Robot in Health Care Services: Moral Judgment for the Existence of
Artificial Intelligence
Elsa Roselina
1
, Taufik Asmiyanto
2
1
Hospital Administration of Vocational Education Program, Universitas Indonesia, Kampus Baru UI Depok 16424,
Indonesia
2
Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia, Kampus Baru UI Depok 16424, Indonesia
Keywords: Health Care, Moral Agents, Information Ethics, The Centering Subject, Industry Revolution 4.0.
Abstract: This paper focusses on the usage of artificial intelligence in the health care services, from the perspectives of
ethical and humanitarian. In health care, the issue of using AI assistive technologies raises different
perspectives. First, the use of technology-assisted by artificial intelligence is predicted to replace human care.
Second, care assisted by AI technologies is not as good as social care. In other words, the issue is not about
replacement but replaceability. This research adopts the ontology of Floridian information based, which is
originated from ethical information theory. Using the hermeneutic phenomenology method, this study
performs a systematic literature review. The research findings showed that the artificial agents in health care
cause the reduction of the human position that creates social nervousness as a knowing subject. Based on
this study, ethical regulation is required on artificial agent construction effort as a moral agent within the
constellation of ethical actions in the information ecosystem.
1 INTRODUCTION
The discourse of artificial intelligence is widely
discussed in the last decade. Discussion of this
intelligent artefact dwells on the future, especially
on its impact on human life. Is this artefact will
bring significant benefits to humankind? Or its
presence would bring disaster to humans? Questions
and concerns about the future of AI are widely
discussed by several countries, both national and
supranational. Discussions were conducted generally
discuss the opportunities and risks of the presence of
artificial agencies is amid society. But of all these
things, one thing for sure that AI is a high strength,
an intelligence agency, which has been reshaping
our lives, interactions, and environment (Floridi,
2018).
The diversity of meaning arising in connection
with the phenomenon of AI causes differences in
interpreting the existence of these smart artefacts.
Floridi (2019, 1-2), at least, notice two things that
need to be studied more deeply associated with AI
development. First, the nature of the data is used by
AI to support its performance. Second, the quality of
the problem that AI can possibly solve. In this
article, I will not describe both things more deeply.
Stahl and Coeckelberg (2016, 153) managed to
summarize the main points of discussion and
philosophical reflection about ethical and social
issues related to intelligent artefacts, especially in
the context of health. They at least look at three
things to be a significant concern. First, a critical
evaluation of the vision of intelligent technology and
its implications on society and health care. In this
section, Stahl and Coeckelberg see that the issue of
the replacement of humans by robots enliven the
discussion by questioning the possibility that robots
and other technologies threaten social work?
Besides, the chance of robots can provide quality
work like humans that include emotions. Second, the
idea of a takeover of the role of man by intelligent
artefacts. The main issues addressed in this case are
the issue of autonomy, the role and duty, moral
agency, responsibility, deception and trust. Third,
the problems have been widely discussed about ICT
that involve human users, among other things:
privacy and data protection as well as safety and
avoidance of harm. This latter issue expressed by
Asimov in Coeckelbergh (2010a, 235) about robot
morality that gave birth to 'Laws of Robotics'.
The world community has undertaken
precautions for treating AI technology that will be
Roselina, E. and Asmiyanto, T.
Robot in Health Care Services: Moral Judgment for the Existence of Artificial Intelligence.
DOI: 10.5220/0010030500002967
In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference of Vocational Higher Education (ICVHE 2019) - Empowering Human Capital Towards Sustainable 4.0 Industry, pages 69-74
ISBN: 978-989-758-530-2; ISSN: 2184-9870
Copyright
c
2021 by SCITEPRESS – Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved
69
used as part of human life. High-Level Expert Group
on Artificial Intelligence (AI HLEG) has even
managed to put together a guide in connection with
efforts to develop an AI that bring benefit to
humankind. There are at least three things
highlighted by AI HLEG in the guide: [1] guarantee
attempt to maximize profits with the presence of AI
and also at the same time minimizing the risks of it;
[2] ensures that the development and utilization of AI
must be on the right track through a human-centric
approach where AI should not only serve as a means
but as a goal to improve human well-being; and [3]
build trustworthiness for AI because humans can be
fully confident and reap more benefits if they trust
the technology (European Commission, 2018).
