Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy: Assessing Indonesian Foreign

Policy under Yudhoyono (2004-2014)

Radityo Dharmaputra

, Agastya Wardhana

, M. Anugrah Pratama

Department of International Relations, Universitas Airlangga

ASEAN Study Centre, Universitas Airlangga

Department of International Relations, Universitas Airlangga

Keywords: Strategic culture, Yudhoyono's regime, Indonesian foreign policy, identity construction, discursive structure

of identity.

Abstract: This article explores the discourse and practices of Indonesian foreign policy under President Yudhoyono

(2004-2014) by using the lens of strategic culture. Based on Ole Waever's idea of discursive structure, the

constructivist's constitutive logic between foreign policy and national identity, and by combining these with

Neumann and Heikka's idea on strategic culture as interplay between discourse and practices, this article seeks

to comprehend the effort to reconstruct Indonesia identity that was articulated during Yudhoyono regime.

Therefore, the conduct of foreign policy during Yudhoyono, especially the doctrine of navigating turbulent

ocean, was used as a tool to further examine the actual discourse and practice of Indonesian strategic culture

at the time. Using the Hansenian methods of poststructuralist discourse analysis, we gathered the speeches

made by Yudhoyono and his foreign minister during the timeline of the research. We then charted the

emerging patterns of Yudhoyono’s policies, compared the actual policies with the discursive rhetoric and

narratives from the official sources, before finally assessed the appropriateness of the discursive patterns by

looking at the initial and historical ideas (and practices) of Indonesian strategic culture. Based on our findings,

we argue that the initial discursive structures of Indonesian strategic culture, formulated during the history of

the nation (as argued by Sulaiman in 2016), limited the choices for foreign policies during Yudhoyono’s

regime. This limitation forced Yudhoyono to cling into more inward-looking foreign policy rather than his

initial aim for outward-looking options.

1 INTRODUCTION

This article is trying to re-examine the relationship

between national identity and foreign policy, by

focusing on one concept of national identity which is

strategic culture. By focusing on strategic culture, this

research will also contribute to the

reconceptualization of strategic culture as part of

national identity. Empirically, this project’s

contribution will be a deeper understanding of the

case study. To that end, this study took the case of

Indonesia as the focus of the research.

Indonesia is important in the study of national

identity and foreign policy. The position of Indonesia

as a country with the largest Muslim population in the

world, but has a democratic system of government,

has triggered the assumptions regarding the identity

of Indonesia in the form of moderate Muslim identity.

However, in terms of strategic culture, Indonesian

identity was discussed (Sulaiman 2016) as its

tendency to reject any military alliance with other

countries, to focus on the defensive aspects of

military policy, and to restrict interference by foreign

countries. The problem then, is it true that Indonesia’s

strategic culture has causal effect on foreign policy,

especially under Yudhoyono? There were few

researches dedicated to unravelling the relationship

between Indonesian national identity and Indonesian

foreign policy. Most of the research was only looking

at the “given” identity of Islam and causally tried to

explain Indonesian foreign policy within the Islamic

identity structure. This project tries to enhance this

section of scholarship by re-examining the strategic

culture/foreign policy nexus in Indonesia.

The dilemma of the relations between Indonesian

identity and foreign policy has been understudied in

recent years. The lack of books on this subject was

apparent; the only book elaborates this issue was

Rizal Sukma’s book, Islam in Indonesian Foreign

Policy (2003). This lack of research or rather, the lack

Dharmaputra, R., Wardhana, A. and Pratama, M.

Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy: Assessing Indonesian Foreign Policy under Yudhoyono (2004-2014).

DOI: 10.5220/0010272400002309

In Proceedings of Airlangga Conference on International Relations (ACIR 2018) - Politics, Economy, and Security in Changing Indo-Paciﬁc Region, pages 9-20

ISBN: 978-989-758-493-0

of published research, was one of the weaknesses in

Indonesian academic atmosphere. If Sebastian and

Lanti’s research (2010) proved right, this research

tries to elaborate one of their outspoken challenge,

that is “...while social constructivist variables like

identity...have great explanatory

value...constructivist approaches need to explain

deviant behaviour...” (Sebastian & Lanti, 2010,

p.167). One of the challenges in answering Sebastian

and Lanti’s research is to conduct research on

identity/foreign policy nexus in Indonesia, while not

just concentrating on the “Islamic” variables. This is

one of the reason why this article focuses on the issue

of strategic culture.

In summary, the contribution of this article lies in

the ability to deepen the understanding of the

relations between identity and foreign policy. On a

theoretical level, this research enhances the position

of post-structuralist approach in foreign policy

analysis by elaborating the notion of causality. By

combining the poststructuralist discourse analysis

(Hansen 2006) and the inductive recovery of national

identity (Hopf 2016), this research promises a

modified approach in analysing foreign policy. On

the empirical level, this project contributes a new

body of scholarships in Indonesian studies, especially

related to foreign policy and strategic culture. Policy-

wise, this research also contributes to a better

understanding of Indonesian history, its strategic

tradition, and therefore enriches the decisionmakers

options. By reading the findings and results of this

research, policymakers will have a better

comprehension on how to formulate Indonesian

military and foreign policy, while adhering to the

limitations and the traditions put by Indonesian

strategic culture.

