Foreign Policy Analysis: The Influence of Culture and National

Identity in Turkey’s Response on Russia Related Crimean

Annexation 2014

Halida Fitriasari and Irfa Puspitasari

International Relations Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Airlangga

Keywords: Crimean Annexation, Turkish Foreign Policy, Russia

Abstract: The annexation of the Crimea by Russia has received various responses from the international community.

Referred to as a violation of international law, the annexation continues until the referendum stage and the

formation of a new status for the Crimea. Responding to this, Turkey views it as an illegal action. The

rejection of the recognition of the outcome of the referendum and the assertiveness of criticism of the action

is different from Turkey's cautious step in providing further responses to Russia. Based on this

phenomenon, this paper attempts to examine the reasons for such a policy. This ambiguity is traced within

the framework of the influence of a national identity that encourages the formation of Turkish foreign

policy. The perspective used to examine this is post-structuralism with the layers of identity structure. Each

layer contains different content but still has a relationship with each other. This paper is divided into three

main sections beginning with the presentation of the problem and focus of the study, then the elaboration of

LoA and the third part is the analysis of LoA and case elaboration. Furthermore, in the last section will be

drawn conclusions from the exposure and analysis that has been given related cases and LoA that affect it.

1 INTRODUCTION

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 by Russia

received a variety of responses from the

international world. The action that began in

February 2014 was followed by a referendum one

month later. This rapid process is further clarified

with the Crimean endorsement being part of the

Russian Federation in the same month. The

annexation is generally regarded as a violation of

international law. Western countries respond by

imposing sanctions on Russia and rejecting the

results of the referendum. The merging of the

Crimea to the Russian Federation is believed to be

the majority vote by Russia because previously

people have been asked to vote through a special

electoral process. Although, not a few parties

judging the voting is not valid. The historical

background of Crimean society is not only closely

related to Russia. The division of ethnic groups

existing in Crimea is one of them filled by Crimean

Tatars that are part of the people of Turkey. For that

response is not much different from the Western

countries also expressed by Turkey.

Turkey considers that Ukraine has the right to

determine its own destiny, including those related to

the Crimean issue. Turkey has ethnic and cultural

relations with the Crimea and therefore, the status

and fate of the Crimean Tatars that are indirectly

part of the Turkish people is a separate consideration

for the country. Despite criticizing and rejecting the

results, Turkey seems to be cautious in responding to

Russia. Unlike Western countries that decided to

give sanctions, Turkey strives to maintain good

relations with Russia. Policies issued by the

government don’t include the imposition of

sanctions or more than that. Related to this, some

parties judge the decision due to the relationship

between the two countries as a strategic partner.

Others doubt the solidarity of the partnership, since

there are essentially two scenarios of consideration

that arise in government policy toward the Crimean

situation. The first scenario stems from cultural ties

and historical backgrounds that Turkey denounced

the annexation of Russia and refused to recognize

the referendum. The second scenario, the

consideration of maintaining good relations with

Russia as a form of partnership can be seen from the

absence of sanctions against Russia from the Turkish

government. The official statement by the Turkish

496

Fitriasari, H. and Puspitasari, I.

Foreign Policy Analysis: The Inﬂuence of Culture and National Identity in Turkey’s Response on Russia Related Crimean Annexation 2014.

DOI: 10.5220/0010279300002309

In Proceedings of Airlangga Conference on International Relations (ACIR 2018) - Politics, Economy, and Security in Changing Indo-Paciﬁc Region, pages 496-502

ISBN: 978-989-758-493-0

government expressed its desire to be a mediator of

the situation and hope for a peaceful solution and a

more democratic solution.

There is an ambiguity in Turkish attitude and

policy. On the one hand being criticized but not

wishing to exacerbate its relationship with Russia.

The driving factors of this condition can come from

many possibilities. One of the possible things is

Turkey’s national identity. Is this then encouraged

because of its Islamic identity? Or because of the

existence of traces of the Ottoman Empire are

closely related to the Crimean Tatar people or

because of the hollow of Eurasian identity.

