Unconventional Attack against Voting Machines

Enlarging the Scope of Cybersecurity Risk Analysis

Eric Filiol

1,2 a

ENSIBS, Lab-STICC/IRIS, Vannes, France

Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

Keywords:

Social Terrorism, Precautionary Principle, Standards, State Regulation, Security Policies, Security Models.

Abstract:

Most modern democracies and states have adopted a large number of standards and norms to promote and

harmonize international trade. The precautionary principle has come to complete this regulatory arsenal es-

pecially in the ﬁeld of security of states and citizens, their health, their private life ... The aim is also to

protect government agencies against wrong decisions, especially when uncertain, immature technologies are

concerned. Social, political, institutional security and stability and now cybersecurity has become heavily

dependent on these new forms of regulation. In this article we will show how this regulation arsenal could be

exploited by cybercriminals. It is indeed possible through a broader vision of the notion of cyber attack to turn

these norms and standards and this precautionary principle precisely against those they are supposed to pro-

tect. Among many possible scenarios, we consider a speciﬁc one for illustration with respect to the attack of

voting machines. The main conclusion is that any (cyber)security risk analysis should now extend the mostly

favoured technical view to a more operational vision in which non technical aspects also be included.

1 INTRODUCTION

Citizens in modern countries want to be protected

against almost any kind of risks. On the other side,

decision-makers who want to be re-elected or who

fear the permanent risk of being prosecuted in case

of wrong decisions. On the other side, citizens have

strong demands for a life increasingly safer and more

secure.

This is particularly true when considering the

technology issues. Science and technical world make

too quick progress to take the time of questioning this

progress and its consequences on society and citizens’

life, health, freedom and civil rights, (cyber)security...

Recent cases throughout Europe and the USA have

made headlines.

As it is inconceivable to restrain and slow techno-

logical progress, the precautionary principle has been

adopted as a routine safeguard: when in doubt, (too)

drastic limits are taken. The problem with this princi-

ple is twofold:

• On a ﬁrst hand, there is nothing to prove/conﬁrm

that these limits are sufﬁcient. They are often set

by experts who have direct links with industry and

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5101-8073

with commercial interests.

• On the other hand, these limitations and their ex-

istence can be exploited by malicious people to

conduct attacks. In other words, measures taken

to protect the State and/or its citizens can back-

ﬁre. The cure might be sometimes worse than the

disease.

In this article we discuss and show through a sim-

ple scenario how the precautionary principle and the

norms/standards can be exploited and misused. It is

important to keep in mind that the term ”attack” must

be taken in the broadest sense: it is any action whose

outcome is likely to disturb public order, the stability

of a state, the health and/or the safety and security of

citizens ...(Qiao and Wang, 1999; Filiol, 2009).

We identiﬁed several instances of malicious ex-

ploitation of the precautionary principle, norms and

standards that can be very effective in an enlarged

view of what a cyber attack is or could be. In order not

to give ideas that could be used for bad purposes, we

present only one scenario in this paper to illustrate our

idea. This scenario lies on a detailed analysis of spe-

ciﬁc and real cases (a few being rather recent ones)

from which our study and operational approach is

based in which reasonable doubt and equally reason-

Filiol, E.

Unconventional Attack against Voting Machines Enlarging the Scope of Cybersecurity Risk Analysis.

DOI: 10.5220/0010417607630770

In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy (ICISSP 2021), pages 763-770

ISBN: 978-989-758-491-6

763

able suspicion cannot be completely ruled out. Rea-

sonable doubt is in a way the other side of the precau-

tionary principle.

If this particular case-study can be solved eas-

ily by suitable policy choices (forbidding the use of

voting machine), for many others it is unfortunately

not possible unless important changes are made in

society, in critical or industrial infrastructures, large

scale processes, large IT systems or whatsoever sim-

ilar. Additionally, decision-makers are even more re-

luctant to adopt strong measures without challenging

huge ﬁnancial interests.

