Determinants of Indonesia’s Defense Technology Cooperation with

Turkey: A Decision Making Perspective

Luerdi and Hizra Marisa

Department of International Relations, Universitas Abdurrab, Jl. Riau Ujung No.73, Pekanbaru, Indonesia

Keywords:

Cooperation, Defense Technology, Domestic Politics, Military and Economic Capability, International

Context.

Abstract:

This paper aims to describe a number of determinants of Indonesia’s technology cooperation policy with

Turkey. That dominant literature on Indonesia’s defense relations with its traditional partners either in East

Asia or in Asia Paciﬁc while less scholars’ attention to such relation beyond the regions seems to exist is a gap

the paper intends to ﬁll. The research found that Indonesia’s defense ministry’s role as well as political support

from political parties at the parliament, state economic-military gap and the trend of emerging powers’ defense

self-sufﬁciency and self-reliance along with increased global arm trades were the signiﬁcant factors which

encouraged the state to agree on the cooperation ranging from joint development, production to potential sale

of armaments. The research applied the decision making theory developed by William D. Coplin providing

such determinants as domestic politics, state economic and military capability and international context. In

addition, the research made use of the qualitative approach with a descriptive analysis. The paper argues that

Indonesia has been pursuing its defense technology independence within last decade; therefore, it diversiﬁes

its defense relation beyond its traditional partners.

1 INTRODUCTION

The paper seeks to describe the determinants encour-

aging Indonesia to carry out the defense technology

cooperation with Turkey whose issue belongs to in-

ternational cooperation and defense studies. Defense

technology development, which is overwhelmingly

associated with defense industry, is such a strategic

agenda the states have taken into account including

Indonesia that they will step up their domestic defense

industry to meet, at least, a national deterrence func-

tion against any threat.

The Indonesian government has knowingly dealt

on a number of defense frameworks through de-

fense diplomacy with ten main partners namely the

United States, Australia, Malaysia, Russia, China,

France, Singapore, Netherland, India and South Ko-

rea, Syafwi as cited in (Laksmana, 2012). In addi-

tion to national deterrence capability, through which,

the state contributes to regional stability and security.

While the cooperation has taken shape in commonly

various military deals, for instance, joint military ex-

ercises, intelligent exchanges, joint patrols around

border areas and arms transfers, the meaningful de-

fense technology development deal is a relatively new

sort of policy taken by the Indonesian decision makers

only after 2012. The latter is based on a national con-

stitutional mandate that the state is seriously aware

with transfer technology instead of being an arma-

ments importer state.

A mutually advantageous scheme is the character-

istic of Indonesia’s defense industry development to

speed up the increase of defense technology acquisi-

tion as well as to control growing cost as the regards

national interest (Pertahanan, 2015). The scheme is

mainly aimed at reducing Indonesia’s reliance on for-

eign military hardware supplies and is believed to

be a pathway towards national defense system self-

sufﬁciency. Such goals match the principle of Indone-

sia’s defense industry independence in order to obtain

strong, self-sufﬁcient and competitive defense indus-

try (Kemhan., 2018).

Indonesia and Turkey share characteristics as im-

portant regional actors affecting their region dynam-

ics respectively. As a middle power which has long

contributed to stability and security in Asia Paciﬁc,

Indonesia’s defense modernization and independence

are required to maintain strategic autonomy in pur-

suing regional diplomatic agendas (Gindarsah and

Priamarizki, 2015). On the other hand, in a addi-

440

Luerdi, . and Marisa, H.

Determinants of Indonesia’s Defense Technology Cooperation with Turkey: A Decision Making Perspective.

