The Dynamics of Politics Indonesia: Patrimonial Bureaucracy Model

in Indonesia Period of Reform

M. Adian Firnas

Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Indonesia

Keywords: Patrimonial Bureaucracy, Neutrality, Patron-Client, Election of Regional Head

Abstract: This article discusses the political relations and bureaucracy in particular UU No. 34 of 2004 on the

Principles of Local Governance which provides the direct election of regional heads. It uses a qualitative

approach with secondary data sources.The reality occurs in the electionsareas, make the bureaucracy to be

neutral. Political and bureaucratic rulers take advantage of each other for their own sake. This relation

strengthens the literature on the development of bureaucracy in Indonesia,andit appears that patron-client

relationship or patrimonialism is apparent.The bureaucratic cooptation on the rulers' political interests is

inevitable because,in that relationship, there has been a mutually beneficial or symbiotic relationship of

mutualism.. The term patrimonialism or patrimonial politics in Choi's study refers to the dominance of

patron-client relations in the workings of political institutions rather than applying the principles of public

interest and professionalism. In another study, Crouch also saw that the Indonesian bureaucracy still tends to

be patrimonial, in which power is acquired and maintained by exchanging loyalty and support with material

positions and interests.This pattern of relationships has the potential to ignore the principles of meritocracy.

1 INTRODUCTION

Contribution to the development of bureaucracy is

based on the developing bureaucracy by its social

environment or in other words, attitudes,and values

adopted in society. Furthermore, the term

bureaucratic culture is the collective character of

society in living and treating bureaucracy, so it is not

limited to the behavior of the bureaucratic apparatus.

Bureaucratic ethics is the character of individual or

group of individuals, in this case, individual and

collective bureaucratic apparatus in understanding

and treating authority as bureaucratic apparatus

(Said, 2009).

From the literature on the development of

bureaucracy in Indonesia since the colonial era, it is

clear that the patron-client relationship or

patrimonialism is apparent. Bureaucratic cooptation

of political interests is unavoidable because in that

relationship there has been a mutually beneficial

relationship symbiotic mutualism.

In the period of independent until the end of the

Old Orderperiod, patrimonial bureaucracy is still

attached, andthe influence of feudalism and

colonialism continues.In the Old Order era, patron

relationship pattern is still active, and it was

powerful,and all bosses should be respected, obeyed,

and abstinence opposed. At this time bureaucrats

become the pedestal of everything. The tyrannical

seeds together with the guided democracy

environment live on the periphery,and the summit

ends with the insistence that gave birth to the New

Order.

In the era of the New Order, although there are

efforts to modernize the bureaucracy, the

characteristics of its patrimonial culture is still thick.

Later the term 'ABS' (AsalBapakSenang) or the

Origin of Father Glad that shows more bureaucratic

functions to the superiors next to the people. Father-

child relationship and “ewuh-pekiwuh” culture are

still affecting the life of the New Order political era.

In the contemporary context, the so-called

patron-clientrelationship is the ability of a patron to

provide chair, position, and employment for the

client (subordinate) with subordinate rewards must

provide job title, through tribute forms, envelopes,

and others. Therefore the subordinate exercises on

the boss associated with loyalty and high dedication

to his patron and beneficial to the community, which

formed them to be influential cultures in the

Reformation era.

Firnas, M.

The Dynamics of Politics Indonesia: Patrimonial Bureaucracy Model in Indonesia Period of Reform.

DOI: 10.5220/0009933516671674

In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Recent Innovations (ICRI 2018), pages 1667-1674

ISBN: 978-989-758-458-9

1667

2 POLITICS AND

BUREAUCRACY IN REFORM

ERA

The dominant political control of the New Order

regime had finally come to an end when a massive

wave of student demonstrations took place and

demanded the resignation of President Suharto. The

fall of Soeharto in 1998 marked the end of the New

Order regime and the beginning of the Reformation

era.

