The Role of Religion, Idea, and Identity in Taliban Alliance with Al

Qaeda in Afghanistan

Mohammad Ayub Mirdad

and Vinsensio Dugis

Ph.D. Program Study of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Airlangga

Department of

International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Airlangga

Keywords: Taliban, Al Qaeda, Religion, Idea, Identity.

Abstract: This study examines the alliance between Al Qaeda and the Taliban from 1996-2001. The alliance between

Taliban and Al Qaeda was transformed since the Taliban governed Afghanistan. The Taliban regime and Al

Qaeda terrorist network were sharing similar world, the Taliban sheltered Osama bin Laden and also

allowed him to operate various terrorist camps in Afghanistan in which militants all over the world could be

trained in terror tactics. Mullah Mohammed Omer, the Taliban leader, wanted Afghanistan to be a pure

Islamic state, while Osama bin Laden had the same objective for the entire Islamic world. Both hated the

West, especially the US. The Taliban provided security and a sanctuary for Al Qaeda where they trained

thousands of recruits, established a state-of-the-art network, and planned various operations, including

September 11. This study has found that the Taliban and Al Qaeda alliance in Afghanistan can be analyzed

based on three factors religion, idea and identity: the particular goal is to replace corrupt and heretical

government with the rule of “Sharia” (Islamic law) and establish an Islamic state. The paper first present the

introduction and literature review of the study, and next the methodology and result, and in the discussion

section addressing the role of three factors between the alliance of Taliban and Al Qaeda, and conclusion of

the study.

1 INTRODUCTION

The waves of violence that have repeatedly damaged

Afghanistan over the past 38 years have also

revealed the assiduity of non-state actors to play a

role in the future of global events. Terrorist groups

led by the central leadership of the Taliban and Al

Qaeda have proven to be a long-lasting and

adaptable and enduring threat to US forces and

overall global security (Skinner, 2011).

Since 1978, Afghanistan has been in a state of

continuous conflict that has resulted in extraordinary

social, political and economic upheaval and

dislocation. Although the great physical casualties of

the conflict in Afghan infrastructure are clear, deep

disruptions and the destruction of some of

Afghanistan's traditional values, customs, and

processes have left a similarly destructive scar on

the people and institutions of government. In the

context of Afghanistan's modern history, the two

occupying forces have sought to consolidate control

and support the weak regime through occupation:

the Soviets between 1980 and 1989 and the US-

NATO alliance between 2001 and 2018, which

persists (Johnson, 2013: 3).

In the 1980s, when Afghanistan was occupied by

the Soviet Union, the US handed over billions of

dollars to revolutionary militia forces who named

the mujahedeen through CIA secret operations.

Unfortunately, in 1989 not long after the Soviet

Union was withdrawn from Afghanistan rather than

the mujahideen factions, who came together to oust

the Russians, almost instantly turned against each

other and started a new civil war when it was proven

that the coalition government was founded after the

Soviet invasion has failed to overcome their ethnic,

clan, and religion differences (Roraback, 2004). It

was in this chaotic environment of civil war that

extremist religious groups emerged victorious. The

Taliban, a name derived from the Arabic word for

students, is composed of young people who have

barely lived in Afghanistan since they were in

refugee camps, and attended radical religious

schools in Pakistan (Rubin, 1999).

In a Taliban-controlled region, its growing zeal

for religious issues began to draw criticism and

spread uneasiness among the people. The vast

Mirdad, M. and Dugis, V.

The Role of Religion, Idea, and Identity in Taliban Alliance with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

DOI: 10.5220/0010277300002309

In Proceedings of Airlangga Conference on International Relations (ACIR 2018) - Politics, Economy, and Security in Changing Indo-Paciﬁc Region, pages 369-374

ISBN: 978-989-758-493-0

369

majority Afghans resented the strict reading of the

group from an ancient tribal social code called

Pushtunwali, because they have never been exposed

to such restrictions before (Ruiz, 2002). Far from

being a legitimate government, the Taliban rule is

only recognized by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the

United Arab Emirates. The international institutions

such as the United Nations and the Organization of

Islamic Conference also did not give official

recognition to the Taliban as the official government

of Afghanistan (Bajoria, 2011).