DOI: 10.5220/0009370304400445

In Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Social, Economy, Education and Humanity (ICoSEEH 2019) - Sustainable Development in Developing Country for Facing Industrial

Revolution 4.0, pages 440-445

ISBN: 978-989-758-464-0

tion to being a member of North Atlantic Organiza-

tion Treaty (NATO), Turkey is a new emerging power

gaining a reputation in pursuing its self-sufﬁciency

and self-reliance of domestic defense technology

(MacGillivray, 2019) and building defense industry

competitiveness with other states (BILGEN, 2010);

therefore, it is able to encounter threats targeting its

domestic and regional stability without or by little re-

lying on foreign military hardware (Ba

gcı and Kurc¸,

2017).

The defense technology cooperation started off

with Indonesia’s President Susilo Bambang Yudhoy-

ono’s ofﬁcial visit to Turkey and the signing of memo-

randum of understanding (MOU) in June 2010 which

was ratiﬁed four years later and formally codiﬁed in

the 2014 Republic of Indonesia’s Law Number 19

on the Ratiﬁcation of Defense Industry Cooperation

between the Republic Indonesia and the Republic of

Turkey.

Both sides agreed on defense technology devel-

opment overseeing joint research, production, mod-

ernization and potential sales, in addition to mutual

interests, security and integrity commitment explic-

itly stated in the law. Upon the parliament’s ap-

proval, the Indonesian government was capable of

commencing the concrete cooperation with Turkish

government. Regarding technical and operational

matters, both governments along with their respec-

tive ministries of defense and domestic defence ﬁrms

talked over a number of deals which were becom-

ing more intense shortly after Indonesia’s President

Joko Widodo’s visit to Turkey in 2017. The co-

operation covered a range of areas such as Kaplan

medium tanks, MALE unmanned aerial vehicles, mil-

itary communication equipment and 214-type sub-

marines.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The research applied the foreign policy decision mak-

ing theory in order to provide a description of driving

factors with which Indonesia considered its defense

technology cooperation with Turkey. The theoreti-

cal approach adheres to a basic assumption that any

international action is deﬁned in term of a series of

decisions taken by domestic political units and state

leaders either individuals or groups acting as main ac-

tors in a policy making process (Jensen, 1987). The

approach reveals a black box in which a state decision

making is processed and afterwards transformed into

a state behavior or action.

(Coplin and Marbun, 1992) suggests some impor-

tant determinants which enable to explain why a state

would prefer any foreign policy such as domestic pol-

itics, economic and military capability and interna-

tional context. The domestic politics, which refers

to domestic political actors also called policy inﬂu-

encers, is such a fundamental factor which inﬂuences

the state decision making. The policy inﬂuencers are

divided into four types:

• Bureaucratic inﬂuencers; individuals or institu-

tions in a state executive body who assist the deci-

sion makers in formulating and executing a state

policy;

• Partisan inﬂuencers; political parties within a state

legislature whose roles vary like bridging the gap

between public demands and executive policies,

either supporting and blocking a government’s

policy;

• Interest inﬂuencers, informal groups or organi-

zations which represent particular interests and

struggle to inﬂuence a government to either im-

pose or deny any policy in accordance with their

preferences; and

• Mass inﬂuencers, public opinions generated by

particular population and frequently considered

by the state decision makers while formulating a

foreign policy (Coplin and Marbun, 1992).

The state decision makers need to balance their

commitment to the state capability by considering

constraints driven by both economic and military situ-

ation (Coplin and Marbun, 1992). Both economy and

military, which have long been material powers and

mutually affected, are often associated to the state ge-

ographical elements from which it has a capability of

defending its security against potential threats coming

from both outside and within. While domestic devel-

opments do matter in the state foreign policy making,

the international environment, so-called international

context, complements during the process. The inter-

national context is a product of the past, present and

future behaviors preferred by all states which would

be anticipated by the state decision makers (Coplin

and Marbun, 1992).

The foreign policy decision makers are those who

encounter a particular situation and they have to con-

sider all determinants like domestic politics, eco-

nomic and military capability and international con-

text (Coplin and Marbun, 1992). Decision making is

basically such a rational problem solving that the de-

cision makers consider a number of existing alterna-

tives of options as well as of goals, and one of which is

taken as the best decision (Coplin and Marbun, 1992).

