Using Big Data Analytics to Combat Retail Fraud
Danni Zhang
1
, Steffen Bayer
1
, Gary Willis
2
, Gina Frei
1
, Enrico Gerding
2
and PK Senyo
1
1
Southampton Business School, University of Southampton, Southampton, U.K.
2
Electronics & Computer Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, U.K.
Keywords: Fraudulent Returns, Simulation, Returns Policy, Fraud Interventions, Retail Strategic Management.
Abstract: Fraudulent returns are seen as a misfortune for most retailers because it reduces sales and induce greater costs
and challenges in returns management. While extant research suggests one of the causes is retailers’ liberal
return policies and that retailers should restrict their policies, there is no study systematically exploring the
impacts of various return policies and fraud interventions on reducing different types of fraudulent behaviour
and the costs and benefits of associated interventions. In this paper, we first undertook semi-structured
interviews with retailers in the UK and North America to gain insights into their fraud intervention strategies,
as well as conducted literature review on fraudulent returns to identify the influential factors that lead
customers to return products fraudulently. On this basis, we developed a simulation model to help retailers
forecast fraudulent returns and explore how different combinations of interventions might affect the cases of
fraudulent returns and associated financial impacts on profitability. The background literature on fraudulent
returns, the findings of interviews, and the demonstration and implications of the model on reducing
fraudulent returns and related financial impacts are discussed. Our model allows retailers to make cost-
effective evaluations and adopt their fraud prevention strategies effectively based on their business models.
1 INTRODUCTION
Retailers collect a vast amount of data on the channels
shoppers use to buy their goods. This results in a
‘lake’ of big data leading to some powerful analysis
on shopper behaviour. Retail businesses aim to give
their customers a good experience when shopping.
Part of this experience is to make it easy to return
goods, referred to as frictionless returns and then
increase sales. However, there are dishonest
customers who will exploit lenient return policies to
obtain money or use of goods illegally through
fraudulent returns, at little or no cost to themselves
(Harris, 2010; Speights & Hilinski, 2005; King,
Dennis, & McHendry, 2007). Unfortunately,
fraudulent returns could erase a retailer’s 10%-20%
profit margin (King, 2004). A survey conducted by
the National Retail Federation in 2008 suggested that
around 5.4% of merchandise loss is due to return
abuse.
Many retailers have seen an extreme growth in
their online business since the beginning of the
pandemic. However, Covid-19 may aggravate the
problem of high genuine and fraudulent returns,
which have been increasing over the last few years
(Jack, Frei, & Krzyzaniak, 2019; Smriti, 2018).
Specifically, many non-essential retailers have to
change the way they manage their returns and
refunds, which leads to less scrutiny and increases
fraudulent returns over time. For example, most
retailers extending their returns periods resulted in
more dishonest customers returning a product long
after extracting most of the product's market value.
Retailers also try to reduce the time customers spend
in-store by introducing drop-boxes and accepting
returns at sister-brand stores, resulting in less
inspection. Additionally, returned products need to be
quarantined that retailers are unable to inspect the
returns before refunding. Moreover, a surge of
product returns arrived when non-essential retailers
reopened; however, retailers lack the staff to
thoroughly sort and check all returns. Therefore,
problem behaviours that are costly in normal periods
(e.g., fraudulent refunds, serial returners) have
become worse in this pandemic period. The
LexisNexis (2020) study confirms this and shows a
considerable increase in fraudulent returns.
The effects of these changes on fraudulent rates
are currently unknown and need investigation. To
survive this crisis, besides needing to get a handle on
returns rates, retailers must be robust when faced with
non-genuine customers who want to abuse the
system. In order to plan their returns strategies, it is
Zhang, D., Bayer, S., Willis, G., Frei, G., Gerding, E. and Senyo, P.
Using Big Data Analytics to Combat Retail Fraud.