The Taliban regime and Al Qaeda terrorist

network share the same world, the Taliban protect

Osama bin Laden and also allowed him to operate

various terrorist camps in Afghanistan where

militants around the world can be trained in terror

tactics. Mullah Mohammed Omer, the leader of the

Taliban, wants Afghanistan to be a pure Islamic state,

while Osama bin Laden has the same goal for the

entire Islamic world. Both hate the West, especially

the US. This collaboration turned Afghanistan into

one of the most ideal locations for terrorism. At the

same time, these were very important indications

showing how Afghanistan became a main base for Al

Qaeda to implement its terror campaign against the

US before 9/11 (Kinzer, 2007).

As a matter of fact, Rotberg in, "Building a New

Afghanistan" talks about how profound relationship

with Al Qaeda transformed the Taliban from a

nationalist group of fighters in to a more extremist

group, "the Taliban provide security and sanctuary

for the Al Qaeda where they trained thousands of

recruits, established a state-of-the-art network, and

planned various operations, including September 11.

Al Qaeda's support comes in several forms: they

provide much needed financial resources, training

Taliban fighters in their conflict with the opposition

in the north. Most importantly, Al Qaeda

ideologically influenced the Taliban leadership,

which in many ways resulted in their extreme vision,

"(Rotberg, 2006).

After the 2001 terror attacks in New York and

Washington, the Taliban and Al Qaeda are

increasingly seen as two sides of the same coin, as

manifested in the reasons behind armed intervention

launched in Afghanistan to change the regime and

constrain the Taliban's ability to operate. Analysts of

transnational mobilization often see a joint identity

as a key factor, mostly with an emphasis on

ethnicity, sometimes also on other religious or other

identity foundations (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006).

The Taliban alliance with Al Qaeda has changed

since the Taliban ruled Afghanistan. The Al Qaeda

network has to a large extent itself on alliances with

the Taliban, based on three factors religion, ideas

and identity, contributing to their local combat while

at the same time seeking to influence them

ideologically, supporting and recruiting activists for

its own global war. (Hoffman, 2004 & Leheny,

2005).

Since the US invasion in late-2001 in

Afghanistan, there have been many scholars and

experts who have written about Afghanistan and

more specifically about the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

Josh Schott (2012) states that the Taliban had three

goals from 1994 to 2001: cleans Afghanistan of the

corrupt warlords, create a functioning government

grounded in Sharia law, and gain international

recognition. In contrast to the Taliban, Al Qaeda has

a global perspective, expanded horizons, and long-

term goals. Similarly, Franzen Simon (2012)

examines that the complex relationship between the

Taliban and Al Qaeda is generally assumed based on

misinformation, misunderstanding or

misrepresentation of historical events. The Taliban

and Al Qaeda can in many ways be seen as sharing

common values, although their ultimate goals

remains very different.

Different from above is a study by Peters (2009)

and Shanty (2006) observing the relationship

between the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and drug trafficking.

Drugs have long played a supporting role in the

Afghan conflict also transform through deepening

ties between insurgents based on ideology and

driven by profit. Over the past twenty-five years the

opium trade has provided a vast source of funding

for the Afghan Mujahideen, the Taliban and Al

Qaeda. Other noted studies have also provided

findings Shafiee (2013) and Dorronsoro (2005), they

addressing that the Taliban continuing their rebellion

against the Afghan government and focus on

rebuilding the Islamic Emirate, by receiving

assistance and training from various circles in

Pakistan, and any every successful fight against this

group depends upon the elimination of their

sanctuaries in Pakistan. The Taliban strategy has so

far been successful. They have achieved most of

their objectives in South and East Afghanistan, and

they are making inroads in the North. For the

Taliban, their close relationship to the global

Islamist struggle has been a mixed blessing. As

Tarrow points out, it is not uncommon for local

groups to face undesirable outcomes when they enter

into global alliances (Orenstein & Schmitz, 2006;

Tarrow, 2005). For the Taliban, their relationship

with Al Qaeda has accelerated its isolation by the

international community, and became a precursor to

its demise as a regime. Similarly, Zahab and Roy

ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations

370

(2004) they argues that without the role played by Al

Qaeda, the Taliban, who have never been accused of

playing an active part in the September 11 attacks,

are likely to continue in power. And, even if the

Taliban do not share in the globalist jihad agenda, it

has been radicalized through its relationship with Al

Qaeda, first and foremost at the leadership level.

The review of the literatures in the alliance

between Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan,

which gives details about the Taliban and Al Qaeda

relationships and operations in Afghanistan, has

focused merely on partial explanations. There has

been no attempt to see the role of factors in the

Taliban and Al Qaeda alliance in Afghanistan.