In order to respond to political reforms, in the

context of bureaucracy, the instruments of

legislation are revised to adjust to the circumstances

of the times. At the time of Megawati SoekarnoPutri

for example, by stipulating Undang-Undang No. 32

of 2004 on the Principles of Local Government. This

law is the primary basis for decentralization and

regional autonomy. This law also regulates the

election of regional heads and their representatives

(Governors, Regents, and Mayors) to be elected

directly by the people. The law also regulates the

relation of officials and civil servants in the Pilkada,

where there is a prohibition for officials to involve

civil servants in practical politics as well as to

engage in practical political activities.

Provisions for civil servants to be neutral are also

regulated in Undang-Undang No.43 of 1999 on the

Principles of Personnel. In Article 3, paragraph 2

mentions that civil servants should be neutral from

the influence of all groups and political parties and

not discriminatory in providing services to the

public.

Furthermore, with the enactment of Undang-

Undang No. 32 of 2004, then the election of regional

heads (Pilkada) must be done directly. The Pilkada

impacts brought changes to the bureaucratic

relations with politics, especially the bureaucratic

neutrality of politics. In some areas, the elections

have had an impact on civil servants to engage in

practical politics in the form of political support to

particular candidates.

The heads of regions elected by direct regional

head elections (Pilkada) must be aware in taking

policy included arranging their "cabinet." Therefore,

the cabinet is filled by government bureaucrats

officials who will support and implement political

policies and as a political channel head of the region

down.

It is essential for the regional head to have a

strategy in recruiting his government's bureaucratic

officials. This strategy is needed to get bureaucratic

officials who can work together in realizing four

things, among others: First, to ensure the

program/pledge during the campaign from

happening. Secondly, through the support of a stable

bureaucracy, the regional head can maintain his

power at least until the end of his tenure. Third,

creating an effective and efficient government.

Fourth, to accommodate the interests of political

forces that surround the regional head.

The need and expectation of such bureaucracy

are potentially disregarding the principles of

meritocracy, where consideration in the recruitment

of bureaucratic posts is based on personal interest,

placing those close to the leadership of political

forces prioritized even though they lack the

necessary specifications and qualifications in the

bureaucratic position (dilemma of loyalty and

competence). Ignoring the principles of meritocracy

in the body of government bureaucracy has the

potential for bureaucratic disease (bureanomia)

which affects:

First, bureaucracy and bureaucrats become

neutral or neutral. Second is the non-functioning of

promotion mechanisms of positions in career

positions within the government structure; Third,

bureaucracy and bureaucrats focus on the interests of

the rulers or political parties than the community;

The four bureaucracies and bureaucrats will perform

actions that are not elegant in accordance with his

professionalism, but move like a mass as practical

politics(Utomo, 2007).

In the case of Major Election in South Tangerang

city 2010, for example, became public attention

when the Constitutional Court canceled the victory

of candidate number four, AirinRachmiDiany and

Benjamin Davnie for being proven to have

committed systematic, structured, and massive

violations during the elections. Violations

committed by this couple, according to the

Constitutional Court was involving the power

structure, ranging from officials at the city level,

sub-district head, village head, until the head of RT /

RW. In practice use pressure on employees who are

not in line with the interests of the couple (Kompas,

2010). The sovereignty of the candidate in the

governor elections in South Sulawesi 2009, and in

many other regional elections. This phenomenon

shows that there are still problems in bureaucratic

reforms that proclaim the beginning of reforms that

want the bureaucracy to be modern, and neutral.

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3 THE MODEL OF THE

PATRIMONIAL

BUREAUCRACY

According to the Indonesian Dictionary, the term

neutrality shows a condition of someone who is free,

and does not take sides with certain groups or

groups, or conditions in which a person does not get

outside influence from himself (Alwi, 2005). In the

context of bureaucracy, neutrality means that the

bureaucracy is a system where the bureaucracy will

not change in providing services and be free from

the influence of certain political parties or groups.

