Cozy Relationship between Bureaucrats and Politicians in West Aceh

Regent Election

Ikhsan

and Vellayati Hajad

Department of Social and Political Science, University of Teuku Umar

Keywords: Politics, bureaucracy, politicians, bureaucrats and local election

Abstract: This research focuses on the relation between bureaucrats and politicians in West Aceh. The main goal of the

study is to capture a comprehensive picture of the involvement of bureaucracy actors in Pilkada (regional

head election). This research used a qualitative method. The data collections use through the in-depth

interview and document analysis. Bureaucrats are required to be neutral in every election. However, the

literature shows that the bureaucrats remain involved in political practices and have a cozy relationship with

politicians. That is why the question comes up. Why are the bureaucrats still involved in politics even though

it is not allowed by law? The results of this study are: (1) Direct election has been fertile ground for

paternalism culture in bureaucracy; (2) Before and after the election, the strategic position in bureaucracy tend

to be the gifts for the loyal person. It became the attraction for the bureaucrats to be the candidate supporters

in the regent’s election. On the other hand, many people in strategic positions lost their positions due to

political reasons.

1 INTRODUCTION

This article discusses the relationship between

bureaucrats and politicians after the autonomy

implementation in West Aceh. Bureaucrats play a

vital role in arranging, implementing, and supervising

public policy as well as inevaluating. In this strategic

position, it is common that there will always be an

effort to involve bureaucrats in the administrative

area. Consciously or subconsciously, the

bureaucratsarethe means of achieving, maintaining,

or extending politician power. For that reason, this

article focuses on the relation between bureaucrats

and politicians who tend to seek a balanced position.

Therefore, government bureaucrats, directly or not,

are related to those with political interest, and a cozy

relationship emerges between them after the

individual autonomy.

Previous studies about the relation between

bureaucrats and politics discuss the case in national

level. However, this article focusesonthe relation

ofthe regional level. Bureaucracy and politician have

a close relationship since the local autonomy is

implemented in Aceh. It becomes worse by the direct

system of regional head election. The direct regional

head election is the implementation of Laws (UU)

No. 32/2004 which is operationalized through

Government Regulation (PP) No. 6/2005.

Unfortunately, in this direct regional head election,

the bureaucracy tends to be a political machine, and it

is likely to give bad impact to the realization of

bureaucracy reformation.

The anomaly of bureaucracy relation also happens

in other countries when the bureaucracy considered

the more influential power than any other social

groups. In Japan, for example, bureaucrats in

particular department like in Ministry of International

Trade and Industry, are regarded as permanent

politicians who determine the realization of the

‘economic miracle’ (Heywood & Meyer-Sahling,

2013). In England, on the other hand, bureaucrats are

referred to as Britain’s ruling class because of the

strong influential power that they wield more than

those owned by the cabinet. In Europe, the

bureaucrats are generally considered to be the real

power wielders and executives.

The relationship between bureaucracy and

politician in regional level in Indonesia, West Aceh is

appropriate to serve as the object of study. West Aceh

is one of the regencies in Aceh province. After the

special autonomy, West Aceh owns exclusivity in

boththe implementation of administration and

budgeting aspect. Regarding administration, special

1496

Ikhsan, . and Hajad, V.

Cozy Relationship between Bureaucrats and Politicians in West Aceh Regent Election.

DOI: 10.5220/0009930714961503

In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Recent Innovations (ICRI 2018), pages 1496-1503

ISBN: 978-989-758-458-9

autonomy offers the ex-Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (The

Free Aceh Movement) members to be involved in

local political parties, such as Partai Aceh. As a result,

it enables the ex-GAM members to become a regent

(regional head) or become a member of Dewan

Perwakilan Rakyat Kabupaten or DPRK Aceh Barat

(West Aceh Regional Parliament). Meanwhile, the

others are offered to work in the government as

bureaucrats like a regionalsecretary, head of the

department, and other government officers.

Bureaucracy and politics are two different, yet

inseparable institutions in West Aceh because both of

them contribute to theregional administration. The

contribution is by administering check and balance

process in order that the government administration is

always on the right track, especially Aceh with its

special autonomy that offers authority in politics and

economy. The political autonomy is indicated by the

emergence of the local political party like Partai Aceh

as the union for ex-GAM after the conflicts ended.

