

Islam, Democracy, and Equality

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Abstract: The relationship between Islam and democracy, on the one hand, is considered compatible, while others call it as a paradoxical relationship. Islam as a religion has a particular standard in placing social diversity. At least, the existence of Islam as a religion positions itself "different" from other religions and thus demands special treatment in state policy, as the democracy system places all religions equally. The proposed procedural mechanism of democracy tends to create dominance that threatens the space of equality. This article agrees on the compatibility of Islam and democracy but questioning to what extent is the tolerance level when it comes to the implementation of equality in a democracy. This discussion is important because if the limits of religious involvement in the public sphere are not clearly defined, there is a potential for the majority to dominate the minority. There are rules and regulation which are dominated by the interests of the Islamic teaching which gains rejection on its practical level. Even though the deliberation process has been taken place but the law is kept being run due to satisfying the public interest.

1 INTRODUCTION

Democracy is a system which gives equal opportunities for individuals in expressing their aspirations in the public sphere. Aspirations that are tolerated in a democracy should be in line with democratic principles, namely freedom, and equality. Religion as a guiding value in social life can emerge as part of citizens' aspirations. That is why at some point religion is placed as a value that can strengthen democracy. However, many also doubt the correlation between the two. Huntington, for example, sees Islam as incompatible with democracy (Huntington, 1993). According to Huntington, the Islamic and Western systems have absolute differences so that they cannot be merged. The Western system that Huntington refers to is a democracy born from values that grow from the West. Among Muslims, this view gained its legitimacy through a view that forbids democracy. Islam as a doctrine that cannot be disturbed by its truthfulness while democracy is a conception that is always open to correction.

Other experts point out the coherence between Islam and democracy. Esposito, for example, places Islam as a religion that has a various relationship with democracy. Based on his observations in Egypt, Algeria, Pakistan, Malaysia, Sudan, and Iran,

Esposito explains that there are dynamics of different relations between Islam and democratic practices. The experience from the six countries implies the existence of a common thread between Islam and democracy, but this relationship is not absolute. The implementation of democracy in the six countries has not yet shown the maximum implementation of democracy (Esposito & Voll, *Islam and Democracy*, 1996). Recent views of Islamic and democratic relations show the constructive and mutually reinforcing relationships. Conceptually, the experts have long argued about the conceptions in Islam such as equality (*al-musawa*), deliberation (*al-shura*), justice (*al-'adalah*), freedom (*al-hurriyyah*), and tolerance (*at-tasamuh*). These conceptions are only in the realm of justification without facts, qualified democratic practices, or shown by Esposito and Voll. However, the democratic process in Indonesia after bureaucratic authoritarianism showed a new phenomenon. One of the critical works in portraying the factual relations of Islam and democracy, in fact, is the findings of Saiful Mujani in his book; *Muslim Democrats*. His thesis does disputes not only Huntington's thesis but also gives an agreement on the relations presented by Esposito and Voll. As the largest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia has shown a constructive democracy by showing a stable

implementation of democracy and four elections at the national level. However, the relationship between Islam and democracy Indonesia cannot be separated from the fact that Islam is a dominant religion which dominates the country. In a democracy, freedom is the basis that allows all individuals to actualize their aspirations based on equality. In this context, the relations of Islam and effective democracy in Indonesia use trials by looking at the factors that exist in the name of majoritarian and negating minority intentions.

The space of freedom presented by democracy leads to majoritarian domination which eliminates the existence of minorities which will eventually become a single force. This research departs from the facts that religious domination in Indonesia's politic in the midst of a democracy that promotes equality. This dominance can appear in the first form, formulation of Islamic values in legislation. Second, internal forces within political parties both in the form of organizations and political choices which put forward the symbolization of religion. Third, power interplay in legislative institutions that support political parties at different times.