The bureaucracy has to be in the framework of

professionalism not because of political or class

interests ( Thoha, 2003). Based on UU No. 43 of

1999 concerning Amendments to UU No. 8 of 1974

concerning the Principles of Employment, Article 3

paragraph 2 states that Public Servants must be

neutral from the influence of all groups and political

parties and not discriminate in providing public

services. Furthermore, the neutrality of civil servants

is regulated again in Goverment Regulation (PP)

No. 37 of 2004 concerning Prohibition of Civil

Servants to become Members of Political Parties. In

the consideration of the Government Regulation, it

is stated that Public Servants as elements of the state

apparatus must be neutral from the influence of all

groups and political parties, not discriminatory in

providing services to the public, and prohibited from

becoming members / administrators of political

parties. In Chapter II, article 2 paragraph 1 of the PP

states that civil servants are prohibited from

becoming members / administrators of political

parties. If there are civil servants who are members /

administrators of political parties, then according to

the provisions of article 2 paragraph 2 PP, these civil

servants must be dismissed from civil servants.

Based on the provisions of the regulation according

to the author, let alone be a member or manager of a

political party, being influenced by certain groups or

certain political parties is prohibited for civil

servants to guarantee their neutrality.

In addition to the ban on impartiality for civil

servants, the government also regulates the

prohibition of constituents or candidate pairs to

involve civil servants in politics. The provision is

regulated in PP Number 6 of 2005 concerning

Election, Ratification, Appointment and Dismissal

of Regional Heads and Deputy Regional Heads. This

regulation was issued on February 11, 2005. In

article 62 the PP clearly stipulates that the candidate

pair is prohibited from involving the Civil Servants,

Members of the Indonesian National Armed Forces,

members of the Indonesian National Police as

campaign participants and campaigners in the

election. The neutrality of civil servants in the

context of Pilkada is further regulated in the SE

Menpan No. 8 of 2005. In this circular it is stated

that civil servants who are candidates for the Head

or Deputy Regional Head, are obliged to make a

statement of ability to resign from office if elected as

Regional Head / Deputy Head Regions, are required

to undergo leave / inactive while in state positions

during the election process in accordance with the

provisions of the prevailing laws and regulations, are

prohibited from using government and / or regional

government budgets, are prohibited from using

facilities related to their positions, are prohibited

from involving other civil servants to provide deep

support campaign. Whereas for civil servants who

are not candidates for Regional Head or Deputy

Regional Head, it is prohibited as an Election

Supervisory Committee, except from the Prosecutor

and Higher Education elements or unless there is an

element of the Attorney General's Office and Higher

Education, civil servants can be domiciled as the

electoral supervisory committee appointment of

KPUD with the approval of the Regional Head, is

prohibited from engaging in campaign activities to

support candidates for Regional Head and or Deputy

Regional Head, is prohibited from using facilities

related to his position in campaign activities, is

prohibited from making decisions and or actions that

benefit or harm one candidate during the period

campaign, is prohibited from being a member of the

District Election Committee (PPK), the Voting

Committee (PPS) and the Voting Organizing Group

(KPPS), except in the electoral district there are no

independent community leaders as referred to in

Government Regulation Number 6 Year 2 005 for

the appointment of KPUD with the approval of the

Regional Head. These provisions regarding the

neutrality of civil servants are also regulated in SE

Menpan No. 7 of 2009.

Karl D Jackson tried to explain the involvement

of the bureaucracy in politics by using the

bureaucratic polity model, where there was an

accumulation of power in the State and the removal

of society from politics and government. The

interest of participation at the elite level outside the

State is only at the stage of policy implementation.

They are small adjustments at the local level. This

model explains the existence of a form of political

system with the power to make decisions lies

entirely in the hands of state rulers, especially

military officers, high-ranking bureaucrats, and no

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community participation. The only mobilization in

bureaucratic politics is competition between the

bureaucratic circles and the military elite. This elite,

especially the President, will determine socio-

economic change, with the possibility of the

following: (a) the development of a competitive

democratic political system based on mass political

parties and citizen participation; (b) the motion to a

single party, to a mobilization regime with

ideological underpinnings; or (c) bureaucratic

political survival. The country of bureaucratic policy

is different from the militarist rule because its basic

style and purpose are more bureaucratic and

technocratic than military. While the sole ruler

(Sultanic regime), whose legitimacy based on the

authority of the leader's charisma, is different from

bureaucratic polity in the decision-making process.

Because in bureaucratic polity decisions are taken

jointly in bureaucratic and military alliances.