Moreover, a group of people in Europe who call
themselves Atomium European Institute for Science,
Media, and Democracy (Atomium EISMD) develop
a forum named AI4People. The Forum is built to
create an open discussion space to lay the
foundations that contain principles, policies, and
practices in building "Good AI Society". There are at
least three important things are highlighted as the
outcome of the Forum, namely: [1] the opportunities
and risks of AI technology to uphold the dignity and
human growth; [2] 5 principles that support the
adoption of AI technology; and [3] 20
recommendations for stakeholders to be able to take
advantage of opportunities, minimize and offset the
risk, and respect the principles that can build Good
AI Society (Floridi, 2018). The emergence of
intelligence agency has developed a man's
consciousness of the potential benefits and risks at
the same time, both of which cannot be predicted
early from the moment they were created. Therefore,
efforts that can be done is to minimize the risk that
impacts on humans because of the existence of AI.
This article discusses the position of AI amid a
vortex of debate which predicted its existence could
threaten human life. However, the discussion
emphasized the use of AI in health care by using
Luciano Floridi's information ethics binoculars.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Floridi (2013) information ethics is a 'new' ethical
theory which focuses on the actions the recipient
(patient) as opposed to the majority of existing
methods of ethics which is precisely oriented
towards moral agents. This information ethics is not
to answer the question of how agents should behave,
but rather to answer questions about what qualifies
as the honourable recipient, namely objects that
deserve moral consideration or respect, and how
different classes of distinguished recipients are
treated.
Floridi (2013) defines a class of moral recipients
by taking a radical view that everything in the world
is an honourable recipient. That is, everything that
exists deserves appreciation, although minimal.
Floridi idea is beyond the classical anthropocentric
position where moral receiver class includes only
human, and outside the biocentric location and
ecocentric with consideration where precise receiver
class is composed of a living organism or ecosystem
elements.
Floridi's ethical position is categorized as into
centrism or infocentrism, where the main idea is not
just humans or animals that deserve moral respect,
but also inanimate entities. Floridi wants any moral
agents behaviour should be guided by the fact that
his actions could cause a negative or positive impact
on the environment. Thus, it is not only the form of
life that deserve respect and brings moral interest,
but also everything that fits in that environment.
The idea was introduced when he published an
article entitled "Information Ethics: on the
Theoretical Foundations of Computer Ethics" on an
international scale discussion in 1999. This article
highlights the relationship between information and
computer ethics. Shifting Floridi of computer ethics
to the ethics of information based on the observation
that the ethical issues that arise not only address the
issue of how far computer challenged the morality of
human action. But also the question of how now a
person, not just a computer professional but
throughout the policyholder, challenged by what
called infosphere (Floridi, 1999: 38). This shift then
obscures our view, through the mediation of ICT, on
the meaning of life online where so far, we
conceptualize as life has two sides, one is analogue,
carbon-based, and offline and the other side of the
digital, silicon-based, and online. So, a mix
between human agents of evolutionary adaptation
to the digital environment, and as a form of post-
modern life is becoming increasingly unclear.
Floridi (2013, 8) then call it as life experience in an
online (online).
The fundamental moral claim about the ethics of
information is that all entities that inhabit infosphere
are an information object. Because of their status as
objects of knowledge, all of the bodies are entitled
to an intrinsic moral value, which means that they
have a moral value that cannot be deprived of their
own and therefore deserve ethical consideration and
respect. The correct amount may be quite minimal
but could be supplemented by other moral factors.