The economic autonomy is showed by the abundance

of special autonomy budget to be managed by the

regional government. In this special autonomy

situation, the bureaucrats and politicians are supposed

to create a dynamic and constructive interaction.

However, instead of creating the dynamic and

constructive interaction, these institutions develop a

cozy relationship in regional level which at last sets

aside public interest.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND

RESEARCH FOCUS

Study about bureaucracy is inseparable from Weber’s

bureaucracy paradigm which focuses on structural

and functional phenomena which characteristics are

specific and formal (legal). This Weber’s bureaucracy

is classic or traditional (traditional paradigm) because

its concept and application tend to be at the maximum

development of organization and bureaucracy and

less at humanity dimension. Interaction in the

bureaucracy is hierarchical and formal. Max Weber,

a prominent figure who illustrates modern

bureaucracy concept, purposes Weberian

bureaucracy model. It refers to a model that functions

bureaucracy to fulfil ideal criteria of Weber

bureaucracy. There are at least seven bureaucracy

criteria described by Max Weber, namely clear work

division, clear authority hierarchy, high

formalisation, impersonal, decision making about

employee placement that is based on competence,

track record of the career for the employees, and

organisational life that is clearly separated from

personal life (Fatah, 1994).

Weber in Latuconsina (2008) explains the

difference between modern bureaucracy and

patrimonial bureaucracy. The first element that

distinguishes is the existence of clientism, namely the

relationship of power that is built by rulers with the

power of the surrounding environment. In the modern

bureaucracy the loyalty center is in an impersonal

order in this case the law that governs everything. But

in clientism loyalty lies with superiors. Second, in the

modern bureaucracy the relationship between rulers

and their environment is more legal rational and open

but in the patrimonial bureaucracy the relationship is

patron client, so loyalty is in the boss and is built by

the charisma of individual superiors or the influence

of the material aspects of the leader. Third, according

to modern bureaucracy is the separation of formal

space and personal space while the patrimonial

bureaucracy is based on emotional and non-formal

relations (Latuconsina, 2008).

The emergence of patrimonial bureaucrats in

Indonesia is a legacy of the traditional value system

that grew in the past kingdoms and mixed with

colonial-style bureaucracy. So, the current

bureaucracy of Indonesia in addition to growing as a

modern bureaucracy is also colored by the traditional

bureaucracy of past inheritance. Like the courtiers

and priyayi who also layered, state employees also

consist of various ranks, groups and echelons. The

state servant's slogan is a servant of the nation bearing

the meaning of the above-oriented and very similar to

the royal bureaucracy which emphasizes more on the

leader (above) than the service to the community

(bottom).

The development of patrimonial culture makes

the growth of the spoil system in the bureaucratic

body. The Spoil system is a system that prioritizes

political interests, political struggles, a political

stream, ideology and political beliefs, especially after

winning votes after the election. Of course this is very

dangerous. Ideally, the bureaucracy adheres to the

merit system and career system, which is to avoid

bureaucratic affiliation with politics (in terms of

cooperation or symbiotic ties with political parties

and politicians in it), or dare to make a sterile

bureaucracy and dare to create distance with political

parties and politicians so that the bureaucracy only

give loyalty to the people, nation and state, instead of

being a building block, "political machine" and

lackeys of political interests and power. Thus, it can

be minimized what is called abuse of power and

rampant corruption for the benefit of a political party

or a minor of politicians (Sunantara, 2006).

Cozy Relationship between Bureaucrats and Politicians in West Aceh Regent Election

1497

Weber expects the bureaucracy to maintain its

neutrality; it does not involve in any party. Neutrality

is also related to keeping the distance, uninvolved,

unbiased, and impartial acts towards the existing

political parties or particular groups because

bureaucracy is supposed to be able to direct,

empower, and create competition in public services to

the society (Osborne and Gaebler, 2005). This

neutrality challenge of bureaucracy becomes a

significant issue and always appears in every election,

either legislative or executive election. Because

bureaucracy is expected to be able to work as a

professional and neutral institution (Asmerom, Reis,

1996).