DOI: 10.5220/0011042600003206
In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Finance, Economics, Management and IT Business (FEMIB 2022), pages 85-92
ISBN: 978-989-758-567-8; ISSN: 2184-5891
Copyright
c
2022 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved
85
important to be able to predict the fraudulent rates
expected under varying conditions. Much research
associated with fraudulent returns focuses on
exploring fraudsters' motivations via surveys or
interviews methods, or identifying fraudsters’
returning patterns by analysing returns data (e.g.,
Urbanke, Kranz, & Kolbe, 2015; King & Dennis,
2006). Building a comprehensive customer profiling
model for distinguishing and identifying abusive
customers can be costly and time-consuming.
Therefore, the aim of this research is to use the big
data collected to develop a model that helps retailers
understand the effects of their return policies and
intervention in reducing fraudulent returns.
This position paper first presents the background
literature on fraudulent returns and some of the
measures that are taken to mitigate fraudulent returns.
Then we present our model used to help merchants
forecast the fraudulent returns and see how the
measures might affect the cases of fraudulent returns.
2 RELATED WORK
Modelling has been at the centre of forecasting
returns (Drechsler and Lasch 2016; Potdar and
Rogers 2012). Machine learning (Smriti 2018; Cui,
Rajagopalan, & Ward, 2020) and AI (Urbanke,
Kranz, & Kolbe, 2015) has been used to forecast
returns volumes from fashion online sales in order to
develop returns strategies, identifying consumption
patterns associated with a high return rate. Zhu et al
(2018) used historical data to address the much-
criticised ‘one size fits all’ approach to differentiate
the service approach, predict returns and derive
strategical implications for retailers. Ketzenberg et al
(2020) utilised an extensive data set with over 75
million transactions from a US retailer and identified
the characteristics of abusive returners.
However, this body of work is based on relatively
stable behaviour patterns to predict aggregate return
volumes or individual level return probabilities. In the
current, rapidly changing situation due to the
pandemic, the usefulness of such approaches is
limited: understanding patterns in past purchase data
is not enough to create robust strategies to deal with
the very significant uncertainty of the present and the
future. There are limited studies that have explored
the types of interventions that retailers can take to
reduce fraudulent return rates. The effects of
interventions remain under-researched in simulation
and modelling based analysis.
2.1 Fraud Triangle
The fraud triangle framework developed by Donald
Cressey and W. Steve Albrecht has been widely used
to explain why people violate trust and commit fraud
(Homer, 2020). The triangle suggests three elements,
namely pressure, opportunity, and rationalisation,
that are the motivations for fraudsters to commit the
crime (Cressey, 1973).
The reason for committing fraud varies, but it
often comes from financial pressure. Specific to
fraudulent returns, Wachter et al (2012) suggested
that a combination of product’s high prices and
fraudsters’ low income resulted in them utilising the
lenient returns policy to gain benefits (e.g., returning
used products). Additionally, the financial shortage
caused by the pandemic crisis may lead more
dishonest customers to consider generating financial
benefits by making a fraudulent refund, for example,
returning an empty box for a full refund.
Organisations with inadequate internal controls,
procedures and processes, or physical safeguards can
create an opportunity for fraud to be committed and
concealed (Counter Fraud Services, 2016; DeltaNet,
2021). Some employees do the return transaction for
their family members illegitimately or even do a
refund to their personal account without any
purchases. A recent review paper suggests that
opportunity is the most important factor for
explaining fraudulent behaviour in contrast to other
elements (Homer, 2020). People with antisocial
tendencies tend to believe, if someone is scammed it
is their own fault (Sarah, 2019). Piron and Young
(2000) found that recidivists blame the loss caused by
wardrobing (represents the situation that customer
legitimately buying an item for a specific occasion
with the intention of returning it after use) is retailers’
fault, and some of them manifested their surprise at
how easy it to return the used products.
