Religious Framing of New Media Technology: Islamic Salafi

Movement in Indonesia and Its Communal Narratives of the Internet

Asep Muhamad Iqbal

, Irma Riyani

Faculty of Ushuluddin, UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung, Bandung, Indonesia

Keywords: Salafism, Salafi groups, Indonesia, the internet, communal narratives, religious legitimacy

Abstract: Many studies focus their analysis on the nature and characteristics of the internet to answer the question

about why Islamic groups and movements harness the internet as a new important resource. Using this

medium perspective, they believe that the internet adoption by Islamic groups and movements is closely

related to what the medium can and will do in the ways it differs from old media. This article, however,

suggests that the answer should be found on the users in that how and why Islamic groups and movements

harness this new media technology. Using this user-centred perspective and focusing on Islamic Salafi

groups in Indonesia, it analyses how the proponents of Islamic Salafi movement in Indonesia defined and

interpreted the adopted internet as a new resource in a communal discourse inspired and supported with

references to religious texts. It argues that as they required a theological legitimacy in order to engage fully

with the internet as a new chosen resource, Salafi factions legitimised and heralded the internet as a new

resource of collective action through narratives informed and guided by Islamic texts and Salafi world

views.

1 INTRODUCTION

Most observers generally turn to the specific

nature and characteristics of the internet to answer

the question about why Islamic groups and

movements embrace the internet as a useful and

acceptable resource. Focussing on what this medium

can and will do, they suggest that Islamic

movements and groups use the internet because,

among other factors, it is faster, cheaper, and has

wider outreach than ‘old’ media technologies such

as print and TV broadcast to achieve their

organizational, social and religious goals [1]–[17].

This article suggests, however, that significant

answers to the key question of internet adoption by

Islamic groups and movements are to be found by

looking at the users, and what they can or cannot do

with the internet. This user-centred perspective

believes that the harnessing of the internet is

influenced by user-related issues including the

extent to which users give legitimacy on the adopted

digital technology. To do this, this article focuses its

analysis on how the proponents of Islamic Salafi

movement in Indonesia defined and interpreted the

adopted internet as a new resource in a communal

discourse inspired and supported with references to

religious texts. It argues that as they required a

theological legitimacy in order to engage fully with

the internet as a new chosen resource, Salafi factions

legitimised and heralded the internet as a new

resource of collective action through narratives

informed and guided by Islamic texts and Salafi

world views.

Information required for this study was obtained

through online investigation that involved crawling

websites (Garrido, 2003) for samples of Indonesian

Salafi websites using search engines and collecting

materials from the selected Salafi websites for

themes, topics and tones related to the research

questions. In addition, this study is based on in-

depth interviews with a number of the proponents of

the Salafi movement in some cities in Indonesia.

Analysis involved textual analysis of the

collected data to uncover the agency of Salafists in

the relationship between religion and the internet

technology, and the Salafi discourses of the internet.

In this study, text comprises the Salafi websites in

the form of web articles and postings- and interview

transcripts.

1852

Iqbal, A. and Riyani, I.

Religious Framing of New Media Technology: Islamic Salaﬁ Movement in Indonesia and Its Communal Narratives of the Internet.

DOI: 10.5220/0009936418521857

In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Recent Innovations (ICRI 2018), pages 1852-1857

ISBN: 978-989-758-458-9

2 SALAFI COMMUNAL

NARRATIVES OF THE

ADOPTED INTERNET

As it developed in the era of the revolution of

information and communication technology, the

Salafi movement embraced the internet as a new,

important resource. The proponents of Salafism in

Indonesia have embraced the internet and integrated

it as a new acceptable resource into their socio-

religious practices. Each Salafi faction mobilizes the

internet to present and articulate its own version of

Salafism, and analyse the contemporary state of

Muslim societies.

They use various internet applications including

websites, weblogs, emailing lists, internet forums,

and online business. Their presence in cyberspace is

seen in hundreds of these applications written in

Indonesian, operated by Salafi individuals or

organizations, accessed and followed by Salafi

adherents and activists.

The Indonesian Salafists required a theological

legitimacy in order to engage fully with the internet

as a new chosen resource. For this purpose, they

turned to their religious tradition to give a sacred

legitimacy for their embrace of the internet. The

Salafi factions, therefore, framed this new media

technology in a set of particular narratives in order

to integrate it into their world view and socio-

religious practices. In doing so, they used a set of

resources of ideology, beliefs, tradition and history

as a “cultural toolkit” (Benford, 2000) to create a

communal discourse on the internet to justify their

embrace of this technology and validate their

particular engagement with it. This involved a

process of defining meaning so that internet use or

non-use could be integrated into the Salafi factions’

needs and purposes.