Jackson also saw a patrimonial element, namely the

elite relationship of the state united through patron-

client relationship (Jackson, 1977). In line with

Jackson, Harold Crouch sees that bureaucratic

politics in Indonesia contains three main features.

First, the dominant political institution is

bureaucracy. Secondly, other political institutions

such as parliaments, political parties, and interest

groups are in a state of weakness that is unable to

compensate or control the power of the bureaucracy.

Third, the mass outside the bureaucracy is passive,

which is partly the weakness of political parties

(Crouch, The New Order: The Prospect for Political

Stability, 2006). In another study, Crouch also sees

that Indonesian bureaucracy is still a patrimonial

tendency, in which power is acquired and

maintained by exchanging loyalty and support with

material positions and interests (Crouch,

Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia,

1979).

Meanwhile, William Lidde rejects the view that

in bureaucracy crucial decisions are taken on a

scientific basis by long-term social and political

interests to achieve an equitable society. He argues

that bureaucratic networks rely on patron and client

networks called neopatrimonialism.

"Neopatrimonialism" bureaucracy is the power

relationship between the rulers and the subordinate

bureaucracy (Patriarchal, priyayi, and other) patron-

client networks. The ruler as a patron (Gusti /

Father/ Master), while bureaucracy as a client

(Kawula / Abdi / Anak). The relationship is nothing

more than an exchange between loyalty and

position. If not loyal and serve maximally to the

ruler, a client will not get a position. In neo-

patrimonial bureaucracies or relationship, positions

are the sources of material income. The higher the

position, the higher the income earned because there

is a presumption that in the office attached great

authority to expand the opportunity to earn

income(Lidle, 1992).

Donald K. Emmerson also presented the theory

of patrimonialism in the bureaucracy by examining

the bureaucratic structure of the New Order.

Patrimonialism refers to a power centred on the

acquisition of certain individuals who accumulate

power, while others identify their interests. The ruler

distributes the resources of his power to a credible

party and has significant influence in the community

to maintain the sustainability and stability of his

power. While for, for those interested parties, have

accessibility in seeking political and economic

protection within the power structure. The

relationship takes place in a profitable exchange

maintained neatly by both parties (Emmerson,

1983).

Although the above research is not new, in the

context of analysis it is still necessary to illustrate

how bureaucratic patterns in Indonesia in the past

few decades have somehow contributed to the

current pattern and color of the bureaucracy.

3.1 Cases of Bureaucratic Politicization

in the 2009 Election

In the 2009 election, there are still many cases of

bureaucratic politicization, although this is the third

election era of Reformation and these bureaucrats

have long been getting socialization about the

necessity to uphold the neutral attitude. Moreover,

the issue of bureaucratic politicization has also

considered as an election criminal act. There are

three categories of election violations:

1. Administrative Offenses:

a. Campaign state officials without a letter of

absence

b. The campaign over time

c. Cross-regional campaign

d. Change of campaign type

e. Convoy not previously notified to police &

off track

f. Violation of the limitations of the frequency

and duration of the campaign's ad

impressions

2. Election Crime Violations:

a. Engaging children

b. Civil servants who use civil servant attributes

c. Civil servants who mobilize civil servants in

their work environment

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d. Campaign out of schedule

e. Destruction or disappearance of campaign

props

f. Implementers and campaign officers

contempt other campaign participants

g. Use of the state or government facilities

h. Involvement of state / regional / military /

village officials

i. Money politic

3. Other Violations:

a. Traffic violations

b. Not reporting campaign implementers to

KPU / D and copies to Bawaslu / Panwaslu

The exposure of the Minister of Home Affairs

Mardiyanto in a meeting with the Commission II of

the House of Representatives on May 4, 2009, found

several cases of legislative election campaign

involving bureaucracy, i.e., 2 cases of state officials

mobilizing civil servants in Papua.Four cases stated

officials were campaigning without a permit from

the Minister of Home Affairs, 12 cases of civil

servants conducted campaigns using certain political

party attributes and using civil servant uniforms, 68

cases of state officials using the state facilities, and

21 cases involving civil servants, TNI / Polri, and

village apparatus.