2.2 Theory of Planned Behaviour
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB; Ajzen,
1991) was developed from the Theory of Reasoned
Action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1973) is also implemented
on examining the fraudulent behaviour (non-financial
generate purpose). In the TPB framework, there are
three psychological variables, namely attitudes,
subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control,
that all together lead to the formation of a
‘behavioural intention’ which in turn influence the
behaviour (Ajzen, 2002).
FEMIB 2022 - 4th International Conference on Finance, Economics, Management and IT Business
86
King et al. (2008) is the first study that applied the
TPB to analyse consumers’ dishonest returning
behaviour via a self-administered questionnaire with
535 female consumers. Their results justified that if a
person believes that dishonest returning will be an
easy or pleasant experience, they are more likely to
do it. King and Dennis (2006) is a follow-up study
that conducted in-depth interviews with dishonest
returners. Their results suggest that returners’ prior
returning experience is linked to their proclivity of
fraudulent returning in the future. According to
Johnson and Rhee (2008), if the return procedure is
complicated or there is a cost attached to returning or
getting a refund may be difficult, it reduces
opportunistic return behaviour, and the customer may
decide against return. In the retails, there are a number
of techniques fraudsters use to commit theft through
product returns (Speights and Hilinski, 2005). Some
of the most common types are:
Wardrobing or Renting: Here the shoppers buy
an item (e.g., clothing or a digital camera) with the
intention of using it for an event then returning it
after the event.
Price Arbitrage (online frauds): Here the
shoppers (1) replace the cheaper item/counterfeit
in the expensive item’s packaging and return it for
a full refund, or (2) purchase a new item, then
return an older or non-working version of the
same item, using the packaging from the newer
merchandise for a refund.
Payment Fraud: offenders purchase items with
an illegitimate credit/debit card or with one
backed by insufficient funds and then return the
merchandise before the card clears by the bank.
Insider Fraud: Offenders receive assistance from
employees to return stolen goods, or employees
return the stolen goods for their own benefits.
Returning Stolen Merchandise (in-store frauds):
Returning shoplifted items: individuals or gangs
shoplift goods in-store and then “return” the
item without a receipt for a refund or store
credit.
Receipt Switching: offender makes a genuine
purchase, leaves the store with the item and
receipt, then re-enters later (or goes to another
store but the same company), and picks up an
identical item. Then using the receipt, the
individual claim a refund on the item they have
just picked. The fraudster has in effect received
the first item for free.
Receipt Fraud: offender with a receipt obtained
from somebody else (or the sites selling fake
receipts either digital or physical) goes to shop
to return the stolen item for a refund.
The above findings and discussions indicate that
it is important to reduce the opportunity to initiate a
fraudulent or abusive return at the first purchase stage
and explore how different return policies and
interventions will affect the fraudulent rates.
3 INTERVENTION TO LIMIT
FRAUDULENT BEHAVIOUR
In this section, we discuss the interventions to reduce
fraudulent behaviour, which is based on our
interviews with retailers. The interventions aim to
remove the fraudulent opportunities at customers’
purchase and returns stages.
The interviewed retailers were drawn from the
Efficient Consumer Response (ECR) Retail Loss
Group. This is a community in which retailers discuss
issues they are facing. The interviewed organisations
were selected purposively that retail a wide range of
products, including groceries, clothing and general
merchandise products such as home entertainment
and small electrical goods. We asked the interviewees
to answer our questions regarding non-food products.
They are major players in the market, with the
number of stores ranging from 150 to 750 in the year
2021. Therefore, they all have significant impacts on
society and the economy. Having conversations with
these organisations’ loss prevention managers allows
us to develop various practical interventions in the
fraudulent prediction model (Section 4). The
interview duration was between 90 and 120 minutes.
As with security generally, retailers are willing to
discuss with researchers on fraud prevention methods
but not will have their name associated with a
particular method.