2 RESEARCH METHODS

This research follows Hopf (2016) in inductively

uncovering the dominant (and the oppositional)

discourses. Where this research diverges from Hopf

(2016) is that after uncovering the dominant

discourses, this research will examine the mechanism

of the causal processes. In that sense, this research

will investigate what kind of discourse(s) that exist,

and then tries to relate it to the Indonesian policy

towards its neighbouring countries (regarding the

absence of military pacts while engaging intensively

in ASEAN), towards the US (related to the idea of

non-interference), and towards the military build-up

(related to the defensive tendency of Indonesian

military policy).

However, on the contrary to Hopf’s (2002) work

which exclude the policy documents until the latter

stages, this research focuses more on the foreign

policy documents. Thereby, concerning the

applicable methods, this proposal will use the

methods offered by Hansen’s (2006) work on

discourse analysis. Hansen (2006, p.67) explained

that several issues had to be considered while

formulating research design. Firstly, how many

numbers of selves that would be analysed? In this

case, only single number of “Self” might be

considered here, which is the Indonesian “Self”. The

second issue is which intertextual model that will be

used in the research. Hansen (2006, p.57) proposed 3

(three) intertextual research model based on the

intertextuality of official discourse, wider debate,

cultural representations, and the marginal discourses.

To analyse the Indonesian discourse on strategic

culture, this research will try to elaborate the model 1

(official) and the model 2 (wider debate, especially in

the academic and media). For the official

discourse(s), this research will mainly focus on the

foreign policy establishments. Meanwhile,

comparing it with the media discourses would be

useful in examining the potential of the changing or

the strengthening of the discourse. This proposal uses

shorter timeline, from 2004-2014. The shorter

timeframe would allow this research to explore

deeply the position of the Indonesia elites during

Yudhoyono’s era, Indonesia academia, and the

Indonesia media, in viewing the triviality of military

pact in ASEAN (Sulaiman’s first point regarding

strategic culture), the importance of the US’s

presence in Southeast Asia (Sulaiman’s second

point), and the priority of defence (Sulaiman’s third

point). The Yudhoyono’s first period (2004-2009) is

the timeframe when discursive construction of

Indonesian “Self” has taken place. The second period

(2009-2014) is the timeframe when the concrete

policy changes might affect the (re)construction of

identity.

The official discourses could be analysed by

looking at the official documents, in-depth interview

with the decision-makers, and by analysing the

speeches and the spontaneous live interviews

(Hudson, 2014). The 2nd model consist of the wider

foreign policy debate will be analysed by analysing

the foreign policy debates in the parliament, the

debate held in the media, and the editorial reports of

the main media in Indonesia.

The Indonesian case was chosen because of some

considerations. Firstly, the understudied body of

scholarship on Indonesian identity/foreign policy

nexus was the most important considerations.

ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations

Secondly, as a country with many possible identity

discourses (ethnic, race, religion, political, and many

more), Indonesia was being side-lined in the context

of the study of foreign policy. Many researches have

followed the logic of fault line (Huntington, 1996),

and to analyse Indonesia would mean broadening the

case study.

As part of the methods used in this research, this

research chooses 2 (two) focal points in this study.

The first was the conflicting external relations, which

will give the insight into how Indonesia perceived

itself and how the “Indonesia” was articulated

regarding the external “Others”. As Sulaiman (2016)

argued, the “Others” in this case would be a

hegemonic foreign actor such as the US or China.

Whether a territorial dispute or cultural dispute, this

first focus would serve as the focus to explore the

identity/foreign policy nexus in Indonesia. The

second focus was proposed to elaborate the internal

aspects of identity (how many articulation of

Indonesia) which was problematic enough to be

considered in foreign policy context. Regarding the

timeframe of this research, this research follows what

Hansen (2006) did in her research, by using shorter

timeframe. To understand the dynamics of

identity/foreign policy nexus in Indonesia, this

research argues that shorter timeframe during the first

and second term of the then president Susilo

Bambang Yudhoyono will be more contributive. The

shorter timeframe would allow this research to focus

on the position of the elites and society in the

identity/foreign policy nexus.

3 RESULTS & DISCUSSIONS

3.1 Strategic Culture as a Discursive

Structure

Concerning the study of strategic culture, there are

three generations of scholars. This article follows the

logic of the third-generation scholars, who tried to

overcome the pitfalls of the first-generation which

contained definitional problem that considers the

sources of strategic culture as coming from nearly all

aspects and the second-generation independent-

dependent variable problem by narrowing the

conceptualization of strategic culture as independent

variable and some strategic decisions as dependent

variable (Johnston 1995, pp. 41). This

reconceptualization is realized in the work of Kier

(1995, pp. 67) by narrowing the sources of strategic

culture only from the aspects of domestic politics and

military organizational culture in explaining the

choice of French policymakers in choosing the

preferable military doctrine (offensive or defensive.

She asserts that a cultural analysis is fit because it

provides a bridge between the culturalist tendency

and over-rational mode of analysis and that can be

done through analysing only the aspects that is crucial

to the objects of analysis (Kier 1995). For example, if

Kier’s objective is to explain the French military

alternating use between offensive and defensive

military doctrine, then one of the tools to analyse it is

by tracing the dynamics of French domestic politics

and military organizational culture that will

determine the formation of principles and guidance

during a circumstance whether it is preferable to use

an offensive or defensive military doctrine.

