them in Europe again. "(Johann,

2014)

Johann also revealed that relations with Russia

should also be reconsidered. Escalations in Ukraine

have put relationships under intense pressure. Russia

accused the West for its intervention and blamed

Europe for the violence. He said that it was an

outrageous allegation that lacked basic facts. It is

Russia rather than the EU that has actively

intervened in Ukraine. This is based on the fact that

Moscow announced billions of euros from aid to

Ukraine before the police move. Moscow clearly

sustains Yanukovych's position by showing support

to the Ukrainian president when describing pro-

European protesters as terrorists who are planning a

coup d'etat. Such statements make it clear that

Russia approves acts of violence taken to stir up

protests and that it is toxic to relations between

Russia and the European Union (Johann, 2014).

The opinions of some German academics, Kamil

Frymark and Artur Ciechanowicz, published on the

official website of the European think tank, The

Center for Eastern Studies or OSW who argue that

Russian aggression against Ukraine and propaganda

actions targeting Germany has resulted in an

increase in distrust in German society Russia and a

more resolute political reaction. In this opinion, they

explain how nowadays German politicians are

beginning to change their minds to adopt Russian

sanctions, such as the Social Democratic Party,

German Foreign Minister Steinmeier's coalition.

Having become a strategic partner of Germany,

Russia has now become a strategic issue. When the

Russian-Ukrainian war broke out, the German

approach to finding conflict resolution was based on

the principle of 'strategic patience' against Russian

aggression and on the assumption that Europe was

destined to cooperate with Russia as well as the

welfare and security of the continent which may

only be realized by cooperating with Russia . This

attitude is the result of a clash of two concepts for

Germany's approach to Russia. First assumes that

Russia is a strategic partner of Germany, which is

indispensable for maintaining stability in Europe,

and that good relations with Russia deserve

recognition by the West. Others assume that Russia

is a country with significant potential for destructive

acts, as exemplified by the Crimean annexation,

aggression against Ukraine and military intervention

in Syria. As for Germany, Russia is just one

significant partner, excluding the EU and the United

States, but not the most significant (Frymark &

Ciechanowicz, 2016).

The involvement of the two German leaders,

Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister

Frank-Walter Steinmeier in working on and

implementing the Minsk agreement-a treaty signed

by the EU, Russia and Ukraine to implement a

ceasefire and restore peace in eastern Ukraine, under

conditions including disarmament and exchange of

prisoners-did not bring the expected results of Berlin

(Frymark & Ciechanowicz, 2016). This is reinforced

by German disappointments both with Russia and

Ukraine for their non-compliance. The German

debate on sanctions imposed on Russia became a

domestic political element as formed by the

Bundestag election campaign. According to Frymark

and Ciechanowicz, the German Government is

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572

becoming impatient with the lack of progress in the

implementation of the Minsk agreement. At the

same time, the German government is opposed to

the idea of exerting greater pressure on Ukraine to

ensure the implementation of commitments under

this agreement and may impose new sanctions on

Russia because of its failure to enter into

agreements. Berlin realizes that the failure of this

deal will be tantamount to a decline in German

credibility. This is why the sound is increasingly

heard in Germany which indicates that the Minsk

treaty must be changed. In this way Germany will

maintain the appearance that the peace process is

progressing, which in turn will enable the first

sanction to be lifted in 2017 (Frymark &

Ciechanowicz, 2016). This will encourage the

normalization of German relations with Russia,

much desired by all German politicians. Although

Merkel does not explicitly state that there will be

sanctions in 2017, this analysis of Frymark and

Ciechanowicz is enough to prove why in late 2016

there has been a demand for Russian sanctions from

Russia's political elite.

7 CONCLUSION

In this article, we discussed the beginning of

Germany's policy towards Russia and how Germany

changed its policy to sanctions because of the armed

takeover of Crimea. Cooperation relations between

Germany and Russia are key to the EU's fate in both

the economic and defense and security sectors. Since

the Cold War, even afterwards, Germany has

spawned the term "Ostpolitik" framework which

guides the openness of diplomatic relations and

German negotiations on Russia and establishes a

"strategic partnership". This strategic partner is then

manifested into a mutually beneficial symbiotic

relationship between Germany and Russia. Russia

became Germany's largest supplier of gas and

Germany became the largest supplier of automotive

manufacturing to Russia's largest investment.

However, this Ostpolitik policy began to be

considered using since Russia raises a threat to

Germany with the outbreak of conflict in the

Crimea. German policy towards Russia played a

very important role during the Ukrainian crisis.

Germany has defended sanctions against Russia, but

has also sought mediation to find conflict solutions.

Germany under the leadership of Angela Merkel

continues to try to tighten Russian sanctions for his

actions are considered crossing the line. Russia too

much to intervene Ukrainian politics in times of

crisis with its interests to seize the Crimea through

the support of a referendum on secession from

Ukraine. Not only that, Russia also placed a number

of military forces and weaponry in the border

regions of Russia and Ukraine and was involved in

the war in Donbass, the territory of Ukraine.

In response, German Chancellor Angela Merkel

is not afraid to criticize and take firm action against

Russia, even Germany is willing to bear the

economic impact as implication to impose sanctions

on Russia in retaliation for violation of international

law in Crimea annexation.

Throughout the dynamics of Russia's sanctions

by Germany through the European Union, a number

of upheavals occurred in German society that

directly or indirectly felt the impact of these

sanctions. People's voices also emerged as a

response to German policy, to this day even the

request to lift Russian sanctions also comes from the

political elite. The writer then analyzed German

foreign policy under Angela Merkel using the level

of analysis of public opinion and the media in

influencing the continuation of German policy

direction towards Russia. The authors also base the

level of analysis of public opinion and media on the

view of constructivism by reviewing the social

construction contained in public opinion contained

in the mass media, so that it can affect the political

elite policy makers. Then based on top-down model

analysis results in the level of public opinion

analysis and media, the German Society in a survey,

split into parties that agree to maintain sanctions and

parties who disagree. According to a survey

conducted by German government agencies such as

the Russian-German Chamber of Commerce (AHK),

the disagreeing parties came mostly from

businesspeople urging the government to

immediately lift economic and trade restrictions.

This is because German companies predict a decline

in economic growth after Russian sanctions. Then

using the bottom-up model in the level of public

opinion analysis and the media, there are opinions

from several German academics published in

German-owned mass media that analyze why today's

political elites are beginning to voice Russian

sanctions. It is the ineffectiveness of the Minsk

treaty, a peace treaty ratified by representatives of

the European Union, Russia and Ukraine, which is

Germany's inability to manage this conflict. The

reason, Berlin began to realize that the failure of this

deal will be tantamount to the decline in German

credibility. Although there has been no new policy

on the lifting of German sanctions against Russia

either by Chancellor Merkel or Foreign Minister

German Foreign Policy on Russia: Analysis of Public Opinion and Media on Crimean Annexation Sanctions

573

Steinmeier, the results of surveys and public opinion

made in the mass media have received a response

that there will be a gradual lifting of these sanctions,

even the support of politicians Germany like the

Social Democratic Party.

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