National Identity Analysis and Foreign Policy China Aggressive

Stance in South China Sea under Xi Jinping

Anggia Rahmadini and Citra Hennida

Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Airlangga

Keywords: China, National Identity,Xi Jinping, South China Sea

Abstract: China's influence in the escalation of the South China Sea dispute tension cannot be denied. The country has

made a claim of maritime sovereignty coupled with reclamation and construction in the territorial waters.

These measures were conducted unilaterally and aggressively to encourage responses from countries involved

in the South China Sea sovereign conflict of Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei

Darussalam, as well as the United States. During Xi Jinping's reign, China had a peaceful development

program to defend China's sovereignty and core interests. This peaceful development strategy seems far from

reality, because China is showing its decisive stance by building a formidable military force. This paper will

present an analysis of China's aggressive posture linked to China's national identity under the rule of Xi

Jinping. The authors then argue that national identity has an important role in the decision-making of a

country.

1 INTRODUCTION

South China Sea or SCS is a semi-enclosed

archipelago territory, as defined in Article 122 of the

United Nations Convention on the Law of the

International Sea (UNCLOS). The islands are

grouped into three islands namely Spratly, Paracel

and Pratas, as well as Macclesfield Bank and

Scarborough Shoal. The uninhabited islands then

cause international disputes involving many

countries, especially those countries directly

bordering on LCS. The disputes over the sovereignty

claims of the islands and the surrounding seas,

involving China and five ASEAN countries are

Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei

Darussalam and Indonesia. The Philippines,

Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia claim a marine zone

in the LCS adjacent to their territorial waters, while

China and Vietnam claim a wider sea territory. This

dispute involves complex issues relating to the Law

of the Sea or UNCLOS which does not offer clear

guidance on the claims of maritime territories, islands

and Exclusive Economic Zones or overlapping ZEE

(Buszynski, 2013).

The South China Sea is an important commercial

gateway for most of the world's trade. More than half

the world's total oil tankers are sailing through these

waters every year. In addition, this area is also

important for naval forces due to crossings between

the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean. The other virtue

of this LCS is an ecosystem that is integrated with

extraordinary biodiversity. LCS is one of the richest

marine in the world in terms of marine flora and

fauna, coral reefs, mangroves, seagrass beds, and fish.

In addition to marine resources, LCS is also predicted

to produce abundant oil and natural gas reserves so

that LCS is sometimes called the second Persian Gulf.

But apart from these privileges, these waters are

vulnerable to piracy, poaching, theft of resources,

drug trafficking, illegal migration, and terrorist

threats (Li, 2014). Therefore, ASEAN and China

countries want to secure their rights in LCS.

Here are the claims and policies made by some

countries including the Philippines, Vietnam, and

China. These three countries are taken as examples to

see how they compare their attitudes to claims in the

LCS. The Philippine claim to Spratly's sovereignty

was originally based on a personal claim by Captain

Thomas Cloma, who declared in 1956 that he had

found a group of islands in the South China Sea called

Kalayaan (Freedom) Island. Later in 1978, the

Philippine government determined that the LCS was

included in its country ZEE for a distance of 200

miles from the country's bottom line. The legal basis

of such claims was re-patented through the United

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or

UNCLOS in 2009 (De Castro, 2013). In this case, the

Philippines tends to rely on international legal

434

Rahmadini, A. and Hennida, C.

National Identity Analysis and Foreign Policy China Aggressive Stance in South China Sea under Xi Jinping.

DOI: 10.5220/0010278400002309

In Proceedings of Airlangga Conference on International Relations (ACIR 2018) - Politics, Economy, and Security in Changing Indo-Paciﬁc Region, pages 434-440

ISBN: 978-989-758-493-0

institutions to support its archipelagic claims. This is

also evident in 2013 when the Philippines submitted

its claims dispute with China to the UNCLOS

Arbitration Board for dispute settlement.

Next up is Vietnam's claim over LCS which is

divided into two periods. The first period was after

the unification of Vietnam in 1975. At that time,

Vietnam was ambitious to have full sovereignty over

the whole island of Paracel and Spratly on the basis

of history as stated in Hoang Sa and Truong Sa. This

claim is also reinforced by evidence of three White

Papers published in 1979, 1981, and 1988 that present

various historical data. This ambition is accompanied

by decisive measures such as navigation restrictions

on LCS claimed as Vietnam's maritime zone (Hi,

2013). However, Vietnam's attitude began to change

in the second period around the 1980s where

Vietnam's focus began to shift to economic

development, so the attention on the LCS began to

soften. While still maintaining its claims, Vietnam

seeks to resolve existing disputes peacefully on the

basis of international law or UNCLOS. Vietnam

wants to find a solution about the LCS problem

through negotiation dialogue so that this issue does

not become an excessive security threat (Shoji, 2011).