The third-generation exhibits some strengths over

the previous generations, (1) it avoids determinism in

the first-generation, because it leaves behaviour out

of the independent variable (Johnston 1995, p. 42)

and (2) this generation is committed to competitive

theory testing by pitting alternative explanations

against each other. For example, Legro (1996) tests a

realist model against institutionalism and

organizational-culture explanations of restraint in war

and Kier (1995) pits structural realism, bureaucratic

organizational models and military culture against

each other (Johnston 1995, pp. 43).

Regarding the works on Indonesian strategic

culture, there was only few authors and most of them

did not use the third-generation conceptual

understanding and style of analysis, as shown in the

work of McElhatton (2008) that analysed the

Indonesian strategic psyche by asserting that the

modes of guerrilla war in Indonesia that was

pioneered by Nasution, is embedded in the

Indonesian political and military apparatus and taken

the role as an instrumental tools for the government

to use anti-guerrilla posture to deflect potential evils

and dangers from the internal, such as rebellion and

even political opponents and to use the guerrilla

posture to fend of external threats. The characteristic

of McElhatton (2008) work is similar with the

descriptive focus in the first-generation and the use of

strategic culture as a toll for the government to create

legitimacy in the second-generation.

This project combines the logic of the third

generation and the work of Hansen (2006) and

Campbell (1990) which engages the puzzle of

identity/foreign policy nexus by using the methods of

discourse analysis and the logic of post-structuralist

approach and tries to apply the modified framework

and methods under the different case study and within

a longer timeline.

Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy: Assessing Indonesian Foreign Policy under Yudhoyono (2004-2014)

This research tries to use poststructuralist

approach developed by Campbell (1990), Hansen

(2006), and Waever (2002). Poststructuralist argues

that identity is relational, related to the “significant

Other” (Neumann 1996; Hansen 2006). This idea of

relational identity means that identity could only

matter in a process of differentiation and linking to

others (Waever 2002). As Campbell (1990, p.266)

argued, identities are relational, that Self and Other

could not exist “prior to a relationship with each

other”. In this research, Indonesia identity and

strategic culture is evaluated in relation with outside

power as the “Others”.

Secondly, poststructuralism understood identity

not as a more important concept than material factors.

Hansen (2006, p.19) elucidated that poststructuralist

understands that ideational and material factors could

not have any meaning without each other. In this

sense, contrary to constructivism that put ideational

factors as the more important factors,

poststructuralism argued that both ideas and material

factors are important part of the analysis, which they

considered as discourse. Instead of differentiating the

ideational factors behind material consideration, this

research follows Hansen’s (2006, p.20) argument that

poststructuralist analytical intent is to “understand

both ideas and materials as constructed through

discourse which gives materiality the meaning by

drawing upon set of identity constructions”. By doing

so, this research tries to understand Indonesian

strategic culture and its military policies through the

historical discourse of Indonesianness.

To further elaborate the poststructuralist

theoretical arguments, we use the explanations by

Waever (2002) and Hansen (2006). Waever (2002,

p.34) argued that poststructuralism, which usually

tends to analyse “how foreign policy serves to

reproduce a certain identity”, could be used as a

theory of foreign policy, explaining state’s options

and actions. He (2002, p.21) emphasised the needs of

using poststructuralist argument because of the

inability of neorealist, neoliberal, and even

conventional constructivist, to explain the relations

between identity and foreign policy. According to

Waever (2002), neorealist neglect the concept of

identity altogether (due to the ontological assumption

of a coherent state/national identity), neoliberal

missed the possibility of ideas and norms as important

factors in changing state identity, while conventional

constructivist such as Wendt focused too much on the

systemic level on international relations. Waever

(2002, p.22) even suggested that constructivism

failed to address the possibility of change in their

analysis, arguing that constructivism is a “very strong

theory of non-change”.

To address all those problems, Waever (2002,

p.22) then argued about discourse analysis as a theory

which respects “the self-producing meaning systems

of different actors” and at the same time escapes the

ideational-material divide of constructivism. Waever

(2002, p.27) also postulated that policy “must hold a

definite relationship to discursive structure, because

it is always necessary for the policy makers…to argue

where to takes us”. The main theoretical argument is

that structure put a sufficient pressure so that the

policies stay within a certain, limited margin (Waever

2002, p.28). In another word, the discursive structure

put some limitations to what the policies could do. On

the other hand, these structures are socially

constructed and reconstructed through the social

process, which refers to Onuf’s (1998) argument that

“rules create agents, agents create rules”. Bringing

this principle into the context of foreign policy, it

resembles what Campbell had said before, that the

structure (consist of the process of “othering”)

informed the possible policy choices. The chosen

policies (limited by the structures) then reproduce the

identity discourse.

Using Waever’s and Campbell’s argument about

how the discursive structure put limitation to the

possible policy choices, this research tries to

elaborate the possibility that Yudhoyono’s personal

ideas and the elite’s efforts to modify foreign policy

(and its subsequent basis of strategic culture) was not

followed by some significant changes. Rather,

following Waever’s argument, the existing strategic

discourses put some restraints to the possibility of

closer military alliances, the possibility of

strengthening Indo-US relationship, and the

possibility of an offensive Indonesian military. These

situations reflected the presence of a stable, yet

prohibitive, discursive structure of Indonesia identity.