Therefore, this paper is aimed to find out the reasons

of Turkey’s foreign policy related to the Crimean

issue and more than that is the linkage of national

identity with the establishment of the policy. How

big and how the elaboration of the concept of

national identity can lead to state policy. In the first

section will be presented about the elaboration of

concepts and theories of national identity that

contains basic principles to theoretical

consequences. The next section is the conceptual

analysis and discussion of the variables in the case.

In the last section is the conclusion that will be

drawn about the national identity that has shaped

Turkey’s foreign policy and attitude towards Russia

in the case of the Crimean annexation and reaffirms

the reasons for the established policy.

1.1 The Elaboration of Level of

Analysis

Identity and culture experience a resurgence in

International Relations and on the one hand is seen

as part of a constructivist change. The present

approach to explaining the concept of national

identity can be obtained from constructivism to post-

structuralism. Arguments in constructivism separate

the explanations of the ideational and material

factors. Constructivism views the state as the main

unit of international analysis and structure as being

intersubjective. Then the identity of the state is seen

as a result of social construct and not a given thing.

The identity in the constructivism approach

concentrates on international systemic theory and

sees identity in the general sense as a state,

sovereign or anarchic form. But to provide insights

derived from within the country is not sufficiently

elaborated through this approach. The argument

provided by Wendt focuses on one side only -from a

system perspective- but can’t explain how the state

can interpret international political structures and

their use in interactions with other countries

(Ringmar, 1997: 283; Waevar, 2002: 21). The

concept of ideational identity then makes the identity

itself more viscous with cultural elements and tends

to be rhetorical. So the analysis will not be about

how the state can come with an identity and how it

can push the country to a foreign policy. Moreover,

constructivism is also unable to account for changes

in foreign policy taken by a country (Waever, 2002).

This then became the criticism that comes from

the post-structuralist approach. The arguments

brought about in post-structuralism focus on

elaboration and a systematic understanding of

identity. The analysis that Weaver proposes in post-

structuralist not only focuses on recognizing oneself

or ‘who we are’ but also understanding them

through the layers that exist within the identity itself.

Identity is a relational concept generated through the

elaboration of self and others. But in this case, post-

structuralist emphasizes more on the explanation of

constructions over oneself than involves the role of

another identity. This illustrates the depth of the

existing structures, the more in self-understanding it

is, means the less likely it is for change. Although

then this condition can still change when there is

pressure in the system and with the recall that the

existing structure is actually socially constructed. An

understanding of identity in international relations is

often interpreted as a sociological question but the

real one is that political identity is a discursive and

symbolic construct. Further explained that able to

explain about politics or foreign policy can be done

through a structural model based on national

discourse (Waever, 2002). The national documents

and texts of a country are the source of analysis to

discover national identity and its interrelationship

with foreign policy.

Discourse analysis can basically be used for all

forms of policy. The main idea is that discourse can

provide coherent or interrelated and well-structured

boundaries. This is not found in traditional foreign

policy analysis with reference to either causal

explanatory factors or decision-making models. The

preceding limit then related to the extent to which a

thing can be said and not said. Discourses form a

system with layered arrangements containing

various interrelated statements. One important

element in every discourse is language. In the post-

structuralist argument, language can be understood

as a meaning system. It can’t be denied that

language can be an issue of its own, but far more

important than that is the view that the actor believes

is worth more than what is said so that the interest to

find out the main thoughts of the actor can be the

beginning to examine the existing discourse.

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497

Therefore it is not the choice of the word in question

but the meaning of the use of the words (Foucault,

1972: 49; Waever, 2002: 30). This is one of the

points that distinguishes post-structuralist with

constructivist. Although, there is doubt present in the

analysis itself, regarding the truth of the

interpretation obtained through the existing

discourse. It means whether the actual motives are

meant to be in accordance with what is interpreted or

contradictory.