Therefore, this study aims to explore the role of

religion, idea, and identity factors between Taliban

and Al Qaeda alliance in Afghanistan. This study

focuses on the following question, to what extent are

religious, idea and identity factors contributing to

the ongoing alliance between the Taliban and Al-

Qaeda terrorist groups in Afghanistan?

This study is clarified in the following discussion

sections. Section one presents the introduction and

literature review of the study. Section two explains

the methodology of the study. Section three is the

result. Section four is the analyses on alliance

between Taliban and Al Qaeda based on the three

mentioned factors. Section five is the conclusion of

the study and bibliography of the research.

2 METHODS

This research is an explanative research, exploring

how the factors of religion, idea and identity

function as essential factors in forging the

continuing alliance between Taliban and Al Qaeda

in Afghanistan. Given the critical situation in

Afghanistan, the author was unable to reach and

interview active members of the Taliban and Al

Qaeda in Afghanistan. In this study used data

collection techniques through literature study.

Therefore, the discussion of the data is based more

on the secondary data. The method of collecting

secondary data is taken from books, articles,

journals, internet, mass media information, and other

literature sources.

3 RESULT

When the Soviet Union was defeated in

Afghanistan, it encouraged non-state actors involved

in Afghanistan's theater to replicate the same

experience elsewhere against their own enemies.

After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Afghanistan

fell into a brutal civil war between rival mujahideen

groups and warlords. Different groups and warlords

occupied several regions, but no organization

succeeded in occupying large part of the country

(Hussin, 2005). Taliban-ruled Afghanistan soon

become safe havens for other terrorist groups.

Osama bin Laden solidified his relationship with the

Taliban and operated in Taliban-controlled

territories in Afghanistan (Commission 9/11, 2004).

The Al Qaeda and Taliban alliance can be in the

following mode of cooperation:

Mode one, the training camps in the Taliban-

ruled Afghanistan was founded by Bin Laden and

his network to provide troop fighters against Taliban

enemies in times of need, especially whenever they

open up fronts to the Northern Alliance in their

military efforts in the north (Peters, 2009: 99).

Mode two, gathering support for the Taliban

regime amongst Arab sympathizers of Al Qaeda was

another milestone achieved by Al Qaeda and which

strengthens their alliance. Arab sympathizers began

to send millions of dollars of alms money to the

Taliban regime as well as weapons and equipment

ranging from four to four vehicles for small arms

(Peters, 2009: 80).

Mode three, the Afghan Taliban regime also

provides sanctuaries for sectarian militant's outfits of

Pakistan, presumably at the behest of Al Qaeda.

Sectarian terrorist outfits such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

(LeJ) were proscribed by the state of Pakistan and

most of the leadership of banded sectarian groups

found safe havens in Afghanistan only when they

colluded with Al Qaeda and received training at Al

Qaeda run training camps (Peters, 2009:86).

Mode four, most importantly, the killing of

northern alliance leader Ahmad Shah Masoud, by

two Arabs posing as Belgian-Moroccan journalists

was sent by Al Qaeda leadership to eliminate the

most potent threat to the Taliban government in

Afghanistan. Subsequent investigations led to

exposure to the important role played by Al Qaeda

leaders in the assassination of Ahmad Shah Masoud.

It was an act to show the Taliban leadership of their

loyalties and proving Al Qaeda as an asset to the

Taliban regime rather than a liability (Peters, 2009).

Mode five, Chechen Islamists fighting against the

Russian forces also joined hands with Al Qaeda

under the Taliban regime's care. After facing defeat

in the Second Chechen War (1999-2000) most

Chechen leaders have nowhere else but Afghanistan

to seek refuge. Chechen Islamists later became an

The Role of Religion, Idea, and Identity in Taliban Alliance with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan

371

asset for Taliban forces during their military

offensive against Northern Alliance forces and

against the US-led invasion after the 9/11 attacks

(Peters, 2009).

Mode six, the Taliban are also cooperated with

Al Qaeda as far as the opium issue is concerned.

There is much evidence of Taliban and Al Qaeda

cooperation in this field. The cash starved Taliban

needed money to run the government and get no

support except from Saudi Arabia and rich Arab

sympathizers. Al Qaeda needs funds to run its camps

and recruit more Islamist radical youth around the

world, and of course to conduct terrorist operations

(Peters, 2009).

