RFID Data Management in Supply Chains: Challenges,
Approaches and Further Research Requirements
Adam Melski, Lars Thoroe and Matthias Schumann
University of Goettingen, Institute of Information Systems, Dep. 2, Goettingen, Germany
Abstract. The implementation of RFID leads to improved visibility in supply
chains. However, as a consequence of the increased data collection and
enhanced data granularity, supply chain participants have to deal with new data
management challenges. In this paper, we give an overview of the current
challenges and solution proposals in the area of data collection and
transformation, data organization and data security. We also identify further
research requirements.
1 Introduction
As a result of, in particular, efforts towards standardization and the falling costs of
technology, RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) systems are leaving their niche
and are being increasingly implemented in an effort to eliminate inefficiency and the
lack of visibility in global supply chains. Large retailers like Wal-Mart [1] and Metro
[2] function as the primary pioneers in the introduction of RFID, but smaller
businesses, for instance, the medium-sized textile company Lemmi Fashion [3], have
recently started to optimize their supply chains with the help of this new technology
as well. Above all, the implementation of RFID leads to improved visibility in
complex and, when using conventional technologies like the barcode, hardly
transparent, supply chains [4]. These advantages are being utilized in at the expense
of new challenges in the area of data management, which can be primarily attributed
to the rise in data volumes. The substantial data volumes are a result of the increased
amount of data capture points, more frequent capture sessions and enhanced data
granularity. Considering this background information, the following areas of
investigation can be identified:
Data capture and transformation: RFID systems function first and foremost as
data generators. Because of the physical characteristics of the technology, the data
are often faulty (dirty data). Besides, the data possess a raw character (low-level
data) and must therefore be filtered from the middleware, compressed and properly
transformed before being relayed to their respective application systems (high-level
information).
Data organization: The exchange of object related data has seen a significant
increase in RFID-supported supply chains. The provision and relay of the data
Melski A., Thoroe L. and Schumann M. (2007).
RFID Data Management in Supply Chains: Challenges, Approaches and Further Research Requirements.
In Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on RFID Technology - Concepts, Applications, Challenges, pages 61-74
DOI: 10.5220/0002413200610074
Copyright
c
SciTePress
represent new challenges for the hitherto existing informational architecture in
business networks.
Data security: The more data on their products businesses save and exchange, the
simpler it becomes for competitors to gain access to these data. These businesses
are therefore exposed to a greater danger of manipulation and unauthorized data
retrieval, particularly because of the fact that data are stored directly on the object.
This contribution provides an overview of the current challenges and solution
proposals in the above-mentioned areas of data management in RFID-based supply
chains. Besides the illustration of the present state of research, the demands of future
research will be identified. In section 2, general data management challenges will be
derived based on the characteristics of RFID systems. Thereupon, current data
management concepts will be presented in section 3 on the basis of the three
identified areas of data management. Furthermore, future research questions will be
identified in this section. Finally, section 4 concludes with a short summary.
2 RFID Data Management Challenges
RFID systems use radio waves to facilitate communication between transponders and
readers. This leads, on the one hand, to the capability to identify objects from a
reasonable distance without line of sight; on the other hand, the identification process
is subject to conventional physical influences and can lead to reading anomalies (e.g.
tags are not recognized). Besides, mistakes can occur at the operational process level.
For example, a product in the supermarket can make its way more than once from the
warehouse to the supermarket shelf and back again (e.g. because there's no shelf
room). Such cyclic object movements could be interpreted as anomalies and then
wrongly filtered by the system [5]. Besides, if sensors which, for instance, measure
the local temperature are implemented in addition to RFID tags, then they can cause
incorrect data to be delivered because of a technical defect [6]. For the reasons just
named, the demand for increased data filtering in RFID systems is collectively posited
in the relevant literature [7] [8] [9].
Data capture by means of RFID requires no manual actions, which causes a
decrease in the cost of the data capture process. This implies that the number of
capture sessions and points increases. For instance, with the implementation of so-
called smart shelves, data from the objects on the shelves can be read continuously.