Claims are also filed by the Chinese who want full

sovereignty over the LCS. This claim is based on

historical factors that the territorial waters are part of

the Manchu Empire. But the conditions that must be

met for sovereignty in the LCS is to show clear legal

evidence, so that historical evidence is unacceptable

to most international jurists. Moreover, China is

considered indiscriminate in showing evidence

because it is actually in Manchu or Qing dynasties, its

southernmost territory on China's border is Hainan

island, not the island of Paracel and Spratly (Malik,

2013). In connection with the claim, Chinese Defense

Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng said that his

country would oppose any provocative military

behavior of other countries and was willing to use

force to protect national sovereignty and maritime

rights in the LCS. Chinese courage is also reflected in

the development of artificial islands above the Spratly

in 2014 which led to the escalation of tensions in the

LCS (Zhou, 2015).

From these three comparisons can be seen

significant differences between countries in the effort

and attitude to address each dispute in the LCS. The

Philippines and Vietnam are categorized as small

countries with relatively low economic and military

power. So these two countries have not been able and

dare to show their resistance militarily in the LCS. In

addition, the Philippines and Vietnam are

incorporated in the Association of Southeast Asian

Nations or ASEAN countries which have the ASEAN

Way Principle with an important point is non-

intervention and consensus. This also underlies the

attitude of the Philippines and Vietnam in the LCS

dispute, namely by filing a claim with the authorities

and avoiding any action that may cause tension,

especially among ASEAN members. Compared to

China, the country has rapid economic growth

making it possible to play a greater political role in

global affairs and able to strengthen its military to

cope with the potential threats. In addition to strong

economic and military factors, China's

aggressiveness in the LCS can also be understood

through an analysis of national identity that will be

discussed further in this paper.

1.1 National Identity and Foreign

Policy

National identity can affect a country in making

foreign policy. Sometimes in becoming a policy-

making guide, national identity is coupled with

cultural factors that are both dynamic in time and

context (Hudson, 2007). National identity is a very

complex multi-dimensional aspect. National identity

is formed through the idea of citizenship and

patriotism of ethnic, racial, and cultural differences

with the logic of assimilation of cultural equations or

also called melting pot (Gilroy in İnaç & Ünal, 2013).

According to Hudson (2007), national identity is

about how we define self image with the key points

being "who we are", "what we do", and "who they

are". This is in line with the opinion of Richard Ned

Lebow (2008) that then identity can be the basis or

foundation for social or political action, because the

identity is derived from collective equations between

group members in certain categories (Lebow, 2011).

The nature of the national identity is exclusive and

dynamic. Breuilly (in İnaç & Ünal, 2013) says that

national identity has an exclusive character because

national identity is the result of the relationship

between culture and nationalism which then

distinguishes one country from another. In addition,

national identity is also dynamic because in it there is

a relationship between nationalism, culture, historical

powers, ethics, and changing political circumstances

that then also affect the change or shift of a national

identity. Then how does the national identity affect

the foreign policy of a country? The national identity

is the result of constructivist thinking put forward by

Alexander Wendt in 1999 and Peter Katzenstein in

1996. This approach is a challenger to a rationalist

perspective in which constructivism has proved that

the identity of the state can offer another alternative

National Identity Analysis and Foreign Policy China Aggressive Stance in South China Sea under Xi Jinping

435

to rational choice theory in policy making

(Alexandrov, 2003).

The concept of identity makes it possible to

integrate the changing interests of the actors into the

research framework. According to constructivist

reasoning, the interests of countries formed by

national identity may change in the process of

interaction between subjects. So constructivists claim

that foreign policy can be analyzed through

international interaction (which carries national

identity) perpetrated by actors (Alexandrov, 2003).

Added by Clunan (2009), this identity can be learned

through aspirational constructivism, a perspective

that states that national identity is shaped by past

history and present situation. These two dimensions

of time will shape the paradigms and perspectives of

political elites, bureaucrats, and decision-makers who

will guide them in determining the direction of their

foreign policy (Clunan, 2009). The statement implies

that the national identity is the essential foundation in

formulating policy instruments. But Hudson (2007)

expresses a different opinion. Hudson assumes that

national identity is regarded as the Last Resort or the

basis of the last consideration in making a decision.

