illegal financial activities such as money laundering. 
This corresponds to approximately EUR 160 billion 
(Premti et al, 2020) Moreover, the identification and 
investigation  of  transnational crimes  is  complicated 
by  the  lack  of  proper  interaction  between  the 
authorities  of  national  states,  their  evasion  from 
providing legal assistance to other countries (FATF, 
2020
). 
A negative phenomenon can also be the fact that 
banks  and  credit  organizations  often  report  the 
implementation of suspicious transactions long after 
they were performed (Truntsevsky, 2011). Shortfalls 
in  the  banking  sector  regulation are  revealed  in  the 
course  of  international  studies  of  mass  money 
laundering  with  the  participation  of  large 
international  banks.  For  example,  the  ICIJ  report 
(International  Consortium  of  Investigative 
Journalists) states that only for the period from 1999 
to 2017, the internal control employees of  financial 
institutions  identified  suspicious  transactions  that 
showed signs of possible money laundering or other 
criminal  activity  totaling  over  USD  2  trillion, 
including USD 514 billion at JPMorgan and USD 1.3 
trillion  at  Deutsche  Bank  (ICIJ,  2020,  Schnauder, 
2020).  
Remarkably a transaction that is suspicious in 
terms  of  financial  transparency  is  not  necessarily 
evidence  of  criminal  behavior,  but  each  such 
transaction  deserves  attention  and  appropriate 
scrutiny  (Lord,  Wingerde  &  Campbell,  2018,  Xie, 
Reddy, Liang, 2017). In this regard, it seems logical 
to  develop  and  apply  legal  norms  that  allow  the 
competent authorities of OSA to temporarily restrict 
(prohibit)  the  financial  and  other  transactions  with 
monetary  funds  in  the  presence  of  reliable 
information  about  the  crime  commission,  in  cases 
where delay may lead to concealment proceeds from 
crime (96% of respondents agreed with the feasibility 
of this proposal). 
4  CONCLUSIONS 
Despite  the  importance  of  timely  response  to  the 
revealed facts of criminal activity and the expediency 
of blocking offense-related property, in truth, there is 
a  problem of the quick decision-making process on 
blocking funds and other property.  In  this  case,  the 
OSA  authorities  do  not  have  the  powers  to  block 
offense-related  property.  Accordingly,  if  there  is 
information  about  the  illegal  transactions  and 
financial transactions, a number of approvals shall be 
made  to  prevent  their  fulfillment,  to  prevent  the 
withdrawal of funds abroad. 
The  bank  accounts  blocking  shall  have  a  legal 
basis, and arbitrariness on  the part of employees of 
operational  units  shall  also  be  excluded.  It  seems 
appropriate  to  allow  the  competent  authorities  to 
temporarily restrict (prohibit) the financial and other 
transactions  with  monetary  funds  or  assets  at  the 
legislative level for a period of up to three days in the 
production of impatient postponements of the OSA. 
These norms should be applied in cases where delay 
may lead to the concealment of the proceeds of crime. 
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