Australian Foreign Policy Shift in China’s One Belt One Road: The

Role of Small Group and Multiple Autonomous Group

Rahmatul Amalia Nur Ahsani and Baiq Wardhani

International Relations Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Airlangga

Keywords: OBOR, Australia, Small Group, Multiple Autonomous Group, Decision Unit

Abstract: China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) Foreign Policy aimed at building a liaison infrastructure between

Asia, Europe and even globally is welcomed by the Australian government as a country that offered to

invest in the project. Australia under the leadership of Prime Minister Turnbull has a cooperative foreign

policy direction towards China. Therefore, OBOR investments offered by the Chinese government to the

Australian government initially received a positive and optimistic response to the huge returns from

infrastructure investments in Northern Australia where it coincided with the Australian government that

intensifying massive infrastructure development in Northern Australia. However, Australia’s position in the

OBOR cooperation was not clear with the rejection of the signing of the OBOR MoU by the Australian

government. In this case, the author attempts to explain the shift in Australia’s position in OBOR through

group level of analysis by explaining small-group decision units as well as multiple autonomous units.

Furthermore, to explain how then the unit’s decision works, the author provide identification of the decision

units contained in small groups and multiple autonomous groups, explaining how organizational structure of

leaders to groups, as well as providing further small group analysis through the decision tree.

1 INTRODUCTION

Australia’s foreign policy under the government of

Prime Minister Turnbull centered on massive

infrastructure development, investment growth and

trading activity, in particular with the Northern

Development Plan of Australia policy. The

Australian government wants to make the northern

part of Australia a state powerhouse of the economy.

Before going further, Malcolm Bligh Turnbull’s

elected Prime Minister in 2015, has a foreign policy

direction that is quite a contrast to Prime Minister

Tony Abbott. One of them is related to how

Australia sees its relationship with China where if

former Prime Minister Tony Abbott is more likely to

see Australia’s relationship with China driven by the

spirit of regional rivalry and tends to forge mutual

cooperation with China’s rival countries in other

East Asia and Asia Pacific regions such as Japan.

While Turnbull primarily has businessman-oriented

traits, Turnbull positively views China’s economic

growth and the opportunities generated from it for

Australia itself. However, with China’s economic

position it does not necessarily make the Prime

Minister of Australia to always be a pro-party with

foreign policy made by President Xi Jinping. PM

Turnbull seeks to avoid tension and emphasizes the

existence of mutually beneficial cooperation

between the two (Tyler, 2016).

Departing from the above statement, Australia

can be said open to outside investments that give

significant impact to their infrastructure

development. This also applies to China’s One Belt

One Road initiative which, when viewed from the

interests of trade and infrastructure, there is

considerable consideration regarding OBOR

cooperation. First, the Chinese government invited

Australia’s participation in the project investment by

providing access and construction facilities in the

maritime project or “road initiative”. Australia has

been spending enormous amounts of money for

Chinese operating companies in countries that have

agreed to invest through China’s own Bank. More

specifically, China offers substantial investments

under OBOR to support governmental development

in Northern Australia (Wade, t.t.). China is

Australia’s largest trading partner by an increasingly

intense cooperation since the signing of the China-

Australia Free Trade Agreement or ChAFTA.

OBOR then seen as an opportunity that make the

Australian government should be able to expedite

Australia’s massive development plans especially in

562

Ahsani, R. and Wardhani, B.

Australian Foreign Policy Shift in China’s One Belt One Road: The Role of Small Group and Multiple Autonomous Group.

DOI: 10.5220/0010280300002309

In Proceedings of Airlangga Conference on International Relations (ACIR 2018) - Politics, Economy, and Security in Changing Indo-Paciﬁc Region, pages 562-567

ISBN: 978-989-758-493-0

infrastructure in Northern Australia. The OBOR

initiative also became a major consideration for

Australia especially after seeing the prospect of a

non-promising Trans Pacific Partnership with the

exit of the United States while Australia needs a lot

of investment in infrastructure both to improve its

previous projects mainly in urban transport (Eslake,

2017: 4).

Based on the statements above, it appears that

Australia has more reasons to participate in this big

project. However, in reality the Australian

government has not shown a clear position in

OBOR’s participation with the signing of the One

Belt One Road. According to the latest White Paper

released by the Australian government in November

2017, the Australian Government’s interest in

OBOR policy is largely based on the government’s

hope that Australia’s infrastructure development

plan brings no debt and other losses to the region’s,

but inside of it also mention related to the policy that

considered still in “cautious” position (ACRI, 2017).

