Media Coverage to Panel Data Analysis on the Impact of Listed
Companies’ Debt Financing Costs
Yijun Peng
Shaanxi Normal University International Business School, Xi’an, China
Keywords: Non-Negative Media Reports, Negative Media Reports, Nature of Property Right, Debt Financing Costs.
Abstract: At present, small and medium-sized enterprises generally face the difficulty of financing and expensive
financing. As a company's external governance force, the media plays a role of supervision and corporate
governance, which has a significant impact on the cost of debt financing. This paper takes A-share listed
companies on the small and medium board in 2014-2018 as the research object, constructs a panel data model
for multiple regression analysis, empirically examines the mechanism of media attention on debt financing
costs, and further explores the differences in the impact of different property rights. The results show that
media attention can help reduce the company’s debt financing costs, while reports of different natures have
different impacts in companies with different property rights, which can provide useful references for
companies to ease financing constraints, government supervision, and creditor self-protection.
1 INTRODUCTION
At present, how to alleviate corporate financing
constraints has become a common concern of the
theoretical and practical circles, and has attracted
great attention from relevant government
departments. The report of the 19th National
Congress of the Communist Party of China clearly
pointed out that “deepening the reform of the
financial system and enhancing the ability of
financial service entities, expand the financing
channels of enterprises in an all-round way.” Debt
financing is an important source of funds for the
external financing of Chinese companies, so the
factors that affect the cost of debt financing have also
become an important topic in the field of corporate
finance. Theoretically speaking, the main reason why
companies need to be subject to financing constraints
is the asymmetry of internal and external information.
In the case of information asymmetry, external
creditors will demand a higher premium due to the
consideration of information costs and default costs.
To compensate for risks, companies need to bear
higher debt financing costs.
In recent years, with the improvement of
information technology and the popularization of the
Internet, as a fourth power independent of legislation,
administration, and justice, the media’s supervisory
role in the capital market has become increasingly
prominent, it has become an important external force
that affects the operation and management decisions
of listed companies. In July 2018, a number of media
successively reported the news that Changchun
Changsheng rabies vaccine production records were
falsified and 250,000 DPT vaccines were sold to
Shandong, which immediately triggered intense
discussions among netizens and high social attention.
On October 16, the illegal production of vaccines
caused the relevant departments to impose
administrative penalties on Changchun Changsheng,
such as revocation of drug production licenses and
fines. On December 11, the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange planned to delist the company’s stocks in a
major illegal manner. The media collects and
processes information to make information publicly
available, which saves information users the cost of
information retrieval and collection, and reduces the
degree of information asymmetry. Secondly, as a
company’s external governance force, the media
plays the role of exposing financial fraud, improving
corporate governance defects, and improving
corporate performance. Media reporting on
corporate-related information can alleviate the
information asymmetry between companies and
investors. The problem helps investors to effectively
supervise the relevant decision-making of the
Peng, Y.
Media Coverage to Panel Data Analysis on the Impact of Listed Companies’ Debt Financing Costs.
DOI: 10.5220/0011163100003440
In Proceedings of the International Conference on Big Data Economy and Digital Management (BDEDM 2022), pages 111-116
ISBN: 978-989-758-593-7
Copyright
c
2022 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved
111
enterprise management, which is conducive to the
alleviation of the entrusted-agent problem.
Related research shows that the media as an
informal governance mechanism will inevitably
affect the financial decision-making of corporate
stakeholders, but there are few related studies on
whether media attention affects the debt financing
costs of listed companies. This article aims to
examine in depth whether media attention affects the
cost of debt financing; whether it will increase or
reduce the cost of debt financing for companies;
divide media reports into non-negative media reports
and negative media reports according to their
substance, and Explore the difference between the
two effects on corporate debt financing costs. The
media is concerned about whether it will have a
consistent impact on the debt financing costs of
companies with different property rights.
