The Influence of National Identity on Israel’s Refusal Policy on Iran

Nuclear Deal

Muhammad Faisal Javier Anwar and Irfa Puspitasari

International Relations Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Airlangga

Keywords: Israel, Iran, Israel’s refusal, national identity, structural constructivism

Abstract: On 2015, Iran has reached an agreement with the European Union and the P5+1 (permanent members of the

UN Security Council plus Germany) on Iran’s nuclear program. In this deal, Iran is required to reduce its

nuclear program capability instead of sanctions imposed against Iran will be gradually lifted. But the deal

was rejected by one of Iran’s arch-enemies in the region, Israel. Israel suspects that the deal could be

exploited by Iran to enlarge its nuclear weapons capabilities. The author uses the National Identity LoA to

examine why Israel rejected the agreement, and also through the perspective of structural constructivism to

find out more in the identity relation between Israel and Iran, as well as how that identity influenced Israel’s

refusal of the Iran nuclear deal.

1 INTRODUCTION

After a deadlock for 13 years, finally in 2015

emerging a new history of Iran’s nuclear program

that has been much in the spotlight of the world. On

April 2, 2015, an agreement was reached with the

European Union and the P5+1 group, the UN

Security Council member states (United States,

Britain, France, China and Russia) plus Germany

with Iran taking place at the Beau-Rivage Hotel

Palace in the city of Lausanne, Switzerland (BBC

News 2015; Borger and Lewis 2015). This

diplomatic agreement was reached after 18 months

of intensive talks, and then peaked in a period of

eight days of talks held almost continuously through

the night, and finally reached an agreement on April

2 night that continued into the early hours (Borger

and Lewis 2015). Under the deal, Iran pledged to

drastically reduce its nuclear capacity as a form of

retaliation for the gradual sanctions imposed on Iran.

In a joint statement after the talks, top European

Union diplomat Federica Mogherini and Iranian

Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (in Borger

and Lewis 2015) praised the agreement, which they

called a ‘decisive step’ after a long negotiation. Zarif

later added that the agreement indicates that Iran’s

nuclear program is particularly peaceful, and has and

will always remain particularly peaceful, while on

the other hand it does not impede Iran’s interest in

meeting the needs of nuclear energy aimed at the

needs of its citizens. Based on the factsheet issued

by the United States after the negotiations which

were later launched by BBC News (2015), the

outlines of the agreement’s outcome include: 1. Iran

will reduce its uranium enrichment capability by

two-thirds of its current capability and inventory low

uranium levels. 2.) The uranium add-on machine

that is no longer in use will be stored and monitored

by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

3.) All Iranian nuclear facilities will be regularly

inspected by the IAEA. 4.) Iran will redesign the

heavy water reactor in Arak so that the reactor is

unable to produce plutonium bombs. 5.) Sanctions

imposed by the United States and Europe on Iran

will be gradually lifted but may be re-imposed if

Iran does not comply with existing agreements.

Nevertheless, it turns out that a deal that many

received this positive response is also inseparable

from the various rejections. One of the refusals came

from Israel as a close ally of the United States as

well as Iran’s enemies. Israeli Prime Minister

Benjamin Netanyahu even called the deal a “historic

mistake” (Kershner 2015). Furthermore, Netanyahu

mentioned that Israel would not be bound by the

resulting agreement. Netanyahu sees that the Iran

Nuclear Deal’s deal will sharpen regional tensions

and also give Iran plenty of time to produce bombs

in large quantities. Netanyahu told Obama that the

treaty would increase the danger because Iran would

produce a nuclear weapon whether it waits for 10 to

15 years according to the limitations set forth in the

522

Anwar, M. and Puspitasari, I.

The Inﬂuence of National Identity on Israel’s Refusal Policy on Iran Nuclear Deal.