Nevertheless, there are always some challenges in

realizing neutrality and professionalism of the

bureaucratic officials in the government, one of them

is the case of political officials’ arbitrariness to the

career officials (Fachruddin, 2012). Therefore, to

sustain their neutrality, the bureaucrats are demanded

to be professional by creating a balanced relation

pattern between politics and bureaucracy. This

relation balance needs to be clear and stablefor the

roles and responsibilities of those institutions

(Kurniawan, 2009).

Carino (1994) offers a solution to this problem.

He suggests that the politics-bureaucracy relation

need to be in ‘bureaucratic sublation’ pattern. This

type refers to the relation which is relatively equal and

balanced between the politicians and bureaucrats.

This pattern based on the conception that bureaucracy

is not merely an instrument entity or a means of

administrating public policies only. The argument of

bureaucratic sublation states that despite being

apolitical and non-partisan, bureaucracy also

possesses power and its resources when it deals with

political officials, especially concerning its

professional abilities. As a consequence, bureaucracy

is not only as a political subordination but also as

balancing power (Carino, 1986).

In Indonesia, bureaucracy-politics relation has

generated a vast number of studies. One of them is

Jackson’s study that considers bureaucracy in

Indonesia belongs to bureaucratic polity model,

where power accumulation happens in the state and

sets aside society roles from political space and

government (Jackson, 1980). On the other hand,

Orwell's bureaucracy is a bureaucratization pattern as

a process of government power expansion to control

economic, political and social activities using some

regulations even some forces (Thoha, 2012). Thus,

bureaucracy in Indonesia does not improve and

become more efficient. It becomes inefficient,

complicated, and unsuitable with the formal

regulations. This might happen since the bureaucrats

and politicians run ‘politik balas budi’or ethical

politics, where politicians choose bureaucrats.

Indonesia still uses the system of patrimonial

bureaucracy. Where any policies and regulations are

issued within the framework of politicization. So that

it creates a political bureaucracy like the one in the

model above. This is a system that must be eliminated

and corrected, because by remaining in this system

the framework of the Indonesian bureaucracy will

continue to inherit socio-economic diseases to the

lower generations who are none other than relatives

who have close ties with the previous generation of

bureaucracy (Damanhuri, 2006).

This phenomenon underlies the questions of this

study, which consist of: How is the relation between

bureaucrats and politicians during West Aceh’s

regional-head election in 2017? In West Aceh’s

regional head election, can the bureaucrats (who are

also civil servants) maintain their neutrality before the

election process?

3 RESEARCH METHOD

The research method uses a scientific procedure to

obtain data for particular reasons (Craswell, 2014).

This study uses the qualitative method with a case

study approach. This type of research aims to attain

the answer for the posed question using one’s

opinion, responses or perceptions, so it discusses the

results in qualitative with the description. This study

attempts to seek description from activities by

examining problems, applicable procedures,

applicable relations, attitude, view, and the ongoing

process as well as its influence.

The data collection in this research an applies in-

depth interview and literature study. For the

interview, the interviewees are determined by using

purposive sampling method, where the number of

interviewees is based on the needs of the data and the

chosen interviewee is an individual who

comprehends bureaucrats-politician relation in a

regional head election in West Aceh. They are

bureaucrats, election supervisory committee (panwas

pilkada), society and politician. The data collection is

administered through literature study, that is, by using

primary and secondary sources (books, journals,

research reports, mass media, and internet).

Qualitative data analysis is a systematic process

of searching and constructing data from interviews,

field notes, and documentation by organizing the data

into categories, analyzing units, synthesizing,

organizing into patterns, selecting the important and

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useful parts for the study, and drawing conclusion, so

the result is understandable for the researcher and

other parties. Data analysis in qualitative studies is

conducted before, during and after going to the

research field.

4 THE RESULT OF THE STUDY

4.1 The Relation of Bureaucrats and

Politicians: Learning from West

Aceh

For West Aceh society, regional head election 2017

is the third election held in West Aceh after the

implementation of special autonomy. Direct elections

have some fundamental distinctions with those in the

New Order era in which eligibility is determined by

political elites in-district Legislative Council

(DPRD). In the regime of the direct regional head

election, political party supports are only needed in

the candidacy process. To win the election, a

candidate has to attain majority votes. It means that

whoever wants to be the regional head of West Aceh

s/he has to own the strong popularity and political

machine.