2 PRIOR LITERATURE AND
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Empirical data proves that company characteristic
factors, corporate governance factors and macro-
environmental factors can all have a significant
impact on a company’s debt financing costs. The
media is regarded as the fourth power independent of
legislation, administration, and judiciary, which to a
certain extent, supplements the lack of the system. On
the whole, the media has two major functions:
information intermediary and corporate governance.
First, the media organizes, analyzes, processes, and
releases the collected information to the public,
thereby reducing information costs for information
users and reducing information asymmetry.
Secondly, the media also has corporate governance
functions such as exposing accounting scandals,
protecting investor rights, and curbing financial
restatements and financial fraud (Yang, Kong, 2017,
Wu, et al., 2019). Existing research results show that
the media play a corporate governance function
mechanism in at least three aspects, namely:
traditional supervision mechanism, reputation
mechanism and market pressure mechanism.
Based on the theory of information asymmetry,
reputation theory, and principal-agent theory, this
paper divides media reports into different types of
media reports according to the essence of the report
content, and discusses the influence of media
attention on the cost of corporate debt financing.
According to the information asymmetry theory, the
creditor cannot fully grasp the debtor's true
production and operation status in the borrowing and
lending relationship, so there is a problem of
information asymmetry between the two parties. The
study of Fang and Peress found that information
friction can be alleviated by media reporting on
information (Fang, Peress, 2009). The media plays its
role as an information intermediary, collecting and
organizing corporate information through
professional means, and passing the information to
the market. Through the media’s disclosure of
relevant information, creditors can have a more
comprehensive grasp of the company’s investment
and operation status, return the degree of information
asymmetry to a lower level, and promote creditors to
improve the accuracy when judging the required risk
reward, which is more in line with the real situation
of the enterprise. From a realistic point of view,
media reports can be divided into non-negative and
negative reports according to the type of report, while
non-negative media reports can be divided into
positive and neutral reports. Media’s positive reports
on listed companies signal to creditors that the
company’s business is in good condition and reduce
creditors’ expectations of the risks they face. At this
time, creditors will demand a lower risk
compensation premium, and thus the cost of debt
financing will be reduced. Media's neutral reports on
listed companies can enable investors to have a more
in-depth and comprehensive understanding of the
true investment and operating conditions of the
company, thereby reducing the cost of information
that investors need to pay. Therefore, non-negative
media reports reduce the investment risks faced by
creditors, and are beneficial for listed companies to
obtain debt financing with low borrowing interest
rates and a long term structure. However, when the
media reports a lot of negative news about listed
companies, it will send a bad signal to the capital
market, the creditors will face an increased risk of
default, and the financing constraint dilemma of
enterprises will be further aggravated.
From the reputation theory, reputation, as an
intangible asset of a company, will bring unexpected
benefits to the company. Therefore, companies and
managers are paying more and more attention to
establishing a good image. Generally, creditors will
assess the risks they face based on the reputation of
the company. Compared with companies with poor
reputation, the risk of default by a company with a
good reputation is lower. Therefore, creditors are
more inclined to sign a loan agreement with a
company with a good reputation. Positive media
reports help companies build a good reputation,
deepen stakeholders’ good impressions of the
BDEDM 2022 - The International Conference on Big Data Economy and Digital Management
112
company, and enhance the company’s influence and
competitiveness. Media reports on corporate neutral
news, through these information fund providers will
have a more diversified understanding of the financial
status and operating results of the company, and
enhance the company's reputation. Therefore, non-
negative media reports can enable companies to
establish a good image and have a good reputation,
thereby reducing the risk compensation required by
creditors for the company’s default risk and moral
hazard, and reducing the company’s debt financing
costs. Negative media reports of companies will
damage the company’s reputation, destroy the
company’s image, and reduce the company’s core
competitiveness. Banks and other financial
institutions will lower the company’s credit rating,
and creditors will face increased investment risks,
which will require higher the risk-reward of the
company has intensified the debt financing
constraints of enterprises. Based on the above
analysis, this article proposes the following
hypotheses:
H1: Media reports are negatively related to the
debt financing costs of listed companies.