DOI: 10.5220/0010279700002309

In Proceedings of Airlangga Conference on International Relations (ACIR 2018) - Politics, Economy, and Security in Changing Indo-Paciﬁc Region, pages 522-528

ISBN: 978-989-758-493-0

agreement or by violating the agreement itself

(Kershner 2015). Even quoted by The Times of

Israel (2015), Netanyahu referred to Iran as a

‘terrorist regime’ and the existing accord provides

incentives for Iran to increase its nuclear weapons

power, rather than changing Iran’s policy so far. The

agreement also further strengthens Iran's power to

destroy Israel.

2 NATIONAL IDENTITY LEVEL

OF ANALYSIS

In explaining the issue of Israel’s rejection of the

Iran Nuclear Deal agreement, the authors chose to

use the National Identity Level of Analysis (LoA).

The author set out from the argument of

Dharmaputra (2017) that state, culture plays an

important role in any case because all human

activities will be the products and components of the

culture. While the national identity itself is one of

the basic concepts contained in the culture. National

identity can play an important role in the foreign

policy of a country because it can differentiate one

country from another. The national identity can

determine the answers to emerging questions such as

“who are ‘we’?”, “What do ‘we’ do” and “who are

‘they’?” (Hudson 2007 in Dharmaputra 2017).

Simply understood that the national identity can then

determine the direction of a country’s foreign policy.

Radityo Dharmaputra (2017) then also adds that

the main values of the national identity LoA are

related to the relationship between “self” and

“other”. Therefore, Campbell (1990) adds that

meaning and identity are always the result of “self”

and “other” arising from interpretation, and not as a

product that reveals the exclusive sides of an

existing identity. When valuable forms and content

of domains depend on specific historical contexts, it

can then be understood that identity in the world of

global politics is the result of the exclusive practice

of various resistant elements that seek to secure the

identity contained in a country connected with the

dangerous discourse identified and coming from

outside the country (Campbell 1990). Then there are

two views related to identity relation with foreign

policy. First is the opinion of Neack (2008) that the

cultural factors in a country's domestic can establish

a national identity, and which then direct the foreign

policy of a country. Second is the opinion of Clunan

(2009) that the national identity and culture of a

country is formed based on the interpretation of

other countries.

According to Hudson (1990), there are several

assumptions underlying the national identity LoA.

The first is that a country’s decision-making is

influenced by the country’s culture and historical

experience. Second, the cultural influence on the

foreign policy of a country is not directly, but

through the intermediaries of the actors who play a

role in the foreign policy making of the country.

Third, the analysis of culture is also useful in

predicting responses most likely to be taken by a

country in the face of certain situations. Because the

identity and culture of a country tend to be

permanent, the predictive accuracy produced tends

to be high if the prediction uses cultural analysis and

identity.

National identity LoA is closely related to the

perspective of constructivism. This perspective has

basic principles, among others: (1) the structure of

the human set is determined chiefly by shared ideas,

not the material forces (2) the identity and interests

of the actors of international relations are

constructed by shared ideas rather than by

circumstances (Wendt 1999). Then Katzenstein

(1996) also adds that ideational factors in

constructivism such as cultural roles as a means of

social mobilization or generating threat perceptions

are the best forms of explaining patterns of

friendship or hostility among nations.

In the the national identity LoA perspective that

the author will use to analyze this case is the

structural constructivism initiated by Alexander

Wendt. Wendt (1999) then proposed several

premises supporting the perspectives which he

initiated, which was then summarized by

Dharmaputra (2017). First, because the state

dominates subjectivity in the politics of the world,

the state becomes the main unit of analysis. Both

international structures are formed based on

interaction between subjects, not material aspects.

Third, that the identity of the state is constructed by

the social structure, not something given.