Another case was in the North Sumatera Election

Supervisory Committee; it found at least seven

regional heads to mobilize their government

apparatus to win specific candidates and political

parties. The seven areas were PematangSiantar City,

Binjai, Mandailing Natal District, Central Tapanuli,

Asahan, SerdangBedagai, and LabuhanBatu. In

KabupatenTapanuli Tengah, panwaslu found

evidence of recording of village heads and sub

district heads who deliberately called for the people

to vote for the Democratic Party. The same thing

happened in PematangSiantar.

Meanwhile, in PematangSiantar, Panwaslu also

found the Head of Education and Teaching Office,

SurungSialagan, conducted a veiled campaign

involving principals, overseers, teachers. The

campaign was done to win the Democratic Party.

Integrated Law Enforcement Center 2009

PematangSiantar City has officially designated

Surung as a criminal suspect.

The above cases show that the tendency to make

bureaucracy as a political machine and money

machine to win certain political parties strengthens

in the regions. In addition to the issue of the many

heads of regions coming from politics, this tendency

also arises because of supervision in weak areas. It

also undeniable that the election moment serves as a

venue for repayment for party cadres who have been

elected to be executive officers to show loyalty and

devotion to his party by trying to maximize his party

in the region.

3.2 Cases of Bureaucratic Politicization

in Major Election in Depok (2005

and 2010)

The case of a Major election in Depok is an

example. Major Election in Depok is the first

Pilkada in West Java Province. Thus the success of

election in Depok will become the first barometer of

the success of elections in cities and districts of West

Java. The Major election in Depok is also the means

to see how the implications of decentralized politics,

especially the struggle of local elites in power

struggle. In the context of bureaucratic and political

relations, the election is also an instrument to see if

theneutralismof the bureaucracy.

In the process of the election in Depok, 2005, has

also been an inconvenience among civil servants.

Badrul has a relatively powerful bureaucratic

machine, from the municipal level to the village, to

be driven for his victory. The non-neutrality of civil

servants is due to the strong influence of Badrul

Kamal among the bureaucracy has caused the civil

servant to side with this incumbent candidate. For

civil servants in Depok, it is better to support an

obvious candidate, rather than choosing other

candidates from outside who are not clear and may

not be able to support the acceleration of his career.

Moreover, at that time rumours circulated, the urban

village and sub district officials in Depok were

promised Badrul Kamal's team that if he were re-

elected, all Sub-District Heads and Lurahs would be

re-appointed for the next term. For officials, the lure

of the reappointment or the extension of tenure by

his direct supervisor is undoubtedly exciting. Proof

of the allegation of civil servants is the emergence of

a letter of rejection to NurMahmudi Ismail signed by

42 urban villages of Depok. On December 30, 2005,

42 the heads of the local district (Lurah) from 63

urban villages in Depok City also sent a letter of

rejection of the Supreme Court's Decision to

President SoesiloBambangYudhoyono, House of

Representatives, and Minister of Home Affairs.

Rejection of the lurah who incidentally PNS

certainly very surprising because in this position

they should be neutral. One of these cases shows

how powerful Badrul Kamal's influence is capable

of mobilizing the bureaucracy for his political

interests.

The behaviour of civil servants above shows that

there has not been a loss of patron-client relationship

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1671

culture which can affect the performance of

bureaucracy that should distinguish themselves from

the practice of particularism both by nepotism and

primordialism. The client's patron relationship which

is an emotional connection between the servant and

the devotee is thought to affect the bureaucratic

system in Depok government. This phenomenon

occurs along with the work and the spread of

sympathizers of certain parties in positions and

positions on the city government. The sympathizers

of political parties who have been in government can

be influenced by the interests of the group or party

because of the relationship between the person who

serves and devote.

In the case of a Major election in 2010, there

are four pairs of candidates. Nurmahmudi pair with

KH.Idris Abdul Somad (PKS, PAN, PNBK, Pioneer

Party, and Republican), YuyunWirasaputra Paired

with PriyadiSupriyatna (Hanura, Gerindra and 13

Small Party), GantahSunuSumantri-Derry Drajat

(Independent) and Badrul Kamal-

AgusSupriyanto(Golkar, Democrat, PDI-P, PPP,

PKB, PDS, and PDP).