As far as the security experts are concerned, this

shed a new light on the cybersecurity evaluation pro-

cess and (cyber)security risk analysis which can no

longer consider technical aspects only. Any attacker

may consider a broader view and environment to build

and drive his attack. In this respect turning the pre-

cautionary principle against the target can not only

weaken its security but also hinder its defence, reac-

tion and protection ability.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 ﬁrst

presents the deﬁnition of standards/norms and of the

precautionary principle. We focus on their intrin-

sic differences. Section 3 then addresses the partic-

ular case of cell telephony and voting machines, on

a technical basis. Section 4 then explains how an at-

tacker could exploit the norms in the ﬁeld of cell tele-

phony and the application of the precautionary prin-

ciple of voting machines. We then illustrate how to

mix those two (seemingly) different and uncorrelated

aspects with our scenario, to cause a major, political

crisis in a Western country. We will then conclude by

addressing the protection issues against that particular

risk.

2 STANDARDS, NORMS AND

THE PRECAUTIONARY

PRINCIPLE

First a technical standard is an established norm

or requirement about technical systems (Wikipedia,

2020c): “It is usually a formal document that es-

tablishes uniform engineering or technical criteria,

methods, processes and practices. In contrast, a cus-

tom, convention, company product, corporate stan-

dard, etc. which becomes generally accepted and

dominant is often called a de facto standard [...] The

standardization process may be by edict or may in-

volve the formal consensus of technical experts.” So

norms and standards do not imply security or safety

issues but are just way to make industry speak the

same voice. But since all people are working on the

same (technical) basis, it is then possible

• to know how they work, think and develop,

• to determine what they use (on the customer’s

side),

• to design a powerful attack that has the maximum

impact.

The most widely known case relates to operating sys-

tems. Microsoft Windows has de facto become some

sort of norms so does recently Apple or Google (Jen-

nings R., 2020). This is the reason why most of the

attacks are targeting Windows systems. The analysis

of the Stuxnet worm has shown that the wide use of

Siemens’ Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) in

industry may have facilitated an attack against a large

number of industrial systems (and not only against

Iranian nuclear facilities as claimed by a large num-

ber of “experts”). The hypothesis according to which

Stuxnet attack was a targeted one only, does not hold

since it relies on a widely used system. The Stuxnet

attack is likely to be a speciﬁc instance of a larger

series of attacks. The rogue exploitation of stan-

dards/norms has been treated extensively in the liter-

ature so we will not address this case.

As for the precautionary principle is concerned,

we will use the following deﬁnition (Wikipedia,

2020a): “The precautionary principle states that if

an action or policy has a suspected risk of causing

harm to the public or to the environment, in the ab-

sence of scientiﬁc consensus that the action or policy

is harmful, the burden of proof that it is not harm-

ful falls on those taking the action [...] This princi-

ple allows policy makers to make discretionary de-

cisions in situations where there is the possibility of

harm from taking a particular course or making a

certain decision when extensive scientiﬁc knowledge

on the matter is lacking. The principle implies that

there is a social responsibility to protect the public

from exposure to harm, when scientiﬁc investigation

has found a plausible risk. These protections can

be relaxed only if further scientiﬁc ﬁndings emerge

that provide sound evidence that no harm will re-

sult.” In some legal systems, as in the law of the

European Union, the application of the precautionary

principle has been made a statutory requirement (Eu-

ropean Commission, 2000). Figure 1 illustrates the

complex decision diagram used to enforce the precau-

tionary principle. This diagram shows clearly that the

aim, this time, is to ﬁnd a balance between risks and

beneﬁts in an uncertain technological environment.

The precautionary principle is in fact the principle of

minimum risk, in a context of partial information due

to the limits of the scientiﬁc knowledge.

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764

Figure 1: Decision diagram of the Precautionary principle (source https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Precautionary

principle).

