Domestic Politics Analysis of Singapore’s Foreign Policy on the Belt

and Road Initiative

Athaya Aushafina

Universitas Airlangga

Keywords: Singapore, foreign policy analysis, domestic politics, government institution

Abstract : In this article, the domestic politic level of analysis is perused as an explanan for Singapore’s foreign policy

regarding the One Belt and One Road initiative (OBOR) as proposed by China. The developmental plans for

OBOR has been explicated by China’s President Xi Jinping since 2013, in which the OBOR initiative are

comprised of the development of two components, a land course in the form of the Silk Road Economic Belt

(SREB) and a sea course in the form of Maritime Silk Road of the 21

Century (MSR). China seeks to increase

the degree of integration across Asia as well as increasing connectivity between Asia and Europe. Singapore,

as a South-East Asian country involved in the initiative showed its support for China’s endeavor. In line with

Ronald Rogowski’s work, analysis in regards to the influence a governmental institution hold over foreign

policy making is examined based on five aspects: policy bias, credibility of commitment, coherence and

stability of policy, mobilization and projection of power, and strategic environment of domestic actors. The

influence an institution has over said five aspects are examined through three dimensions of government

institutions including franchise, representation, and decision rules. This paper comes to the conclusion that in

Singapore’s case, foreign policy analysis utilizing domestic politics level of analysis has an inconclusive

result.

1 INTRODUCTION

The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century

Maritime Silk Road or more colloquially known as

the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is China’s

development strategy formulated by President Xi

Jinping. BRI had been formulated as China’s effort in

increasing interconnectedness and cooperation

among Eurasian states, and in consequence, increase

China’s role in the region. The BRI itself consists of

two main development plans which are set out to

integrate trade and economy among the Eurasian

states which are in its path. The BRI consists of two

components, which is land and sea, where the land

component is implemented through the Silk Road

Economic Belt (SREB) which is a path that cuts

through lane, and the 21

Century Maritime Silk

Road (MSR) which is a sea lane and a form of

maritime cooperation. Xi Jinping announces the plan

for SREB on September 2013 during his visit to

Kazakhstan, and the MSR during his visit to

Indonesia on October 2012 to attend an APEC

meeting. During that visit, President Xi Jinping also

proclaimed an initiative to create the Asian

Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (Wang, 2016).

President Xi Jinping also stated that Southeast Asia is

a region which should be a focus for the BRI

development plan, not least because the development

of a China-ASEAN maritime cooperation in the MSR

can support each party in fulfilling their interests (Xi,

2013).

The blueprint for the Belt and Road Initiative had

been officially formed by March 2015, after

undergoing intense deliberation between three

ministries of the Chinese government: National

Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce. The

guideline which had been published simultaneously

by the three ministries elaborates the initiative’s main

goal which is to create an interconnected network in

the longest economic corridor in the world,

connecting the Asia Pacific Economic Circle in the

east and European Economic Circle in the west,

involving about 65 countries and regions around the

Silk Road, also known as the Belt and Road lines

(National Development and Reform Commission,

2015). The blueprint for the BRI which had been

created in China was designed to achieve five main

Aushaﬁna, A.

Domestic Politics Analysis of Singapore’s Foreign Policy on the Belt and Road Initiative.

DOI: 10.5220/0010275000002309

In Proceedings of Airlangga Conference on International Relations (ACIR 2018) - Politics, Economy, and Security in Changing Indo-Paciﬁc Region, pages 193-199

ISBN: 978-989-758-493-0

193

goals, which includes: Tiongkok dirancang untuk

mencapai lima tujuan utama, yakni: supporting policy

coordination, facilitating connectivity, lifting barriers

in the conduct of trade, create financial integration,

and forming interpersonal relationships (Wang,

2016).

Singapore is among the Southeast Asian nations

involved in the BRI. Generally speaking, Singapore

has been a proponent to China’s development

initiative. Geopolitically, Singapore, with their

identity as a port nation is located at a geographical

advantage. Historically, Singapore has a history as a

port which connects the Asian and European

civilizations in the historic Silk Road. Singapore’s

location also puts the island state at the intersection of

two other lanes which constitutes the BRI plan, which

are the SREB in the China-Indochina Peninsula

Economic Corridor which begins in South China and

ends in Singapore, as well as the MSR which is a sea

lane which stretches all the way from off the coast of

China, through Singapore, and into the Mediterrania.