First, having a generous returns policy not only
make it easy for fraudsters to return but also to obtain
a refund illegally. A ‘no quibble’ policy gives the
feeling of trying it out first, but it can make it easy for
the fraudsters to steal items and money unless there
are some checks being done by the retailer. Common
generous policies include giving customers a refund
in cash or a gift card even if they do not have a receipt,
extending the returns period, no return costs (e.g., free
to return to stores or provide a pre-paid return label).
Much of the work has highlighted that generous
return policy is the critical driver of fraudulent returns
(e.g., Harris, 2010; Speights & Hilinski, 2005; Tyagi
& Dhingra, 2021). For example, in one organisation,
we were told:
Using Big Data Analytics to Combat Retail Fraud
87
We have a quibble policy up to £40 pounds. If
anyone comes to our store wanna a refund of the £40,
we don't ask them why. If something that a shoplifter
brings for a return and refund, we wouldn’t have
questioned it. However, we should’ (Loss prevention
manager A, Company A)
While our customers come in and will not have a
receipt and we will still refund it, we shouldn't, but
that still happens, unfortunately.’ (In-store Loss
prevention manager, Company B)
The type of intervention that retailers suggested
have been shown to make it more difficult for
fraudsters include:
Setting a shorter return period.
Increasing the deployment of CCTVs & guards
in-stores.
Online, customers need to contact Customer
Services to arrange a return and fill out forms
before sending them back, as opposed to where a
return label is already included.
Providing clear communication of return policies:
no receipt, no refund (exchange possible), if the
serial number did not match, no refund (if
appliable) and no swing tag, no return (exchange
possible).
Returning funds to the same payment method
only.
One manager commented that:
We spend now roughly £40 million a year on
guarding [in-store] when it was £20 million pre-
pandemic, which obviously reduces the likelihood of
having a theft, but also significantly reduces the
likelihood of fraudulent returns. I suppose there's
theoretically more visibility over shoplifters and
fraudsters…the feedback is the visual deterrent. We
have workshops with ex-offenders, so, we have a team
that asking them[offender], how would you steal and
fraud, and what would put you off? And they
[offenders] all said that having a visible and clearly
looking guard is the biggest deterrent.’ (Loss
prevention manager B, Company A)
Second, other organisational processes aid the
fraudsters. These are poor returns management, poor
cyber security, a universal product code for the same
category’s products, weak supervision in the
workplace regarding returns and refund processes,
and lack of sufficient training to spot fraudulent
returns. Based on the discussion with retailers, a
number of interventions have been shown to improve
organismal procedures.
In-store, all returns have to be handled by the
Customer services (well-trained staff and
supervision).
Employees cannot refund their own purchased
products without the presence of a manager.
Managers should take turns to supervise refunds.
Using Address Verification Service to ensure the
cardholder has provided the correct billing
address associated with the account.
Using 3-D Secure service, Payment services
(PSD 2).
Using new technology: Radio frequency
identification (FRID).
Reporting fraudulent retunes behaviour (e.g.,
using fake products/cards) to the police for
investigation.
For example,
We also go down the civil recovery route in terms
of bricks and mortar fraud, even going to bailiffs. So,
we're really aggressive with that, so we give ourselves
a reputation with the bad people, not to bother with
us because we will hunt you down. We do see the
immediate effect of reducing the fraud returns.
(Fraud prevention manager A, Company C)
‘…now, we’ve got a policy in place where all
refund of £9 and above needs to be signed for by a
senior manager. So, they need to basically see the
product, see the receipts to make sure it's been
refunded appropriately. So, we don't get colleges
refunding themselves for products fraudulently,
which we had been in the past…We have got that
policy that reduces the probability of inside fraud.’
(Loss prevention manager B, Company A)
Third, good use and analysis of the retail data
generated can reduce fraud. Data analysis can flag
serial/repeat offenders, leaving the customer service
team free to deal with cases without suspicion.
Data analytics can be used to:
Identifying serial offenders and blocking them.