On the other hand, a foreign policy action is the im-

plementation of preferred option taken by the state de-

cision makers. During the decision making process,

Determinants of Indonesia’s Defense Technology Cooperation with Turkey: A Decision Making Perspective

441

national interests remain the utmost of foreign policy

goals which are actually the policy inﬂuencers’ repre-

sentation.

The paper argues that Indonesia’s defense min-

istry and political parties were the bureaucratic and

partisan inﬂuencer respectively whose roles inﬂu-

enced the decision making of such strategic pol-

icy. Such domestic determinants were bolded by In-

donesia’s economic-military gap along with interna-

tional environment; emerging powers’ ambition for

defense technology self-reliance and the rise of global

arms transfers. The Committee for Defense Indus-

try Policy (KKIP, Komite Kebijakan Industri Perta-

hanan) was responsible for all strategic decision mak-

ing regarding the national defense technology includ-

ing foreign cooperation. As the state legitimate in-

stitution, the committee viewed the all determinants

serving national interests namely defense and econ-

omy. The technical know-how or technology trans-

fer from Turkey was the main goal of cooperation

and with which the state would maintain a maxi-

mum deterrence capability against threats, boost do-

mestic defense industry to reach military hardware

independence and take advantage of economic prof-

its through arms exports. Therefore, the cooperation

scheme sought joint productions as well as potential

joint sales, instead of sole armaments purchases.

3 METHODS

The research applied the qualitative approach with a

descriptive analysis which only focused on the expla-

native unit; the factors (determinants) encouraging In-

donesia to conduct the defense technology coopera-

tion with Turkey. Due to a library research, it em-

ployed both online and ofﬂine resources ranging from

books, scientiﬁc journals, reports and other relevant

documents. The data were analysed through an an-

alytical inductive technique with which the universal

explanation on particular phenomenon was searched,

comprising some stages:

• Deﬁned a rough research question;

• Determined hypothetical explanation of the ques-

tion;

• Collected data and checked cases;

• Conﬁrmed the hypothesis provided that deviant

cases were not found;

• However, in case of deviance, either the hypothe-

sis ought to be reformulated and more data ought

to be collected to check the cases, or the hypothet-

ical explanation ought to be redeﬁned in order to

remove the deviant cases (Bryman and Burgess,

2002).

The technique emphasized the importance on con-

ﬁrming, reshaping hypothesis, and redeﬁning hypo-

thetical explanation during data collection process

and cases evaluation. Despite a conﬁrmation of the

cases during the research, collecting data remained

necessary in order to result in a strong hypothetical

explanation. The research eventually embraced the

hypothetical explanation ‘that Indonesia conducted

the defense technology cooperation with Turkey was

encouraged by both domestic and international envi-

ronment all of which were processed in a decision

making system.’

4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Based on the theoretical explanation previously elab-

orated, the cooperation between Indonesia and Turkey

was encouraged by a number of factors such as In-

donesia’s defense ministry’s role and the parties’ po-

litical support at the parliament, the gap between eco-

nomic and military capability and the trend of emerg-

ing powers’ preference for defense technology self-

sufﬁciency and self-reliance along with the rising

global arms transfers.

4.1 Defense Ministry’s Role and

Political Parties’ Support

The KKIP is a committee representing Indonesia’s

government in coordinating national policies, which

is responsible for planning, formulating, control-

ling, synchronizing and evaluating defense industry

to meet self-sufﬁcient military hardware (Kemhan.,

2018; KKIP, 2018). As a coordinator, the commit-

tee is mandated to coordinate the execution and con-

trol of national policies on defense industry including

cooperation with foreign states with the aim of ad-

vancing and promoting Indonesia’s defense industry

(Kemhan., 2018; KKIP, 2018).