Furthermore, Wendt (1999) believes that there

exists an anarchic world structure, marked by the

absence of centralist authority. The structure of

anarchy will dominate the system, and then there are

three examples of the dominant role of anarchic

systems: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian

structures (Wight 1991 in Wendt 1999). Then Wendt

(1999) adds that self-help in Hobbesian structures is

the best way for a country to get out of the threat it

faces. In this paper the author will attempt to explain

whether it is true then that Israel’s national identity

has a significant effect on Israel’s refusal of an Iran

deal seen from the perspective of structural

The Inﬂuence of National Identity on Israel’s Refusal Policy on Iran Nuclear Deal

523

constructivism, or indeed it does not play an

important role in Israel’s rejection.

3 THE INFLUENCES OF

IDENTITY ON ISRAEL’S

REFUSAL ON IRAN DEAL

When Israel was founded nearly seven decades

ago, the Declaration of Independence clearly states

the new state as a Jewish state. But the document

also perpetuates democracy as a core principle,

ensuring “the full equality of social and political

rights for all its inhabitants” (Rudoren 2014).

Submission of a draft law stating that Israel is a

Jewish state has actually been going on for a long

time. The same bill was first proposed in 2011 and

then submitted again in 2015 (Harkov 2017).

However, it was only in May 2017 that the bill was

finally accepted by the Knesset board.

The bill, which will also be ratified as the basic

constitution of the state of Israel, also states that

Israel is a nation state of all Jews. If the draft law is

to be passed, then all laws applicable in Israel must

be interpreted in accordance with the basic values of

Jewish belief (Harkov 2017). Not only that, the bill

that will validate Israel as a Jewish state also

includes several important issues, such as national

anthem and symbols as well as national flags. This

includes the controversial issue of Hebrew as the

official language, while Arabic has a special status

and it is still required that all government services be

available in Arabic. The bill also calls for the

government to work to strengthen relations between

the state of Israel and the Jewish diaspora. So the bill

is a form of self-determination aspiration based on

Jewish cultural and historical traditions (Harkov

2017).

The Jewish identity that was attempted to affirm

through the bill agrees with what Susan Wright

(1998) has said that culture is a process of

contestation to form meaning. In this case, the

existence of a draft law is able to preserve Jewish

cultural and historical traditions, thus later affirming

that Israel is a Jewish state, and the identity

possessed by the Israelis is a Jewish identity. Then,

of course, will raise the question of whether this

Jewish identity turned out to have negative

sentiments that then impact on Benjamin

Netanyahu’s refusal of the Iran nuclear deal. So then

in this section the author will explain whether

Jewish identity influences Benjamin Netanyahu’s

refusal of the Iran nuclear deal.

As Hudson (1990) has pointed out in the

previous section, there are some points that serve as

the basic assumptions of the national identity level

of analysis. The first is that a country’s decision-

making is influenced by the country’s culture and

historical experience. Second, the cultural influence

on the foreign policy of a country is not directly, but

through the intermediaries of the actors who play a

role in the foreign policy making of the country.

Third, the analysis of culture is also useful in

predicting responses most likely to be taken by a

country in the face of certain situations. Because the

identity and culture of a country tend to be

permanent, the predictive accuracy produced tends

to be high if the prediction uses cultural analysis and

identity. Then the author will verify whether these

basic assumptions are true.

Regarding the first point, it must be assessed

whether later rejection made by Benjamin

Netanyahu is based on cultural influences and

historical experiences of the past. If later the author

interprets textually Benjamin Netanyahu’s official

statement issued after the achievement of the Iran

nuclear deal agreement released by The Times of

Israel (2015), in which there is not explicitly

contained aspects of culture that then impact on

Netanyahu’s refusal. The complete statement issued

by Netanyahu does not show at all that there are

elements of Jewish culture which then encourage

rejection. Although there were later denunciations of

Netanyahu against the burning of American and

Israeli flags followed by the Iranian President four

days before Netanyahu issued a statement. However,

it is hard to say that the Israeli flag incineration then

provoked Israel’s rejection of the agreement.