This has multiple effects:
Firstly, the data quantity increases significantly. These data must be compressed
before they are relayed. On this point, the implementation of so-called aggregation
methods is discussed in the literature [10]. These methods decrease data quantity
without loss of information. In addition, suitable archiving methods should be
implemented as a means of separating old, as well as obsolete, data from data
being presently used. This would guarantee a better system performance [11]. This
is because, in RFID systems, which, above all else, create a memory map of the
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real world in its digital counterpart, current data (e.g. concerning ongoing good
movements) are of primary interest [12].
Secondly, RFID data are quite dynamic, whereby the time component must be
adequately mapped. New data models are therefore necessary [13].
Thirdly, the data accumulate continuously (asynchronous) [14]. Whereas a barcode
is only read when needed, transponders continually transmit data to the reader.
These data must be processed in real-time and then relayed to the connected
systems.
Fourthly, as objects pass multiple read points, data from different readers must be
compressed to complex events which represent the object flow. This generally
occurs through the definition of predefined rules [15].
RFID allows the data from multiple objects to be read simultaneously (bulk
reading). Possible collisions, by which more than one signal arrives simultaneously,
and therefore cannot be separated by the reader, must be avoided through the
implementation of anti-collision algorithms [16].
The efficient identification procedure of RFID is not the only reason why it is of
interest for business processes. Rather, it is the ability to store data directly on the
object that provides impetus for innovative implementation. The fact that the data are
bound to the object means that they can be read at all times by whoever is the
temporary possessor of the object. Although this, in most cases, is not problematic,
being even desired, there are certain 'sensitive' data which should not be accessible to
everyone. This is, as a result of public discussion, especially the case as it pertains to
consumer privacy (for instance, pertaining to shopping at the supermarket) [17]. But
companies also cannot afford to give away sensitive data (e.g. product features,
maintenance data). The data stored on the tag must therefore be adequately protected
against potential abuse or manipulation. Suitable data protection mechanisms (e.g.
encryption) must be implemented.
In open-loop supply chain applications, by which the tagged object runs through a
series of supply chain levels, data stored on the object and/or in central databases
should be accessible to all partners. Only in this way can the transparency in the
supply chain be enhanced. The construction of an information network which spans
all companies and makes access to these data possible is, consequently, necessary to
this end. Furthermore, questions of data allocation and distribution
(centralized/decentralized data storage) need to be considered.
3 RFID Data Management Concepts
3.1 Data Collection and Transformation
An important question in the area of RFID data collection in supply chains regards the
data capture points and the tagging level (pallet/case/item). The vision of complete
visibility through the use of RFID appears to be economically unreasonable in most
cases. The relevant literature attests retail in particular as the last element in the
supply chain high potential benefits through RFID data collection. Thus, the
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distribution of costs and benefits of an RFID implementation within supply chains
continues to be an object of research [18] [19].
A further important area of research is the performance capability of the reading
infrastructure. Two main factors are relevant for the measurement of the performance
capability of a data capture system: accuracy and efficiency [20].
Acurracy: A 100% data capture is not necessary in all applications; however, in many
cases – for instance, when striving to monitor product movement in supply chains
exactly – a read rate of near to 100% is practically required. This rate, however, is
often not achieved and faulty readings occur. The most significant example of faulty
reading is the failure to identify tags which are located within the vicinity of a reader.
The most important sources of these failures can be assigned to collisions [21] [22].
In order to avoid disturbances through collisions, there exist various anti-collision
protocols; the development of effective and efficient algorithms remains, however, a
topic of research [23] [24] [25] [26]. Another source of failures is the tag detuning,
misalignment and shielding [21] [27].
A possible solution for this category of problems lies in the redundant
implementation of RFID infrastructure. On the one hand, the accuracy of the system
can be improved through the implementation of several readers with overlapping
reader fields. On the other hand, several tags (so-called mirror tags) can be used for
the identification of a single object [20].
Efficiency of data capture: An essential criterion in this case is the speed at which the
tags are read. The speed at which a single tag is read depends on the frequency being
used by the system as well as on the extent of the content to be read. The latter is
greatly determined by the chosen form of data organization. The demand for research
exists with respect to the question as to with which level of data organization the
required speed of data provision for controlling the application can be reached. The
quick bulk reading of several tags is equally a topic of current research [23].
