Examining the Potential of Local Interfaith Institution in Conflict

Prevention and Resolution in Indonesia: The Case of Forum for

Religious Harmony (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama) of Ambon

Mohammad Hasan Ansori

and Rostineu

Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Indonesia

University of Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia

Keywords: inter-faith, conflict, prevention, resolution, Ambon

Abstract: The local government of Ambon has been actively engaged with Ambon post-conflict reconstruction and

immensely addressed the residual issues of the conflict. However, some issues still define the society of

Ambon, particularly socio-spatial segregation and lack of trust. Unfortunately, the government has put

excessively focus on economic development and access. Inter-religious cooperation and synergy are

absolutely needed to cope with socio-spatial segregation and lack of trust in post-conflict Ambon. In this

sense, organizations from different religious background can work together, build a collective platform, and

produce more joint work. The Forum for Religious Harmony (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama) has been

strongly identified as a particularly well positioned organization to play the role, given its formal links to the

government and influential membership, while mandated to work with communities at large. Since the Forum

for Religious Harmony (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama) is a multireligious organization, it has the ideal

starting point for providing an example for other organizations and bringing groups together as well as

working with all. However, it is also true that dialogue and conflict resolution capacity building will

unquestionably help the Forum for Religious Harmony (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama) effectively plays

its expected role of independently preventing and resolving conflict in Ambon.

1 INTRODUCTION

In January 1999, violent conflict broke out in Maluku

and made Ambon the theatre of the most intense

violence in Indonesia since the anti-communist

pogroms of 1965/66 (Klinken, 2007). It received

widespread international attention due to its scale,

and came to be considered a concern for national

security. The conflict claimed almost 5,000 lives and

displaced a third of the population in Maluku and

North Maluku. The outbreak of conflict can be

attributed to a combination of underlying factors that

coincided with specific triggers.

In February 2002, Jusuf Kalla, the coordinating

minister of social welfare, succeeded in bringing The

violence in Maluku decreased rapidly with the groups

together over a peace agreement. He had asked the

Maluku governor to pick one representative from

each religious group, who again selected members for

their negotiating teams. The two teams, which

included 35 representatives from each side, were

isolated in a secluded spot in Malino for three days,

and produced an agreement to end the violence,

known as the Malino II Peace Agreement. The

Agreement marked the official end of the conflict. It

comprised eleven points that called, among others, for

the halting of every form of violence; return of

internally displaced people (IDPs); the establishment

of an investigation team; restriction on separatism;

and the implementation of post-conflict rehabilitation

measures.

The Malino II Agreement. The peace accord did

not prevent outbreaks of violence, however. (Klinken,

2007) From 2002-2014, a total of 12 incidents took

the death toll of 1600 down to less than 200. (NVMS)

Small incidences of communal violence sporadically

broke out such as between Hila and Waitomo, both

considered Muslim villages, in February 2015. The

latter initially started when a Waitomo resident

stabbed a youth from Hila causing eight houses burnt

down and a few other houses ruined. In most cases,

the violence was quickly contained, but from time to

time, larger incidences have taken place. Major

Ansori, M. and Rostineu, .

Examining the Potential of Local Interfaith Institution in Conﬂict Prevention and Resolution in Indonesia: The Case of Forum for Religious Harmony (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama) of

Ambon.

DOI: 10.5220/0009934217231729

In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Recent Innovations (ICRI 2018), pages 1723-1729

ISBN: 978-989-758-458-9

1723

violent incidences occurred on 24 April 2004, 11

September 2011 and later on 15 May 2012(Ansori et

al., 2014).

Figure 1: Incident of Violent Conflict between Religions

in Ambon (2002-2011)

The new level of hostility and distrust is to a large

extent attributed to the local government’s approach

to addressing the problems of the IDPs following the

end of the conflict. Three options were offered to the

IDPs: return to their place of origin; relocation; and

continue to live in the IDPs resettled areas(Ansori et

al., 2014). Relocation was the option preferred by

most IDPs, fearing the status as a minority in the place

of origin under conditions of existing resentment,

being combined of an absence, real or perceived, of

security guarantees upon their return. In choosing the

relocation sites, the IDPs tended to choose areas near

or around communities that share their religious

identity, as this provided a sense of safety and

security. All these factors further unintentionally

make post-conflict segregation in Ambon.