3.2 The Historical Foreign Policies and

the Formation of Initial Discursive

Structure

In this section, we analyse the relation between

Indonesia “pre-Yudhoyono” foreign policy and its

connection with strategic culture. The value we seek

to analyse is 1) the unwillingness to join a defence or

alliance pact, 2) a defensive orientation, and 3)

concerns about foreign intervention (Sulaiman,

2016). From the data, we conclude that there is a

consistent influencing pattern of strategic culture in

Indonesian foreign policy. Therefore, we argue that

Indonesia foreign policy is a big part of the discourse

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of strategic culture. The foreign policy data used in

this study are policy related to security issues and or

related to Indonesia's role at international level

starting from Soekarno’s era to Megawati’s.

Under Soekarno, Indonesia foreign policy was

divided into at least two major parts: the early

independence struggle, when Indonesia sought

independence support (1945-1955), and guided

democracy era (1956-1965). In the first part,

Indonesia foreign policy mostly focuses on seeking

recognition from the international community.

Despite attempting to gain international recognition,

Indonesia did not necessarily join in any defence

block or alliance that existed at the time, even though

the world was slowly polarized toward cold war. This

is because Indonesia has deep rooted trauma related

to subjugation and occupation. This is due to the 350

years of colonial experience. Mohammad Hatta (then

vice president of Indonesia) even stated that the focus

of Indonesia's foreign policy is to encourage unity and

to counter the existing subversive acts within the

country. This action deemed necessary because they

were a threat to the newly united nation (Hatta 1948;

1953).

Indonesia foreign policy doctrine at the time was

called “free and active” policy. This free and active

foreign policy aims to resolve the main domestic

issues in three issues: safeguarding Indonesia's

sovereignty and security, maintaining internal

consolidation and safeguarding and fulfilling

economic interests. The fulfilment of these objectives

was carried out through various actions including the

dispatch of senior Indonesian diplomats such as Sutan

Sjahrir, Agus Salim, even Mohammad Hatta himself

to negotiate Indonesian independence to Netherlands

and seeking support for the de facto recognition of

Indonesia to several countries (Leifer, 1983).

However, the need for recognition did not make

Indonesia resort to one of the two great powers that

existed at the time, the US-led Western Bloc and the

USSR-led Eastern Bloc. Hatta firmly stressed that

Indonesia would actively and independently

participate to avoid foreign intervention from either

side (Hatta, 1953). In general, the policy in

Soekarno's first era reflects its strategic culture that

focused on inward looking policy with the context of

solving post-independence problems such as de facto

recognition and economic sustainability. At the same

time foreign policy in this era also developed to

become the main doctrine in Indonesian foreign

policy that is free of active. This doctrine is the result

of the existing strategic values and the complicated

domestic constraints that happen at the time.

In the second era of Soekarno, Indonesian foreign

policy focused on efforts to actively engage in the

international order through the spirit of anti-neo-

colonialism and the formation of the third bloc in the

world (Feith, 1963; Leifer, 1983). The spirit shown

by Soekarno still upheld the doctrine of free and

active policy but, as in the first era, Soekarno kept

adjusting his foreign policy to domestic needs. In this

context Sukarno encouraged the establishment of a

sovereign Indonesia so he centred his foreign policy

to liberate West Irian and encourage confrontation

with Malaysia (Sukma, 1995). This policy leads to a

general opinion that Indonesia was increasingly

shifting from free and active doctrine because

Sukarno saw that the West Irian problem was related

to the practice of colonialism. Similarly, the

Malaysian confrontation was born from Sukarno's

assumption of Malaysia as a puppet of new forms of

colonialism. Unlike the first period when the spirit of

anti-colonialism was used for economic development

and the quest for de facto recognition, he became

much more nationalist and tend to ignore the principle

of free and active policy. This is demonstrated

through the making of NEFO (Newly Emerging

Force) and the Asian-African Conference which,

although placing Indonesia on the third axis, has

made Indonesia gain negative sentiment from

Western countries (Leifer, 1983). This policy proved

to be the beginning of Soekarno's fall which later

replaced by Suharto in 1965. In general, foreign

policy during the guided democracy era still

incorporates strategic culture value, in the context of

fear about foreign intervention. The liberation of

West Irian and the maligned doctrine of Malaysia can

also be understood as a defensive defence orientation

effort in the context of domestic consolidation and the

realization of national unity.

During Soeharto’s presidency, Indonesia shift the

focus of foreign policy toward economic

development and improving its stature in the

world. Soeharto also revert back Soekarno foreign

policy that is more nationalistic and assertive in

action to the basic that is a foreign policy based on the

ideology and the constitution. The reversal of this

principle was done to encourage the internal

consolidation after 1965 revolution. This effort then

translated into national development policy (Oei,

1969; Sukma 1995). This policy focuses on efforts to

improve Indonesia's economy based on the mandate

of constitution and Pancasila. In the context of foreign

policy, national development policies were the

guideline that put Indonesia closer with the western

and other developed country due to the much-needed

economic incentives (Kroef, 1970). This close

Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy: Assessing Indonesian Foreign Policy under Yudhoyono (2004-2014)

relationship does not mean Indonesia was part of the

western bloc. It is only part of the Soeharto’s

pragmatism that heavily influenced Indonesia foreign

policy during his reign.