There are a lot of examples in which this princi-

ple is applied. One of the best example relate to the

effect of cell phone on users’ health. Consequently

to prevent any possible risk, a large number of lim-

its have been imposed: cell phone power emission,

antennas installation authorization, age of cell phone

users... Public health is also another ﬁeld where this

principle has been widely applied.

Surprisingly we observed that the limits imposed

because of the precautionary principle are different

according to the ﬁeld considered. This reﬂects the

multiplicity of actors involved, the interests involved

and the complexity of the context in which actors of

different nationalities can intervene (national actors,

supra-national actors...). This leads to inconsistencies

that an attacker can exploit as we shall see in the sce-

nario of Section 4.

3 LAWS OF PHYSICS, CELL

TELEPHONY AND VOTING

MACHINES

Before presenting our attack scenario, we need to re-

call a few technical facts in order to understand what

is at stake.

3.1 A (Very) Few Basics Regarding the

Physics of Electric Fields

In physics, electric ﬁeld denotes a ﬁeld created by

electrically charged particles. This ﬁeld is used to de-

termine at any point in space the electric force exerted

by these remote electric charges. In the case of ﬁxed

charges in our study, the electric ﬁeld is called the

electrostatic ﬁeld. More generally any device pow-

ered by electricity also produces an electric ﬁeld de-

noted E. This is a vector ﬁeld that at any point in

space combines a direction and a magnitude (ampli-

tude). The norm of this vector is expressed in volts per

meter (V/m). The scope of the electric ﬁeld is theo-

retically inﬁnite, their values at any point depending

Unconventional Attack against Voting Machines Enlarging the Scope of Cybersecurity Risk Analysis

765

on the charge distribution or the nature of the material

ﬁlling the space.

According to the law of superposition if we have

n charges q

located at points P

, producing an electric

ﬁeld E

, the total electric ﬁeld is additive (Feynman

et al., 2010):

E = E

+ E

...

Two charges (or devices) exert on the other an

electric ﬁeld which describes the interaction force be-

tween charges (or devices) point. Two charges repel

each other while two charges of opposite signs at-

tract each other proportionally to the product of their

charges and inversely proportional to the square of

their distance, the forces are of equal values and op-

posite directions, according to the principle of action

and reaction.

In fact, to be more precise, the ﬁelds do not add up

arithmetically. The resulting ﬁeld E

res

is equal to the

square root of the sum of the squares of the different

components, i.e.:

res

+ E

+ ...

There are continuous ﬁelds (AC ﬁelds) and alter-

nating ﬁelds (AF ﬁeld or E-Field). DC ﬁelds have

a ﬁxed direction and a constant (or nearly constant)

intensity over time (ﬁelds produced by a permanent

magnet or the earth’s magnetic ﬁeld). Conversely, the

strength of an alternating ﬁeld varies over time (ﬁelds

produced by the electrical grid or radio communica-

tion antennas for instance). Generally, variations in

ﬁeld intensity are repetitive with cycles of constant

duration; frequency (expressed in Hz) is the number

of times a cycle occurs in a second. The frequency

of the ﬁelds produced the GSM 900 and DCS 1800

mobile telephone networks is 900 and 1800 MHz re-

spectively (Pirard W., 2003).

3.2 Cell Phone Electric Fields

In the ﬁeld of mobile telephony, most of the norms

and standards were chosen so to satisfy (more or

less explicitly) one or more principles of precaution,

mainly to face to the controversy about the adverse

effects on human health.

Mobile phones are radio transmitters/receivers

that communicate with antennas. The frequen-

cies currently used are within the range of 900 or

1,800 MHz (GSM) and 2100MHz (UMTS) without

forgetting the 2,400 MHz range corresponding to Wi-

Fi and Bluetooth for wireless access to terminals or

using accessories communicating with mobile Blue-

tooth. Speciﬁcally, a GSM mobile always transmits

with high power while the transmission power of a

real 3G is usually much lower than that of GSM.