This fact shows the substantial domination of religion through a tool of democracy that narrows down space for the interests of other minority religious groups. This is where the problem of access to Islam as a religion with democracy provides a space for the freedom to articulate interests. The problem is equipped with religion and democracy not only in aspects of religion that are appropriate to the deviation, but also at relative levels, including values in religion.

The position of religion in a democracy tends to be alienated especially institutionally. Religion becomes a private value that has no direct connection with public life. However, in countries that have just transformed into democratic countries, such as Indonesia, the power of communal values that are influenced by religion is very strong with all the consequences, between surviving with a democratic system with the tendency of its majoritarian domination or returning to a communal-centralistic system.

2 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF DEMOCRACY

For Muslim countries, the implementation of democracy is still an agenda for confirmation, most of them have not used a minimum standard of

democracy, namely a system that provides expression space for citizen politics. Of the few Muslim countries that implement democracy, there are those who can survive, but not a few who retreat (Esposito, Sonn, & Voll, *Islam and Democracy After the Arab Spring*, 2016).

One of the problems in democracy in Muslim countries is the lack of a civic culture that is compatible with democracy.

The lack of tolerance and respect are not very strong among people which result in domination and losing the substance of the democracy.

On the other hand, Muslim countries that have succeeded in implementing a stable system also experienced the dominating symptoms on the basis of democratic principles, namely freedom. Islam or Muslim population is used as legitimacy to fight for their aspirations in a maximum and dominant manner. Humans in the shadow of Islamization which at certain points gain legitimacy from minority groups. This is what happened in Indonesia as a country that has the most population of Muslims in the world with a relatively stable democratic system (Menchik, 2016).

Reading the relations between Islam and the state in Indonesia is always associated with socio-historical reality as the legitimacy of the facilities enjoyed by Muslims (Effendy, 1997). Likewise, Islamic patterns in Indonesia are often measured in majoritarian tendencies, so that Islam that appears in the Indonesian context is moderate Islam (Mujani, 2004).

Bahtiar Effendy's analysis related to the relationship between Islam and the state refers to the New Order regime whose centralistic power system or in Guillermo O'Donnell's language is authoritarian-bureaucratic. Under these conditions, the state is so strong in determining all forces in the community, including Muslims who are quantitatively the majority. But in the study it was also found that in the midst of the hegemony of the state Muslim powers emerged as a new middle class with better levels of education. The growth of modernist Muslim power cannot be ignored by the state to be able to support the continuity of its power. The accommodative form of the state against the strength of the Muslim community by itself forces the state to "adjust" itself to these new developments in various fields. The rare vertical mobility of Muslims at the beginning of the New Order's power was increasingly unstoppable into various levels of government and the private sector in line with these developments. This capital also

strengthens the direction of reform as the collective will of society.

The increasing level of public education causes them to increasingly understand the rights and obligations as citizens. Under these conditions, the state cannot close itself to these changes and developments. This is the forerunner of reform in response to the cultural demands of citizens for repressive power structures. The strength of the cultural aspects that grow in society as a basis for change according to Saiful Mujani is the capital for democracy. The strength of values that attach social groups or organizations, including within Muslims in Indonesia, is an important part of the survival of democracy in the largest Muslim country in the world. That is the role of democrat Muslims who guard democracy can run without significant obstacles as happened in Muslim countries in the Middle East that tend to be unstable and fail to celebrate democracy.

An optimistic view of the development of democracy in Indonesia is based on the availability of abundant civil society for a long time. (Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam*, 2001). The existence of civil society in a pluralistic society is an important capital for strengthening the level of community participation. Civil society as a force that exists between family and the state becomes the foundation for the maintenance of voluntary interaction among individual citizens. This is based on the facts that take place in strong democracies that cannot be separated from the strong base of civil society. America is a classic example of the presence of clubs or organizations or groups that are based on religion, culture, business, trade unions, and others that are a vehicle for strengthening voluntary interaction between members. In this interaction a variety of information was spread which mobilized members to engage more strongly in various social activities. This is the social capital that has always been a foundation for the sustainability of democratic life. According to Hefner, Indonesia has strong capital in the Indonesian Islamic community that has become accustomed to social strengthening through various associations. Long before independence the associations grew up in the midst of society as a medium of transformation for the awakening of the nation from various forms of colonization.