This minimum moral value then is premised on the
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argument that any information objects should
develop itself, and other entities should not inhibit
and eliminate each object. Therefore, by the
minimum rights attached to the agent, then the agent
should respect the information object as an end in
themselves. In this context, the agent has a
responsibility of stewardship towards infosphere
overall, to contribute to the growth and maintain its
sustainability by reducing entropy and not to increase
it. Floridi (1999, 44) proposes a set of structured
tasks towards infosphere, including jobs that may
not cause, prevent and remove entropy from
infosphere and promote the development of
information and infosphere entity as a whole.
Thus, we can conclude that ethics Floridi's
information ethics is based on the Four Formal Moral
Principles. This ethics does not show concretely a
moral action that should be done. In other words,
information ethics does not provide material content
about what a virtuous agent must do in a concrete
situation.
3 METHODOLOGY
Paul Ricoeur's Hermeneutics Phenomenology
methods used to understand the constellation of the
existence of AI in the context of health care by
referring to the idea of Luciano Floridi's information
ethics. Reading of the text and AI phenomenon in the
context of health care with this method is expected to
bring interpreters at a better understanding of
themselves (appropriation) through the process of
negation dichotomy between the subjective
dimension of the subject and the object objectivity.
The interpretive activity includes four
methodological categories, namely: objectivation
through the structure, instantiation through writing,
instantiation through the world of texts, and
appropriation (or self- understanding).
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Robot as a Moral Responsibility
Floridi's information ethics wants to expand its
moral judgment by including non-human entities
(e.g. Robots, AI, information systems, etc.) as part of
a moral centre. The basis of his argument is that this
inanimated object is an honourable recipient and in
certain circumstances can be a moral agent at a
minimal level. Another basis of his evidence is that
the object of information, as are humans and animals.
As such, deserves to sit alongside an animate entity
within a moral framework.
The basis of Floridi's views is influenced by his
knowledge that there is currently a rife of
technological discovery activities which led to the
birth of intelligent artefacts resulting from research
conducted in the fields of neuroscience, bio-
engineering, gene editing, and others with the
support of ICT. The impact of this is the reduction
of human dignity because people considered to have
a moral equivalence with other information objects.
Humans are no different from an artificial agent that
has interactive capability, autonomous, and
adaptation because they are equally intelligent. It
was this reduction that became Floridi's foundation
in developing his argument about the position of
artificial agents.
His view is contrary to the current philosophical
perspective in which non-human entities cannot
possibly be the subject of responsibility. The issue
only may be pinned on the man as the only being
who has consciousness and freedom. Awareness is
undoubtedly different from intelligence. Artificial
intelligence agent may have equal or even exceed
human intelligence. However, these agents have no
knowledge that makes his actions could be qualified
as a moral act. Floridi (2013: 110) also view that not
all artificial agent is a moral agent, but some moral
agents can be held accountable.
Thus, if a robot performs moral actions that
deviate from what was programmed at the
beginning, then the moral responsibility, if a
beachhead of view Floridi, embedded on the robot. In
other words, the designer or creator of the robot
cannot be held liable for accountability, but only
moral responsibility alone.
Floridi effort in expanding the classification of
these moral agency marks a shift in the centre of the
moral and ethical as well as build demarcation with
anthropocentric because ethics so far have been
based on moral considerations only on humans.
However, when viewed more deeply, the
information ethics of Floridi does not fully indicate
separation from human centralization. Indeed, the
reduction of human is seen as the centre of moral
action. This reduction process has begun when
biocentric ethics emphasizes its moral judgment on
the value of life and suffering, where even the
honourable recipients in this ethics do not always
have to be humans. For example, land ethics
focuses on the concept of moral recipients on the
environment (non-human entities), where humans
Robot in Health Care Services: Moral Judgment for the Existence of Artificial Intelligence
71
need to consider how to treat them in an ethical
framework.