In addition, Singapore also acts as the coordinator for

China-ASEAN relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Singapore, 2017). Singapore’s Foreign Minister,

Vivian Balakrishnan, stated that Singapore has

supported the BRI since it’s plan’s conception and

has continued to support it, seeing the demand and

desperate need for the construction of an

infrastructure that increases the connectivity across

Asia and connecting Asia to Europe. Balakrishnan

also stated that Singapore has signed an agreement

with China to build three platforms as part of the BRI

which consists of a platform to increase connectivity

cooperation, a platform to boost financial

cooperation, as well as a platform to increase

cooperation with third parties. (Balakrishnan, 2017).

In this paper, the factors which motivates the

formulation of Singapore’s foreign policy in

supporting the realization of the BRI will be analyzed.

Specifically, I will focus more on the motivating

factors from Singapore’s domestic politics.

2 DOMESTIC POLITICS AS AN

EXPLANAN FOR FOREIGN

POLICY ANALYSIS

In conducting analysis on Singapore’s foreign policy

in regards to the BRI, a researcher is faced with many

options, among which is the domestic politics level of

analysis. Robert Putnam (1988) wrote about how the

domestic and foreign aspects of a nation’s policy can

be seen as analogous to a two-level game and are

mutually entangled to one another in that sense. A

shift or movement in one “board” of the game

influences conditions in the other “board”. Through

this analogy, Putnam illustrates how domestic politics

in a state relates and can become entangled in the

foreign policy the state conducts. What occurs in

foreign politics always impacts domestic politics, and

processes in domestic politics always impacts foreign

policy. The correlation between domestic politics and

foreign policy renders analysis which are based solely

on the domestic or on the international insufficient to

explain and shed light on foreign policy

comprehensively (Putnam, 1988). The argument in

this frame of thinking has experienced a vast

development in the discourse of International

Relations and along with the development of the

discourse, the domestic politics level of analysis has

gained traction in academic circles in analyzing

foreign policy.

Domestic political institutions are inherently

situated in an international context, which means that

activities and processes occurring in the domestic

level has international consequences. This is due to

the structure of the governmental institutions which

consists of contingency networks structurally

influential in a direct and non-direct manner to the

foreign policy of a nation. Therefore, it is crucial to

see a governmental institution not only as a structure

but as a determining factor which influences the

formation of the process (Hudson, 2014).

Governmental institutions determine how power is

distributed in domestic politics.

By creating a difference in power and voice

relative between domestic actors, domestic

governmental institutions may construct the

preferences of various domestic actors in a structural

manner. In addition, governmental institutions may

be a tool used to form and implement policy in

regards to certain issues. Domestic political

institutions bounds the enactment of actors’

preferences, and thus it tends to memunculkan

oppositional groups. According to Valerie Hudson

(2014), in regards of foreign policies, it is said that

foreign policies are greatly influenced by domestic

politics, and that to a certain extent is itself a product

of the efforts of domestic political actors to achieve

their interest in the face of opposition. Domestic

actors peruse simple strategies in order to do so,

among which are ignorance, direct tactics, indirect

tactics, and compromizing.

Ronald Rogowski (1999) proposed a method to

determine to what extent a domestic political

institution influences foreign policy based on three

independent variables: franchise – to what extent

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groups which preferences are taken into account has

an influence on policy and which groups’ preferences

are taken into account, representation – actors which

acts as representation for the franchise and how those

representatives are selected, and decision rules –

when and how representatives can encourage a

commitment from a governmental body on an action.

Based on those three variables, the influence

domestic policy and politics has on foreign policy and

politics may be analyzed empirically. Rogowski

categorizes five ways in which foreign policy may be

influenced, which are: policy bias, credibility of

commitments, coherence and stability of policy,

mobilization and projection of power, and strategic

environment. The main objective of all foreign policy

stratefies is to render domestic policies compatible to

international conditions (Putnam, 1988).

The domestic politics level of analysis is not an

approach to explaining foreign policies that is without

its flaws. Some International Relations scholars has

stated that using the domestic politics level of

analysis in explaining foreign policy is reductive in

nature, by way of equating foreign policy to the

domestic politics of foreign nations or to no more than

merely the product of a nation’s domestic politics

(Fearon, 1998). It must also be acknowledged that

research and theorizing in regards of this level of

analysis is still relatively new (Rogowski, 1999).

There exists much debate regarding the relevance of

this level of analysis in explaining foreign policy in

relation to domestic politics. Additionally, I am of the

opinion that the domestic political level of analysis in

its usage may serve to confuse researchers, especially

when the cases being analyzed aren’t sufficiently

focused, which may lead the analysis only in the

realm of domestic politics and its complexities

without giving an explanation or rationalization in

regards to how it relates to foreign policy, and how

both influences each other. However, the domestic

politics level of analysis may form a more

comprehensive explanation of foreign policy. By

starting from domestic politics as a relatively more

self-contained unit of analysis in order to explain the

phenomenon of international politics and foreign

policy which are higher in complexity, researchers

may formulate an explanation which are more

comprehensive and may show how domestic politics

causally relate to foreign policy actors and

formulation processes.