Australia’s policy change on OBOR was also visible

when the Australian government through the

Minister of Trade, Tourism and Investment Steven

Ciobo was optimistic about the benefits of OBOR

investment in Northern Australia. OBOR needs to be

considered further because it has not included

informative and transparent issues after attending the

OBOR Summit in Beijing (ACRI, 2017). The author

then see that the consideration of the investment

benefits mentioned in the previous section is

challenged by other considerations. This is

interesting because the considerations of actors

representing economic, trade and infrastructure

interests are not necessarily manifested in the form

of an agreement signed by Prime Minister Malcolm

Bligh Turnbull. It also imply that Prime Minister

Turnbull in foreign policy making regarding China’s

One Belt One Road is considering the various

aspects voiced by several actors in it. Therefore,

through this paper the author seeks to explain what

factors are influential in Australian foreign policy

making and how the dynamics of the actors in it can

play a role in determining Australia’s position on

OBOR.

2 GROUP LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

In explaining the Australian government’s response

to China’s OBOR policy, the author use the group

level of analysis by agreeing on Hudson’s (2007: 73)

notes that a leader is incapable of creating and

implementing foreign policy on his own, but foreign

policy in many countries is created through groups

setting. This indicates that a leader regardless of the

country’s governance system (democracy or non-

democracy) in some cases does not create a united

foreign policy but there is some influences from the

actors around it. The author then took Breuning

(2007: 86) assumptions which states that the country

policy can be created by several different decision

units and at different times. Decision units explain

the capable actors that have the abilities on shifting

the decision-making circle (Neack, 2008: 67). The

decision unit can simply explain who has access and

the capability to “sit” with the leaders of the country

or the executive ranks of foreign policy makers and

has the capability to contribute to shape and

influence both the policy-making process or the final

decision.

Furthermore, to be able to use the decision unit

that have mentioned earlier in explaining Australia’s

policy toward OBOR, the author then take some

basic form of the decision unit that can influence the

state leaders in formulating foreign policy. The

decision unit can also be referred to as an advisory

team for leaders where within the advisory team

itself there are various aspects that can circle leaders

and influence leaders in formulating foreign policy

(Breuning, 2007: 88). The personality of the leader

influences how the leader organizes the advisory

team. Breuning (2007: 89) mentions three

approaches, namely formalistic, competitive, and

collegial approach. The author explains how a group

of advisory works in the formulation of foreign

policy under Prime Minister Turnbull. The author is

more likely to choose a collegial approach where the

approach emphasizes teamwork rather than

competition between entities. Advisory team is

further explained by the author through the

explanation of small group where policy makers

interact face-to-face to discuss decisions based on

information and analysis provided by various

government agencies and departments. Breuning

(2007: 99) emphasizes the very limited number of

policy makers. In this case no larger than the

governmental cabinet and does not include members

of parliament in the small group category. In this

small group it basically puts the advisory group as a

think-thank where each of the advisors has

incomplete information and then became the source

in decision making so that through the face-to-face

interaction, policy-makers try to construct together

and debate about how the best way to respond to

these foreign policy issues (Breuning, 2007: 99).

The small group in this paper itself refers to the

ministers and relevant staff in the Australian

Australian Foreign Policy Shift in China’s One Belt One Road: The Role of Small Group and Multiple Autonomous Group

563

government who respond fairly frequently to this

issue and the author tries to find relevance about

how the responses or statements issued by the actors

in the small group play a role in shaping Australia’s

foreign policy.

In this, the author took two decision units. In

addition to the small group discussion described

above, the authors also take multiple autonomous

units. There are reasons behind author decision to

choose these decision units, first, in a single group

the author tries to search between individuals who

are the representatives of departments or ministries

within the Australian government who have

influence in consideration of PM Turnbull. Second,

there are groups that also have influence in foreign

policy making but does not meet the characteristics

to be classified as single or small group, namely

parliament. The author first tries to explain the

understanding of the two decision units. Neack

(2008: 75) mentioned in multiple autonomous units,

the actors involved are individuals, groups or

coalitions of which some or all of them can

simultaneously take actions for the government. But

not all actors have the ability to decide and coercion

other actors to obey or follow their thinking. This is

due to the absence of an authoritative body that

oversees members of this unit. Each of the members

is entitled to protect the interests of the group or

entity they represent or even the interests of each

individual himself. In this case multiple autonomous

units refer to the Australian parliament in which

there is a coalition of parties that occupy the most

seats and opposition parties (Gorbett, 2016). The

author sees that parliament members in a country

that believe parliamentary form of government have

an important role in foreign policy decision-making

and seek the significance of the Australian

parliamentary vote against PM Turnbull’s policy.