Because just before the Iranian nuclear deal talks

reached an agreement, a few months earlier Israel

had criticized the talks because it seemed to be

hidden from Israel (Pileggi 2015),

It goes on to the second point that states the

cultural influence on a country’s foreign policy is

not directly, but through the intermediary of actors

who play a role in the country’s foreign policy

making (Hudson 1990). It can then be understood

that from that point, subjects who participate in

foreign policy making are directly affected by

culture in taking their country’s foreign policy. So

then in connection with the case of Israel’s refusal of

the Iran nuclear deal, it should be examined how the

influence of Jewish culture influenced the statement

issued by Netanyahu. In fact, it is difficult to find a

direct and clear correlation that Jewish culture

influenced Netanyahu in his rejection statement.

Consequently if in the first and second points there

ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations

524

is no clear answer to how the Jewish identity of

Netanyahu affects Israel’s rejection, then the third

assumption is not certain that then the predictions

produced have high accuracy.

If then the basic assumptions of the national

identity level of analysis are not able to be strongly

proven, then the question arises whether this level of

national identity analysis is relevant in analyzing

Israel’s rejection of the Iran nuclear deal. However,

later the writer chose not to rush to argue that

national identity has no influence on Israel’s refusal.

As mentioned earlier, the author will use the

perspective of structural constructivism initiated by

Wendt (1999) to examine more in this case, and the

use of this perspective in analyzing this case will be

the authors describe in the next section.

4 STRUCTURAL

CONSTRUCTIVISM ANALYSIS

ON THE INFLUENCE OF

ISRAEL’S IDENTITY IN

REFUSING IRAN NUCLEAR

DEAL

In contrast to the materialist views that have been

circulating in the thought of the study of

International Relations, constructivism has the

hypothesis that the structure of the human set is

chiefly more due to cultural influences than the

material phenomenon (Wendt 1999). Constructivism

also fights the rationalist view that is also widely

circulated in the study of International Relations,

stating that the structure not only regulates behavior

but also constructs identity and interests. But that

does not mean then constructivism no longer regards

the material strength and role of the person as an

intentional actor, but in this case there is a shift that

shared ideas embedded in material and culture such

as identity and interests are the most likely

conditions in explaining the power and interests.

Constructivists hold that the concept of identity

plays an important role in interpersonal and

international interaction. Wendt (1999) treats

identity as the possession of every actor that

generates motivational and behavioral character, and

is rooted in the self-understanding of each actor. But

identity is not as simple as subjective quality or unit

level, simply by self-understanding depending on the

other side and how the other side presents that

understanding. However, the quality of identity is

also seen from the interaction between the subjects

or systemic and identity construction is also

determined by internal and external structures.

Given that identity is not a single phenomenon that

is easily affected by the general definition, then

Wendt (1999) emphasizes that there are four types

of identities that will further the authors discuss

below.

The first is a corporate or personal identity

formed through self-organizing and a homeostatic

structure that distinguishes “self” with “other”

(Wendt 1999). The construction of this personal

identity involves a sense of ‘I’ or when it is

associated with the state then a sense of ‘We’ arises,

and through the work of consciousness and memory

which then form a common narrative of “ourselves”.

However, this type of first identity is inseparable

from outside influences in constructing personal

identity. The second is the type identity that lies in

the personal identity and refers to the social category

or labels that the person owns based on some of the

characteristics of that person. Fearon (1997 in

Wendt 1999) mentions that these characteristics

include appearance, behavior, values, knowledge,

experience, historical similarities, and others. The

third is the identity role that asserts that personal

identity can not be viewed only from “self”, but also

the role identity can only be achieved by taking a

“self” position in the social structure and observing

the behavioral norms of “self” against the “other”

identity contrary to "self". The fourth is the identity

of the collective which has a confusion in

distinguishing “self” with the “other”, because “self”

can be categorized as “other” and even the two can

join to create a single entity (Wendt 1999).

To find out how then the level of identity

analysis plays an important role in Israel’s rejection

of the Iran nuclear deal, it must first be understood

also the history of relations between Israel and Iran.