Because the national identity is a complex and

dynamic aspect because it can be constructed under

certain conditions (Hudson, 2007).

The advantage of national identity analysis is to

provide another option to explain the background of

a policy. The national identity can be traced by

looking for some components in the course of a

nation's history. In addition, the environment also

gives its influence in shaping the identity that

ultimately also affects the thinking decision maker

(Clunan, 2009). On the one hand, national identity

can make it easier to analyze the comparative policies

of one country with another because each country

must have a distinct and distinct identity. But on the

other hand, the analysis of national identity has a

tendency to look at aspects of the past and sometimes

it is no longer relevant to the condition of the country

in the present. The level of national identity analysis

is also biased because identity sometimes does not

represent the whole self image of the whole society.

This happens because the identity is constructive and

subjective which is usually only declared by state

officials as representation of the interests of the

group.

1.2 National Identity Analysis and

China Aggresive Stance in SCS

National identity is something that can be constructed

and is complex and dynamic. This is also the case

with China's national identity. His identity is

currently shifting slightly due to the construction of

policymakers under the leadership of president Xi

Jinping. Xi Jinping is the president of China who was

confirmed on March 14, 2014 after previously had

replaced Hu Jintao as Secretary General of the Party

and Chairman of the Central Military Commission in

November 2012. As is well known, the leaders of the

country can construct a national identity which he

considers to be able to represent the interests of

society and state overall. The construction of China's

national identity is influenced by several factors,

namely other regional powers, the existence of big

countries such as the United States and Japan, as well

as China's own economic growth. The President as

the leader of the state then also has a role in

determining national identity. Whether to continue

the existing identity, or to create a new identity that is

implemented in its foreign policy. The following

discussion will focus on national identity in Xi

Jinping era as the motive of China's aggressiveness in

South China Sea claim dispute.

1.3 National Security State

China's national interests have undergone significant

changes based on different presidential presidents. In

the era of Mao Zedong's government, China

understood his country as a military-national security

state with a focus on building a stronghold for China.

While in the reign of Deng Xiaoping, the focus of

national interest changed into economic development

that is since 1970 end to early 2010. He undertook

economic reforms and open the country for economic

cooperation as widely as possible. Meanwhile,

national security issues are of secondary importance.

As a result of this neglect, national security began to

disrupt and threaten the process of economic reform,

especially in 1989 with Tiananmen Square protests

and again in the mid-1990s when tensions across the

Taiwan Strait threatened to escalate into military

conflicts. Thereafter comes the consideration of

finding a more balanced relationship between

economic development and national security,

although economic problems remain a dominant

priority (Cheung, 2016).

This national interest began to change when Xi

Jinping took office as president. The balance will be

maintained, but Xi Jinping looks more supportive of

national security considerations. The national identity

of China has finally returned to the era of Mao

Zedong's national security state. There are several

types of national security states, including predatory

security states, garrison states, and control states. The

ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations

436

predatory security state is the deployment of the

security apparatus to use its power and influence to

gain control in the economic aspects. An example is

Russia under Putin rule is a classic predatory security

state in which its intelligence bureaucracy extends its

reach to the control of the entire economy. The

second type is the garrison state, a security state born

out of an awareness of a serious external threat. The

state ends up using the military as a dominant actor

who plays a role to maintain its security, for example

Pakistan. Then the third type is the national security

state controlled state, the government oversees the

bureaucratic system in internal and external security

by controlling some aspects of security. For example

traditional security such as military and public

security, legal security, and information diffusion

(propaganda system). It is this controlled country that

Xi Jinping (Cheung, 2016) wants to establish.

The construction of this national identity is

motivated by three main reasons related to the

dynamics of China's current state of affairs. As

Clunan argues, that state conditions can affect the

national identity of a country. The first reason is the

threat of invasion, subversion, and division. This

threat is related to maritime sovereignty disputes

involving China. China is involved in two maritime

claim conflicts with Japan in the seizure of Diaoyu or

Senkaku Islands, and again with Southeast Asian and

US countries over the LCS conflict. In addition,

China also faces a divisive threat that comes from its

internal sphere. Like the problem of Taiwan who

want to get their own sovereignty and ethnic riots in

Tibet and Xinjiang. The second reason is the threat of

reform, economic development, and stability. Xi

Jinping is promoting a reform agenda to guard social

stability in China. It contains ambitious plans to

improve China's economy and security. But the

implementation is difficult because there are some

resistance from some parties such as state institutions

and SOEs. The third reason is China's socialist

development is disrupted (Cheung, 2016).