Despite the many issues highlighted above, the

situation in Ambon as regards religious tensions,

stigmatization and conflict vulnerability has become

a bit better over the last years. Both Ambon

government officials, Members of Parliament and a

LAIM representative, highlighted in interviews that

the people of Maluku were increasingly less prone to

be influenced by unfounded provocations attempting

to appeal to religious tensions (Ansori et al., 2014).

Over the course of the years, Ambon has managed to

move in a somewhat positive direction when it comes

to post-conflict social interaction. As mentioned by

Ansori et al. (2014), although post conflict

segregation is still a defining characteristic of Ambon

society, in certain areas, for example Batu Merah that

is perceived as an Islamic area (Salam) and Karang

Panjang as a Christian area (Sarani), segregation

patterns do not necessarily menace the social

interaction between groups. Despite some positive

developments, the society and its unfinished business

of trauma healing and the lack of trust is still a

defining characteristic of the relationship between the

Christians and Muslim, as underscored by the lack of

interaction and communication between the two

religious communities.

To prevent the risk of small incidences like youth

fighting and traffic accidents to escalate into larger

conflicts, some of the underlying problems, tensions

and trauma must be addressed. Interventions should

strive to contribute to develop engagement and

harmonious relationships between local people from

different groups and between indigenous groups and

migrants, especially in urban areas; address the lack

of trust and suspicion that exist between different

community groups.

The religious leaders in Ambon are key peace

drivers due to their affiliation not only to other

government officials but also with various prayers

groups within their own communities. These

religious leaders are usually mobile and provide

sermons to different groups. The participation of

religious leaders in efforts to maintain harmony and

prevent any further violence or conflict is a necessity

given the above-illustrated strategic position in the

society. The cooperation between these religious

leaders of different religions is important to foster

interfaith and inter-community communication and

interaction. One of the strategic and influential

organizations in particular represents an important

opportunity in this regard is the FKUB.

A qualitative approach is selected for this research

since the problem characteristic of the research

requires a qualitative approach rather than a

quantitative-extensive one. The data are primarily

drawn from open-ended interviews with, local NGOs,

academicians, local leaders, religious leaders, the

elites of FKUB, and security officers. In addition to

the primary sources, many secondary sources were

also employed for this study, including academic

publications, public records, governmental

documents and local and national newspapers and

magazines. The entire informants were purposively

and snowball-based selected strategies of non-

probability sampling strategy. Purposive qualitative

sampling provides me with the expected informants

for the study (e.g. Stener Kvale & Svend Brinkmann

2009, 179; Kathy Charmaz, 2006; Jhon Creswell,

1994, 148; Michael Patton, 2002).

ICRI 2018 - International Conference Recent Innovation

1724

In addition to the primary sources, I used many

secondary sources, including academic publications,

public records, governmental documents, and local

and national newspapers and magazines. Combining

secondary analysis of research data with primary one

provides additional comparative or collateral

evidence using different sources of data (Janet

Heaton, 2004). Alternatively, it could be used for

cross-validation in support of the analysis of other

types of data. The mixed analysis of interviewing and

document is particularly intended to hinder the

vulnerability to errors linked to one particular method

(e.g. Sally Thorne, 1994; Michael Patton, 2002).

2 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE

DYNAMIC OF CONFLICT IN

MALUKU

In January 1999, violent conflict broke out in Maluku

and made Ambon the theatre of the most intense

violence in Indonesia since the anti-communist

pogroms of 1965/66. It received widespread

international attention due to its scale, and came to be

considered a concern for national security. The

conflict claimed almost 5,000 lives and displaced a

third of the population in Maluku and North Maluku.

The outbreak of conflict can be attributed to a

combination of underlying factors that coincided with

specific triggers.

As far as underlying causes are concerned, the

relationship between Muslim and Christian

communities had grown increasingly tense as a result

of the advancement of the Muslim groups in

education, influence and skills, relative to historical

circumstances. The Christian groups who were used

to having more representation in e.g. the bureaucracy,

perceived it as slowly marginalizing them when in

1992, Jakarta appointed a Muslim, Akib Latuconsina.