The structural model based on the national

discourse is described in a post-structuralism layered

structure consisting of three layers; first, the depth of

understanding of identity; second, relationships with

other identities; and third, the actual action. Each of

these layers can influence each other and then

through this structure can be understood as a

changes in policy. The first layer will be more

directed to the meaning of the conceptual

constellation or the fundamental things about the

nation and state. Then in the second layer will

further highlight the role and relationships with other

identities. See whether or not a possibility exists that

influences the first identity in its foreign policy. In

the last layer will be found the real policy. The

purpose of this model of analysis is not to get the

ulterior motive or a plan that is perceived behind a

policy. It is the belief or stance brought about in the

chosen policy (Weaver, 2002). Using a post-

structural layered analysis structure, the authors will

attempt to map Turkish national identity through

three layers. In each different layer will be found the

main idea or content that will be interrelated.

1.2 The Analysis of Level of Analysis

and Case Elaboration

Based on post-structuralism logic it can be

understood that the identity is the aspect that

constitutes foreign policy and the policy will reflect

the identity of the state. Based on the three layers of

identity structure given then this can be mapped as

follows: the first layer is the basic conceptual

constellation of the state and nation. Mapping the

basic idea or concept of the state and nation and how

these two can be integrated. It will be more about

historical matters and open the discussion about the

state ideology. There are five basic principles for

building analysis at this level; (a) to question the

state and nation as a unit or two independent aspect;

(b) look more deeply into construction as a nation;

and internal dimensions in state construction; (d) to

see the possibility of attachment to ideas as a nation;

(e) the possibility to find other concepts that can

describe the true relationship between state and

nation or nation with its attachment (Waever, 2002).

Turkey is not entirely a part of Europe or Asia,

and has not yet stepped closer to getting closer to

Western countries, nor in its track record of

removing the influence of Islam in society and

nation. The important question asked by Waxman

(2000) in an article entitled “Islam and Turkish

National Identity: A Reappraisal” is whether the

Turks are really a nation or just a collection of

distinct and heterogeneous groups? The concept of a

state and as a complex nation is present in the

discussion of Turkish national identity. In the case of

Turkey, construction as a nation and state are two

separate ideas. The tendency to unite these two

things emerged as an attempt to establish a new

identity. But on the way there are still many who see

that Turkey basically has no fixed idea to be called a

national identity. It further disclosed that, in truth,

Turkey is experiencing a crisis of identity and this

issue is not uncommonly disclosed. For example, an

excerpt from a speech by former Turkish President

Suleyman Demirel in Washington DC on April 27,

1999 stating:

“We have a multiple cultural heritage and in

some ways a multiple identity. As individuals,

identity cannot be summed up in one word. It is the

same for our nation's identity. We certainly do not

have, as outsiders sometimes claim, an identity crisis

(Demiral, 1999).”

In the passage of the speech can be seen that

Demiral implies the Turkish identity as a nation is

not only composed of one aspect. From this point if

it is further interpreted then how that identity can

affect Turkey’s foreign policy will depend on what

identity the government has in power. This means

that the attitudes and policies shown in an issue may

vary and more will depend on the interests it carries.

According to Waxman (2000) related to the

construction basically the government does not

involve the community, so the government

positioned itself as an architect who can form the

identity that is considered correct for Turkey. The

Turkish Republic was born outside the Ottoman

Empire. Turkey became a republic that embraced

parliamentary democracy, a country that tried to

maintain the status quo, and not a multinational,

multiracial or multi-religious state, but a

homogeneous society. Turks from the beginning

were Turks, and in the Ottoman Empire the group

called Turk was only part of the ummah. While the

Ottoman never considered himself as Turk. The

construction of a new Turkish identity is also an

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498

attempt to discover a new virtue based on the

Turkish state (Aydin, 2004). But. this construction

on many occasions can’t get rid of the original face

of Islam that has been embedded in the community.

So the construction itself becomes an ongoing

product of negotiation between the state and society

(Waxman, 2002).

1.3 Turkey as a Nation-State: Islam as

the Root of the Nation

The construction of Turkey’s identity as a nation-

state affects much of its foreign policy formation.

The discussion that will arise regarding this identity

constellation relates to a number of key words such

as the Ottoman Empire, Islam and the Euro-Asia

identity. How does Turkey define itself especially

when it relates to its strategic geographic position?