The rejection of the exotic idea of Floridi come
from various experts. One is Rafael Capurro that
commented quite spicy. According to him, for what
man creates, artificial agents are held responsible for
their actions. Meanwhile, at this time, the earth
which people live have packed filled with about 6
billion moral agents. Therefore, for what else we
create millions or even billions of artificial agents?
He reminded analogy of Ockham's knife, entia non
sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate. Thinking about
the possibility of artificial moral agents is not a
realistic and rational alternative, at least in the light
of what needs to be done and thought out
beforehand. Furthermore, Capurro (2008: 171) has
seen that the effort carried by Floridi is related to the
epistemological and moral status of this digital agent,
in fact only a repetition of the argument that
occurred in the 1970s about artificial intelligence.
By saying that any artificial agent is a moral agent,
then the statement is simply to dilute the concept of
morality.
4.2 Considering Robot as Moral Agents
The main problem in ethics is to treat the inanimate
entity as a moral agent. Does this matter raise
questions about whether it might create artificial
intelligence that is morally responsible for his
actions? The argument on this question is based on
the capacity of technology that can solve several
problems faced by humans, and even artificial
intelligence can match human capabilities. This
condition is the cornerstone of Floridi and Sanders
idea. According to them, moral agents do not need to
show free will, emotional or mental awareness.
Then, Floridi and Sanders proposed the concept of
morality without consciousness (mind-less morality)
to avoid the above questions and concerns about
artificial intelligence (Floridi, 2004: 351). This view
would say that artificial intelligence, animals and the
company can be considered as a moral agent. Floridi
and Sanders called it a morality without awareness
(mind-less morality). This concept of morality was
built to strengthen further Floridi's view that to be a
moral agent does not require the existence of
awareness.
These claims are of course raises our doubts and
questions on how might be software or computer
system, which has autonomous character and
programmed by the designer (human) to be able to
"act" in a certain way, can be a moral agent
responsible (accountability) for these actions. In
other words, Floridi and Sanders would like to say
that designers and users, regardless of responsibility
(accountability) of the moral agent. To explain this
view, Floridi and Sanders uses the famous
epistemological conception is Levels of Abstraction
/ LoA.
Floridi and Sanders believe that artificial agents
can lead to crime, namely artificial crime. Both of
them want to expand the existing classification of
crimes, from moral evil and natural evil to artificial
evil. The extension argument is based on the claim
that the classification of moral evil or natural evil
cannot explain all kinds of evil (Floridi, 2001: 60).
In strengthening the argument, Floridi presents
some examples that show the artificial crime. For
example, the analogy of an ambulance driver who
brings emergency patients were stuck in traffic due to
a mistake (error) of traffic lights. If a traffic jam is a
common thing like in Jakarta, every day jammed,
probably an ambulance driver could have chosen
another route or send a helicopter ambulance.
Therefore, the event cannot be said to be a crime. If
it is a crime, if it means Floridi will blame the traffic
lights? This does not make sense.
Meanwhile, a second analogy, the occurrence of a
system error while surgery patients. It may be a
human error. This means that the system developer
as the person responsible for the sustainability of the
system forgets to do adequate testing before the
operation runs. To strengthen their claims, Floridi
and Sanders stated that moral accountability could
be embedded in "autonomous" software because of
the software (although developed by humans), can
learn and "change" its behaviour in ways that cannot
be explained by the original developer. (Floridi,
2001: 62)
Seeing the thesis that non-human entities (for
example, software) can be categorized as morally
responsible agents, of course, it is entirely
unreasonable at least until this moment. Floridi and
Sanders would like to say that when someone uses a
computer and then suddenly the computer has a
problem, and then the person quickly blames the
computer for the incident. This is considered as an
attempt by the person to avoid responsibility for the
mistakes that occur. Floridi and Sanders point of
view is, of course, contrary to one purpose of
developing information ethics which overcome the
problem of depersonalization, and moral action
agents do not understand the consequences of their
actions. With this view, Floridi instead led to the
depersonalization.