When examined by the candidates who fought in

this election, three of them have the potential to

present the practical politics of bureaucracy. Three

candidate packages have a strong background to

mobilize the bureaucracy. It can be seen by

categorizing it in incumbent and ex-incumbent.

Incumbent category attached to the couple

Nurmahmudi-Idris Abdul Samad and Yuyun-

Priyadi. Nurmahmudi is the mayor of Depok who is

still in office, while YuyunWirasaputra is the

Deputy Mayor who is still in office. The ex-

incumbent category attached to the bureaucracy

which was his former subordinate when he served as

mayor. These positions cannot be denied leaving

traces of superior and subordinate relationships. That

way the incumbent or ex-incumbent package is sure

to have a network with bureaucracy.

With this condition, in this election civil servants

are fragmented in the political camps that can divide

civil servants. Some civil servants support

Nurmahmudi, some support Yuyun, and some

support Badrul Kamal. This situation, of course,

makes the work situation becomes uncomfortable

because there is mutual suspicion-suspect, to whom

the civil servant is in favor.

The incumbent mayor NurMahmudi Ismail is

more supported by civil servants who have strategic

positions, such as heads of departments, sub-

districts, and lurahs. While the incumbent vice

mayor of YuyunWirasaputrais partially supported by

a mutated official or civil servant who has hope to

improve his career if the incumbent he supports

becomes the winner. Meanwhile, Badrul Kamal was

supported by officials who were mutated or demoted

when NurMahmudi became mayor in 2006 and civil

servants who wanted to improve his career if Badrul

Kamal was elected as mayor.

The alignment of civil servant officials can be

seen from the policies made by the official that

favour certain candidates. For example the

installation of banners or the spread of strikers with

images of particular candidates. In the report

Bawaslu for example, there are reports in Bedahan

Village Lurah local distributed door to door money

to the public to pick specific candidates. Mutation

practices are also done to suppress officials who are

considered to support their political opponents. The

case of DepokWinwinWinantika's sudden removal,

for example, is allegedly loaded with political

content.

Similarly, the failure of the incumbent to resolve

the conflict at the beginning of his administration

will generate grudge and result in support for the ex-

incumbent candidate with the hope that if this ex-

incumbent candidate is re-elected, then his career

will increase. In another case, according to the

Chairman of DPRD Depok, Drs.RintisYanto, a form

of official bureaucratic support is demonstrated by

making a campaign facility policy that benefits

specific candidates, such as the Cimanggis Sub-

district by making the incumbent incarcerated PSN

data collection form and Head of Fire Department

who also deploy incumbent stickers on the eve of the

elections.

3.3 Pilkada Siak 2011

In the elections of Siak District, for example, there

are many problems in the implementation of

elections, one of which is the neutrality of

bureaucracy. The bureaucratic neutrality of the Siak

District Government is questioned after the

phenomenon of alignment of some civil servants in

the scope of Siak District Government to one of the

candidates of the regional head of Syamsuar-Alfedri.

The phenomenon of alignment in the number three

pair is seen in various ceremonial moments or

activities insome places. Like Rebana Performances

in Tualang District Hall, PGRI Hospitality in Sungai

Mandau Subdistrict, Education Quality Seminar and

PGRI Anniversary in TualangSubdistrict and Apit

River.

The unbreakable potential of bureaucracy in

Pemilukada of Siak Regency in 2011, is driven by

several reasons. First, the extent of political

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accessibility, especially for incumbent candidates or

candidates who received support from the head of

the region at the time. The explanation was an

incumbent candidate or candidate who received

support from the head of the ruling region at that

time had a natural political force, namely the

prerogative to change the position of Civil servants

under it.It makes the bureaucracy psychologically

relatively less courageous to choose other

candidates. It is what happened during the

Pemilukada of Siak Regency in 2011; theSyamsuar-

Alfedri couple was supported by the Head of Siak H.