4 DISCUSSION

Al Qaeda and Taliban alliances in Afghanistan also

have mission statements. A "story of the US versus

them", distinguishes "pure from the impure", creates

group identity and can be considered as "the glue

that holds even the most tenuous organizations

together" (Stern, 2003: 142). Their mission

statement focuses on expelling the US and other

Western troops from Afghanistan and by holding

hostages and bombings. Also Taliban and Al Qaeda

alliances in Afghanistan their objectives and

strategies can be analyzed based on three factors

religion, ideas and identity. The ultimate goal is to

replace corrupt and heretical government with the

rule of Sharia (Islamic law) and establish an Islamic

State. The purpose of the "Re-establishment of

Muslim State" and the abolition of foreign presence,

especially America (Moore, 2001). According to

Hoffman, they believes that the only way to

overcome these objectives and the only language

that the West understands is the logic of violence,

and thus the jihad which is the Arabic word for "to

strive" is the only option (Hoffman 2003: 13).

Bin Laden reiterated the characterization of the

so-called "new crusade led by the United States

against Islamic countries," and emphasized his belief

that an emerging conflict between Islam and the

West would be fought "between the Muslim world

and America and their allies" (Pakistan Daily, 1997).

Bin Laden argues that the Islamic world should see

itself as a one seamless community, or umma, and

that Muslims are obliged to unite and defend

themselves. Changing its focus to the internal

politics of the Islamic world, Bin Laden urged

Muslims to find a leader to unite them and establish

"pious caliphate" to be governed by Islamic law and

follow the principles of Islamic finance and social

conduct (Everyday Pakistan, 1997). Bin Laden has

repeatedly stated that Afghanistan had become a

model of an Islamic state under its Taliban ally and

used religious rhetoric to call for support for the

Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan (Al Jazeera,

1999). Their target is violence against non-military

individuals and their property. This blind and broad-

minded violence is intended to intimidate and coerce

the government, and in order to achieve this, the

Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan use "fatwas"

(religious decrees) issues religious instructions and

decisions in order to justify their actions (Associated

Press, 2006). The alliance between Taliban and Al

Qaeda can be analysed based on three factors:

4.1 Connectivity based on Religion

Understanding the role that religion plays for the

Taliban and Al Qaeda also depends on one's

analytical approach. The important difference in this

regard is whether the role of religion is approached

through the level of individual or organizational

analysis (Rassler, 2012). For example, what religion

has to do with the Taliban and Al Qaeda will be

understood differently when viewed from the lens of

the individual fighter versus the organization (s) to

which that person affiliated. At the individual level,

especially when death or martyrdom is near

certainty, religion is often a strong motivational

factor. However, at the organizational level, religion

can be seen as part of the organizational stratum

calculus, an instrumental tool used to influence the

basis and identity of groups, goals and visions,

methods, and the narratives and justifications uses

for violence (Rassler, 2012). The purpose of religion

in this paper is at the organization level.

The role of religion in political conflict is merely

instrumental. This contest is a popular view that in

the case of Taliban alliance with Al Qaeda religion

serves as a mechanism to gain political legitimacy

and is being misused for purely political purposes.

The religion factor between the Taliban alliances

with Al Qaeda had a major role and makes their

cooperation even stronger. They represented nobody

but themselves and they recognized no Islam except

their own. For example, Soon after the Taliban took

control of Kabul in 1996, the Taliban formulated

their policies under their own self-style

interpretation of sharia, they forbidden women from

working outside or studying, women's limited access

to health care, banning music and TV and men are

enforced to wear beard and etc. As slain leader of Al

Qaeda Abu Mustafa al Yazid said: We participate

with our brothers in the Islamic Emirate in all fields;

ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations

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this has a large positive effect on Taliban self-

esteem in Afghanistan (NBC News 2010).

Al Qaeda and the Taliban emphasized

monotheism as the basis of Muslim beliefs, which

stipulated, "There is no god but Allah and

Muhammad is his last messenger. For both of them

this monotheistic concept defines Islamic traditions

at both the individual and collective levels, for

instance, when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan and

their effort with Al Qaeda was to establish an

Islamic Caliphate, the concept of "There is "No God

but Allah" not only has a ritualistic connotation. Al

Qaeda and Taliban also draws the perspective that

God's concept is synonymous with authority. Any

political system or other authority that refuses to be

subservient to God's will effectively erases a form of

polytheism (Shahzad, 2011). The word (No God but

Allah) symbolizes rebellion against the any man-

made system. Muslims who adopt this stance

automatically reject the system of governance based

on democracy, socialism, or any ideology that

dependent on the human made laws as polytheistic,

and argues that Muslims should struggle against

such a system.