Historically there have been various distortions when both colonizers and ruling elites use or silence these forces to support their interests. Groups that initially had independence and therefore became drivers for social transformation, were co-opted to maintain the status quo and were even used as a tool of power against society. This was seen in the colonial era and in the New Order era with a

centralized power system and controlling all social forces. However, deviations by the state by suppressing the power of civil society did not dampen the transformative steps that took place in the community. Moreover, the existence of Islamic organizations is becoming increasingly important even for its own power so that the state is "forced" to accommodate the strength of Islamic civil society. This fact further emphasized the importance of Muslim civil society in Indonesia which at the same time denied Samuel P. Huntington's thesis about the fragility of the democratic base in Muslim society. Hefner actually shows the opposite fact, namely the relationship between Islam and democracy in the Indonesian context.

The important point of the relationship between Islam and democracy in Indonesia is getting stronger with the presence of reforms that undermine the authoritarian regime that has been in power for more than thirty years. Various forces in society that were previously curbed, can now actualize themselves in the midst of freedom. But like the market, this freedom allows the emergence of a counterproductive force, namely the existence of forces contrary to democratic principles. The freedom enjoyed by everyone is restricted by the steps of other groups that indirectly limit the freedom of others. There is a tendency for the majority to control minorities in the name of freedom enjoyed in various domains, including in fighting for religious aspirations.

Likewise, the existence of a moderate majority Muslim and most of the silent majority do not necessarily dominate the state policy. On the contrary, some state policies are determined by a group of people or political parties which at some point do not reflect the representation of the number of citizens, even contradictory. This can be seen from a number of policies related to religion which are driven by political parties which are not based and based on religion. This is beneficial for Islamic political parties that never get a dominant vote in the DPR so that it is not easy to incorporate Islamic values that are pursued in policy or law. On the other hand, the higher level of piety in society does not interfere with their political choices. Secular parties remain dominant in the legislature. There is a paradox between "secular" aspirations and "Islamization" tendencies in the realm of legislation. This is what is examined in this paper by revealing the presence of Islamic values in legislation intended for many public interests.

3 ISLAMIZATION OF LEGISLATION

Indonesia's democratic journey has faced challenges that are often regarded as part of the consequences of democracy, namely the existence of interests to dominate based on religious teachings which are limited to adherents. This is evident in the case of legislation or regulations that are intended to be limited to the interests of Muslims, but also to various public interests. Some legislation that shows the existence of "intervention" of Islamic teachings for the public interest can be seen, at least in three legislative products as carried out by the Islamic political party, the United Development Party (PPP). For PPP, there are two forms of Islamic values (*tathbiquis syari'ah*) which are fought for and used as a basis by a faction of PPP in responding to the three bills; Pornography, Health, and PDRE (The Elimination of Racial and Ethnic Discrimination). First, universal Islamic values that are believed not only by Muslims, but also humanity as a whole, such as justice, honesty, togetherness, unity, equality before the law, and human rights, which are more substantive. Second, values that are only believed by all Muslims, such as the prohibition of showing off genitalia in the public domain, the prohibition on adultery, haram alcohol, and others. These values are more symbolic by referring to verbal standards in the Quran, hadith, and *ijma'* (agreement) of the scholars. These two formulations are part of an ideology which according to Maurice Duverger is a rationalization and systematization effort that reflects the development of its society (Duverger, 2005).

Both formulations of Islamic values are reflected in the PPP statutes. These values are then used as a basis and reference in a faction plenary meeting related to the discussion of the three bills that are the focus of this research. The plenary meeting was a meeting involving all cross-commissioned PPP cadres to establish a common perception regarding the articles that were considered to be contradictory or potentially contrary to Islamic values. This process according to the party system theory, as proposed Scott Mainwaring is a necessity that can deliver the party to its institutionalization and move the entire party system simultaneously (Mainwaring & Torcal, 2005).