When former President Soeharto appointed another

Muslim, Saleh Latuconsina, as governor in 1997,

suspicion between the communities peaked. As the

governor proceeded to chose Muslims as his deputy

and provincial secretary, leaving the Christians

unrepresented in the top leadership in the province,

rumours emerged about possible open conflict

between groups. Tensions escalated, and violence

erupted during the Muslim Eid holiday in January

1999.

In February 2002, Jusuf Kalla, then coordinating

minister of social welfare, succeeded in bringing the

groups together over a peace agreement. He had

asked the Maluku governor to pick one representative

from each religious group, who again selected

members for their negotiating teams. The two teams,

which included 35 representatives from each side,

were isolated in a secluded spot in Malino for three

days, and produced an agreement to end the violence,

known as the Malino II Peace Agreement. The

Agreement marked the official end of the conflict. It

comprised eleven points that called, among others, for

the halting of every form of violence; return of

internally displaced people (IDPs); the establishment

of an investigation team; restriction on separatism;

and the implementation of post-conflict rehabilitation

measures.

It took the Government of Indonesia (GoI) some

time to address the situation, and it only started doing

so in June 2002, when Megawati formed the National

Independent Investigation Team for the Maluku

Conflict. The task of this team was to bring closure to

the conflict through fact finding and investigation of

violence and human rights violations. It was supposed

to be a key step in conflict transformation. The

Investigation Team submitted their findings to

Megawati, but their findings were never made public.

The violence in Maluku decreased rapidly with

the Malino II Agreement. The peace accord did not

prevent outbreaks of violence, however. From 2002-

2014, a total of 12 incidents took the death toll of

1600 down to less than 200. Small incidences of

communal violence sporadically broke out such as

between Hila and Waitomo, both considered Muslim

villages, in February 2015. The latter initially started

when a Waitomo resident stabbed a youth from Hila

causing eight houses burnt down and a few other

houses ruined. In most cases, the violence was

quickly contained, but from time to time, larger

incidences have taken place. Major violent incidences

occurred on 24 April 2004, 11 September 2011 and

15 May 2012.

In Ambon itself, NVMS traced the reasons for

violence and categorized this into three different

types: the issue of separatism, identity based violence

and others. In the period 2002 – 2004, identity-based

violence was the highest in terms of incidents, death,

injured and infrastructure damages. Religion, as one

of many identities an individual can hold within a

community, is included in this category. There has

been many efforts of intervention in the post-conflict

period, but there are still fundamental problem

unresolved.

Segregation between Christian and Muslim

communities is a defining characteristic of Ambon

Municipality today. As noted above, segregation with

the Christians and Muslims residents living

separately dates back to the Dutch occupation. The

Examining the Potential of Local Interfaith Institution in Conﬂict Prevention and Resolution in Indonesia: The Case of Forum for Religious

Harmony (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama) of Ambon

1725

reality of the current segregation, however, is that the

level of disengagement and distrust of the different

faith of the community is a lot worse than before. It is

widely held that this distrust has become strongly

entrenched in the mind set of individuals due to the

trauma from the 1999 conflict. In the university, for

example, tensions between Poka and Rumah Tiga, are

manifested through segregated rental room

residences. There is also politicization of key position

within the university (Pattimura University

(UNPATTI).

The new level of hostility and distrust is to a large

extent attributed to the local government’s approach

to addressing the problems of the IDPs following the

end of the conflict. Three options were offered to the

IDPs: return to their place of origin; relocation; and

continue to live in the IDPs resettled areas. Relocation

was the option preferred by most IDPs, fearing the

status as a minority in the place of origin under

conditions of existing resentment, being combined of

an absence, real or perceived, of security guarantees

upon their return. Several practical issues also

contributed to making the return to the place of origin

difficult, such as the lack of land certification to prove

ownership of residence that could have enabled them

to return to their homes.

In choosing the relocation sites, the IDPs tended

to choose areas near or around communities that share

their religious identity, as this provided a sense of

safety and security. The government did not regulate

these decisions. In the absence of consistent and

focused efforts at recovery process to rebuild

relationship, communication and create better

atmosphere between the religious communities, the

reinforced segregation gives rise to negative peace

and provides potential for escalation of conflict.