For the afore-mentioned reasons, data input verification in RFID systems needs too be
more sophisticated. Faulty readings have to be identified and eliminated. Several
statistical techniques for the cleaning of RFID data are discussed in the relevant
literature [5] [28] [29]. For instance, Jeffrey, Garofalakis, Franklin present an adaptive
smoothing filter which aggregates and analyses the data from several read cycles
using different, self-tuning window sizes [29].
Following the collection phase, the large quantities of raw data must then be
transformed into usable information. The process of data transformation consists of
the following steps: reduction of the quantity of data, selection of relevant data and
generation of information which serves as a basis for decision-making.
The first two steps are generally taken over by the readers (intra-reader reasoning)
[10]. The generation of information relevant to the decision-making process is,
however, carried out by the connected middleware. This results from the fact that data
from the local reader are no longer sufficient for this process, the generation of
complex events requires an analysis of the data from multiple readers (inter-reader
reasoning) [14].
64
Reduction of data quantity. In general, readers should only relay data to the
middleware when additional information can be generated through the use of these
data. For instance, if transponders are located within the reader field of a particular
reader for a longer period of time, then the same data are read over and over again.
For any particular user, however, the most important data are, first and foremost,
those data pertaining to when the object entered the reading field of the reader and
when the object moved outside the range of that reader. All readings that occur
between these two events are redundant, because they deliver no new information on
the status of the object. This implies that readings should only be relayed when the
status of the object changes. In this way, the quantity of data is reduced without loss
of information [8].
Selection of relevant data. In the next step, the pre-filtered data are subjected to a
selection process. The following scheme, for example, can be used [8] [10] [30]:
Combination: If a pallet, together with the objects that it contains, is identified,
then these data can be combined into a cluster and relayed together.
Passing process: If objects pass a gate (for instance, upon entering the warehouse),
then, instead of the events 'object appeared' and 'object disappeared', only a 'pass
event' should be relayed to the applications.
Simplification of movement paths: For specific data analysis purposes, less
important object movements (like the movement of an object from one warehouse
shelf to another) can be simplified, without the loss of significant information.
Generation of information relevant to the decision-making process. In the final step of
the transformation, information relevant to the decision-making process is generated
from the already-filtered data. During this process, single events are aggregated to
complex events [31], and RFID data are combined with additional context data, as
well as being evaluated according to predefined rules [8]. If, for instance, a product
was identified at specific read points, e.g. 'shelf' and then 'exit', without having first
been identified at the read point 'cashier', then it could be a matter of theft.
Wang and Liu propose a new data model called DRERM (Dynamic Relationship
ER Model) to adequately map RFID data in information systems [11]. Due to the
addition of dynamic relations, the suggested model supports complex queries in the
category of object monitoring and object traceability. Gonzales et al. introduce so-
called RFID-cuboids, which represent RFID data on different abstraction levels (e.g.
data is clustered and presented in an abstract way for decision-makers) [30].
3.2 Data Organization
There are two basic possibilities for data storage in RFID systems: Object-related data
can be deposited in databases and referenced by means of a unique ID (data-on-
network), or data can be stored on the transponder and therefore directly on the object
(data-on-tag) [32].
65
Data-on-Network. In a data-on-network system, a unique ID is stored on the
transponder while all other object related data remain in central databases, which can
be either managed by an information intermediary or can maintain with the supply
chain partners. This is mainly due to the fact that RFID was still too expensive at the
end of the '90s for wide-scale implementation. RFID found itself in a vicious circle, in
which high costs entailed a minimal adoption of the technology and a minimal
adoption of the technology resulted in high costs. For this reason, low-cost
transponders, simple data exchange protocols and elementary data structures were
expected to lead to a breakthrough [33].
If an object is located within the reader field of an RFID reader, then a data
quadruplet is transmitted, consisting of the reader ID, the antenna ID, the object ID
and the time stamp of the reading [8]. With this information, it can be unequivocally
determined where an object is/was located at what time. Further data can be retrieved,
when needed, by the middleware over various networks (e.g. over the internet). In this
case, the data source must be known, that is, the middleware must have access to
information as to which database must be queried in order to retrieve the pertinent
object data.
There are two conceivable possibilities for data storage in this case. On the one
hand, object-related data can be stored centrally and administered by an intermediary;
on the other hand, these data can be stored in each partners’ local databases.