3 SINGAPORE DOMESTIC

POLITICS

Singapore is a parliamentary republic with a

representative democratic system of government. The

Executive branch of the Singaporean government is

carried on functionally by the Singapore Cabinet

under the leadership of the Prime Minister and, to a

certain extent, of the President. The Singaporean

Parliament conducts the Legislative function, with

parliament members who are elected by the people.

Officially, Singapore has a multi-party system, but

practically the Singaporean Parliament has been

dominated by the People’s Action Party since Lee

Kuan Yew was elected as the first Singaporean Prime

Minister in 1959, and since then the party’s position

as the ruling party in the government has been

unchallenged. Up until the general elections in 2015,

the People’s Action Party has won 83 out of 89 seats

in parliament. The People’s Action Party has more or

less been in the dominant position in Singapore’s

domestic politics, without any challenging or

opposition party having enough power to shift the

status quo. The greatest opposition to the People’s

Action Party is present in the Singapore Labour Party

which up until 2017 has placed in 9 out of 101 seats

in the parliament. With this condition, Singapore may

be considered as an undemocratic country, since de

facto it is a country with one singularly dominating

political party (Reyes, 2015).

Furthermore, in line with the writings of Ronald

Rogowski (1999), in this paper the influence of

governmental institutions shall be analyzed in five

aspects: policy bias, credibility of commitments,

coherence and stability of policy, mobilization and

projection of power, and strategic environment of

domestic actors. The influence that governmental

institutions has on those five aspects will be analyzed

from the three dimensions of govermental institutions

which consists of franchise, representation, and

decision rule.

4 POLICY BIAS

Rogowski (1999) expounded that the characteristics

of governmental institutions holds influence over

policy and causes certain biases to form.

Governmental institutions has an influence on the

formation of national interest and in determining the

goal which foreign policy seeks to achieve. This can

be seen in Singapore’s domestic politics which is

effectively dominated by the People’s Action Party,

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195

which places the franchise of domestic policy as well

as of foreign policy of Singapore on the groups which

are part of the People’s Action Party. In other words,

the interests of the People’s Action Party in

policymaking in Singapore are privileged in absence

of any opposition which are able to challenge the

domination of the People’s Action Party’s interests.

The People’s Action Party also has an economic

ideology which are supportive of the formulation of

policies pertaining to free markets. The People’s

Action Party’s ideology which supports economic

liberalization is consistent with Singapore’s support

of the BRI, which provides new economic

opportunities and a larger market integration for

Singapore.

The decision rules in place in governmental

institutions are prone to cause biases to form,

especially when institutions are consisted of a vast

array of bodies with various points in the decision-

making process in which veto may be exacted. Biases

in policymaking can emerge in such conditions and

policies created will tend to conform to the status quo

(Rogowski, 1999). In Singapore’s system of

government, policy is made by Singapore’s Cabinet

of Ministers collectively. Members of the Cabinet and

the Prime Minister of Singapore is appointed by the

President, in which th e President appoints the Prime

Minister from the parliament members which are

deemed trustworthy and may be trusted by the

majority of parliament members (Konstitusi

Republik Singapura, art. 25). Effectively, the Prime

Minister of Singapore is usually the leader of the

majority party in parliament. Since the People’s

Action Party has been the majority party in

Singapore’s parliament since 1959, the composition

of the Singaporean Cabinet of Ministers has also been

dominated by members of the People’s Action Party.

In 2017, when Singapore’s foreign policy in regards

to the BRI is formed, the composition of the Cabinet

of Ministers entirely consisted of members of the

People’s Action Party (Prime Minister’s Office

Singapore, 2017). The decision rule which places the

authority to form policy on the Prime Minister and

Cabinet of Ministers influences the foreign policy of

Singapore to conform to the status quo, which entails

an accordance to the interests of the People’s Action

Party.

5 CREDIBILITY OF

COMMITMENTS

As a part of international relations, nations will

inevitably enter into commitents on the international

level, such as in pacts, agreements, or in development

initiatives such as the BRI proposed by China to

Singapore and to other Asian nations. Rogowski

(1999) in his article stated that the credibility of the

commitment made by nations as part of their foreign

policy is a product of their domestic politics.