One of the telling manifestations of the existing

distrust between the communities is the occurrence of

some particularly violent cases in the post Malino 2

period. Seemingly minor incidences quickly blew up

and caused many deaths, injured people and damaged

buildings. The cases include violence on 25 April

2004, 11 September 2011 and 15 May 2012. The most

serious one is the September 11, 2011, incident.

With regards to the former, it is generally assumed

that the incident was triggered by a misunderstanding

by a Waihaong taxi motorcycle driver in a minor

traffic- accident. It quickly turned into a major

incident, involving both communities, causing 3

deaths and around 90 injured people. Similarly, on

May 15, 2012, a small incident occurred at the

celebration of national hero of Maluku, Pattimura,

escalating to cause the destruction of 3 houses and 5

motorcycles, 34 people to be hospitalized and 44

people to receive treatment.

Although the major conflict that have occurred

over the last years have sprung out of minor

incidences, research has shown that they are by many

in Ambon regarded as a result of provocation by

particular parties. The handling of sensitive issues

and use of religious symbols became triggers for

conflict and for making the communities clash. As

cited in Ansori et al., (2014, p. 88), some respondents

affirmed that one of the conflict push factors was

provocation, “Outside all the debates, provocations

really become the trigger of the 1999 conflict, and in

some accidents, of post-conflict violence.” As for the

case of September 11, 2011 incident, where a Muslim

was killed by a Christian in a traffic accident, it

caused suspicion and assumption among the

community groups, leading the case to escalate into

grave violence. Fortunately, measures to handle the

conflict were taken right by relevant stakeholders

both from city and provincial levels. However, the

case remains unsolved until today, causing people to

question law enforcement and the legal process,

which later has triggered social unrest within Ambon

society. Similarly, with the December 15 2011 case

were there was a death of a public van’s driver with

destination to Kudamati, the investigation has been

going on for years without results or identification of

an assassin.

The lack of results in producing justice for the

above-mentioned incidences nurture the existing

distrust between local people and local government;

in this case the police forces. At a practical level, it

has affected the transportation routes, as drivers and

owners of Kudamati-destination public vans prefer to

avoid Waihaong street until the police succeed in

resolving the case (Ansori, at al., 2014: 94 – 96).

Another important evidence of the vividly existing

distrust between the communities is the fact that some

people feel uncomfortable and insecure to come to

certain areas of different community, especially at

night (Ansori, at al., 2014: 81-85). Violent conflict

has also several times occurred in the border of the

segregated communities, where Muslim and

Christian are in relatively intense contact and

communication (Ibid., 94-96).

The lack of trust leaves the communities in

Maluku prone to provocation based on religious

factors. This is especially a risk during election time.

In the Ambon context, local election are important as

not only for choosing regular political representation,

but as they determine the distribution of religious

representation and power. Elections thus become a

crucial event, where people can easily get provoked

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and mobilized by small triggers. During recent

elections, there has been some provocative SMS

circulated, based on religion issues. In addition to

SMS provocations, during the local elections,

especially the Governor elections, there was a

mushrooming of forums based on family ties and

ethnicity in particular areas. These forums were

usually mobilized by governor candidates to voice

their interests and to attack their political rivals, based

on identify factors. A Muslim Chairperson of an NGO

in Ambon, recounted the attempts of civil society and

NGOs to remind each other to stay vigilant and to not

be prone to any provocative attempts (Ansori et al.,

2014).

In current Ambon society, research also showed

that a fair amount of stigmatization of the other

religious group exists. Muslim people are often

stigmatized as Laskar Jihad or Jihadist and Christian

people as South Maluku Republic (RMS-Republik

Maluku Selatan) (Ansori, et al. 2015). One comes

across naming of the other group, and some areas in

Muslim and Christian dominated parts of Ambon are

still seen as very dangerous by the other groups.

3 FORUM FOR RELIGIOUS

HARMONY (FORUM

KERUKUNAN UMAT

BERAGAMA): A BRIEF

OVERVIEW

As the only Government affiliated institution in

Maluku, FKUB represents a significant opportunity

for several reasons. The study mainly shows that the

FKUB as an interlocutor for the project both due to

its potential and its needs. That is, the study mainly

examines the mandate and role of the FKUB, how it

interacts and connects to other actors, some

organizational challenges and opportunities for

strengthening its role and contributions to peace-

building.