A pragmatic and economic-oriented foreign

policy has resulted in Indonesia's increasing

international confidence. This is the second feature of

Soeharto’s foreign policy, namely the increasing role

of Indonesia in the international community. This role

is shown in at least three occasions. The first was

shown in 1985 when Indonesia held the 30th

anniversary of KAA in Bandung (Sukma, 1995). This

event signifies the intention of Indonesia to become

increasingly active in the conduct of international

politics. Second, Suharto showed confidence through

the normalization of relations with China in 1990

(Sukma, 1995). The normalization became important

because Indonesia-China relations had worsened due

to the 1965 coup. This normalization made Indonesia

not only close to the West but also began to build

relationships with the Eastern and ex-communist

countries. The third and most important opportunity

is the increasing role of Indonesia in ASEAN.

Soeharto, in his foreign policy, applied the

formulation of concentric circles as his focus.

Indonesia during Soeharto era played an active role in

Southeast Asia, initially as the founder of ASEAN,

and then became an influential country in the region.

Not only ASEAN, Soeharto exemplify Indonesian

involvement in the wider region of Asia-Pacific

through APEC forums (Vatikiotis, 1990; Anwar,

1994; Sukma, 1995). This is the culmination of

Indonesia comeback to international politics. It may

have seemed that in the context of Soeharto’s foreign

policy, strategic culture was heavily influenced by his

pragmatism. However, Soeharto’s outward-looking

and active-independent foreign policy was based on

economic independence and did not contradict the

basis of the Hatta ideal-free doctrine. The three values

of Indonesian strategic culture, which are the

reluctance of making military alliances, defensive

orientation, and fears of intervention, were still

reflected in Soeharto's policies. This occurred even

when Soeharto ruled Indonesia for 32 years.

Comprehensive foreign policy formulation still

reflected the value of strategic culture, and it was very

likely to occur in such a long-time span.

Unlike Soeharto, Habibie as his successor did not

have a clear doctrine of foreign policy as he only

serve for less than 3 months before succeeded by

Abdurrahman Wahid. The main feature of Habibie

foreign policy was the effort to reclaim international

trust mainly from the financial institution such as IMF

and the World Bank. This effort was vital to help

Indonesia rebuild and stabilize after the financial

crisis and 1998 reform (He, 2007: Mashad, 2008).

Habibie's efforts to revive the international faith were

done through the Reform of the human rights sector.

This action received good reception from the

international community (Mashad, 2008). Despite the

successful return of international attention, the failure

to prevent East Timor independence became a

testament of Habibie's foreign policy failure. In the

context of strategic culture, Habibie foreign policy is

one of the most distorted because there are various

obstacles and challenges that must be solved

internally in such a short term. This is mainly related

to the 1998 reform and the fall of Indonesia's

economy. Habibie’s foreign policy, therefore, does

not necessary reflect the strategic culture. Although,

considering the heavy criticisms towards Habibie to

the problem with East Timor suggested that the

discursive structure of Indonesian strategic culture

which also emphasise the importance of sovereignty

was still very strong.

After Habibie, Indonesia was led by

Abdurrahman Wahid or Gus Dur. The foreign policy

of the Gus Dur era tended to be close to Sukarno's

nationalistic and active ideas. This is conceived by

Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab as an ecumenical

foreign policy (Anwar, 2004). This foreign policy

considers that all countries in the world have the same

importation for Indonesia in a way that the national

interest of Indonesia can only be achieved when

relations with this country is maintained (Smith,

2000). Through this doctrine, Abdurrahman Wahid

had the most frequent overseas visits in the

presidential history by visiting more than 80 countries

in less than two years (Dhurorudin, 2008). The visit

also included some controversial act such as opening

ties with Israel and a visit to Cuba after a trip to

Washington DC. However, Wahid stated that these

visits were aimed at encouraging the normalization of

the Indonesian economy after the 1998 reform and the

financial crisis (Smith, 2000, Anwar, 2003). In

addition to the ecumenical doctrine, Wahid have a

bigger concern regarding the national integration

issues. This concern then translated into policy by his

enthusiasm to the formation of the West Pacific

Forum, which consists of Indonesia, Australia, New

Zealand, PNG and Timor Leste (Smith, 2000; Anwar,

2004). This move has been criticized by ASEAN

members mainly Singapore because it will threaten

the existence of ASEAN. This step can be understood

as one of the efforts to increase attention to the

separatist movement in Maluku and Papua. In

general, Wahid's foreign policy has close ties to the

value of strategic culture because Indonesia under his

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reign becomes more neutral and relatively safe from

foreign intervention through his ecumenical doctrine.

Wahid also represent the inward-looking strategic

culture through his attention to issues of

disintegration by dealing with separatist movements

such as GAM, OPM and RMS in the conduct of

foreign policy. Generally, Wahid era proved that

Indonesian foreign policy was closely linked with

strategic culture even though Wahid became a

controversial figure in the country that led to his

resignation in 2001.

In Megawati era Indonesia's foreign policy was

focused on efforts to restore national stability and

maintain Indonesia's role in the international world.

One of the typical features of the Megawati era is the

development of Indonesia image as a country that

remains actively contribute in the international world

despite having problems domestically. Megawati

revived the concept of Soeharto era so called

concentric circle by highlighting the importance of

ASEAN. ASEAN considered important to maintain

the stability of security and economy in the region to

further solve the domestic problems faced by

Megawati. Then, in the second concentric circle

Megawati pushed Indonesia's relations with the

pacific countries as Wahid built through the West

Pacific Forum. The last in the third concentric circle

is the East Asian countries (Anwar, 2004). Relations

with these countries are important and actively

pursued by Megawati because of the much-needed

economic incentives. In addition to using the

concentric model, Megawati strongly encourages

bilateral relations with many countries such as Japan,

China, European countries to the United States. One

of the most remarkable ties under Megawati's foreign

policy is the warm relations of Indonesia and the

United States which is special in the context of post

9/11 world (Anwar, 2004). As the largest Muslim

country Indonesia played an important role for Bush's

counter-terrorism efforts. This is also in line with

Indonesia's efforts to combat terrorism domestically.