At the beginning of the emergence of the state of

Israel, the country has a good relationship with Iran.

This is because at the very beginning of Israel’s

emergence it has come under siege and pressure

from Arab countries in the surrounding environment

which makes it necessary to forge alliances with

non-Arab forces in the Middle East, such as Turkey,

Christian Lebanon and Iran (Latschan 2014). On the

other hand in the 1950s, Iran also suspected the rise

of Arab nationalism. The suspicion grew when the

Shah’s regime, which was heavily influenced by the

United States, came to power. Iran also considers

Israel which is also supported by the United States

as a good geopolitical counterweight in the face of

Arab countries. Israel and Iran then have a good

relationship. Israel sends agricultural experts,

The Inﬂuence of National Identity on Israel’s Refusal Policy on Iran Nuclear Deal

525

transfers technical knowledge, and also trains

Iranian armed forces. In return, Israel, which is in

desperate need of oil, is getting crude supplies from

Iran. Even Henner Fürtig (in Latschan 2014)

mentions that in the late 1970s an 80 percent Israeli

oil inventory was supplied by Iran.

However, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran

ended the good relationship between the two

countries (Latschan 2014). The spiritual leader of

the new regime, Ayatollah Khomeini, strongly

criticized Israel for occupying the Palestinian

territories. Once he took power, he canceled all

agreements with Israel. When Israel intervened in

the Lebanese civil war and moved to southern

Lebanon in 1982, Khomeini sent Iranian

Revolutionary Guard troops to Beirut to support

local Shiite militias. To this day, the emerging

Hizbullah militant group was then regarded as an

arm of Iran in Lebanon (Latschan 2014).

Although the Israeli-Iranian relationship is

fractured, at the same time the two countries are still

engaged in secret cooperation, triggered by the Iran-

Iraq war in September 1980 (Latschan 2014). Israel,

felt threatened by Saddam Hussein’s regime, then

sided with Iran. According to a study conducted by

Tel Aviv’s National Security Investigation Institute

(INSS) (in Latschan 2014), Israel supplied $ 500

million worth of weapons to Iran during the three-

year Iran-Iraq war. Instead, Iranian intelligence

agencies then provided valuable information to the

Israeli air force that bombed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear

reactor in 1981. When in 1986 the Iran-Contra

scandal broke out in the United States when senior

US officials ordered the sale of thousands of anti-

tank missiles and anti-aircraft to Tehran and used the

proceeds from the sale of the weapons to fund the

Contra rebels in Nicaragua, Israel is believed to also

be significantly involved in the deal (Latschan

2014).

After the scandal and the Iran-Iraq war

completely ended in 1988, relations between Israel

and Iran were finally cut off. Iraq was weakened,

and eventually further weakened by the US-led

Desert Storm Operation three years later (Latschan

2014). Iran no longer has any reason to maintain

cooperation with Israel. In addition, Iran began to

focus on the issue of Palestine. Iran used to bring the

issue of Palestine out of the Arab context and move

it into the Islamic context. Fürtig (in Latschan 2014)

argues that Iran’s move by drawing the Palestinian

issue out of the Arab context will certainly be the

focus of all Muslims, not just Arabs. So then Iran

hopes to be recognized leadership competence in the

Islamic world. Israel-Iran relations are also often

heated up because of statements often issued by the

presidents of Iran, especially during the leadership

of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad has often

criticized Israel, especially regarding Israel’s

occupation of the Palestinian territories. He even

issued a statement during a speech to the UN

General Assembly that he did not believe in the

Holocaust and also said that Israel would disappear

(Charbonneau 2012). Similarly, Israel’s attitude

denounced Iran’s nuclear and actively participated in

efforts to change the regime in Iran (Latschan 2014).

On the other hand, the poor Israeli-Iran relations

are also supported by Iran’s support of several

military groups who become enemies of Israel, such

as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine.