Based on the foundation of the formulation of Islamic values, the debate within the PPP faction is more at the effort of equating perceptions related to the articles in the three bills that need to be strengthened, revised, or amended if they are

considered contradictory or potentially causing the interpretations that deviate from Islamic teachings. In this case, the party system as initiated by Moshe Maor is an essential part in determining the direction and steps of the party as an independent variable or determined (dependent variable) (Maor, 1997).

In the discussion of the Pornography Bill, the PPP highlighted several articles that were deemed necessary to be maintained, strengthened and clarified because they were considered to have the potential to produce distorted interpretations or effects that were on the contrary to Islamic teachings. Among the articles is Article 1 on the definition of pornography, it does not only includes graphics (images) but also related to body movements (*pornoaction*). The PPP supports, and interpretations of the definition of pornography include the expansion of the definition from only considering pictures as the subject. Likewise, prohibitions and restrictions on pornography for personal use (Article 6), according to PPP, pornography cannot be tolerated even though it is for personal use. Also, spreading pornographic content and seeing images of certain body parts are prohibited in religion. Another problem is the role of the community in preventing the circulation of pornography (Article 21) which, by PDIP Party and PDS, is a Christian-based political party, is considered to be able to make room for the single trial by the community. For PPP, community participation is an essential part of Islamic teachings as well as the implementation of Article 4 (b) in the PPP Constitution, namely *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* (commanding goodness, forbidding evil).

Although the PPP does not include Islamic teachings symbolically into all (44) articles in the Pornography Bill, by looking at the background of the proposed bill, including from academic studies, the substance contained in all articles shows a visible substantive correlation to Islamic teachings, as well as the other religious teachings. However, the substantive values were not explicitly dictated by PPP, especially during the article per article discussion. Hence, the allegation of Islam dominance in the bill cannot be proven. For example sanctions for pornographic actors, PPP still refers to criminal sanctions as applicable in relevant laws, such as the Criminal Code, Broadcasting Law, or Electronic Information and Transaction Law. There is no elaboration of sanctions in Islam in the form of *ta'zir* or educative punishment (*ta'dib*) with the intention of scaring (*tankif*) against immoral acts in with no provision and fine. This fact proves that ideology, as assumed by Roy C. Macridis, has not

succeeded in becoming the base of the entire party system as part of the institutionalization effort which ultimately affects people's choice (Macridis, 1983).

PPP's attitude towards the Pornography Bill is different from its attitude towards the Health Bill which in several articles links it to symbolic Islamic teachings. PPP provides some notes on the Health Bill in accordance with the provisions contained in Islamic teachings, mainly because the Health Bill has an extensive scope, thus providing a relatively broad interpretation space. Regarding the number of articles, the Health Bill consists of 205 articles, far more than the previous Health Act (Law No. 23 of 1992) which has 90 articles and covers more on medical aspects. Just as in the Pornography Bill, PPP does not provide notes on every article, but articles that have the potential to conflict with Islamic teachings are chosen.

There are three issues highlighted by PPP in the discussion of the Health Bill which is directly related to Islamic law and accepted as part of the Health Law. First, the problem of abortion. Abortion in Islam is prohibited (haram) because it is as the same as killing life. However, there is also a clause allowing abortion because of the considerations justified by the Shari'a. Therefore, PPP provides strict requirements for abortion. In addition to the consideration of the safety of the fetus and mother, PPP also requires religious considerations in deciding whether or not the abortion is carried out (Article 77 of the Health Act). Second, reproductive health and rights. In the Health Bill, women get their rights to determine the process before, when and after pregnancy. Although there is an explanation that reproductive rights remain in the corridor of rules taken from various sources of value, including from religion, PPP emphasizes that mother can do exclusive breastfeeding for six months, but it is also possible for a mother to breastfeed for up to two years as recommended in the Qur'an. The third is about post-mortem, its medical standards, including other issues surrounding post-mortem. Medically, when someone dies the body parts can be taken and used for medical purposes. However, according to PPP which referring to the teaching of Islam, the dead so treated with care and should not be harmed in that way. The views and considerations referred to in symbolic Islam are accommodated in the explanation of articles in the 2009 Health Law. If referring to the two formulations of Islamic values; symbolic and substantive, the success of incorporating symbolic values, although not easy, is the same degree as substantive values if the PPP is