Or interpret the Islam that is still closely rooted in

Turkish society? The Ottoman Empire developed the

concept of Ottoman nationality to bind various

ethnic and religious faiths. In 1453, during the reign

of Sultan Mehmet II, a system was established that

divided diverse ethnic diversities into political

groups based on religious affiliation. Every religious

community or nation is called millet (anonymous,

2010). This means that under the power of Sultan

Mehmet II, each group retains its own sub-identity.

All the Muslim populations regardless of their

ethnicity are grouped as millet Muslims and ruled by

shari’a. Officially, Ottoman regards Turkish identity

from the indigenous Turkish tribe (Turk) to be

included as part of the ummah. The same effort can

also be seen in 1517 by establishing Sunni Islam as

an imperial religion. The reigning Sultan Selim I at

that time tried to define the main national identity by

referring to two benchmarks; first, the legal-political

factor; second, the religious factor. There is a

tendency to combine political and ethnic differences

into a national identity based on Sunni Islam. But

the sub-identity especially in the Turks group still

sets the boundaries between religion and politics

(anonymous, 2010).

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire became a

moment of emergence of a new identity for Turkey.

Islam is shifted by the diversity of ethnicity as a key

element of the new nationalism. Correspondingly,

the idea for a more modern Turkey emerges and

widespread. For Turkey at the time, modernization

meant westernization or in other words was to be

part of European civilization. Western civilization is

associated with Western Europe especially France

and England (Bozdaglioglu, 2003). In the

transitional periods passed by Turkey and to achieve

secularization and autonomy as an individual it is

felt not enough simply by improving rationality,

bureaucratization and organizational efficiency.

More than that, the things that needs to be done is to

make a comprehensive transformation in social and

cultural aspects. In an effort to establish this new

identity one thing that is necessary to be removed is

the Islamic framework of culture and society.

During the reign of Selim III (1789-1807) a reform

program known as the New Order was introduced to

increase the organizational power of the central

government and one of them against its external

enemy, Russia. In this period, Turkey placed Europe

as a model to form a more modern Turkey with the

advancement of science, technology and society. A

clearer concept was obtained during the reign of

Mahmut II (1808-1839) through a reorganization

program or Tanzimat. The onslaught of

secularization on the one hand becomes a move to

save and establish Ottoman identity and prevent the

disintegration of the state. The course of this

program is also followed by the emergence of

protests coming from Islamic groups. The main idea

expressed is that the programs don’t take into

account about Islam and traditional Ottoman values.

The thing that they should do is imitate the European

model but still contains Islamic law in it. The Pan-

Islam Movement also appears to bring back the

Islamic Shariah in the Ottoman society

(Bozdaglioglu, 2003). Trying to balance between the

need to be modern but by maintaining cultural

identity as Ottomans and Islam in it.

The presence of religion and its interrelationship

with the state can’t be underestimated. Religion

serves as an attribute of individuals and society, as

an organized interest and an institutional relationship

with the state. In international politics, religion

serves as a set of beliefs or ideologies, cultural

attributes and sources of value (Huntington, 1993;

Norris & Inglehart, 2004; Philpott, 2007; Warner &

Stephen, 2011). The religious heritage of a country

can affect the country’s overall orientation to foreign

policy. Quoting Fox and Sandler (2004; Warner &

Stephen, 2011) country leaders can use a common

religious understanding of their own population and

for other countries with a view to legitimizing

foreign policy options as well as gathering support.

Countries with the same religion have a significant

level of ideological affinity. This thesis departs from

Huntington’s (1993; Warner & Stephen, 2011)

understanding of civilization and that religion enters

into a feature in a cultural concept that goes along

with it as a construction of civilization (Warner &

Stephen, 2011). Citing the argument of

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499

constructivism, the essence of a country is identity,

and it comes from culture (Wendt, 1992; Finnemore,

1996; Warner & Stephen, 2011). Religion is

embedded in the national identity of the state which

further forms the institutions and interests and

foreign policy of the country (Warner & Stephen,

2011).