Arwin Regency, all political actions were done for

the sake of the Syamsuar-Alfedri partners. Second,

the proof is difficult. Not infrequently the use of

bureaucracy in politics is closed.

Consequently, the indications of not being

neutral bureaucracy are not natural. Third, still lax

rules of law. Article 79 paragraph (4) of Law no. 32

of 2004 does mention that candidate pairs are

prohibited from involving Civil Servants, members

of the Indonesian National Army, and members of

the Indonesian National Police as campaign

participants in the election of regional heads and

deputy head of the region. However, this article in

practice still contains weaknesses. The case of

bureaucratic utilization by the regional head for

another candidate (not himself) as described above

cannot be charged because the law does not regulate

it. The involvement of bureaucracy in the process of

Pemilukada of Siak Regency is considered to have

damaged the ideal bureaucratic image,Pemilukada

has changed the face of bureaucracy into a practical

political machine that stands above the political

interests of the perpetrators.

4 CONCLUSIONS

The history of Indonesia's bureaucracy since pre-

colonial, colonial, independence until the New Order

era cannot separate itself from political influence.

Bureaucracy has always been a tool of authority and

used for the sake of the authorities. As a result, such

long-standing bureaucratic and political contacts

have become a culture that undermines the mentality

and performance of the bureaucratic apparatus.

The revolving reforms since 1998 have brought

the message of a fundamental change to aspects of

democratic life in Indonesia, including changes to

the bureaucracy. The planned bureaucratic reforms

are expected to be the starting point of a

professional, neutral and clean bureaucracy from

corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN). It is this

spirit that makes people optimistic that the era of

Reform will erode all forms of bureaucratic

corruption as it did in the previous era.

Through the spirit of good governance, the

community demands the government to realize and

implement good governance. The old patterns of

governance must be changed with new patterns of

governance based on the principles of good

governance.

Furthermore, various legislation products appear

as a legal umbrella for bureaucratic reform such as

Undang-Undang No. 43/1999 on civil servants, PP

No. 37/2004 on the prohibition of civil servants as

members of political parties, and PP No. 42/2004

concerning the Development of Corps of Life and

Code of Ethics of civil servants.

This research found that the implementation of the

regulation has not been effective. The discovery of

patrimonial bureaucratic model proved it. The

relationship model is clear in the case of

bureaucratic politicization in the election. There are

three elections in this era of Reformation,andthey

always found cases of bureaucratic politicization.

Violations committed by civil servants are usually

associated with the use of state facilities for the

interests of a particular party; the mobilization of

superiors for civil servants to choose a candidate or a

particular party. The use of civil servants attributes

in campaigns, or covert campaigns conducted by

civil servants in each installation by affecting

colleagues, work to choose a particular candidate or

party.

In conclusion, the cause is still the politicization

of bureaucracy are among others: First, the attitude

of politicians / Heads of regions who are not

statesmen. Based on the cases mentioned above,

often the cause of the involvement of bureaucracy in

politics instead of encouragement from superiors.

Regional Heads who are politicians or party cadres

are often not professional. They use the bureaucracy

for the sake of their political party. Secondly, the

political culture of the patron-client that still exists

within the bureaucratic body causes the strong desire

of these bureaucrats to provide the best service to

their superiors, including providing political support

to their superiors. Itis clearly followed by the hope

that if his boss is re-elected or his political party

wins, these bureaucrats will gain an uplift and a

bureaucratic position. Third, excessive personal

Fanatism. That is civil servants who have the right to

vote to have the space to express their political

choices. Often excessive fanaticism of the political

parties of his choice carried in his work

environment. It is shown by overtly bolding them to

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install certain party strikers in their workplace, or

using hours of work to attend a particular party's

campaign. Fourthly, the attitude of the boss is not

assertive. Often the politicization of bureaucracy

occurs because of an unresponsive boss's attitude

cracking down on his subordinates involved in

practical politics. The fifth is the weakness of the

law enforcement process. This issue can also be

considered the cause of bureaucratic politicization.

Punishments that do not create a deterrent effect and

lengthy legal process for civil servants who are

considered to violate the election, make the case of

bureaucratic politicization always happen.

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