able to translate it comprehensively into the overall bill as well as the ideological conception in general.

In the case of the PDRE Bill, the PPP's emphasis on Islamic values is more on the basic foundation of the bill, namely the importance of tolerance in plural society as part of the sunnatullah as reflected in the Quran (Surat al-Hujurat: 13). Therefore, the PPP is fighting for the bill not to be limited to racial and ethnic discrimination, but all aspects that have the potential to cause discrimination.

Unlike the discussion on the drafting process of Pornography and Health Law which received support from internal factions, in the discussion of the draft of PDRE Bill, some PPP members wanted the bill to not focus on racial and ethnic issues, because those are the less important issue in the religious practice. Therefore, in addition to providing support, PPP is also fighting for the role of religion in helping to eliminate discrimination, as most do not provide religious nuances in the bill. For example, in the matter of equality and justice which contains two from the six principles which PPP supports and both values have been accommodated in the PDRE Bill. The bill mentions on Article 2 Paragraph (1) that "The elimination of racial and ethnic discrimination is carried out based on the principles of equality, freedom, justice and universal human right values."

Moreover, Article 2 paragraph (2) mentions "The principle of equality, freedom, justice and universal human values as referred to in paragraph (1) is carried out while maintaining religious values ."

Likewise related to civil rights. PPP advocates for revision of the vote in item (d) in the elucidation of Article 10 which states; "The right to choose a spouse in marriage." For PPP, the word "marriage" must be added with the word "legitimate" so that there will be no similar marriages that are contrary to Islamic teachings as well as in accordance with Article 28B paragraph (1) of the Constitution of Republic of Indonesia. However, this proposal was rejected and replaced by; "Forming a family, choosing a spouse and continuing offspring." The PDRE Bill, consisting of 27 articles, was finally agreed to become 23 articles by eliminating some parts that were considered irrelevant.

PPP's struggle to strengthen, revise, and amend articles to conform to Islamic values in the three bills cannot be separated from the debate and lobbying between the factions in the DPR RI. The dynamics of debates between factions in the DPR RI can be divided into two groups; namely the rejecting faction and the supporting faction. In the discussion of the Pornography Bill, the factions that refused

were PDIP and PDS and 8 supporting factions; PG (Party of the Functional Groups), PPP, PAN (National Mandate Party), PKB (National Awakening Party), PD (Democratic Party), PBR (Reform Star Party), PKS (Prosperous Justice Party), and BPD, a combination of several small parties. Even until the bill was passed, PDIP and PDS still refuse, precisely, the three articles containing the scope of the definition, private territory in pornography, and community involvement in the prevention of pornography.

While in the discussion of the Health Bill related to Islamic values, there was a debate even among fellow Islamic parties. PPP's efforts to include Islamic values, especially related to the issue of abortion, get a response from the fact that the PBR originated from the same house of ideology, namely Islam. According to PBR, abortion is contrary to human values. PBR rejects abortion for victims of rape or adultery for any reason. While PDS rejects abortion because it will surely produce more severe regret than the reason for abortion itself. In general, debates between factions can be divided between the supporting factions and the factions that reject or object to proposals such as the one championed by PPP. The first group is PG, PKS, PD, PKB, BPD, and PAN, and the second group is PDIP, PBR, and PDS.