4.2 Connectivity based on Idea

The idea behind Al Qaeda is the formation of a base

that will unite different terrorist Islamist groups such

as the Taliban and others to coordinate their

activities. Many of those who attracted to Al Qaeda

were non-Arabs, both Taliban and Al Qaeda groups

comprising Sunni Muslims and both beliefs in in a

very strict form of Islamic law known as sharia law.

The Al Qaeda militant dream of establishing a new

Islamic state, imitating the medieval caliphate. The

restored caliphate will be ruled in accordance to

sharia law and will cover all the current and former

Muslim lands that stretch from Southeast Asia to

Western Europe. Ultimately, the caliph will serve as

the platform from which the whole world will be

brought to Islam (Mendelsohn, 2016).

Therefore, the Taliban's extremely strict and anti-

modern idea has been described as an innovative

form of sharia law and combining with the Pashtun

tribal codes (Richard et al., 2003), or Pashtunwali,

with Deobandi's interpretation of radical Islam and

Saudi Wahhabis being influenced major over

Taliban ideology and teachings at madrassas during

the Soviet-Afghan war by providing teachers and

supporting from Saudi Arabia (Blanchard, 2008). As

they study in madrassas, the Taliban are often

classified as Wahhabis belonging to the austere,

puritanical form of Islam while the ties of Wahhabis

idea between the Taliban and Al Qaeda are tight.

The Taliban and Al Qaeda have reject differences in

nationality, ethnicity or sect among Muslims. For

example, the shared ideals between them the

establishment of an Islamic state and the

enforcement of sharia law as the only way to build

an Islamic society, and the perception that Islam is

threatened by Western influences. This is regarded

as a direct consequence of the formation of the

Taliban government in Afghanistan (Literalist,

Extremist).

4.3 Connectivity based on Identity

Goffman states that a person has two specific

identities, one that we keep to ourselves, back stage

and one that we present to others, front stage

(Goffman, 1959:112). In this study, it is the front

stage presentation of Al Qaeda and the Taliban

towards outsiders. By applying the main points of

the terrorist identity to the messages, photos and

videos released by Al Qaeda and Taliban the idea is

to identify patterns within the jihadist groups

outward presented identity.

The purpose of identification in this study refers

to the "terrorists" identity of both groups. Terrorism

comes into two varieties local and global, according

to their actions creating fear and threats at local and

global levels to civilians and government. Therefore,

the identity factor between the Taliban and Al Qaeda

alliances is clearly terrorist and their target is to

create violence against civilians, foreigners,

coalition forces, and Afghan government forces

(Denbeaux, 2011). For example, using suicide

bombings, IED and rocket attacks, as well as raids

and shootings, assassinations, guerrilla warfare and

massacres, they are believed to have a high-profile

assassination corps, specifically trained and utilized

for assassinations and targeted killings of individuals

they called Jihad (Pape et al., 2010).

5 CONCLUSION

The Taliban and Al Qaeda mission statement

focuses on expelling U.S. and other Western forces

from Afghanistan and by means of hostage-taking

and bombings. This study has found that the Taliban

and Al Qaeda alliance in Afghanistan can be

analyzed based on three factors religion, idea and

identity: the particular goal is to replace corrupt and

heretical government with the rule of “Sharia”

(Islamic law) and establish an Islamic state. Religion

is far more transcendent than nationality or political

The Role of Religion, Idea, and Identity in Taliban Alliance with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan

373

ideology; fewer groups need to compete for interests

of their constituencies, as the interest of a particular

religious group are largely uniform, regardless of

temporal and spatial concern. Thus, there exist now

terrorist groups, these groups due to their religious

basis are endowed with unprecedented global

support, global reach and member fanaticism

(Rapoport, 2004).

As Al Qaeda and the Taliban interacted and

deepened their alliance, a trans-terrorist identity was

formed to the extent that the soldiers identified with

the battle as one battle and considered their battle to

be one jihad, so the alliance between the Al Qaeda

and Taliban resulted in a synchronicity of objectives.

Ideology or more precisely, religion-based has also

been mentioned as an efficient factor favoring Al

Qaeda and Taliban cohesion. A shared ideology

enables followers to carry out hard to control

operations by using special tactics, for example, the

suicide attacks that are only possible due to a fanatic

belief in a cause. The leader of both groups is seen

as a central piece of this ideology and a “symbol of

resistance” (Gunaratna, 2002: 69). Consequently,

even if Al Qaeda’s and Taliban leadership is

captured, the ideology will still persist.

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