H1a: Non-negative media reports are negatively
related to the debt financing costs of listed
companies.
H1b: Non-negative media reports are negatively
related to the debt financing costs of listed
companies.
The conventional wisdom holds that compared
with private enterprises, state-owned enterprises are
often easier to obtain bank loans because of their
property rights advantages, and private enterprises
are often subject to financing constraints. However,
the study of Wang Jiating and Zhao Liang found that
the cost of capital of state-owned enterprises is higher
than that of non-state-owned enterprises (Wang and
Zhao 2010). With the continuous improvement of my
country's financial system and the gradual
marketization of competition in the financial
industry, enterprises can obtain financial support
from more channels. In order to ensure their own
profits, banks and other financial institutions will pay
more attention to the company's operating conditions
and governance levels when issuing loans. Compared
with private enterprises, state-owned enterprises
generally have poor corporate governance and
serious information asymmetry. The media's
disclosure of company-related information will
reduce the degree of information asymmetry, so that
creditors have a deeper understanding of the
company's operating conditions, and the company's
debt financing costs will be reduced. The media
reports on the non-negative news of state-owned
enterprises, so that creditors have confidence in the
company’s development prospects and solvency, and
can establish a good corporate image. Under the same
circumstances, banks and other financial institutions
provide financial support to state-owned holding
companies. The risk of default is low. And when there
are negative media reports from companies, banks
and other financial institutions will not be different
due to the nature of corporate property rights when
assessing the risks they will face and the negative
impact of the risks. Therefore, negative media in
companies with different property rights. There is no
significant difference in the impact of reports on debt
financing costs. The following
hypothesis is proposed:
H2a: Compared with state-owned enterprises,
private enterprises will weaken the role of non-
negative media reports in reducing debt financing
costs.
H2b: Whether it is a state-owned enterprise or a
private enterprise, there is no significant difference in
the impact of negative media reports on the cost of
debt financing.
3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND
SUMMARY STATISTICS
3.1 Sample and Data Sources.
This article selects my country's A-share SME board
listed companies from 2014 to 2018 as the research
object, and selects the initial sample according to the
following criteria: (1) Exclude the research sample of
the financial industry. (2) Exclude ST or *ST research
samples. (3) Exclude the research samples that are
simultaneously listed on B shares and H shares. (4)
Excluding research samples with abnormal debt
financing costs and missing data. After screening, the
paper obtained a total of 2519 sample observations.
This article performs 1% quantile Winsorize
processing on all continuous variables to avoid the
influence of outliers. The media report data in this
article comes from CNKI's Full-text Database of
China's Important Newspapers, and other financial
data comes from the CSMAR database.
3.2 Variable Definitions
(1) The cost of corporate debt financing is measured
by the ratio of financial expenses to the total annual
average debt.
Media Coverage to Panel Data Analysis on the Impact of Listed Companies’ Debt Financing Costs
113
(2) Usually company-related news reported
through the media will always have an impact on the
company’s next debt financing cost. Media attention
is measured by LN (1 + media coverage of the
previous year). When distinguishing the nature of
media coverage, it will include the best of "violation,
illegality, breach of contract, manipulation,
false/column/addition, fraud, fraud, bribery", etc.
Reports with negative keywords are defined as
negative media reports. Positive reports and neutral
reports that are not negative reports are non-negative
media reports.
(3) According to Luo Jinhui related research on
debt financing (Luo 2012), this article selects Age
(Age), Profitability (ROE), Growth (Growth), Asset-
liability Ratio (Lev), Interest Protection Multiple
(Intcov), Equity Concentration (First), Company size
(Size) and fixed asset ratio (Tangible) are used as
control variables.
3.3 Model Setting
In order to verify the research hypothesis of this
article, this article constructs the following empirical
model.