In the discussion of the PDRE Bill the debate took place regarding the ontological foundation of humans as free beings. For PAN, human beings are not just free, but also holy, and in their own holy words freedom is contained, because it is enough to use the word "holy". This problem is debated because in the perspective of human religions have different positions. Likewise the position (role) of religion and civil rights related to legitimate living donations does not get a portion in the bill, so it enters into debate including by PPP. Related to this, the factions were divided between those who agreed to add the word "holy" (PG, PKB, and PDS) and did not agree (PDIP, PPP, PKS, PBR, and BPD). Finally, the debate can be solved through reformulation of sentences without taking sides in one of them, by removing the word "free" and not entering the word "holy".

The division of factions in the DPR in the discussion of the three bills above is dynamic and not fully binary. In general, there was a debate that reflects the antagonism (pros and cons) among the factions. During the debate, some factions offered a middle ground as an alternative to the pros and cons of the discussion. Also, through lobbying at the

initiative of certain factions, including by PPP, antagonism could be minimized, even compromised.

At the level of civil society, the three bills get critical attention, even rejection on the one hand, but also strong support on the other hand. Especially for the Pornography Bill, in addition to gaining critical attention and strong support, it also received rejection, even with the threat of secession from the Republic of Indonesia. The issue of Islamization of the Bill on Pornography one side brings support, but also rejection on the other side. The two largest Muslim organizations, namely NU and Muhammadiyah as part of civil society specifically formed the "Bumi-Matahari" (earth-sun) coalition which one of its agendas was the anti-pornography and moral movement of porno-action.

Likewise, with the Health Bill, the critical attitude of civil society is very strong. The issue of religion also rose and became a debate between civil society, namely between those who want the elimination of the linking of the Health Bill to religious values with groups that support the opposite values. Another example is the rule governing legal partner (Article 72). According to some community groups, the article castrated freedom, especially for people who do not have a legal partner, such as commercial sex workers or same-sex couple. Adding to that, the religious civil society criticized the problem of abortion. They reject abortions that are done after the fetus is forty days old because it has been categorized as a living creature that must be preserved.

While the partial attitude of civil society towards the PDRE Bill shows its critical support by emphasizing the need to strengthen and expand coverage from just racial and ethnic issues, but also all forms of discrimination, including in the socio-cultural, legal and economic fields. The religious civil society sees the bill ignoring the importance of the role of religion, even though all citizens cannot be separated from their religion. Therefore, this PDRE Bill will not run optimally, because it cannot provide a comprehensive solution to the problem of discrimination that not only deals with race and ethnicity but broader than that, including religious issues.

The inter faction debate in the discussion of the three bills took place in addition to differences in the substance of the article, also because of an offer or proposal of Islamic values that were deemed unsuitable for a pluralistic public interest. Islam as a teaching that is believed by Muslims does not always have a universal dimension that can be accepted by the public, especially related to specific

and ritualistic teachings. However, through lobbying and support from other factions, several PPP offers could be accommodated in the bill which was then passed into law. This shows the existence of power interplay between factions in discussing the three bills which at certain points lead to compromise, but at another point it remains in its antagonism, as in the discussion of the Draft Bill on Pornography.

The discussion of three bills besides involving political parties is also inseparable from the role of civil society. In responding to the three bills, civil society experienced polarization between pros and cons, even in one bill (Bill on Pornography) antagonism emerged between civil society. The support and refusal given by civil society to the three bills is strongly influenced by the values fought for. Religious civil society has become an important force for PPP in fighting for Islamic values as an implementation of its Islamic ideology, although at a certain point religious civil society criticizes certain articles that are considered deviant, as in the case of abortion. This fact simultaneously strengthens the theory of the strong role of civil society in Muslim society.