Case study: Forestry. In order to reduce the shrinkage rate of wood on its way from
the forest to the saw mill, the leading German forestry company Cambium has been
using RFID technology since 2005 [34]. The traditional process of putting a small
plastic flag on the logs and then recording the relevant data on paper lead to 15 %
shrinkage in quantity and quality. Therefore, the logs are now furnished with a nail-
shaped RFID tag. The only information on each transponder is a simple unique ID.
Further data (type of tree, length, quality etc.) are sent to a central database using a
handheld device. The data are accessible to all participants in the supply chain
(primarily the forest proprietor, forest workers, haulers, shippers and saw mills). In
order to determine possible discrepancies in quantity, the tags are queried before each
step in the transportation process and the relevant IDs are then transmitted to the
central database. According to the company's initial calculations, it is assumed that
the implementation of RFID will result in a 70 % reduction in shrinkage.
The case-in-point example of data organization using RFID technology
distinguishes itself through the following advantages:
From the perspective of the participants in the supply chain, it is a matter of a
relatively simple organizational architecture, by which the data management is
outsourced to an informational intermediary.
Low-cost transponders, on which only an object ID is stored, can be utilised.
However, the following disadvantages can also be identified:
Central systems distinguish themselves through poor scalability and the problem of
a single point of failure: If there is a system failure at the central point of
operations, then the entire supply chain is affected.
In the case of central data management, questions of data ownership must be
answered.
66
A connection to the network is necessary.
Example: EPCglobal. A concrete example of the implementation of a decentralized
data-on-network system is the EPC network [35]. The focus of the EPCglobal concept
is the EPC (Electronic Product Code) number, with the help of which each
transponder is allocated a unique identification number. The EPC constitutes the only
information stored on the transponder. Other data pertaining to the object are
deposited in external databases and referenced by means of unique identification
numbers. The relay of the data to the relevant data source occurs by means of the
Object Naming Service (ONS). The data sources are then offered by the EPC
Information Systems (EPC IS). In order to facilitate the exchange of components
between the EPCglobal network and external processes, the XML-based markup
language PML (Physical Markup Language) was created [36]. The data retrieved
from the readers is filtered and transformed by the middleware.
The data organization in distributed databases possesses the following advantages:
The decentralized system is easily scalable.
Compared with centralized data organization, data ownership is clearly regulated.
Low-cost transponders can be utilized.
In addition to these advantages, however, the following disadvantages must be taken
into account:
Decentralized data organization represents a complex organizational architecture,
above all requiring extended controls on identity and access.
A connection to the network is necessary.
Data-on-Tag. The data-on-tag concept is based on the assumption that data that are
needed for the creation of the abstract model in the information system are not
necessarily gathered 'online'. On the contrary, they are captured at the point of action,
which does not necessarily have to be within range of any network. Additionally, it is
not always possible to make control data, which represent real world changes,
available to the real world online. In such cases, the needed data must be physically
present at the point of action [32]. Therefore, it lends itself to store the data on the tag,
the data thereby accompanying the object. Thus, in the data-on-tag concept, the
separation of physical objects from the data pertaining to them, as in conventional
technologies and informational systems, is abolished.
Case study: Lemmi Fashion. The textile manufacturer Lemmi Fashion is equipping all
of its clothing with RFID transponders, which, in addition to their unique IDs, contain
data concerning size, color and other specific information, since the middle of 2005.
The company is implementing RFID technology at the product level in its entire
worldwide supply chain and, for this reason, belongs to the pioneers in the textile
industry [3]. Passive transponders (with a frequency of 13.56 megahertz) are already
being used at four different points in the clothes production and distribution process
(the manufacturing facilities being located mostly in Asia): (1) as the products leave
the manufacturing facility, (2) upon entering the distribution center, (3) in the transfer
from quality control to the warehouse and (4) upon exiting the distribution center. In
addition, several of Lemmi Fashion's customers have already announced their
67
intention to implement an RFID infrastructure (5), whereby all supply chain
participants would profit from the technology. This requires standardization of the
memory’s structure [37].
The data-on-tag concept is distinguished by the following advantages:
No complex infrastructure or network connection is required.
The organizational concept scales well by means of decentralized data
management on the object itself (each object representing a small database).
The following disadvantages must be reckoned with:
In the case that data on the tag is not stored redundantly, access to the data on a
particular object is only possible when that object is physically present.