Cost=β0+β1Media+controls+ε (1)
3.4 Summary Statistics
From the descriptive statistical results in Table 1, we
can see that the debt financing constraints faced by
listed companies in my country are significantly
different, and the gap is large. The average amount of
media coverage was 2.69, non-negative media
coverage was 2.4, and negative media coverage was
1.95, reflecting the tendency of the Chinese media to
report good news but not bad news. The average
value of property rights is 0.151, which indicates that
15.1% of the enterprises in the sample selected in this
paper are state-owned enterprises.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Minimum
Maximu
m
Cost 0.0241 0.0168 0.000337 0.0914
Media 0.576 0.706 0 2.69
Media1 0.457 0.615 0 2.4
Media2 0.177 0.422 0 1.95
State 0.151 0.358 0 1
Age 18.2 4.99 10 36
ROE 0.0506 0.102 -0.531 0.252
Tangible 0.225 0.141 0.00227 0.628
Size 22.1 0.885 20.3 24.5
First 0.323 0.133 0.105 0.703
Growth 0.295 0.632 -0.593 3.98
Intcov 24.6 80.3 -26.4 640
Lev 0.436 0.169 0.102 0.823
4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.1 Media Coverage and Debt
Financing Costs
Empirically test the relationship between media
coverage, non-negative media coverage, negative
media coverage and debt financing. It can be seen
from Table 2 that the regression coefficient of media
coverage on debt financing cost is negative, which is
statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. It
shows that the higher the media’s attention to the
company, the deeper the creditors’ grasp of the
company’s investment and operation status, the
improvement of information asymmetry, the
improvement of information transparency, the
reduction of the cost of creditors’ access to
information, the alleviation of debt financing
constraints. Therefore, the hypothesis H1 has been
effectively verified. Non-negative media reports have
a negative correlation with debt financing costs, and
it is significant at the 1% level, which is in line with
the expectations of hypothesis H1a; the regression
coefficient of negative media reports on debt
financing costs is significantly positive, which
supports hypothesis H1b.
Table 2: Media coverage, non-negative media coverage and
negative media coverage and debt financing costs.
Media
coverage
Non-negative
media
coverage
Negative
media
coverage
Media -0.00188***
(-3.923)
Media1 -0.00188***
(-3.438)
Media2 0.00677***
(9.410)
Age -0.000263 -0.000253 -2.18e-05
(-0.971) (-0.933) (-0.0831)
ROE -0.00446 -0.00420 -0.00337
(-1.300) (-1.222) (-1.002)
Tangible 0.0296*** 0.0296*** 0.0297***
(5.507) (5.510) (5.648)
Size -0.00215** -0.00213** -0.00242**
(-2.037) (-2.009) (-2.352)
First -0.00482 -0.00466 -0.00182
(-0.691) (-0.667) (-0.266)
Growth -0.000187 -0.000179 -0.000187
(-0.346) (-0.331) (-0.353)
Intcov
-3.75e-
05***
-3.73e-05***
-3.61e-
05***
(-8.307) (-8.262) (-8.150)
BDEDM 2022 - The International Conference on Big Data Economy and Digital Management
114
Lev 0.0270*** 0.0267*** 0.0264***
(7.117) (7.039) (7.105)
Constan
t
0.0619*** 0.0611*** 0.0604***
(2.940) (2.891) (2.928)
N 2,519 2,519 2,519
R
2
0.112 0.110 0.146
4.2 Media Coverage on the Impact of
Debt Financing Costs of Companies
with Different Property Rights
When State=1, the controller type of the listed
company is a state-owned enterprise; when State=0,
the controller type of the listed company is a private
enterprise. The model (1) is tested in groups, and
Table 3 is obtained. The research in column (1) and
(2) shows that whether it is a state-owned enterprise
or a private enterprise, non-negative media reports
have a negative impact on the cost of debt financing.
The negative impact on the cost of debt financing is
greater than that of private enterprises, which
supports the expectations made by hypothesis H2a.
The research results in columns (3) and (4) show that
in state-owned or private enterprises, negative media
reports will aggravate the debt financing constraints
of the enterprises and increase the debt financing
costs of the enterprises, and the negative media
reports have all the effects on the debt financing costs.