Governmental institutions functions as guarantors

that binds actors to their commitment – this

assumption is also applicable in domestic politics,

which consequentially means that said assumption

are also extendable to foreign policy. Credibility of

commitment are affected by various aspects of the

institution, among which is the institution’s franchise.

A view that exists among scholars regards credibility

of commitment and franchise as being directly

proportional, with the wider the franchise is the

greater the credibility becomes. However, there are

also those who argue that credibility is obtained from

a strong bureaucracy, insulated from politicization. In

the case of Singapore, with the constellation of their

domestic politics practically dominated by one party,

these assumptions are regarded as inapplicable. Based

on the first assumption, Singapore’s credibility are

considered to be high, seeing as the People’s Action

Party’s electability is also very high, indicating a big

franchise. But the high rate of electability stems from

the fact that the People’s Action Party dominates the

political system in Singapore, and therefore cannot be

considered representative of the Singaporean

people’s franchise. On the other hand, the second

assumption applies only if in a nation’s domestic

politics there exists a contestation from opposing

parties, since the existence of an opposition in the

policymaking process could cause inconsistencies in

the government’s commitments to their policy.

Bureaucracy insulated from politicization is

considered more credible because there is no

challenge in policymaking between opposing parties

with differing and clashing interests. The absence of

an opposition in Singapore’s political system narrows

policy option and limits it only to what the People’s

Action Party proposes.

In line with the principles of franchise,

representation can also affect the credibility of

commitment which the government comes into.

Franchise and representation as an instrument to

deliver and obtain the franchise’s interests are closely

related. Representatives are considered to have a

credible commitment when they are successful in

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insulating judgment from public opinion as well as

pressure to pursue goals which are more short-term in

nature (Rogowski, 1999). This cannot be a point of

analysis in Singapore’s case, since there is no

opposition that the dominant party has to face. The

majority of the representative seats in Singapore’s

parliament are occupied by the members of the

People’s Action Party, the absence of an opposition

menas that there is no contestation for that position,

rendering the representative positions in the

following election cycle more or less guaranteed.

What this means for short-term goals and pressure

that comes from public opinion is that they have less

of an influence on representatives since there is not

really a pressure for them to support policies that are

more populist in nature in order to secure their

positions for the next elections. The credibility of

representatives are more or less guaranteed by the

party’s domination.

Still in relation with franchise and representation,

decision rules also affect the credibility of

commitments. The system in place in an institution

can directly and non-directly exert influence on

credibility, for example, generally delegates who

have specialized roles and tenure on their position has

a higher credibility (Rogowski, 1999). Systems of

veto and clarity when it comes to the authority of each

part of the government can also affect credibility.

6 COHERENCE AND STABILITY

OF POLICY

Commitment to foreign policy is a vital part to the

government of a country, however, commitment on

its own is not sufficient if a state behaves in an erratic

and unpredictable manner in the formulation of their

foreign policy. Another important factor to the

foreign policy of a nation is consistency, for without

consistency in their foreign policy a nation may be

regarded as incoherent and unstable (Rogowski,

1999). Domestic politics in this sense affects the

coherence and stability of foreign policy, in which the

difference in the formulation of foreign policy is

inversely proportional to how far domestic

institutions can unite the preferences of a group or

individual. From the franchise dimension, when there

occurs an internal rift in many an independent issue,

the foreign policy formed will also be unstable. On

the contrary, policies formed mono-dimensionally in

accordance to general agreement tends to be more

coherent and stable in nature (Rogowski, 1999). In

the case of Singapore, it is evident that, at least in their

bilateral relation with China, Singapore is coherent

and consistent with their foreign policy. Formally

Singapore affirms their good relationship with China

and has been consistently fostering that relationship

since the 1990s, albeit along with the passage of time

and with the dynamics of international relations both

parties have had their disputes time and time again.

Singapore’s support of the BRI and of China’s

position in Southeast Asia has generally reflected this

consistency. This coherence in policy may be

attributed to the dominance of the People’s Action

Party in the government which allows for policies to

be more consistently upheld.

Representation-wise, a higher coherence and

stability can be manifested in the form of a more

simplified form of government with a lesser number

of governing body, or with a clearer hierarchy in the

structure of government which consists of a vast array

of bodies (Rogowski, 1999). Moreover, in regards of

decision rules, coherence and stability may be

achieved when authority is concentrated in one

entitiy, whosoever holds the authority has a great

power for agenda-setting (Rogowski, 1999).

Generally speaking, a more streamlined distribution

of power in the domestic level could mean a higher

coherence and stability in foreign policy-making. The

smaller the number of actors involved in

policymaking, the more coherent their policies that

they formulate.