The Indonesia’s defense ministry was viewed the

most inﬂuential actor in the committee acting as a sec-

ond chair whose position was only right below the

president, while other state ministries were subordi-

nated within its coordination. Such position helped

transfer its function such as planning, determining

and executing defense policies (Kemhan., 2018). In

the decision making process regarding the cooper-

ation with Turkey, the ministry practically ensured

that the two states’ relation contributed to domes-

tic arms availability and national defense technology

ICoSEEH 2019 - The Second International Conference on Social, Economy, Education, and Humanity

442

self-reliance in accordance with the defense ministry

and KKIP’s shared vision. It was demonstrated that

the ministry’s role molded the cooperation through

several ofﬁcial visits and talks about a variety of plans

and project agreements with its Turkey’s defense min-

istry counterpart.

So did the political parties making up the parlia-

ment particularly the Commission I (Komisi I DPR

RI) as the Indonesian government’s partner in for-

eign relation matters pay support for the cooperation.

After the MOU signatory, the commission delegates

conducted visit to Turkey and carried out a meeting

with Turkish stakeholders in order to gather informa-

tion in addition to watching Turkish domestic defense

industry development. The activities were initiated to

ease deliberations on a constitutional draft on the two

states’ cooperation among the parties’ fractions (Fal-

lis, 2013).

Now that all fractions of the Commission I could

agree on the cooperation draft by considering the goal

of national defense technology capacity, the delibera-

tion was brought to the parliament plenary session.

Looking on the 2012 Indonesia’s Law Number 16

on the defence industry prioritizing the empowerment

of domestic armaments and defense technology in-

dependence, all political parties’ representatives ap-

proved the cooperation draft to be the 2014 Indone-

sia’s Law Number 19. Such ratiﬁcation was a form of

the political support coming from political parties at

the Indonesia’s legislature so that the Indonesian gov-

ernment had a legal mandate executing the coopera-

tion which was one of the national strategic policies.

4.2 Economic-Military Gap

Indonesia is such a huge archipelagic state that it shall

require a sufﬁcient economic and military capabil-

ity to guarantee its sovereignty. However, the rela-

tion of economic and military capability, on the other

hand, created a vulnerability in maintaining a maxi-

mum state defense function.

The Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and

Security Affairs, L.B. Panjaitan (2016) once stated

that in spite of an annually rising trend, the amount

of military budget had never exceeded one percent

of the national GDP (the average was only 0.78 and

0.82 percent from a period of 2000 to 2004 and 2005

to 2014 respectively). Realizing the military budget

as much as 1.5 percent of the GDP as expected by

many Indonesian leaders seemed long way to go as

the amount would risk other public sectors. (Panjai-

tan, 2016).

Not only did the low ratio to GDP show, the mili-

tary expenditure composition was becoming a consid-

eration for decision makers. The military expenditure

had to be allocated not only for capital but also for

personnel and goods. In fact, the combined personnel

and goods expenditure dominated the whole expen-

diture compared to capital expenditure ideally used

for upgrading the military hardware. That the capi-

tal expenditure only reached IDR 12.8 trillion (2010),

17.7 trillion (2011), 27.9 trillion (2012), 42.2 trillion

(2013) and 30.4 trillion (2014) was by far lower than

the others if combined (Panjaitan, 2016). The insufﬁ-

cient budget for capital expenditure markedly slowed

up the state capability of meeting its minimum essen-

tial force (MEF) previously designed to build a deter-

rence strategy.

The situation was worsened by the state depen-

dence on arms supplies from the main defense part-

ners which absolutely cost its foreign policy and

sovereignty against foreign interventions when it

came to domestic problems. The arms embargo

which the United States once imposed and Australia’s

interventionist foreign policy in East Timor sepa-

ratism were fresh experiences for Indonesia (Laks-

mana, 2012). The other consequence of such depen-

dence was that Indonesia had 173 variants of defense

system transferred from 17 main supplier states which

caused both complexity of inter-operation readiness

and rising maintenance cost of worn out military hard-

ware (Sebastian and Gindarsah, 2013; Gindarsah and

Priamarizki, 2015). The situation was complicated

with less competitive domestic defense industry be-

cause of low human resources along with less re-

search and development programs related to defense

technology (Tippe, 2018).