Note that power is often not (or poorly) controlled

via Wi-Fi and Bluetooth. It was therefore more likely

to be exposed during an internet connection via Wi-

Fi than 3G. Knowing that the frequency of Wi-Fi (2.4

GHz) has a reputation for being particularly harmful

it is strongly advised to avoid this type of connec-

tion! As for newer 4G (LTE) and 5G, they respec-

tively work at 2-8 GHz and 3-300 GHz.

Low frequencies such as 900 MHz are stronger

than the higher frequencies. They are more penetrat-

ing (pass more easily through walls) and are there-

fore less absorbed by the body through. The high fre-

quencies are less penetrating and therefore are more

absorbed by the body exposed. They generate more

energy. We must therefore reduce the power, which

explains that GSM is issued 2 times weaker in 1,800

than 900 MHz. The current of UMTS 2,100 MHz is

rather fragile (we realize this by observing the bars,

especially indoors). The 2,400 MHz used for Wi-Fi is

the frequency used by microwave (high absorption)!

Using a probe to measure the electric ﬁeld produced

by an HF phone allows an assessment of actual expo-

sure in real time (this varies widely) by measuring the

electric ﬁeld mode ridge preferably, within different

situations and mobile-probe distances.

GSM generate tens of V/m (sometimes more than

100V/m) in contact with the mobile and several V/m

in an area close (few meters). The level depends on

the mobile and the power regulation, but is still high in

GSM. Levels generated by the 3G (UMTS) are much

more variable depending on conditions (see Figure 2).

The measurements of electric ﬁelds emitted by

smart or cell phones can, according to the use, reach

several tens of m/V. Figures 3, 4 and 5 show this very

clearly (source (Electrosmog.info, 2010)).

As for the 4G (LTE), a number of studies have es-

tablished that the risk seems to be lower than for 2G

and 3G phones (M. Hietanen and V. Sibakov, 2007;

P. M. Mariappan and D. R. Raghavan and S.H.E. Ab-

del Aleem and A. F. Zobaa, 2016). According to

(Persia et al., 2018), the EMF risk with respect to 5G

seems possible. However there are still not enough

studies on the risk of interferences to assess the actual

level of risk.

3.3 Voting Machine and

Electromagnetic Security

Electronic voting is a system of automated voting us-

ing computer systems. Electronic voting means the

integration through the “electronic ballot box” (also

called “voting machine” in the French law) of meth-

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766

Figure 2: Example of measurements with a probe ED65 Cornet: two photos taken during a test with a 2G/3G mobile,

30cm probe, short network connection (consulting of the talking clock) successively in GSM (left) and UMTS (right). The

reception level is between 1 and 2 µW/m

). There is a maximum level in GSM high (16V/m) and an ineffective regulation.

As for 3G, the maximum level is much lower (0.3 V/m) and the control more responsive, without issuing full-power (source

(Electrosmog.info, 2010)).

Figure 3: Electric ﬁeld values for GSM and UMTS emis-

sions (source (Electrosmog.info, 2010)).

Figure 4: Electric ﬁeld (HF) in peak mode (smartphone)

(source (Electrosmog.info, 2010)).

ods to involve private companies in the voting system.

The main selling point used to promote these prod-

ucts based on the idea of accelerating the process of

the votes cast.

Despite a lot of discussions and passionate debates

about the security of such machines voting machines

are little by little invading the Western countries. As

Figure 5: Electric ﬁeld emitted by a Samsung Galaxy S (TV

on edge mode) (source (Electrosmog.info, 2010)).

an example, in France, more than 750 polling sta-

tions have been equipped in 2005. Among the clients

there were 45 cities including Le Havre, Brest, Lori-

ent, Mulhouse, Bourges, Nevers.... A number of these

cities are medium in size and represent, therefore,

a signiﬁcant percentage of voters. Thus, in France,

the use of voting machines in 82 cities (Zdnet, 2007)

more than 3,500 people could reach 5% of the elec-

torate (1.4 million voters), and thus play a signiﬁcant

role in the choice of France’s president. The main

supplier of voting machines is the Dutch company

Nedap (Gonggrijp, R. and Hengeveld, W.-J., 2007;

OSCE, 2007; France Elections, 2020; Wikipedia,

2020b). Nedap machines represent 80% of the in-

stalled base in France to cover 1.4 million voters.