The higher storage capacity of the transponders used in data-on-tag systems has the
result that they are more expensive than those used in data-on-network systems.
The data stored on the tag must be protected from unauthorized access.
The following figure summarizes and illustrates the advantages and disadvantages
of the proposed concepts of data organization.
Data in central DB
DB
Data in distributed DB
DB
Data on transponder
DB
DB
DB
Internet
++
++ ++
__ __ __
simple architecture
simple data management
low priced tags
scalability
no problems concerning
ownership of data
low priced tags
complex architecture
enhanced identity and
access control
network connection
single point of failure
scalability
ownership of data
network connection
data access only when
object present
cost of tags and storage
capacity
encryption
simple architecture
scalability
data capture „offline“
Data-on-Network
Data-on-Tag
Fig. 1. Comparison of the concepts of data organization.
3.3 Data Security
The problem of data privacy and security plays a central role in the research on RFID,
although the literature is primarily focused on the protection of personal consumer
data (personal privacy) (e.g. [38] [39] [40]), corporate data security typically being
neglected: “Industrial privacy, i.e., data secrecy, is important too, but less frequently
considered” [41]. Indeed, the two areas of research are based on different
considerations: While consumers are afraid of omnipresent surveillance (loss of
privacy, objects being associated with people), companies are primarily interested in
protecting company-internal data from unauthorized access and potential
manipulation. However, the problems are not completely independent of one another,
68
considering the fact that data security represents a required prerequisite in order to
guarantee data privacy.
Especially in supply chains, the guarantee of data security is of primary
importance, due to the fact that, in these complex systems, a great deal of (mostly
insecure) cross company data exchange occurs. From the perspective of a participant
in the supply chain, four primary threats to data security can be identified [42]:
Corporate espionage threat. Supply chain data can be spied out by competitors by
querying transponders at designated places along the supply chain. Alternatively,
communication can be bugged on the air interface. Both cases can lead to the
evaluation of information from traffic patterns between transponders and readers (e.g.
concerning the transmitted data quantity or the number of read sessions). Using
information on goods movement, competitors can better formulate their own stocking
strategies: 'Individually tagged objects could also make it easier for competitors to
learn about stock turnover rates; corporate spies could walk through shops
surreptitiously scanning items' [41]. A further threat is represented by so-called
'spoofing', in which transponders are imitated by the competitor in order to gain
access to the transponder data, as well as so-called 'cloning'the (unauthorised)
capture of data and replication of transponders in order to, for instance, counterfeit
high-value products [43].
Competitive marketing threat. By using objects outfitted with transponders, the
unauthorized access by competitors of information on consumer preferences, which
they can then use for their own personal marketing strategies, is made easier.
Infrastructure threat. The RFID infrastructure can, for example, be subjected to
precise denial-of-service attacks, by which the sensitive flow of data can be disturbed.
Physical attacks can, for example, consist of interrupting the flow of power to the
reader(s) or excessive demands on the components. So-called 'shielding' represents
another threat, in which the radio interface can be blocked by metal objects, or
reduced by purposefully transmitting disruptive signals.
Trust perimeter threat. In supply-chain-wide RFID systems, large data volumes are
being exchanged increasingly more often, which opens up more possibilities for
competitors to intercept this information.
In order to guarantee the security of the data on tag, cryptographic protection
measures, in particular, are being propagated [44]. This approach, however, has grave
disadvantages:
The implementation of cryptographic protection measures is associated with
considerable costs. This represents a great challenge, particularly as it concerns
identification at the product level, where the tag price plays an important role.
Low-cost passive transponders do not have enough storage capacity for
cryptography. And, although, according to Moore's Law, the storage and
processing capacity of transponders will continue to grow, it is more likely that the
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prices will fall in similar capacity classes than that new functionality will be
offered at the same price [43].
The implementation of cryptographic functions for the identification and
authentication of data has the consequence that only transponders and readers
which belong to a certain system are capable of communicating with one another.
Because it is the goal of EPCglobal and ISO that the data stored on transponders be
universally readable, traditional encryption methods are not suitable to protect the
data from abuse.