A. A Double-Edged Sword

The Salafi communal discourse on the internet is

strongly characterized by the metaphor of a double-

edged sword to determine the applicability of the

internet as a new resource. The Yemeni Salafi

faction stressed that the internet is like a sword,

which can be useful or harmful and has good and

bad effects; it can be used for good or evil, by good

or bad people, in accordance with their purposes.

The internet is useful and good as long as it is used

for goodness and religious interests such as for

Salafi propagation (da’wah) purposes.

The Salafi factions presented the internet as an

acceptable new resource through the narrative of

halāl (religiously permitted) internet. Yet, they also

framed it to be a potentially unacceptable technology

through the narrative of harām (religiously

forbidden) internet by highlighting the internet’s

‘dangerous’ aspects in which its use could be in

conflict with Salafi teachings and way of life. These

two kinds of internet narratives play an important

role in the Salafists’ engagement with the new

medium because they guide the Salafi actors and

adherents on how to talk, perceive, and use or not

use it for the purpose of the Salafi movement. In

practice, these narratives aim to direct a religiously

justified pattern of use in the Salafists’ mobilization

of the new resource.

B. Halal Internet

The Salafi factions developed the narratives of

halāl internet with the aim of justifying this new

medium as a new acceptable resource. This was

illustrated by their perception of the importance of

internet for contemporary Muslim societies. They

believed that technological modernization should be

welcomed by maximizing its benefits and avoiding

its harmful effects in the light of religious values and

purposes. Although it had no precedence in the era

of Prophet Muhammad and his companions,

information technology like the internet could be

used for religious interests and purposes.

According to Haraki Salafists, embracing the

internet was necessary to keep abreast with the

development of the “outer world” and contemporary

issues (Musa, 2010). They argued that this new

media technology has offered more advantages and

possibilities than old media. The internet provides

flexibility and portability so people with access to

this new media can acquire a wide range of

information about Salafism in efficient and cheap

ways.

Internet as Facility

The dominant narrative of the halal internet the

Salafi factions developed was that the internet is a

facility. The Salafists regarded the internet as a

facility, which is believed to be inherently neutral

and value-free so that it can be used for any

purposes, good or bad. As an instrument, the internet

can be utilised as long as its usage and effects are

Religious Framing of New Media Technology: Islamic Salaﬁ Movement in Indonesia and Its Communal Narratives of the Internet

1853

not in breach of Islamic values and teachings as

understood by Salafists.

According to Haraki Salafi faction, the internet

is a useful facility for religious purposes, particularly

as a modern means of propagation (da’wah) of

Salafi ideology to a wider audience. They perceived

that the internet is a part of worldly affairs which

can be used in light of Islamic norms and values

(Hadi, 2010).

The Yemeni Salafists also regarded the internet

as a new resource for gaining learning materials and

references including books and articles on Salafism,

to which the Salafi leaders consult for teaching and

sermon materials. They referred to the websites

created by, or dedicated to, the ‘ulamā` of Salafism

in the Middle East. These websites are highly

appreciated as important resources from which they

are able to download articles, fatwa and books

written by Salafi ‘ulamā` for da’wah purposes. The

internet, then, has equipped Salafi preachers with

necessary knowledge and skills for propagating

Salafism (Safii, 2010).

Internet as a value-free tool

Another common Salafi narrative of halāl

internet is the idea the internet is a neutral or value-

free tool. This deals with the issues about values

associated with this new media technology. This

included the issue that the internet was invented and

developed by non-Muslims in the West, particularly

those in the United States of America, whose values

and way of life are different from those of Muslims.

Regarding this issue, the Salafi factions believed that

there is no problem with the use of products made

by non-Muslims provided the products are

considered religiously lawful.

For them, the internet is just like other

technologies invented by non-Muslims such as cars

or mobile phones. As explained above, the internet

is then considered a tool, which is value-free and can

be used by everyone, including the Salafists for their

social-religious needs and purposes. What really

concerned the Salafists was how to take advantage

of the internet for pursuing their movement’s goals

and avoid the aspects of the internet that are harmful

to morality and Islam such as pornography and un-

Islamic content.

In this context, most proponents of both Haraki

Salafism and Yemeni Salafism categorized the

internet as part of mu’āmalah, an Islamic teaching

on interaction and transaction among human beings.