Floridi and Sanders' claim seems like an attempt
to transfer human responsibility to non-human
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agents instead of the developer and people who
deliberately act carelessly, causing the wrong moral
action to occur. It is hard to imagine, that people will
blame an atomic bomb that exploded unexpectedly,
where the bomb has the character as a moral agent
(interactive, autonomous, and able to adapt).
Floridi and Sanders' argument that when this view
is rejected will lead to a more significant increase in
individual moral responsibility, it is illogical.
Moreover, when related to their previous ideas where
they claim that the main problem is humans do not
see and understand the real consequences of their
actions. However, at present, Floridi and Sanders
claim that there is right to much moral responsibility
on the "shoulders" of individuals so that it must be
removed by putting it on the "shoulders" of non-
human entities, such as computer software. The two
views are opposite each other.
4.3 Robot and Health Care
Robot discourse used in health care was present at
least more than a decade ago. The discourse is
increasingly growing and developing rapidly since
the emergence of intelligent artefacts that have
interactive characters, autonomous, and adaptive,
who later became known as artificial intelligence. AI
and human allusion are what gave birth to the needs
of more modern footing ethics because ethics that
currently exist do not speak specifically about
human interaction with these intelligent robots.
This discourse has also led to the pro-cons,
especially related to the use of intelligent robots in
performing health care activities. Robert and Linda
Sparrow, for example, opposed the replacement of
human nurses by the robot in elderly care because the
robot is not able to meet the social and emotional
needs of the elderly. According to him, this work can
only be done through contact with humans (Sparrow
and Sparrow, 2006). While, Coeckelbergh (2010b,
185) found a priori rejection and common like
Sparrow and Sparrow is unacceptable because the
existence of intelligent artefacts, of course, must be
placed on its use in health care on a case-by-case
basis.
Besides, the problem of the use of AI in health
care is feared to leave the issue in the breach of
privacy because the patient medical data can be
accessed by the system and open opportunities others
can view such data. Assurance that the patient
medical data is not used for the benefit of others and
the other party is still an issue today. Therefore,
Coeckelbergh (2010b, 186-187) suggest that system
developers consider the matter of privacy in the
design of the system and its use as well as follow AI
technology regulations.
5 CONCLUSION
Ethical binoculars related to the existence of AI in
the context of
health care should be discussed more.
Therefore, the presence of AI stores the potential to
reduce the position of humans. Humans are no
longer subject (anthropocentric); even human
position is equivalent to other lifeless objects (info
centric). The takeover of social roles by intelligent
artefacts, especially those concerning issues of
autonomous, roles and tasks, moral agency,
responsibility, deception, and trust will occur if AI's
existence is not adequately addressed. The
interaction of AI and humans has the potential to
threaten privacy, data theft, and even to the point of
threatening human safety. Doubts about the existence
of robots or AI appears because the current
AI has not been able to provide proper care
where excellent treatment course requires
interaction with humans who have social and
emotional needs.
Moreover, doubts that AI can provide genuine
care as is done by human nurses, raises the problem
that AI assistive technology such as robots tend to
give 'false' care so that 'cheat' human by making
them think that they receive the real treatment.
Floridi ethical information's binoculars, although
it is formal, it has managed to distinguish between
moral agents who have the responsibility
(responsibility) and moral agents who are held
accountable (accountability). This view can clear up
the issue of morality and law, both of which have
been mixed up unconsciously. While on the other
hand, this view also gave rise to controversy, namely
that artificial moral agents can be subject to legal
sanctions (accountability). Meanwhile, human moral
agents are only asked for moral responsibility
(responsibility).
With this ethics of information, a foothold is
available that provides space for humans to think
and renegotiate anthropocentric morality which is
narrow and not flexible. This makes people aware
that the problem of morality in the future will face
challenges and problems that are more complicated
than the past and present. Therefore, it requires a
flexible ethic and broader scope.
Robot in Health Care Services: Moral Judgment for the Existence of Artificial Intelligence
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