7 MOBILIZATION AND

PROJECTION OF POWER

Domestic politics influences a nation’a ability to

mobilize their resources and to project their power

abroad. This ability depends on the regime of

government in place, with a legitimized government

being better at extracting resources as opposed to an

authoritarian one (Rogowski, 1999). Still in line with

this, franchise has a big part in determining foreign

policy, including as one of the resources being

mobilized. A democratic and legitimate government,

in other words holding big franchise from the people

of the nation, may mobilize with higher effectivity,

one of the reasons being that there is a strong support

from the people themselves. The government regime

in Singapore is a regime which conventionally may

be categorized as legitimate, since it was elected

democratically through a general election. The big

support they receive from the people enables

Singapore to formulate policies which allows them to

mobilize their resources in order to support China in

Domestic Politics Analysis of Singapore’s Foreign Policy on the Belt and Road Initiative

197

building the infrastructure for the BRI. In relation to

public support, a more intense relation and interaction

between the franchise and their representative has

also been attributed by Rogowski (1999) as an

enabling factor for the government to mobilize their

resources and to project their power.

On the other hand, a more complex decision rule

with veto systems causes friction and disagreement

which hinders mobilization, while a larger capacity

for agenda setting may aid mobilization and

projection of power (Rogowski, 1999). In this case,

the Singaporean government are considered to have a

larger capacity for agenda-setting since the

composition of the members of their government tend

to be more homogenous with a majority coming from

the same party. The agreement from a majority of the

decisionmakers are much easier to achieve, which

makes mobilization that much easier to do.

8 STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

OF DOMESTIC ACTORS

Strategy formulated by policymakers in an

institutional setting differ from strategies formed in

other institutional settings. This is due to the fact that

the regimes in each setting of institution also differ

from one another. To achieve the goal of foreign

policy, foreign policy makers need to adjust their

strategy with their respective domestic political

institution, as a mechanism in which policy may be

formed and implemented. In this case, institution may

influence foreign policy by limiting the options for

strategy (Rogowski, 1999). The franchise can have an

influence over how domestic actors formulate

strategy and the ways in which the goals of said

strategy can be achieved. Variation among the

franchise can affect tan actor’s ability in forming their

strategy. However, this does not affect the decision-

making process in Singapore, because the People’s

Action Party has been dominating the government for

over 50 years. Not only that the decisionmakers need

not worry about winning the support of the people,

the people’s preferences are also formed on the basis

of the status quo, in which the People’s Action Party

has been a sole dominating actor and more or less

provides the people’s options when it comes to

policy.

From the representation dimension, power

concentrated in one branch of the government limits

the strategy options to intimidation and domination

from that branch of government, whereas a more

dispersed distribution of power creates an opportunity

for more complex strategies and therefore allows for

a variation of ways of influencing (Rogowski, 1999).

The first condition applies to the domestic politics of

Singapore, where the domination of the People’s

Action Party in the government is the main

contributing factor to the effectiveness of government

institutions in implementing policy.

9 CONCLUSION

I conclude that the domestic politics level of analysis

is not sufficiently effective in explaining Singapore’s

foreign policy when it comes to the BRI and

Singapore’s involvement in the initiative, and in the

end the results of the analysis is inconclusive. This is

due to the fact that indicators used can only explain

the aspects of Singapore’s foreign policy partially.

The indicators employed to determine the influence

of domestic politics on foreign policy is analyzed

through five aspects which include policy bias,

credibility of commitments, coherence and stability

of policy, mobilization and projection of power, and

strategic environment of domestic actors. From the

policy bias aspect, it can be confirmed that domestic

politics can explain foreign policy by causing biases

to form in Singapore’s foreign policy in supporting

the BRI, among which are the biases favoring the

People’s Action Party’s interest as the dominant party

in the Singapore government. From the commitment

credibility aspect, the domestic politics of Singapore

cannot be the basis of analysis for their foreign policy

given the conditions which places the domestic

politics as an explanan is not fulfilled. From the

coherence and stability of policy aspect, domestic

politics cannot fully explain Singapore’s foreign

policy, because the coherence of Singapore’s foreign

policy is partially attributed to the domination of the

People’s Action Party in the government. From the

mobilization and projection of power aspect, the

domestic politics in Singapore which is democratic

can be said to contribute to their foreign policy. From

the strategic environment of domestic actors,

domestic politics is not completely sufficient in

explaining foreign policy. In the case of Singapore,

the domestic politics level of analysis is not relevant

enough as an explanan for foreign policy given that

Singapore’s domestic politics is dominated by one

party. The absence of an opposition renders the

domestic politics ineffective in explaining foreign

policy.

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