This relations with US often became the source of

criticism for Megawati's foreign policy which is

considered too American-centric. Megawati reign

also highlighted as being too liberal in the context of

protecting domestic strategic assets. In his tenure,

Megawati sold important State-Owned Enterprises to

foreign country with the rationalization of domestic

economic stability. In strategic culture context,

Megawati's foreign policy mainly in accordance with

the inward-looking value by encouraging the

normalization of economy and the effort stabilize

domestic security even though question about her ties

with the US and a liberal foreign policy remains.

From the above explanation we conclude that in

general Indonesia's foreign policy is mainly the

continuation of its strategic culture. This can be seen

from the development of foreign policy in each

presidential era that still encourage inward looking

orientation and at the same time encourage the active

role of Indonesia according to the free and active

foreign policy doctrine. But it must be understood that

in each era there are anomalous conditions that make

foreign policy may deviates from its strategic culture.

3.3 Yudhoyono’s Policy and the

Discursive Limitation of Strategic

Culture

During the reign of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

(2004-2014), Indonesia has been trying to redefine,

reshape, and project Indonesia internationalism that

has long been undermined under the barrage of

domestic problems during the early reformation era.

When Yudhoyono first entered the State Palace in

Jakarta in 2004 as the President of Indonesia, he

declared his objective to manage domestic challenges

alongside the restoration of Indonesia’s past

internationalism and active foreign policy leadership

on both regional and global scale (Marton 2015, p.

25). Yudhoyono reigned with great ambitions to

which during his speech to a U.S. audience in 2005

(Mitton 2005 in Tan 2007, p. 180), he said that “…we

are now an outward-looking country, eager to shape

regional and international order and intent on having

our voice heard…” and drawing on past

achievements, he reminisced during a speech at his

foreign ministry at its sixtieth anniversary breakfast

that “As former president Soekarno and others

showed us, we should be able to lead on certain issues

in international relations. This is our ultimate goal and

we can only achieve it if we are doing well at home,

such as creating good governance, so we can have

strength, capacity and credibility to do more in world

affairs” (Susanti 2005 in Tan 2007, p. 180).

Furthermore, Yudhoyono (2005, p.326) emphasized

that “We should never be inward-looking. We should

be non-exclusive and be willing to cooperate with all

stakeholders”.

Yudhoyono still endorse “independent and active

foreign policy” as his basic foreign policy principle.

As in a statement during a speech at the ICWA in

2005, that “Over the years, governments have come

and go, Indonesia has had six presidents, and our

political system has undergone major changes, but

“independent and active” remains the primary policy

principle for Indonesia” (Yudhoyono 2005, p. 385).

He stated his vision during the inaugural speech in

Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy: Assessing Indonesian Foreign Policy under Yudhoyono (2004-2014)

2009, which is to “Maintain a friendly and moderate

spirit of nationalism. Indonesia is facing a strategic

environment where no country perceives Indonesia as

an enemy and there is no country which Indonesia

considers an enemy. Thus, Indonesia can exercise its

foreign policy freely in all directions, having a million

friends and zero enemies” (Jakarta Globe 2009).

Yudhoyono’s mission to address the challenges to

Indonesian foreign policy is to come up with

“navigating the turbulent ocean”, that was developed

from Hatta’s “rowing between two reefs” policy

which addresses the problem of choosing sides

between the Soviet Union and the US. Yudhoyono

(2005, p. 385) described that the problems of

nowadays world required a newly developed concept

and stated that “Our forefathers did not know the

terms and phenomena such as globalization, CNN,

NGOs, sophisticated international terrorist networks

– all the things which part of are our present-day

world”.

Indonesia’s approach toward the world is

described as constructive approach that utilizes

constructivism that “Denotes an ability to turn

adversary into friend, and to turn friend into partner.

It means having the diplomatic, intellectual, and

emotional capacity to respond to complex foreign

policy issues. It also means putting to rest a siege

mentality, wild conspiracy theories, excessive

suspicion, an overly defensive attitude, or the fear that

the world is out to get us” (Yudhoyono 2005, p. 387).

In addition, Yudhoyono adopted a defense and

strategic posture that is non-threatening to its

neighbors and the region and aim toward

strengthening peace and stability

and thus Indonesia

“Will not enter into any military alliances… We will

continue our policy of not allowing any foreign

military bases on Indonesian territory” (Yudhoyono

2005, p. 387).

In addition, Yudhoyono was proud and asserted

the looming influence on Indonesia in the

international system. Yudhoyono boasted Indonesia’s

position, he said during the 2005 speech in ICWA that

“We are a proud nation who cherish our

independence and national unity. We are the fourth

most populous nation in the world. We are home to

the world’s third largest democracy. We are also a

country where democracy, Islam, and modernity go

hand-in-hand… we are also proud of our diplomatic

heritage. Indonesia convened the historic Asian-

African Conference in 1955. We are a founding

member of the Non-Aligned Movement. We are a

founding member of ASEAN. We are at the forefront

of North-South Dialogue. We were at the forefront of

international law of the sea diplomacy. We helped the

peace settlement in Cambodia and in the Southern

Philippines. We are helping to manage potential

conflicts in the South China Sea. We helped design

the ASEAN Security Community. We have always

been active in shaping regional order. And recently,

we hosted the historic second Asian-African Summit

in Jakarta” (Yudhoyono 2005, p. 390). Apart from

those things, Yudhoyono prioritize Indonesia’s role

within the ASEAN and it becomes the main

organization for Indonesia to build upon and develop

a close relationship with the member countries.