A number of other Western countries are also using

electronic vote more and more. More recently, the

US President 2020 elections have conﬁrmed the ever-

growing use of voting machines with a signiﬁcant

number of suspected security issues (for instance the

case of Georgia (Gerstein J., 2020)).

Unconventional Attack against Voting Machines Enlarging the Scope of Cybersecurity Risk Analysis

767

We will not discuss the security issues regarding

the vote itself. We will just mention the fact that a

number of standards/norms have been ﬁxed, most of

them being chosen primarily to enforce the precau-

tionary principle and stop critics against voting ma-

chines. To summarize, as soon as those limits and

constraints are not fulﬁlled, an appeal to the Consti-

tutional Council or other Court (in the USA (Ger-

stein J., 2020)) may be ﬁled to cancel the election.

Several cases are known in which local results have

been cancelled or voting machines have been forbid-

den (Reuters Staff, 2017; EDRi, 2007).

We will consider one of these limits. Whatever

the precautions taken, an electronic machine is sus-

ceptible to electromagnetic ﬁeld (EMC) and the im-

munity levels of these machines is 10V/m (US Elec-

tion Assistance Commission, 2018, page 31, require-

ment 4.1.2.10), (Wyle Laboratories, 2007, page 9,

section 6.2.4), (US Election Assistance Commission,

2015, Section 4.1.2.10). In all equipments, the precise

requirement is ”Vote scanning and counting equip-

ment for paper-based systems, and all DRE equip-

ment, shall be able to withstand an electromagnetic

ﬁeld of 10 V/m modulated by a 1 kHz 80% AM mod-

ulation over the frequency range of 80 MHz to 1000

MHz, without disruption of normal operation or loss

of data”.

It is worth stressing on the fact that these techni-

cal limitations and requirements are nearly the same

for medical equipments or critical equipments (Eu-

ropean Commission, 2014, section E.1.1 p. 156) or

(Zradzieski P. and Karpowicz J. and Gryz, K. and

Leszko, Z., 2018, page 798). It is even more im-

portant to mention that a number of critical incidents

have been reported over the years with respect to elec-

tromagnetic interferences on critical equipments (J.

Ely, 2005; A. Boyer, 2018; R. D. Leach and M. B.

Alexander and G. C., 995 ; The Independent, 2007).

This is the reason why a number of political instances

have enforced the precautionary principles to mitigate

these risks as much as possible.

As a consequence, beyond these limits, votes

could be considered as non reliable because of elec-

tromagnetic pollution or intentional generation of

electromagnetic/electrostatic ﬁelds in the close envi-

ronment of voting machines in use.

4 ATTACK SCENARIO: CAUSING

A NATIONAL POLITICAL

SECURITY CRISIS

Now that the technical context is set up we will see

how an attacker can exploit this, through a ﬁctitious

but realistic attack scenario (inspired by real cases-

studies).

4.1 The Tactical Theme

The WHITE country is on the eve of electing its presi-

dent. According to surveys, the second round of elec-

tions will be very tight: the candidate of the ruling

party is credited with 49 % while that of the opposi-

tion can expect 51 %. The WHITE country – which

belongs to the Group of Eight G8 - is facing an eco-

nomic and political crisis for several months. Its lead-

ership in the world is threatened. International rating

agencies, according to recurrent rumours, are thinking

for several months to lower WHITE country’s rating

from AAA to AA +, AA or even AA-. If this were the

case, it would cause major instability mainland and

undermine the global ﬁnancial balances worldwide.