Having realized the economic-military gap, the

state decision makers viewed that reducing depen-

dence on major powers by improving on domestic

production capability was a strategic policy rather

than importing the ready-used arms. The cooper-

ation in producing defense armaments with Turkey

could be one of the solutions to help meet some of

Indonesia’s domestic defense system. The two states

could share costs in producing medium tanks, drones,

submarines and other military hardware. More im-

portantly, Indonesia received the defense technology

transfer through the cooperation which envisioned the

future national defense technology independence.

Determinants of Indonesia’s Defense Technology Cooperation with Turkey: A Decision Making Perspective

443

4.3 Self-sufﬁciency and Self-reliance

Preference among Emerging Powers

and Increased Global Arms

Transfer

Indonesia was aware of that the emerging powers

had been pursuing their defense technology indepen-

dence through their domestic defense industry em-

powerment. The globalization of arms transfers post

Cold War provided opportunities for the states to meet

their military armaments either alone or through co-

operation with others which had more advanced de-

fense technology taking shape in many kinds such

as joint developments and productions, partnerships,

mergers and acquisitions and joint ventures (Kurc¸ and

Bitzinger, 2018). Not only could such interaction

keep a tight lid on cost among the states, it created ris-

ing arms trades in line with the export-oriented goal

of their defense industry. (Institute., 2019) reported

that there existed the global arms transfers not only

engaging major but also a number of middle powers.

As a middle as well as a regional power, Indone-

sia perceived an opportunity to narrow the existing

domestic defence weaknesses ranging from less de-

veloped defense technology acquisition, insufﬁcient

strategic military hardware to dependence on major

powers’ supplies. In addition, Indonesia looked on its

future armaments exports as a consequence of defense

globalization which it would possibly gained thank-

ing to the defense technology cooperation. Turkey

was viewed as a state with a respectable reputation

for its domestic defense technology development and

aggressive efforts to expand markets for its defense

industry products. During a period of 2013-2017,

Turkey ranked the 15th among top 25 global arms ex-

porters (Institute., 2019). With the collaboration, In-

donesia expected to meet some of its strategic arms

need, boost its domestic defense industry through

technology transfer and vary the market for its de-

fense industry.

5 CONCLUSION

The interaction between domestic and international

factors encouraged Indonesia to carry out the coop-

eration in defense technology with Turkey. For the

state foreign policy decision makers, interpreting the

situation and alternative options became a need to

bring about a strategic policy as an effort to pursuit

national interests. The defense technology cooper-

ation between Indonesia and Turkey was inﬂuenced

by Indonesian defense ministry and political supports

among political parties at the legislature, strength-

ened by the existing economic-military gap and the

emerging powers’ preference for defense technology

self-sufﬁciency and self-reliance along with the rising

global arms trades.

In Indonesia’s point of view, the two states’ coop-

eration would enable to step up its domestic defense

industry capacity inasmuch as with which technology

transfer entailed. The domestic defense technology

development would beneﬁt Indonesia in maintaining

its territorial integrity and sovereignty through deter-

rence capability betterment, upholding its foreign pol-

icy independence to contribute to the regional stability

and shifting to be a signiﬁcant player in global arma-

ments transfers in the future.

Turkey was one of the chosen partner states in re-

alizing such agenda since Indonesia dealt on similar

cooperation in Asia and other regions. The strate-

gic decision within the cooperation with Turkey was

limited to development and production of medium-

tanks, military communication tools, drones and sub-

marines, some of which are still ongoing. After all,

the cooperation policy indicates that Indonesia has

begun diversifying its foreign policy on international

defense cooperation especially in term of technology

transfer, no longer by only relying on traditional part-

ners. The two states’ relation could forward to strate-

gic bilateral partnership bearing in mind that Turkey

has been extending its foreign policy global role in-

cluding into Southeast Asia.

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