The 1% confidence level is significant. Therefore, in
state-owned enterprises or private enterprises, the
impact of negative media reports on the cost of debt
financing is not very different, which supports the
expectations made by hypothesis H2b.
Table 3: The Impact of Media Reports on the Debt
Financing Cost of Enterprises with Different Property
Rights.
State=1 State=0 State=1 State=0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Media1 -0.00794*** -0.000925*
(-3.951) (-1.721)
Media2 0.0171*** 0.00504***
(6.589) (7.085)
Constant 0.0814 0.065*** 0.129 0.060***
(0.884) (3.184) (1.469) (2.984)
Controls YES YES YES YES
N 381 2,138 381 2,138
R
2
0.116 0.128 0.196 0.154
5 CONCLUSION
This article selects 709 listed A-share companies on
the small and medium board from 2014 to 2018 as the
research objects, and studies the impact of media
reports on the cost of corporate debt financing, from
the relationship between media coverage and debt
financing costs, and media reports under different
keynotes. The relationship between debt financing
costs and the impact of property rights on the
relationship between media reports and debt
financing costs have been studied.
The research conclusions of this article are as
follows: (1) Media reports on companies can help
alleviate the problem of information asymmetry
between borrowers and lenders, improve information
transparency, thereby alleviating debt financing
constraints faced by companies, that is, as the amount
of media reports increase, companies’ debt financing
costs can be significantly reduced. (2) Non-negative
media reports can send a positive signal to the market,
and can establish a good reputation, which can
alleviate and reduce the debt financing costs of
enterprises; while negative media send a bad signal to
the market, help creditors understand the business
risks of enterprises, and help creditors know the
moral hazard they face through reputation
mechanisms, so creditors will demand higher
premiums to compensate for the risks. (3) Whether it
is a state-owned enterprise or a private enterprise,
non-negative media reports have a negative impact on
debt financing costs. Among state-owned enterprises,
non-negative media reports have a greater negative
impact on debt financing costs than private
enterprises. (4) In state-owned enterprises or private
enterprises, the impact of negative media reports on
debt financing costs is not very different.
At the same time, this study provides important
decision-making references for our government,
enterprises and other social groups, including the
following points: (1) Listed companies should
strengthen communication with the media, strengthen
the supervision of distorted media reports, and avoid
news reports negative impact on the company. (2)
Listed companies should use the supervision function
of the media and the role of corporate governance to
encourage companies to establish a good reputation,
improve corporate governance, improve
management,
strive to reduce operating risks, and make reasonable
and effective investment management decisions. (3)
Banks and other financial institutions should
comprehensively consider the impact of media
coverage when issuing loans to enterprises. Actively
communicate with the media in order to obtain
Media Coverage to Panel Data Analysis on the Impact of Listed Companies’ Debt Financing Costs
115
information related to the loan applicant in a timely
manner, save the collection of information, and avoid
misjudgments due to information asymmetry.
REFERENCES
Fang L., Peress J. (2009) Media Coverage and the Cross-
section of Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance,
64(05):2023-2052.
Luo J. H. (2012) The Impact of Media Reports on the Cost
of Equity and the cost of Debt and their Differences:
Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies.
Investment Research, 31(09): 95-112.
Wang J.T., Zhao L. (2010) An Empirical Analysis of the
Financing Constraints and Influencing Factors of
Listed Companies in my country. Industrial Economic
Research, (03):77-84.
Wu P., Lu S., Yang N. (2019) Research on the Role of
Media Coverage in Corporate Governance from the
Perspective of Financial Fraud. Journal of Central
University of Finance and Economics, (03): 51-69.
Yang W., Kong D.M. (2017) Media Coverage and
Corporate Socially Responsible Investment: Evidence
Based on the Consumer Goods Industry. Investment
Research, 36(09): 16-33.
BDEDM 2022 - The International Conference on Big Data Economy and Digital Management
116