The FKUB was established in 2006 by a joint

regulation from the ministries of Religious Affairs

and Home Affairs. The regulation sets out the

objectives and the mandate of the FKUB, and

stipulates that it should be operating at the province

and district levels. Local organizations were

established in many provinces and districts, including

in Ambon. The FKUB’s mandate is to provide a

regional interfaith dialogue umbrella at the province

and district levels of government. Its role is to

conduct dialogue among religious and community

leaders; to work with religious and community based

organizations and ensure their aspirations are

captured as policy submissions to the local

government and to conduct capacity building for

communities. This forum is also mandated to conduct

outreach programs on the government’s law and

regulations concerning religious harmony; and

finally, to provide capacity building for the

community. The objective is to encourage interfaith

ties and harmony.

The members of FKUB are to be suggested by the

people and selected by the government at each

respective level of the province or district. The FKUB

may be composed of up to 21 members at the

provincial level and 17 at the district level. All

existing religions at the province or districts/township

level should be represented. In FKUB Maluku, due to

the mobilization and individual circumstances, at

present only counts 12 active members. Interviews

highlighted that generally, the head of religious

groups appointed members and the names were

submitted to the Governor or the District Head/Mayor

who issues the letter of appointment.

Funding is a key challenge for the FKUB.

According to FKUB in Maluku, the organization

received an amount of 200 million rupiah for

2015.These funds are said to only cover office and

operational costs, and there is a shortage of funding

for programs and activities. The FKUB stated they

were not allowed to conduct their own independent

fundraising, is seen as a challenge. Maluku, as a

province of islands, inevitably needs more funding in

operating their work if FKUB is expected to get into

the remote districts. The local government’s limited

allocation could be an indication of the lack of

political will to support FKUB in their peace building

effort. Regardless, being a government affiliated

organization, changes of government can potentially

impact on FKUB’s program and sustainability.

Despite the FKUB being authorized to be

composed of 21 members, there are only 12 active

members, and the Maluku FKUB is significantly

short of their mandated membership. An active

member of FKUB Maluku claimed that he was not

informed or consulted about his recruitment process.

He was given a letter of appointment from the Maluku

Governor without any due process.

Examining the Potential of Local Interfaith Institution in Conﬂict Prevention and Resolution in Indonesia: The Case of Forum for Religious

Harmony (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama) of Ambon

1727

4 EXAMINING THE POTENTIAL

OF FORUM FOR RELIGIOUS

HARMONY (FORUM

KERUKUNAN UMAT

BERAGAMA) IN CONFLICT

PREVENTION AND

RESOLUTION IN AMBON

The FKUB and interviewees expressed that there is

significant missed opportunity with the FKUB. Based

on its official mandate, if it were to function to its

expected capacity, it would be a robust association or

forum that made a significant contribution to peace

building and conflict prevention. As the FKUB forms

part of the hierarchy of the Indonesian government

also comes with expectations for it to be a body that

can perform as a bank of solutions to interfaith and

communal conflicts.

Although the FKUB was established in Maluku in

2008 and is now in its seventh year of operations, the

impact of their work has not been felt by the general

public. As FKUB’s mandate include capacity

building for the community and conducting public

outreach, it is necessary to first establish relationship

with other actors. This is the key if it is to serve as a

strategic body to accommodate the aspirations of the

stakeholders from the three level groups (elite, middle

level and the grassroots) in Maluku society. The

FKUB is also well placed to identify and drive

synergy and interaction between the formal interfaith

institutions in Ambon and Maluku and the informal

and private interfaith institutions that may need

support for their united movements. It should assist

Maluku society shift from the current negative peace

to a positive peace setting. In order for it to work, it

needs to strengthen relations with actors at all levels,

and enhance its capacity in a targeted areas.