T Three reasons that have been mentioned before

then make the Chinese government to return its

identity to national security state. Many internal and

external threats require the government to take firm

steps to build China's strength and defense. The

implementation of the national security state's

firmness relating to the LCS can be seen from its

policy of fortifying control over the Spratly Islands.

China unilaterally reclaimed the island since 2014 by

dredging seven reef centers estimated at 3000

hectares. The reclaimed island is largely the right of

Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines and Taiwan to be

captured by China. However, Xi Jinping said it would

not militarize the islands of reclamation. But in fact

China is actually building three airfields that can

accommodate bombs. Furthermore, China deployed

air and jet missiles at Woody Island, Paracel. This

move was justified by China on the grounds of

defending his rights, so the country built both civilian

facilities and defensive facilities on the island (Hunt,

2016).

1.4 Re-emerging Power

Currently China can be regarded as a re-emerging

power country. This is also realized by China itself

and most analysts consider China to be more

aggressive in recent years, especially in issues related

to LCS. The position of re-emerging power in the

international system then influences the interests and

behavior of the Chinese. Logically, any newly

emerging power naturally has the desire to drive away

the main world power that exists, namely the United

States. As stated by Hugh White, Professor of

Strategic Studies at Australian National University

that "China wants primacy not because they're

communist, not even because they're Chinese, it's

because they're normal". It is understandable that

every country with great powers has a tendency to be

number one. History has proved just like Persia,

Athens, Sparta, Rome, and America, they will want

something or have the same goals as other rival

civilizational goals. Still, the virtues of each

civilization will be very different and reflected from

certain cultural, historical, and political bases

(Varrall, 2015).

The national identity of China as re-emerging

power becomes supportive in performing aggressive

steps in the LCS. This attitude reflects his national

interests at the same time. China's interest in the LCS

also relates to its goal of becoming a super power, by

strengthening the influence and firmness of China in

the LCS to undermine US dominance in the Asia-

Pacific region and potentially challenge the power of

hegemony. China's aggressive posture in this case is

reflected in its policy of issuing the White Paper in

2015 on its defense strategy. China's State Council

announces a new military strategy that changes from

'defensive posture' to 'active defense posture'. This

policy is implemented by increasing the number of

navies in the surrounding area, including the LCS to

protect its strategic interests (Zhou, 2015). In essence,

the Chinese self image as re-emerging power gives a

psychological effect that is the desire to overthrow the

hegemon power and replace that position. China

considers that what should be done to expedite the

National Identity Analysis and Foreign Policy China Aggressive Stance in South China Sea under Xi Jinping

437

business is by being aggressive as strengthening its

defense and firmly in running diplomatic relations.

1.5 Chinese Dream

The Chinese Dream or Zhongguo Meng is the

motivational slogan for the Chinese leader in

governing his government. This phrase is a

characteristic of traditional culture which means

looking to the past to articulate future goals. If based

on classical Confucian texts, the goal is to achieve the

life of a prosperous society (Xiaokang shehui 小康

社会). In addition, the Chinese Dream is also

presented as a vision for the development of China for

decades with its core concept of national rejuvenation

(Fuxing, 复兴) (Barmé, t.t.). The term then evolves as

the government and the media use the word 'dream'

(梦) as an allusion to describing the country's re-

emergence as a major force and other contemporary

national aspirations. The Chinese Dream became the

ideological basis in Xi Jinping's government as well

as previous Chinese leaders who had their own

ideology. Like Mao Zedong with "class struggle",

Deng Xiaoping with "four modernizations" Jiang

Zemin with "three represents" and Hu Jintao through

"harmonious society" (Denton, 2014).

Although the term Chinese Dream has been

popular before, this slogan has begun to become the

ideological platform of China since it was declared by

Xi Jinping. So it can be articulated that the Chinese

Dream is a culture that then forms the national

identity of China under the leadership of president Xi

Jinping. This is also clarified by Xi Jinping's

statement "China Dream means the dream of a

people, and it is also the dreams of each Chinese

person" (Denton, 2014). This national identity based

on the Chinese Dream can explain the background to

China's aggressiveness in the LCS dispute. Xi Jinping

through his ideology of government has led to a

transformation in China's domestic and foreign

policy. Xi wanted to abandon an old-fashioned

strategy like Deng Xiaoping's "keeping a low profile"

to turn into an "active and creative" strategy. The

strategy is to realize "Two 100s" which means China

will become a moderately well-off society by 2020 to

coincide with the 100th anniversary of the Chinese

Communist Party (Sinaga, 2015). It was also "rich

and strong socialist country" in 2049 as China's 100th

year of independence (Sørensen, 2015).