Based on this teaching, they argued that human

interaction and transaction is not only religiously

permitted among Muslims, but also between

Muslims and non-Muslims. Hence, they emphasised

that Muslims are allowed to have mu’āmalah with

disbelievers such as doing business with them and

using their products considered lawful according to

Islamic teachings. According to these Salafists, it is

true that the internet was created by disbelievers, but

it does not mean Muslims are prevented from using

the technology because it constitutes a part of

worldly matters and human interaction in which

Muslim can participate under the guidance of

Islamic values (Arafat, 2010) and (Satrio, 2010).

Furthermore, the Salafi factions did not perceive

internet use as against tashabbuh, a doctrine that

Muslims are forbidden to imitate and follow

particular ways of life of non-Muslims. According to

Haraki Salafists, the internet is a matter of worldly

affairs, not a matter of aqīdah (fundamental creed) in

which Muslims are forbidden to imitate other

religions’ beliefs and traditions. This argument

reinforced the notion that the internet is neutral and

value-free regardless of the fact that it was created

and produced by non-Muslims. Again, Muslims are

allowed to use the technology for their own purposes

and needs in ways that are permitted by the Islamic

teachings (Hadi, 2010).

C. Haram Internet

Although they recognized the usefulness of the

internet as a resource of Salafi propagation, the

Salafi factions also developed narratives of

religiously forbidden (harām) internet. In these

narratives, they framed the internet as a danger to

the purity of Islam and a threat toward Muslims’

morality. They particularly referred to what they

considered un-Islamic use and content of this media

technology. The forms of harām internet, they

identified, include immoral content such as

pornography, ideas regarded as destructive to

Islamic faith, and harsh criticism and ‘attack’ from

those regarded as the enemies of Salafism.

Internet as Threat

The common Salafi narrative of harām internet

was that the internet is a dangerous medium in that

users can use it to spread ideologies that have the

potential to destroy Islam and Muslims such as those

of Jaringan Islam Liberal (the Liberal Islam

ICRI 2018 - International Conference Recent Innovation

1854

Network), which attack Salafism through web

content that vilifies the ‘true’ Salafi ideology, and

engages in ma’shiyat (forbidden things according to

Islamic values) (Safii, 2010).

It should be noted that in spite of their

recognition of the internet’s advantages, the Salafi

factions did not regard the internet as a new resource

that could replace traditional means of religious

learning. They believed that majlis ta’lim (venues

including a mosque where face-to-face religious

learning is conducted) and other face-to-face

religious gatherings are still the most important

media for transferring and gaining religious

knowledge. According to Yemeni Salafists, majlis

ta’lim remains advantageous in that it provides

religious knowledge seekers with spiritual benefits

which the internet is unable to give its users. For

example, by attending a majlis ta’lim, one will have

opportunities to have silaturrahim (maintaining

“family bonds” among Muslims), one of the highly

rewarded virtues in Islam. The internet, therefore, is

regarded as complementary to the traditional media

of religious learning and mission.

D. Religious Legitimacy of the Adopted Internet

To fully understand the above Salafi framing of

the internet, it is necessary to consider Salafi

tradition of religious texts by investigating particular

ideological beliefs that underlie their narratives of

the internet. Our interviews revealed that the Salafi

factions went beyond the idea of the internet simply

as a useful tool; their narratives imply a religious

mandate for the use of the internet. To understand

more precisely the nature of this religious legitimacy

requires an investigation of the Salafi religious

beliefs that provide the Salafists with a theological

foundation for their engagement with internet. In

this context, uncovering dalīl (evidence) from the

Qur’an, hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings

and practices) and other Islamic resources that allow

Muslims to use the technology, particularly internet,

becomes indispensable.

Internet Use as Non-Worship Act

The Salafi factions affirmed that there are no

Qur’anic or hadith texts that explicitly or specifically

talk about the use of media technologies including

the internet. Yet, they turned to some Islamic

principles, which were derived from the Qur’an,

hadith and ushūl al-fiqh (the principles of Islamic

jurisprudence), believed to give religious legitimacy

to their engagement with the internet. First of all,

both Haraki Salafists and Yemeni Salafists based

their decision to mobilize the internet as a resource

on a principle that God has created everything on the

earth for human beings so that everybody is allowed

to use and take benefit from them in accordance with

divine law.

This, they said, includes technologies like the

internet. To support this, the Haraki Salafi leaders

quoted a Qur’anic verse: “It is He Who has created

for you all that is in the earth” (Al-Baqarah: 29) and

a hadith that says: “You know best your own

worldly affairs (antum a’lam bi umūri dunyākum)”

(Badrudin, 2010) and (Abdullah, 2010).