It is more likely that the public at all levels is not

aware of the role of the FKUB. There is a need and

the opportunity to conduct public outreach to raise

awareness of the role and mandate of the FKUB. As

an institution funded under the government, it is

expected that it could at least play an exemplary role

for other interfaith groups. In order for the FKUB to

function effectively, there is a need for making

FKUB’s presence known to the public and for

relationship building with other relevant religious and

interfaith stakeholders. Currently, FKUB has yet to

perform its coordination role and is limited to

networking within the elite circles. Due to the lack of

association and coordination between the lower

vertical levels, information disseminations and

outreach activities as stated per FKUB’s mandate are

yet to be implemented.

The FKUB could engage with all groups, and

perhaps specifically the middle level group. As set out

above, embracing the middle level group can

minimize the association or engagement gap. By

specifically targeting the middle level groups, actors

that are influential could come to participate actively,

gain ownership of peace building through the process.

They could also be important in providing access for

the grassroots to information, knowledge gathering,

developing skills in peace building and conflict

prevention. The FKUB should also work with mews

media as part of the middle-level group to

disseminate information regarding FKUB’s vision,

mission and efforts to implement its mandate and

support peace (Figure 2).

As an institution formed and funded by the

government, FKUB Maluku Province and Ambon

City showed awareness of their mission and vision.

FKUB members intended to fulfill the expectations;

however, the need for a tailor made strategy and an

implementable work program was recognized.

Figure 2: Different Levels of Cooperation FKUB Needs to

Maintain

FKUB as mandated by the Government of

Indonesia is not equipped with a detailed term of

references to guide the members in conducting their

day-to-day work. The Joint Minister Regulation No.

9 & 8/2006 was the only legal document to guide their

work; however, it is insufficient as guidance on

ICRI 2018 - International Conference Recent Innovation

1728

operational and implementation aspects.

For the Provincial FKUB in Maluku, formed by

the Governor of Maluku, members that are known to

the public for their leadership roles in other public

activities have been recruited. This is not seen to be

the case with the Ambon City FKUB members. In

the shadow of the provincial level, there is considered

to be significant missed opportunity in the

functioning of the Ambon City FKUB. It has not been

utilized as it should in Maluku peace building’s effort.

One interviewee expressed that the establishment of

the FKUB seems like more of a formality and to

check a box than to meet any real objectives. It has

not been turned into a forum with a significant role in

sustainable peace building for Maluku. At best, the

FKUB has been given the role and resources to be a

firefighter and reactive only when there is a conflict,

when it should be working to prevent and preempt.

A couple of types of building capacity efforts that

would benefit the FKUB in fulfilling its mandate and

better utilize its unique position in Ambonese society

to contribute to positive peace have been identified.

Firstly, support to enhance relationship building with

other actors and communications to raise awareness

of FKUBs role. Although FKUB may be able to some

extent, perform coordination tasks with religious or

interfaith middle level groups, but certainly they

cannot perform hands-on work at the grassroots level

due to the high level position in the provincial

hierarchical structure. In reaching the grassroots and

general public this forum will need to the assistance

of other religious or interfaith entity, which are

operating in the middle level group. Secondly,

training and capacity building in mediation and

dialogue will primarily make the FKUB able to

effectively carry out these initiatives. Finally, some

organizational development is needed. The FKUB

does not have a sound strategy and accompanying

work plan to guide its work.

5 CONCLUSIONS

It is important to note that some positive

developments can be traced in addressing post

conflict trauma, stigmatization and vulnerability in

Maluku, but that segregation and lack of trust still

defined societies. Government efforts have gone

some way in addressing problems, mostly focused on

economic development and access, and a range of

local and international organizations have also done

much to address issues. There is still significant

potential in improving these efforts, in particular by

linking up organizations from different religious

background and producing more joint work.

The FKUB has been identified as a particularly

well positioned organization to do this, given its

formal links to the government and influential

membership, while mandated to work with

communities at large. It is a multi religious

organization, and thus has the ideal starting point for

both providing an example for other organizations

and bringing groups together as well as working with

all. It is expected that FKUB and the middle-level

groups in Maluku that are involved in the effort of

peace building and sustainable peace effort will be

able to continue the work independently through

other means and efforts.

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Examining the Potential of Local Interfaith Institution in Conﬂict Prevention and Resolution in Indonesia: The Case of Forum for Religious

Harmony (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama) of Ambon

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