The WHITE country is involved in the war in

GREEN country. Fundamentalist extremists in this

latter country accuse the WHITE country has to have

voting laws that go against the commandments of

their religious faith. The WHITE country has adopted

voting machines in many cities, which affects approx-

imately 6% of voters.

4.2 The Course of Events

On May 6

, the second round of elections takes place.

Participation is massive. Polling stations are full. Af-

ter the election, the opposition candidate was elected

with 50.8 % of the vote. Within hours, the opposition

appealed to the Constitutional Council to overturn the

vote in 7 cities. This potentially affects 1.3 % of the

voters. The opposition claims of political manipula-

tion and fear an attempted constitutional uprising. It

follows a political crisis that will last a week. Many ri-

ots and street demonstrations as well large strikes are

held across the country. The WHITE country is sus-

pended to the decision of the Constitutional Council

to validate or invalidate the results of these cities.

On May 15

, the Constitutional Council decided

to cancel the votes of the seven cities. The reason

is that suspected attempts to sabotage on voting ma-

chines make these votes invalid. New elections must

be held. The opposition is convinced that it is an at-

tempt at political manipulation. The crisis becomes

more serious, the country is blocked strikes, violent

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768

riots. Supporters of the opposition leader try to oc-

cupy the National Assembly and block the presiden-

tial palace to protest against this cancellation. Inter-

national rating agencies lower the WHITE country’s

rating to AA. A major crisis has begun.

4.3 The Course of Events Analysis

Facts are in fact very simple are based on a legal but

malicious manipulation of the precautionary princi-

ple. Many groups of GREEN country supporters were

instructed to spend the whole day in polling centers

equipped with voting machines. They were also in-

structed to bring their 2G/3G smartphones and ac-

tively communicate with them.

At the same time, WHITE opposition leaders have

been warned anonymously that the opposition was

seeking to distort the functioning of voting machines

and it would be nice to make measurements of elec-

tric ﬁeld by a sworn person (bailiff) during the day. In

a climate of political tension and of distrust with re-

spect to voting machines, bailiffs equipped with sen-

sors have detected an average electric ﬁeld 4 times

higher than the standard allowed to validate the elec-

tronic ballot. The Constitutional Council had no other

choice, once entered, to proceed to the cancellation of

the vote concerned.

From a technical point of view, the continuous and

additive emission of a signiﬁcant number of electric

ﬁeld result in a global electric ﬁeld interaction that

exceed the limits imposed by the precautionary prin-

ciple.

5 CONCLUSION

This simple scenario may appear somehow artiﬁcial

not to say extravagant. In fact it is not. First it is in-

spired by real facts both related to voting machines

and to other ﬁelds where the precautionary principle

is (sometimes abusively) applied. Second, in this kind

of attacks the problem is not to determine whether

it had an actual effect requiring cancelling indeed

the vote. It just sufﬁces to pour the doubt into the

decision-makers and into the public opinion. Then

this poison makes its effect. This is precisely where

the insidious side of the precautionary principles.

The solution is not easy to take. It implies to

change our views on the pre-eminent role of the tech-

nology and the market over the minds and over citi-

zens. It is not only a technology issue but also a prob-

lem of political will.

This case above all shows that evaluating the se-

curity must go far beyond the pure technical aspects.

Any security risk analysis method should take non-

technical attacks into account. Manipulating minds

(as Psyops techniques usually do) may be as efﬁcient

as pure technical approach. Only the ﬁnal result mat-

ters.

Finally, as a consequence, we stress on the fact

that an excess of regulation is likely to hinder the se-

curity and stability of nation states. In this context,

it is not possible to have security/stability and free-

dom at the same time. The only solution seems to

come back to fewer regulations, to replace the human

component at the centre of a number of critical activ-

ities/domains and to limit the power and invasion of

technology in them.

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