Yudhoyono (2005, p. 395) stated that “At the regional

and sub-regional level, the mainstay of our foreign

relations is our involvement with ASEAN… In

building this community, we in ASEAN are taking

full responsibility for our own security. We will also

complete our integration into a single free trade and

investment area”, this statement refers to the non-

interference policy.

One of the prominent tenets of Indonesia’s

outward-looking policy is Yudhoyono’s concept of

“thousand friends zero enemies” in which its defence

posture is not to easily feel threatened and adopt a

defensive attitude. However, this defensive attitude

and the fear “that the world is out to get us” was

displayed after the declared agreement between

Obama and Australia’s PM Julia Gillard in 2011

regarding the stationing of 2.500 US Marines that was

planned to be conducted by 2017 (McDonnell and

Brown 2013). Then foreign minister, Marty

Natalegawa, stated that he wanted to ensure that the

US and Australia will not pull anything funny, he said

“…what I would hate to is if such developments were

to provoke a reaction and counter-reaction precisely

to create that vicious circle of tensions and mistrust or

distrust. That’s why it’s very important when a

decision of this type is taken there is transparency of

what the scenario being envisaged is and there is no

misunderstanding as a result…” (McDonnell and

Brown 2013). He referred to the meeting that was

held between Indonesia and Australia.

In addition, Anwar (2012) noted that there are

suspicions regarding the US marines positioning in

Darwin among Indonesian politicians, NGO, and

academics that it is not aimed to counterweight

Chinese influence, but to enhance American interest

toward Indonesia and even Papua and that this

defensive attitude is aimed at defending Indonesia’s

territorial integrity and to avoid invasion and

encroachment of Indonesia’s territory by the US and

Australia as Indonesian still believe that the Dutch’s

success is partially attributable to both countries.

Darwin is located at about 600 miles from Indonesia’s

shores. While some perceived the US troop

ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations

deployment as an effort to project power and deter

threats to peace, Indonesia has directly linked it to

regional disputes over the oil-and-gas-rich South

China Sea (Petersen 2011). Admiral Agus Suhartono

feared that the decision would put Indonesia in an

armed conflict and said “Their military fleets would

very likely go back and forth through our waters,

given the analysis that the planned base will have to

conduct [military exercises] due to rising tension in

the South China Sea. We haven’t learnt clearly but we

have been studying the plan and analyzing any

potential impacts on Indonesia. We have been

consulting all sources” (Petersen 2011).

The era of SBY was marked by the growing

cordiality between Indonesia and China. In the realm

of humanitarian aid, during the Aceh tsunami disaster

in December 2004, Beijing provided medical team

and donation worth 63 million USD. In addition,

Prime Minister Wen Jiabao attended tsunami aid

summit in Jakarta on 2005 to coordinate assistance

program (Suryadinata 2017, p. 2). In 2005,

Yudhoyono signed the Strategic Partnership joint

declaration which covers many realms of

cooperation, including economy, politics, culture,

defence, and security (Suryadinata 2017, p. 3).

Regarding economic relationships, trade and

investment between Indonesia and China continued

to grow and there are major joint projects, one of them

was the Surabaya-Madura Bridge (Suramadu)

between China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and

Indonesian SOEs (Suryadinata 2017, p. 4). However,

these cordial relationships only occurred and limited

to the realms of economic, trade, and other than

military and security, in which Indonesia is wary

toward China’s increasing presence in is nearest

territory, Natuna Island and Malacca Straits. China

made a territorial claim over the waters surrounding

Natuna Islands in 1993 and its show that during 2011,

there are 50 Chinese maps which includes an area

north of Natuna Islands that falls within Indonesia’s

EEZ (Brown 2011, p. 8). However, Indonesia always

downplayed it during Suharto’s era because they’re

afraid that the act of retaliation will legitimize

China’s claims.

However, in 2009, there are incidents of China’s

encroachment in Indonesian’s territory during which

it detained 75 Chinese fishermen operating in Natuna

Islands and it escalates in 2010 and 2013 when

Chinese gunboats forced Indonesian fisheries

protection craft to release Chinese poachers caught

fishing in Natuna waters (McBeth 2016). Natuna

Islands is seen as strategically and economically

important for Indonesia which provide geographical

gateway to the Malacca Strait – which is another

important territory for Indonesia Brown 2011, p. 8).

After the 2009 onward escalation of tensions in

Natuna Islands, there were two diverging discourse in

Indonesian government regarding their position on

the issue. The first position was held by the military

which treats this problem as a problem of territorial

sovereignty, as stated by Commodore Fahru Zaini,

then Assistant Deputy to the Chief Security Minister

for Defence Strategic Doctrine, that “China has

claimed Natuna warers as their territorial waters. This

arbitrary claim… will have a large impact on the

security of Natuna waters” (Suryadinata 2014) and

was added by then Commander of the Indonesian

Chief of Staff, General Moeldoko that “There are

significant changes in the stable and calm conditions

that existed in the region a decade ago. So everyone

has an opinion that China is a threat to the

neighborhood” (Dw.com 2014). These point of view

produces military’s eagerness to increase defense in

Indonesia’s surrounding waters (Suryadinata 2014).