3 SMALL GROUP DECISION

UNIT

In initiating the analysis of this case, the author refer

to Neack’s (2007: 67) paper to, first identify the

decision unit in this case based on what has been

mentioned above. The author analyze the decision

units in small groups. First, what the author wants to

offer is that Prime Minister Turnbull himself is the

Prime Minister who prioritizes strategic foreign

policy by trying to accommodate all the

considerations related to Australia’s own national

interests. It can be seen from how Turnbull’s PM is

detached from the direction of foreign policy that is

leaning towards China, does not necessarily approve

any foreign policy undertaken by China. Since the

election of Malcolm Turnbull, several senior Liberal

Government rulers have occupied positions in the

Turnbull cabinet, some of which have served as

ministers and senators. These individuals also serve

as private advisory group of PM Turnbull in

reviewing both domestic and foreign policy.

Decision units identified by the author in small

groups include; Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hon.

Julie Bishop; Minister of Trade, Tourism, and

Innovation, Hon. Steve Ciobo; Michael Pezzullo,

Secretary of Immigration and Border Protection; and

Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin, AC Chief of the

Defense Force.

When the Australian government finally refused

or “postponed” the signing after One Belt One Road

Summit 2017 that was held in Beijing, it indicated

the declining of Australia’s interest and seriousness

in OBOR. This is based on the views of Minister

Julie Bishop and Minister Steve Ciobo who consider

further consideration of Australia’s involvement

with the OBOR project. However, in this case the

position of Minister Julie Bishop is more assertive

than the position of Minister Steve Ciobo himself. It

considered that the involvement of Australia in the

OBOR project will not create a tangible advantage

and will not encourage the extra investment of

China. The argument expressed by Minister Julie

Bishop is that the government is dissatisfied with the

details contained in the Chinese proposal. In this

case the OBOR proposal in reality does not meet the

ideal investment standards as stated in the previous

White Paper (ACRI, 2017).

The current situation still indicates the same

thing. Australia’s stance towards China is more

clearly shown through the statements of the actors

who are in the small groups. Nevertheless, the

response does not necessarily indicate Australia

refusing to engage in China’s One Belt One Road

investment. Minister Julie Bishop’s remarks are also

in line with Turnbull’s repeated attitudes that

Australia will withhold a decision on its involvement

in OBOR because OBOR proposal is still under the

Foreign Investment Review Board or FIRB and has

not received approval recorded until November 24,

2017 (Department of Defense Minister, 2017). The

relationship between Mike Pezzullo and PM

Turnbull was established when Mike Pezzullo was

named the best federal public service by the

Australian government. Then, Marshal Mark

Binskin often shared with PM Turnbull in a press

release addressing defense issues including One Belt

ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations

564

One Road. Basically, there are other individuals who

have the potential to be influential in the formation

of OBOR’s foreign policy, such as Greg Moriarty

who served as Chief of Defense who has worked

with PM Turnbull as chief of staff (Turnbull, 2017).

The author see that the closest individuals of PM

Turnbull are largely in strategic and security

positions. The defense plays a complementing role

in Turnbull’s foreign policy making, This because of

the character of this foreign policy are more open

and contributed in recommending strategic

consideration regarding OBOR Policy to PM

Turnbull.

Judging from how the dynamics that run in small

groups, it can be seen from how each of the

individuals in the small-group has the authority and

capacity to openly debate and vote to respond to the

OBOR policy. Therefore, it became relevant if the

author uses a collegial approach in viewing the

management style used by PM Turnbull. In this

approach the core weakness lies when the

individuals within the group begin to have the same

thoughts and exchange ideas that should happens

more to be a mutual agreement. This point is what

the author tried to take in referring to the Australian

government’s position that is still “gray” until now.

This is because from the beginning, Australia looked

optimistic but at the end they have considerations

that began to shift the position to oppose OBOR. In

this case the author refers to Minister Julie Bishop

and in some cases, Minister Steve Ciobo but then the

process of assessment increasingly making

Australia’s position blurred.

4 MULTIPLE AUTONOMOUS

UNITS: THE ANALYSIS OF

THE ROLE OF THE

AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENT

If refers to Breuning, the author place the members

of parliament as a unit in which there are various

groups or individuals with their respective powers.

The author in this case includes the parliament in the

identification decision unit because as mentioned by

Breuning (2007: 94) that in the parliamentary

system, the prime minister in defense of his position

directly noticed the support available in the

legislature. If there is one party that wins the

majority seats in the parliament, the prime minister

tends to get more influence from the composition in

government and advisory system. However, if the

seat of government is filled by some political parties

such as the government coalition cabinet, the

emerging advisory system tends not to have or

exhibits a common characteristic which in this case

are the characteristics in addressing a foreign policy

issue. In the Australian government formed from

electoral elections in 2015, parliamentary seats are

dominated by party coalitions. Then, the Australian

government itself is filled by the Australian Labor

Party as the and followed by other minor parties

(Parliament of Australia, tt). There is a

parliamentary role in influencing Turnbull’s foreign

policy. The author tries to seek an explanation of

this by looking at the votes in the Australian

parliament in response to OBOR policy.