It is interesting that the main concern for the

Salafi factions was not what dalīl (evidence) allows

Muslims to use the internet for, but rather what dalīl

forbids Muslims from using it. When there are no

religious texts that forbid certain issues, it is

permissible for Muslims to engage with them in

light of universal Islamic values and principles.

In this sense, the Salafi factions referred to the

principles of Islamic jurisprudence to support the

permissibility of internet use for their religious

purposes. The Haraki Salafists supported their

arguments by making reference to al-aṣl fi al-ashyā`

al-ibāhah illa mā warada `an al-tashrī tahrīmuh, a

principle that everything related to acts of non-

worship is permissible except those things that

Islamic law clearly prohibits them. Based on this

principle, a Haraki Salafi leader argued that the use

of the internet is permitted because it is a non-ritual

activity against which there has been no religious

prohibition provided it is used according to Islamic

values (Hadi, 2010).

The Yemeni Salafists did the same, quoting

another principle of Islamic jurisprudence lil wasāil

hukm al-maqāṣid, which means the ruling of

instruments is subject to what they are intended to be

and the intention of their users. They explained that

the internet is a waṣīlah (instrument) that is basically

halāl, religiously permitted to be used by Muslims

provided it is to do good things according to Islamic

teachings. Yet, it can be harām, religiously

forbidden, if it is used for doing things that breach

religious values and ethical norms such as for

viewing pornography.

Internet as God’s Gift

Furthermore, to provide religious legitimacy to

their internet use, the Salafi factions went beyond

Religious Framing of New Media Technology: Islamic Salaﬁ Movement in Indonesia and Its Communal Narratives of the Internet

1855

the idea of the internet as waṣīlah (instrument); they

even took the view that the internet is a gift from

God (ni’mah). This implies a religious mandate to

use the internet for good according to Islamic values

and for religious missions.

The above Salafi narratives of the internet

suggest that while the internet is a global

information and communication medium, it operates

within the confine of local and particular values and

ethics shared by its users. Through their narratives of

the internet, the Salafi factions developed “a

prescriptive discourse” (Campbell, 2010) on the

technology, framing it as a valuable tool that

supports their ideology, core values and practices. In

such communal discourse, though they disagree on

some issues the Salafi factions shared the same

narratives of the internet.

Notwithstanding some variations over when the

internet can be a religiously and morally forbidden

medium, the Salafi factions have largely shared

positive ideas about the internet as a new resource

for propagating Salafism (da’wah salafiyyah).

3 CONCLUSION

This article has shown that the Salafi embrace of

the internet is closely and explicitly linked with the

Salafi religious world view and ideology. To

embrace the internet fully as a new resource, the

Salafi factions needed more than an organisational

justification.

As religious text-based and oriented factions, the

Salafists sought to claim theocratic legitimacy for

their internet use through a communal discourse of

the internet with strong references to religious texts.

This provided the proponents of the Salafi factions

with a framework of how to perceive and utilize the

internet, and more importantly a religious legitimacy

for their adoption and mobilization of the new

medium as an acceptable new resource for

promoting Salafi ideology.

These narratives demonstrate that religious

ideology plays a key role in Salafi factions’ adoption

of the internet. Religious values and tradition

provide a theological foundation for the Salafists’

responses to the introduction of the internet into

their socio-religious practices. Since religious texts

play a central role in formulating their ideology and

guiding their practice, the Salafists depend heavily

on the Qur’anic texts, hadith, and the Salafi ‘ulama

in giving legitimacy to the internet use. Not only do

the Salafists impute neutrality to the internet, but

they also regard it as God’s gift, legitimising their

mobilization of the medium for their religious needs

and purposes. At this point, we see a spiritually-rich

engagement with the internet technology, which

distinguishes religious users like the Salafists from

non-religious ones, such as a football club or a

corporation, for example.

The Salafi framing of the internet suggests that

the Salafi factions are not passive receivers or blind

rejecters of the internet. Their engagement with the

internet involves processes of negotiation with

opportunities opened by the internet in light of Salafi

ideology and beliefs. Given such specific

motivations, the Salafi factions are involved in a

technological practice in which they attempt to

religiously shape the meaning and purpose of the

internet. But, this article still has a question that

needs an answer: How have the Salafi factions

actually mobilized the internet as a new resource?

Perhaps, further studies are needed in order to

provide answers to this important issue.

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