Competition and debate in the discussion of the three bills led to a simpler grouping of ideologies, namely between the pros and the cons. Except for Islamic ideological parties, other ideological parties; nationalist-religious and nationalist-secular, does not show a strong ideological color, so ideological categorization in the discussion of the three bills is not as complex as the categorization made by Herbert Feith which includes radical nationalism, Javanese traditionalism, democratic socialism, communism and Islam. But it is also not as simple as Sigmund Neumann's category of in-group parties and out-group parties that are more in the category of domination and subordination. In the discussion of the three grouping bills based on loose pros and cons, depending on the substance of the issues discussed. Therefore, the pro and contra formation of the PPP proposal in the discussion of the bill could be different in number and name of the party.

Based on some of the findings above, it is clear that Islamic ideology is still quite significant in coloring legislation with its diverse dynamics in a religiously diverse society. Ideology based on typical values (Islam) can be actualized based on broader public interests without losing the substance of the ideology itself. Therefore, Islam as a political party ideology still exists in various forms of actualization and support. The existence of Islamic values in the three bills that are the object of this study shows the close link between the attitude of

party cadres and their party ideology. Even some politicians from secular parties also show the similarity of religious values that are actualized in the form of support for efforts to incorporate Islamic values into the three bills. But in the context of PPP, the relationship between ideology and social reality is not as strong as what is perceived as an ideology because of the success of incorporating Islamic values not entirely on the PPP struggle, but thanks to the support of other parties who share common views. Amid social reality with a majority Muslim religious identity, PPP with its Islamic ideology is only able to be understood by a small number of people. In fact, one of the functions of political ideology is to help people understand the position of ideology in society.

4 EPILOGUE; IDEOLOGICAL OR PRAGMATIC INTEREST

The process of discussing the bill until it becomes law involves many interrelated factors. Institutionally, the existence of an Islamic-based party is an entry point to incorporate Islamic values into the law. The existence of Islamic political parties that are still a minority compared to secular parties does not preclude efforts to incorporate Islamic values through lobbying the secular parties. The effort received a response from secular political parties through support and shared views when the bill being discussed.

Political parties as an essential pillar of democracy have become an easy way to incorporate various aspects of their interests, including the interests of Muslims. Democracy as a system that promotes equality, with the dominance of laws or regulations that are segmented based on a particular religion can threaten freedom which is also the basic principle of democracy.

Actions taken by the PPP and supporting parties against the inclusion of Islamic values are included in actions that Roy C. Macridis calls an ideological action, namely actions carried out because of the urge to fight for the values contained in the ideology adopted. These ideological values are seen from the formulation of Islamic values championed by PPP in the discussion of the three bills. The difference in emphasis and intensity of the struggle of Islamic values between the symbolic (formal teachings) and substantive (universal teachings) depends on the context of the possibility of article deviations from Islamic values.

Civil society support for the inclusion of Islamic values in the law is complementary to the occurrence of "intervention" of Islamic teachings into the public sphere. Although the voices of civil society are diverse, support for the inclusion of Islamic values into the law increasingly shows the dominance of the majority against minorities. This is where the democratic agenda in Indonesia has come to some extent at the level of consolidation, but the fact still relies on domination in the name of a majoritarian.

The existence of a relationship between the existence of Islamic political parties, civil society with interest in the enforcement of Islamic constitutional values. The presence of politicians who have the same interests and awareness even though different parties constitute a challenge to the actual enforcement of democracy, namely a system that provides space the same for all citizens without being isolated by differences in religion, ethnicity or class. Islamic compatibility with new democracies takes place in the realm of pragmatism because of the benefits or incentives perceived by Muslims as majority citizens. Democracy enjoyed by the majority tends to be procedural rather than substantial. The comfort of the majority is legitimized by laws or regulations that are strong enough to involve political parties and civil society so that they are not disturbed by the interests of other groups. This is the development of democracy in a country where the attitude and behaviour of its citizens are thick with religious nuances. The space for freedom in a democracy is overwhelmed by strong group interests and tends to neglect minority groups as citizens who have the same rights and obligations.

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