In an effort to counter the problems just illustrated, a series of security measures
are proposed in the literature. In order to secure low-cost transponders against
counterfeit, a so-called 'relational check code' is proposed, with the help of which it
can be ascertained whether data on the transponder were manipulated [45]. However,
no determination can be made as to which part of the data was changed or to what
degree the change occurred. The problem of counterfeit protection is also treated in
[46]. The authors propose that the block of data comprising the unique object ID be
used to deposit secret information (generated using three hash functions out of the
data blocks Header, Object Class and Object ID) in this memory. Using this approach,
it is possible to determine which data were manipulated. The proposed method has the
advantage that no additional memory is required and, furthermore, no calculations are
performed on the transponder.
Using the two security measures just illustrated, it is not possible to prevent
counterfeit, only to discover it after the fact. In order to achieve an effective level of
data security, active measures are necessary: Floerkemeier et al. describe the
prototypical implementation of a 'watchdog tag', which monitors and records all
reader activity in the proximity [47]. Rieback et al. propose the implementation of a
device with the name 'RFID Guardian', which, similar to a computer firewall,
intercepts reader queries and evaluates them before relaying them to the transponders
[48].
In order to solve the problem of the 'competitive marketing threat', Juels proposes
so-called 'pseudonym throttling' [43]. This is also a simple security mechanism which
can be utilized in low-cost tags. The tag contains a short list of random IDs or
pseudonyms. During each consecutive reading, the tag transmits the next available
pseudonym from its list. In order to eliminate the danger that the list of pseudonyms is
intercepted by multiple read queries performed within a short period of time, the tags
are programmed so that they transmit their data with a predetermined delay.
3.4 Summary of Future Research Requirements
The following table summarizes the topics illustrated up to this point and gives an
overview of suitable research questions relating to data management in the context of
RFID-based supply chains.
70
Table 1. Overview of research questions.
Data collection and transformation
What consequences do demands on efficiency and accuracy have when choosing a type of data
organization?
Extent of the data collection: What degree of visibility is economically reasonable?
How can the performance of the RFID data collection be adequately measured?
Into what form must the data be transformed for various information consumers along the supply chain?
To what extent should the data transformation process be decentralized? What problems result when
extensive data transformation is already being conducted before relay to the applications?
Which traditional data warehouse concepts can be used in RFID systems? How can the data effectively
be mined? What (potential) modifications must be made?
Data organization
What degree of decentralization is advantageous with respect to the proposed concepts?
Will new information intermediaries arise to manage the huge data volumes?
Which data should be stored on the object and which data should remain in databases?
Based on which rules should stored data be synchronized in a redundant data management system (data-
on-network, as well as data-on-tag)?
Which supply chain steps are well-suited for 'object-accompanying' data storage?
How should the access concepts be regulated in a decentralized data management system?
Data security
What value do the data stored on the object represent for the company and what could competitors
possibly do with the data?
How can data security be guaranteed while still maintaining the use of low-cost tags?
What alternative security measures could be employed instead of encryption (mainly because of costs
and storage capacity)?
How can the RFID infrastructure be protected from denial-of-service attacks?
To what extent do additional security measures restrict the propagandized 'open' RFID systems?
4 Conclusion
Although RFID has entered supply chain management practice, the technology still
poses several challenges that need to be addressed by research. In this contribution we
discuss the particular challenges and possible solutions that practice faces in the field
of RFID data management. The massive amount of potentially unreliable data is the
main challenge in the field of data collection and transformation. Whereas progress
has been made in the development of algorithms for the fast and reliable bulk reading,
the improvement of these methods still constitutes a topic for future research in order
to provide the accuracy and efficiency that practice requires. Other research
opportunities remain in the field of data transformation, which deals with the question
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how raw and dirty data can be converted into information. Data organization persists
to be of interest for research and practice. The recent inclusion of user memory in the
standards of EPCglobal indicates a gain in importance of the data-on-tag concept. The
extent of implementation of this decentralized approach as well as questions
concerning the access of distributed data will be future objects of research. Data
security faces severe challenges as research finds itself caught between the need for
security measures and the necessity for simple and low priced tag architectures. This
predicament intensifies when one considers possible effects of item-level tagging on
consumer privacy. In response to early experiences from retailers who faced massive
opposition when piloting item-level tagging, research needs to continue with the
development of feasible security measures. In summary it can be ascertained that
although RFID data management has been the object of intense research for the last
few years, a variety of topics for future research remain.
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