Rabinovich (2015) mentions that the military

capabilities of Hizbullah and Hamas while fighting

with Israel are a product of Iran’s regional ambitions

and policies. Support for Hezbollah in Lebanese

politics as well as of course Hamas in the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict clearly demonstrates Iran’s

interests. The effect is surely to present Iran

geographically located on the outskirts of the Middle

East region to the core areas of the Mediterranean as

well as the northern and southern sides of Israel

(Rabinovich 2015).

One of the important elements that the author of

this analysis is Netanyahu statement in the official

statement of his rejection of Iran nuclear deal. In the

statement, Netanyahu referred to Iran as a ‘terrorist

regime’ (The Times of Israel 2015). Netanyahu did

not once just label Iran as a terrorist regime. As he

appreciated Trump’s plan to pull the United States

out of the Iran nuclear deal, he also called Iran the

“world’s foremost terrorist regime” (Netanyahu

2017). But there is no clear explanation as to why

Netanyahu has repeatedly referred to Iran as a

‘terrorist regime’.

In relation to the type of identity categorized by

Wendt (1999) and described earlier, the labeling of

Iran as a terrorist regime by Netanyahu relates to the

classification of type identities. Wendt (1999) calls

the identity of type lies in the personal identity

(which in this case the state is equated with the

person), and it is intrinsic to the actor. This intrinsic

property refers to the social categories or labels that

the individual possesses based on some of the

characteristics of the person, one of which is

behavior (Fearon 1997 in Wendt 1999). The author

argue that this is inseparable from Iran’s foreign

policy behavior which is hostile to Israel and

supports Hezbollah and Hamas that Israel considers

to be terrorist and threaten Israel. Such Iranian

behavior then prompted Israel to label Iran as a

ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations

526

‘terrorist regime’ and to construct Iran as a threat to

Israel.

In connection with Israel’s refusal of the Iran

nuclear deal, the author will start from Wendt’s

(1999) analysis of three basic values in Hobbesian

anarchy culture that can help actors in shaping their

interests. The first is to construct enmity with each

other. The second is the term construction. The third

is within the conceptual framework of the symbiosis

of hostility. At this time, the author will analyze how

Israel’s refusal is based on a symbiosis of hostility

between Iran and Israel. In the Hobbesian

international system, hostility is something

constructed. The entity of a state depends on the

existence of the other party. In this case, the self

pushes the other to take the enemy’s identity so that

then “self” can maintain its identity to be hostile to

the “other”. This is what happened when after the

1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran ran a foreign policy

hostile to Israel (although there was some secret

cooperation between the two, especially during the

Iran-Iraq War as described above). Therefore, Iran

which in this case positions as self directly makes

Israel a position as the other as its enemy, and this is

similar to Soviet-Soviet hostilities in the Cold War

(Wendt 1999). Israel's rejection of the agreement is

reasonable as Wendt (1999) says that as an enemy,

“other” is an actor who does not recognize the right

of self as an autonomous actor and will not reduce

the level of violence against “self”. In this case

Israel as the “other” did not diminish his suspicion

of Iran as a form of self-help, so Israel later refused

the deal

5 CONCLUSION

The Iran nuclear deal that gets a positive response

from various parties, in fact still get rejection from

Israel as the arch enemy of Iran so far. In an attempt

to analyze how Jewish identity that has been closely

associated with Israel affects the rejection, the

author do not get a single explanation that can

answer why there is rejection. Therefore, the author

uses the perspective of structural constructivism in

answering this problem. The author searches the

dynamics of Israeli-Iran relations before determining

the identity of Israel and also Iran, so it is found that

Israeli identity labeled Iran as a ‘terrorist regime’

due to Iran’s hostile behavior towards Israel and

sponsoring groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas.

Through an analysis of Hobbesian culture, it is

found that Israel refused the agreement also

encouraged the attitude of Israel that did not reduce

its suspicion of Iran as a self-help form from Israel

itself.

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