The position of the opposition Labor Party in this

policy is more likely to be optimistic in accepting

such initiatives for economic and business interests.

It is as mentioned by ACRI (217: 4) that Senator

Penny Wong considers it is a necessary to look at

the Belt-Road Initiative policy with optimism on the

existence of mutually beneficial interests and

complements and avoids the reflexive negative

views. In addition, the Australian absence in

following the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

may bring Australia’s disparaging views. Broadly

speaking, Senator Wong stressed that the gains or

losses in BRI depend on how the Australian

government can identify points that could benefit

Australia’s national interests. Within the Labor Party

itself the response to OBOR is not homogeneous.

There are other opinions that concerns about the

Chinese dominance that feared can caused

uncompetitive economic competition in the

international market. The identity of the party

groups in the decision unit does not necessarily

represent the attitudes and interests of each of its

members. However, these interests are ultimately

manifested through voting mechanisms in which the

dominating voice can be seen as the interests of this

group.

In addition, the author view this parliamentary

analysis with a bureaucratic-politics model because

of several aspects such as the existence of fairly

complex bargaining activities between individuals

and government agencies. It is shown here by how

each senate member has its own views in responding

to OBOR. The condition also implies that the key

actors are senate members, especially if the senate

members are from a government coalition. Thirdly,

that is related to the decision process within the

Australian parliament itself. The choice of policy is

determined from how the bargaining power and

political maneuvers of each members of parliament.

However, at this point the author do not clearly find

Australian Foreign Policy Shift in China’s One Belt One Road: The Role of Small Group and Multiple Autonomous Group

565

out how political maneuvering takes place but power

bargaining can be seen from the ongoing

parliamentary debate, one of them was happened on

August 17, 2017 (Senate, 2017). The direction of

senate support in the Australian government has a

very powerful role. It can be seen from how PM

Turnbull paid enough consideration to the

considerations given both from and to the senate as

seen in the composition of senate members and the

making of agreements and laws.

5 SMALL GROUP ANALYSIS:

DECISION TREE

The author in this case tries to find the problem

solving contained in the small group mentioned in

the previous section through decision tree by Charles

F. Hermann (in Neack 2008: 70). There are several

question that the author focused here (1) the

members do not have a primary identity with the

group, each head of the ministry and the government

officials who involve in it do not have the

attachment of a particular identity. Then, (6) all

members do not have the same preference at first

where in this case indicated by the position of

Michael Pezzullo and Marshal Mark Binskin who

from the outset had a different view of OBOR. In

number (7) there was no rule of thumb that required

all individuals in the small group to agree. Then,

(11) the group was likely to continue even though on

different issues this was due to the small group. In

this case it is part of the government apparatus that

has the authority and tasks associated with the issues

raised. When speaking of foreign policy issues, the

four individuals are likely to remain in the same

small group. Finally, (13) there is no preference

enforcement intense towards the minority votes. The

result of the decision tree shows that the solution has

a likely-subset solution. In this case the author tries

to explain that the Australian government’s

temporary response by delaying the signing of the

OBOR MoU is ultimately a small part of the major

solution that can actually creating maximum results.

In this case the author tries to explain that the

unclear position of Australia is a safe way to avoid

insecurities.

6 CONCLUSION

Based on the above analysis, the authors conclude

that Australian foreign policy in addressing China’s

One Belt One Road policy has to do with the

influence of the nearest individuals around the PM

Turnbull as well as groups involved in the political

bureaucratic process of the Turnbull government.

More specifically, the group referred here is a small

group as well as multiple autonomous units.

Individuals who can be classified as members of

small groups include Foreign Minister Julie Bishop,

Minister for Trade, Tourism and Investment Steve

Ciobo, Immigration and Border Protection Director

Michael Pezzullo, Defense Force Chief Marshal

Mark Binskin and Greg Moriarty as Defense Chief.

In this small group, initially there was a similar

preference in the views of Julie Bishop and Michael

Pezzullo who optimistically approved OBOR’s

investment in infrastructure development in

Northern Australia. But, there was a shift in view

with the postponement of the OBOR MoU signing

by the Australian government. This has led the small

group to have the same preference in addressing

OBOR’s investment, which is a further review of

Australia’s national strategic value. The individuals

surrounding PM Turnbull are dominated by

individuals from the security and defense fields. It

can be concluded that there are dynamics within the

parliament members regarding OBOR. But if

reviewed further, the parliament members

themselves do not directly affect the Australia’s

foreign policy but still play some roles in terms of

forming and agreeing on the agreement.

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