Reporting on the categorisation of frauds that
result in financial and non-financial loss.
One manager highlighted that:
‘… now we're doing everything with machine
learning and getting all this fraud data into an online
screening tool. We're actually seeing that we're not
getting attacked as much now, because we're
identifying these people every week and putting new
data in. So, our database of customers that have
committed fraud with us is really big. We've got about
4,000 customers out of 20 million. And as we go, we'll
build that up. So even though they're not unique
customers, we're able to look at people that are linked
to them by a delivery address, an email etc.
Something like that, we can start really analysing
who's targeting us and manage that risk.’ (Profit
Erosion and Data Mining Manager, Company D)
FEMIB 2022 - 4th International Conference on Finance, Economics, Management and IT Business
88
4 MODELLING
The aim of our modelling was to create a tool for
retailers to evaluate the impact of different policies on
fraud. A retailer could use this model to choose cost-
effective strategies and explore complementarities
between measures targeted to reduce genuine returns
and fraudulent returns. In our approach, we
summarise different fraud types and then apply which
policies would impact fraudulent returns over time.
First, we consider six stringencies of fraud
controls that are only targeted at reducing fraud.
These targeted controls include:
1. Unique barcode for each product.
2. Radio frequency identification (RFID).
3. Limited payment methods & Stronger security of
online payment.
4. Sending warning messages.
5. Increased inspection at stores (e.g., increasing the
deployment of CCTVs & guards).
6. Stricter supervision on the returns process.
Second, we consider seven return policies that
impact return volumes as well as fraud attempts.
7. Setting a shorter the return period.
8. Requiring original receipts.
9. Requiring more return efforts for online returns
(e.g., account registration, contact customer
services for online returns).
10. Items can only be returned with tags still attached.
11. No Pre-paid return label for online returns (i.e.,
customers either pay the shipping fee or contact
the retailers first).
12. All returns have to be handled by the Customer
services.
13. Returning funds to the same payment method
only.
These policies and controls are drawn from
interviews and literature review, which have been
implemented or are considered by retailers. The
model allows employing these policies alone or in
combination with others. In this way, we can assess
any complementarity between measures.
The model (see Figure 1 for the relationship on
which the calculations are based) then predicts the
number of fraud attempts and successful frauds as
well as the number of returns under different
Figure 1: The demonstration of the model for the relationship on which the calculations are based.
Using Big Data Analytics to Combat Retail Fraud
89
Table 1a: Fraud attempts over two 24 months depending on policies adopted.
Cumulative fraud
attempts by type
Ward-
robing
Price
Arbitrage
Payment
Fraud
Returning
shoplifted items
Receipt
Switching
Receipt
Fraud
Insider
fraud
Baseline 1243 1243 1243 1243 1243 1243 1243
Stricter Fraud Controls
343 244 301 283 356 844 419
Stringent Return Policies
63 80 238 281 447 854 894
All Interventions 18 16 58 64 128 580 301
Table 1b: Successful fraud over two 24 months depending on policies adopted.
Cumulative successful
frauds b
y
t
yp
e
Ward-
robin
g
Price
Arbitra
g
e
Payment
Fraud
Returning
sho
p
lifted items
Receipt
Switchin
g
Receipt
Fraud
Insider
fraud
Baseline 621 621 621 621 621 621 621
Stricter Fraud Controls 127 8 103 106 141 418 61
Stringent Return Policies 23 29 65 131 204 415 264
All Interventions 5 0 11 22 46 279 26
combinations of these 13 interventions over a two-
year time horizon distinguishing seven different types
of fraud. The fraud types are: wardrobing, price
arbitrage, returning shoplifted items, receipt
switching, receipt fraud, payment fraud, insider fraud.
In addition, the model allows users to assess the
financial impact of fraud as well as other key
performance indicators.
Table 2: Financial outcomes over two 24 months depending
on policies adopted.