The Chinese Dream illustrates China's ambitious

determination to fight for its national interests which

include sovereignty, territorial integrity, and

sustainable socio-economic development. In his

article entitled The Significance of Xi Jinping's

"Chinese Dream" for Chinese Foreign Policy: From

"Tao Guang Yang Hui" to "Fen Fa You Wei",

Sørensen (2015) states that the approach in the

Chinese Dream is a peaceful development strategy

development strategy. But in its implementation, not

all development is done peacefully with the principle

of win-win solution. China tends to be firm in

maintaining Chinese sovereignty and core interests.

This is implicit in some of Xi Jinping's speeches and

statements that emphasize regaining international

status, rights and power (Sørensen, 2015). The new

grand strategy drafted for the Chinese Dream has

attracted much attention from the international

community, particularly those related to LCS, as

China has claimed with its nine dashed line (Sinaga,

2015).

“While we pursue peaceful development, we will

never relinquish our legitimate rights and interests,

or allow China's core interests to be undermined. We

should firmly uphold China's territorial sovereignty,

maritime rights and interests and national unity, and

properly handle territorial and island disputes.‛ - Xi

Jinping, November 2014.

China's firm stance in its core interests is seen in

some of its policies at LCS. First, China is actively

conducting military exercises at the LCS to

strengthen its claims. China sends patrol boats

regularly and has built military posts and airstrips on

several islands. In December 2013, China sent its first

aircraft carrier, Liaoning, to LCS. Some are

concerned that China will declare Air Defense

Identification Zone or ADIZ at LCS as it has done in

the East China Sea. Secondly, in 2014, China is

placing a rig or drilling tool for Haiyang Shiyou-981

oil at a location that belongs to ZEE Vietnam. This

Chinese move sparked a major anti-Chinese protest in

Hanoi and eventually China National Petroleum Corp

closed the rig and moved closer to Hainan Island in

southern China. Subsequently, in June 2014, The

Hunan Publishing House Map published a new map

of China featuring a ten-dashed line at LCS which

Taiwan described as a territory incorporated with

mainland China. China's aggressive attitude was also

seen when China blocked two civilian ships hired by

the Philippine navy to send logistics to the Philippine

Marine Unit at Second Thomas Shoal. Though the

area has been claimed as part of the continental shelf

of the Philippines (Sinaga, 2015).

2 CONCLUSION

From the above explanation it can be concluded that

the conflict over overlapping claims in the South

ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations

438

China Sea is difficult to solve. This is resulted from

the behavior of actors involved in it as a giver of

influence on the tension that occurred. The dominant

actor who worsen the situation was China.

Periodically this country has conducted controversial

activities in disputed areas, especially on Spratly

Island and Paracel. There are several factors that

underlie China's actions. First is China's desire to

explore the various natural resources offered by the

LCS archipelago. The island's islands are believed to

have marine biodiversity that can be utilized as a

source of economy, coupled with abundant natural oil

resources. His uninhabited status prompted China to

exploit its resources to explore these privileges.

Second is China's desire to erode slowly the influence

and strength of the United States in the Asia Pacific

region. As it is known that the United States as a

hegemon country has the capacity to influence the

policies of small countries and develop through its

diplomacy. Therefore, China responded by doing

bold actions to show China's strength and bargaining

position.

In this regard, China's aggressive posture can be

analyzed not only by its purpose, but can also be

analyzed from national identity during Xi Jinping's

reign. The national identity becomes the guidance and

motivation for the actors to formulate national

interests and then determine the direction of their

policies. National identity is something that can be

constructed by circumstances, environment, even

individuals or groups, so that identity is subjective.

Furthermore, China's national identity under Xi

Jinping's presidency was China as National Security

State, China as re-emerging power, and China with

Chinese Dream ideology. These three identities were

a shift and counter to Chinese self-image in the reign

before Xi Jinping. The Chinese identity since 2013

tends to portray China as a revisionist force aimed at

overhauling the global order. The posture is

supported by rapid economic progress to support the

formation of military power as the identification of

superpower states. Thus it has been found a common

thread between Chinese identity and aggressive

attitude in the LCS, namely that every posture and

firm policy of China is a reflection of its national

identity as a security state that will play an

antagonistic role in order to maintain its sovereignty

and its core interests.

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