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries,

Ottoman regions in Europe became independent

states and Muslim populations in the region

converged on Turkey (Pick, 2011). The need to unite

society through a new national identity, which can

embrace all ethnic and religious in Turkey is

growing. A Turk is a citizen of the Turkish

Republic, AttaTurk places Muslims, Jews and

Christians on the same level and thus confers

religion to the private realm. Yet the influence of

Islam is not completely removed. Islamic

nationalization became the face of Turkish Islam and

prevented the politicization of Islam (anonymous,

2010). Turkey underwent a major change in 1923

but the great influence of Islam remained embedded

in Turkish society to the extent that it had helped

shape foreign policy. Turkey needs Islam because it

can’t be separated from the root of the nation itself

(Schon, 2013). The position of Islam is in fact not

shifted. For example, during the war of

independence, Kemalist elites used Islamic

discourse to strengthen their popular legitimacy and

unite leading figures, religious leaders and Anatolian

peasants. In the charter of the founders of the

Turkish Republic as well as the declaration of

conferences in Erzurum and Sivas, the term

“Turkish nation” is hardly mentioned but rather

mentions Islam and its elements. Even more vivid

and even impressed impartiality can be found in the

Income Tax Act of 1942 which requires non-

Muslims to pay ten times more than Muslims

(Waxman 2002). Bernard Lewis (in Waxman 2002)

through his work entitled “The Emergence of

Modern Turkey” reveals that in Turkish culture, the

roots of Islam are still alive and the highest identity

of Turkey and Muslims is unchallenged. The last

statement that can be asserted to further affirm the

Islamic roots of Turkish society and culture is found

by looking at the definition of a “Turk” as Islam

itself.

The second layer in this identity frame structure

will see the relational position of Turkey with

Eurasia. How the basic constellations of previous

layers relate to Turkey’s projection of Eurasian

identity. The linkage of Eurasia in this layer is based

on the geographical position of Turkey which is in

the middle between Europe and Asia. Turkey is seen

as a bridge between Europe and Asia. This

geostrategic location puts Turkey in a favorable

position to play a bigger role. In mapping this

strategic position, one of Turkey’s developed

strategies is “strategic depth” that emphasizes

Turkey’s historical and cultural affinity with

countries in the region to drive its regional and

global influence (Tufekci, 2015). Halford Mackinder

(1861-1947) in his article “The Geographical Pivot

of History” reveals the concept of “Heartland”

which represents the region of the Euro-Asia region.

The Turkish position in “Heartland” brings

advantages as well as losses. The strategic location

of Turkey allows it to serve as a bridge for countries

that transact in the oil market, between oil-rich and

needy countries. The strategic value of Turkey is

also known very well. An example is a statement

expressed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan

stating that Turkey is not a peripheral country of

Europe, Asia or the Middle East. In contrast, Turkey

lies at the crossroads and has the ability to influence

the three regions (Tufekci, 2015). Eurasia basically

means Europe and Asia. In the classical concept of

Eurasianism there are four main principles in it. Two

principles that are considered important to be known

further are; first, western anti-Eurasians consider

themselves closer to Asia than to Europe although in

fact its main purpose is to build a different country

from Europe and Asia. Second, the uniqueness and

culture of Russia. It was developed on the basis of

the Turanian idea which later included the Finno-

Ugric countries (the Estonians, Karelians, Finns, and

Ugandans), Samoyed, Turks (Turks) -including

Ottoman Turks, Manchurian people (Tufekci, 2015).

According to Tufecki (2015), Eurasian ideology

first encountered Turkey in the 1990s that created

the collapse of the Soviet Union and gave birth to

Turkey as a nation. The concept of neo-Eurasianism

is more appropriate to describe Turkey and Eurasia.

There are two reasons why Turkey is not related to

classical Eurasianism; first, classical Eurasianism is

a representation of Western-oriented ideology and

recognition of Russia’s historical and cultural

superiority against the West; second, classical

Eurasianism was present to save the Russian Kkota.