The other position, which is more dominant, was

held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which the

then Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa stated in

response to the military apparatuses statements that

“There is no territorial dispute between Indonesia and

China” and that he emphasized the ongoing maritime

cooperation between China and Indonesia at the

deputy foreign minister level and pointed that one of

those cooperation involved foreign investment in

Natuna for fish processing and canning (Suryadinata

2014). However, the diplomatic apparatus questioned

and rejected China’s “nine-dash line” claims and sent

a diplomatic letter to the United Nations’

Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf and

expressed concern of China’s overlapping claim

through Indonesia’s EEZ in Natuna Islands

(Dominguez 2015; Suryadinata 2014). However,

Indonesia’s position remained cautious and that it

didn’t treat the Natuna Islands as a territorial and

threat to sovereignty (Suryadinata 2014).

Another instance of Indonesia’s inward-looking

foreign policy was shown in its fear regarding

external powers domination and their conduct in

Malacca Strait. Indonesia is responsible for ensuring

the safe passage of more than half of the world’s

commercial maritime traffic. To ensure this

responsibility, Indonesia needed the help of foreign

powers, in which Indonesian defense minister,

Juwono Sudarsono asked Japan, China, and South

Korea for technical assistance in 2007 (Brown 2011,

p. 9). Ironically, however, Indonesia rebuffed the

offers by America, India, Australia, Japan, and China

to help secure the waterway for the reason that

Indonesia did not want to attract impressions which

Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy: Assessing Indonesian Foreign Policy under Yudhoyono (2004-2014)

betrays to those foreign powers a sense of Indonesia’s

inability to secure the waterway (Brown 2011, p. 9).

Indonesia feared that technical assistance could lead

to greater cooperation and then domination by

external power might become a huge possibility. In

another incident, the paranoid element toward foreign

powers was shown in 2004 when Indonesia was

confronted by unconfirmed reports that contained

suggestion in which America would begin sending

patrol boats to nearby waters, which was then

responded angrily and claimed that it would not only

attracted Islamic extremists to target US vessels, but

it was considered an infringement on Indonesia’s

sovereignty (Brown 2011).

Indonesia’s relations with its Southeast Asian

neighbour too was sometimes caught within

Indonesia’s fear of sovereignty infringement.

Indonesia planned a joint defence pact with Indonesia

after the problematic sand trade for Singapore’s

reclamation and territorial extension (Asia Sentinel

2007). The agreement was approved by President

Yudhoyono and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in

April 2007 and that this defence deal is consists of

both countries’ cooperation on the extradition treaty

and Indonesia to provide land, sea, and airspace

within its jurisdiction for Singapore’s armed forces to

conduct training exercise (Asia Sentinel 2007).

However, Indonesian lawmakers criticized the latest

version of the defence agreement, mainly because of

the lack of benefits to be gained by Indonesia and that

Indonesia would be selling its sovereignty to

Singapore, referred to one of the clause in the pact

which would permit Singapore to invite “third parties

to conduct and take part in future joint military

exercises (Asia Sentinel 2007). Previously, Indonesia

also complained to Singapore that they threatened

Indonesia’s sovereignty by frequently involving US

and Australian forces and then Indonesia unilaterally

stopped the use of training areas (Asia Sentinel 2007).

These cases had shown that Indonesia’s outward-

looking foreign policy and discourse during the

Yudhoyono era worked best in the realm of in the

economic, trade, and other international traditional

and non-traditional problems alike that is not in the

immediate urgency and not pertaining to Indonesia’s

immediate threat and problems, such as Indonesia’s

national sovereignty and territory. In addition, the

dominant discourse of outward-looking foreign

policy is one amongst many other discourses. These

seemingly unequivocal dominant discourse withered

when faced with the fears of foreign powers

infringement of Indonesia’s sovereignty and matters

pertaining to military and defence, in which Indonesia

suddenly switched from being an outward-looking

country to an inward-looking one.

4 CONCLUSIONS

Several things could be summarised from this article.

Firstly, previous investigations on Indonesian foreign

policy have neglected the importance of strategic

culture as a possible explanans.

Of those few who focused their research on

Indonesian strategic culture, they mostly traced the

origins of Indonesian strategic culture. Anwar (1996),

Sulaiman (2016), and Arif & Kurniawan (2017) spent

their time to trace the origins first, before focusing

only on one aspect of military policy. Instead, this

research tries to reconstruct Indonesian strategic

culture from the actual discourse and practice during

the Yudhoyono’s regime.

As we have shown, Indonesian foreign policy

since Soekarno have the tendency to adhere to the

limits set by the discursive structure of the strategic

culture. Even during the more outward-looking

period of Soeharto’s later years, the more pragmatic

parts of the policies were contained to the more

economic aspects.

Secondly, by using the poststructuralist theory,

this research argues that the existing discursive

structures limit the policy options. Therefore, it was

not possible to Yudhoyono’s regime to change its

policy drastically (whether to create a stronger

military pact in the region, to strengthen Indo-US

relationship, or to change Indonesian inward-looking

policy and defensive posture of the military).

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