Cumulative cost of all
p
olicies (£)
Baseline 0
Stricter Fraud Controls 86896
Strin
g
ent Return Policies 28171
All Interventions 110901
Cumulative cost of returns (£)
Baseline 319632
Stricter Fraud Controls 197063
Strin
g
ent Return Policies 174781
All Interventions 139616
Cumulative sales value (£)
Baseline 3863440
Stricter Fraud Controls 3278380
Strin
g
ent Return Policies 3011640
All Interventions 2843790
Total cost of successful fraud (£)
Baseline 328896
Stricter Fraud Controls 80720
Stringent Return Policies 93559
All Interventions 36720
As we have not yet have been able to apply our
model to retailers’ data, our results are illustrative and
indicative, we based this information on our
interviews with retailers. Tables 1a and 1b show the
impact of different combinations of policies on fraud
attempts and successful frauds over two years. For
illustration purposes, we assumed fraud attempts are
equally divided between fraud types, and all fraud
types have the same success rate. Table 2 shows
financial outcomes over two years depending on the
combination of policies adopted.
Figure 2 shows the number of successful frauds
under different scenarios, and Figure 3 demonstrates
the profit comparison under different scenarios. By
comparing scenarios, we can see how the introduction
of more stringent return policies will reduce sales,
partly by discouraging honest shoppers. Additionally,
we assume a reduction on stricter fraud detection in
fraud attempts as awareness of our policies will
spread.
Figure 2: Successful frauds under different scenarios.
The combined impact of policies can be surprising: in
our illustrative example (see Figure 2 and Figure 3),
we see that while the introduction of all policies
combined reduces fraud the most, it is not the most
profitable. Under the current assumptions of cost and
impact of the interventions, just focusing on stringent
return policies is more profitable than a combination
of all policies with a focus on fraud detection alone
FEMIB 2022 - 4th International Conference on Finance, Economics, Management and IT Business
90
being the second-best choice. These results could be
the starting point to discussion among stakeholders
across different departments in an organisation tasked
with meeting sometimes competing objectives such
as increasing sales or reducing fraud. The model and
the simulation results could guide further data
gathering and the development of strategies based on
a more holistic understanding.
Figure 3: Profit comparison under different scenarios.
5 CONCLUSION
Evidence shows that fraudulent returns cause great
losses for retailers. Retailers try to be robust by
implementing or planning various strategies to
enhance customer experience and mitigate the
probability of fraudulent returns. However, extant
returns and fraudulent research tend to focus on the
prediction of returns rates but not the rates after
changing certain policies and/or implementing new
interventions. Furthermore, managers need to know
the financial impacts of their strategies for reducing
fraudulent returns. In response, the model we
proposed in this paper demonstrates the impacts of
interventions on fraudulent rates and associated costs,
as well as other financial indicators (e.g., the potential
negative impact on sales value). The model takes
costs and profitability into account as they are key
factors for retailers when making strategic decisions.
This model has significant implications. First, it
promotes conversation between the loss-prevention
department and other stakeholders within the
company so that strategic approaches are aligned
(e.g., not incentivising fraudulent sales). Second, it
assists retailers to make effective judgements
regarding the dilemma of balancing amongst return
policies, costs and profits in retail businesses. Third,
the model offers insights for other research domains,
such as marketing management, and strategic
management, as well as practitioners. As the model
indicated, implementing stringent return policies is
likely to reduce sales values; therefore it is crucial to
balance sales and reduce fraudulent returns. Retailers
can use the model as a scenario-based analysis tool
that evaluates the impacts of different scenarios (i.e.,
different combinations of interventions). Our next
stage is to establish a greater degree of accuracy by
offering our model to retailers and applying real-
world data. We believe that this model provides a
solid foundation for further research and
development.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research is funded by the Economics and Social
Research Council (ESRC), as part of UK Research
and Innovation’s rapid response to Covid-19.
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