For that the old status of Turkish relations with

Russia is in two rounds, namely as an enemy or a

strategic partner. As a strategic partner, the two

countries build a principle of mutual trust. In 2001,

the parties responsible for improving bilateral ties

and became multidimensional partnerships. In 2002

the economic ties between the two countries

improved and Russia became a trading partner for

Turkey in later years. Turkey’s energy imports from

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500

Russia are in significant amounts, 55% natural gas

and 12% oil to accommodate Turkey’s domestic

needs. Beyond the energy problem, Turkey also has

a historical relationship with Russia (Cagaptay &

James, 2014). As an enemy, Turkey and Russia have

been involved in many contexts of imperial times

and similar tensions are still exist in contemporary

issues.

The third layer will emphasize the

government’s policy-related issues. In this third

layer will be found the actual political actors and

integrate the dynamic elements into the structural

model. A number of things to note in relation to the

two previous levels or layers are; in this last layer

the aim is to create a theoretical model in which the

layered structure is capable of combining change

and confrontation. Changes can be found in these

three layers but with different degrees. The smallest

can occur at level three and does not change the

concept of the second layer. While a fairly radical

encountered when there is a change in the second

layer and will be very vital when the same thing

occurs in the first layer structure (Waever, 2000). In

the case of the Turkish national identity it can be

seen that the tendency to change the identity of the

former imperials and based on religion to become a

more secular, modern form and abandon the

concepts are considered incompatible. But this

change is not entirely successful because the cultural

relations in Turkish society towards Islam are

difficult to separate. The government also can’t

abandon the concept of Islam and even be used as a

tool to gain legitimacy from the community. For that

reason Islam’s position and its relationship with

Turkey have not really changed. In Turkey’s policy

and response to Russia it can be seen that the

attitudes shown tend to be ambiguous. In the sense

that there is a hesitancy to take further action to its

strategic partner, Russia. If Turkey contributes to

economic sanctions as Western countries do, it will

be difficult and detrimental to the Turkish economy.

While the opposite attitude is shown in relation to

the Tatars in the Crimea. The ideological foundation

as well as the historical background that links these

three subjects (Turkey, Crimea and Russia) to the

consideration and basis of the attitude and policy of

Turkey condemning the annexation and referendum.

2 CONCLUSION

Turkish national identity becomes a complex

discussion that can’t be seen from one aspect only.

Multi-Turkish identity is absent in one form of

national identity. This diversity can also be seen in

Turkey’s foreign policy formation. This statement

can be seen further in the case of Turkey’s response

to Russia that annexed the Crimea. The idea of Islam

and the Ottoman Empire in Turkish cultural relations

is stronger than the projection of Eurasian identity.

This statement is believed for a number of reasons;

first, the Islamic roots of Turkish society have

existed for a very long period of time, even when

defining a Turk then the idea of Islam will share the

identity of the individual. So it is with the Turks.

This identity then can be projected further in relation

to Turkey’s response to the Tatar conditions in the

Crimea. One Turkish historian IIber Ortayli revealed

that Turkey should maintain good relations with

Russia while continuing to ensure that the Tatar

cultural heritage in the Crimea is protected. Yet

Turkey’s level of interest in the Crimean Tatar is not

a part of the priorities of the Islamic Conservative

Justice and Development Party (AKP).

The Crimean crisis can’t be said to be parallel to

such an emotional issue as Palestine. This is found

in the identity structure of the first layer which

essentially contains the ideational concepts of nation

and state. This means that the case of the Crimean

annexation does not provide a major shock in

Muslim society in Turkey while still providing an

ideological impact to the extent of cultural linkage

and efforts to protect existing heritage and

relationships. While Turkey in its projection as

Eurasian is believed to be closely related to material

drivers that can be seen from the exposure of

Turkey’s strategic position against Europe and Asia,

as well as Turkivis-à-vis Russia. Mentioned earlier

that Turkey as a bridge for the two regions as well as

a country that needs Russia to meet domestic energy

needs and other economic aspects. When it comes to

Turkey’s response to Russia in the case of

annexation it is believed that Turkey is very cautious

in taking a position and policy towards Russia. As a

strategic partner, it would be a bad scenario if the

economic sanctions were granted by Turkey

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