In the West Aceh context, a political machine for

winning the election is the political party of ex-GAM

network, families, kinship, and bureaucracy.

Bureaucracy becomes a vital political machine,

especially for two candidates who had ever become

West Aceh regional head, they are Ramli MS (2007-

2012 period) and T. Alaidinsyah (2012-2017) who

currently are competing for the seat of West Aceh

regional head.

Table 1: Serial Number, Candidate Pairs, and Supporting

Parties

No Candidate names Supporting Parties

HT Alaidinsyah

/ H Kamaruddin

Partai Amanat Nasional

(PAN), PDIP, Partai Golka

PPP, PKB, Partai Demokra

(PKS)

H Ramli MS/

Banta Puteh Syam

Partai Aceh (PA)

Fuad Hadi/

Muhammad Arif

Independent

Source: KIP Aceh Barat

The primary indication of the close bureaucracy

and politician is that the bureaucracy politicization

happens before and after the regional head election.

For example, the transfer of 10 civil servants in

Education Board in 2012 who were suspected as

loyalists of the former regional head, Ramli MS.

The transfer caused a presumption of civil

servants’ partiality towards one of the regional head

candidates. Hence, it is necessary to ‘clear’ the

bureaucracy ranks from this partiality. Another case

of transfers also occurred towards the regional

head election in 2017. The massive transfer happened

in 2016 that involved 234 civil servant officials. One

of them is the Head of West Aceh Regional Office of

Maritime and Fisheries, T. Helmi SP, MM, who was

discharged by T. Alaidinsyah (West Aceh Regent)

after being alleged to support Ramli MS.

Although the bureaucrat power is necessary for

winning the election, a regional head candidate must

have the support frompolitical parties, either by

national political parties or the local ones.

Meanwhile, to run for West Aceh’s regional head,

every candidate must be supported by 20% of 25 seats

in West Aceh Regional Parliament (DPRK). The final

voter’s data in the West Aceh regional head election

is in the following table.

Table 2: The Number of Final Voters and Polling Station

List in the West Aceh Regional Head Election

No Districts

Final

Voters

List

Total of

Polling

Stations

Arongan

Lambalek

8.004 28

2 Bubon 4.595 17

Johan

Pahlawan

41.711 90

Kaway

XVI

14.231 46

5 Mereubo 18.758 51

Pante

Ceuremen

7.771 25

Panton

Reu

4.475 20

Sama

Tiga

10.780 39

Sungai

Mas

2.879 18

10 Woyla 9.180 43

Woyla

Barat

5.483 27

Woyla

Timur

3.505 26

Total 131.372 430

Source: KIP Aceh Barat

An indication of the cozy relationship between

bureaucrats and politicians is that the bureaucracy

seems to support one of the candidates actively. The

most dominant mode is employing state resources to

elevate the supported candidate’s image,

Cozy Relationship between Bureaucrats and Politicians in West Aceh Regent Election

1499

especiallythe softest resource mobilization is the

installation of the prospective candidate banners all

over the city and the advertisements in mass media.

The banners and advertisements contain various

messages, from “Ied Mubarak” (Selamat Idul Fitri),

Happy Indonesian Independence Day, the description

of any sector development success, to the anti-drug

campaign. The messages brought by these media tend

to highlight the candidates’ personality than the

vision and mission of the government.

West Aceh election supervisory committee

realizes that there arerules violation in it. However,

the committees admitted that they face difficulties in

controlling this covert campaign. At least, there are

two reasons. First, the installation of various media

cannot be categorized into the campaign because it is

not campaign season yet. Thus, this kind of situation

is not the area of electoral law enforcement. Civil

servants could get sanction if they organize the

campaign, while so far, the involvement of

bureaucrats is hideous and rarely apparent in the

official campaign. Second, due to limited authority,

the supervisory committee can only warn without

being able to take any further action.

The competition in the West Aceh regional head

election was quite tricky. Although there were three

pairs of candidates, an intense competition happened

between Ramli MS and T. Alaidinsyah. It might

occur because both figures were the ex-

regents/regional heads in two different periods, 2007-

2012 and 2012-2017. The results of final ballot

counting are in Table 3.

Table 3: The Number of Votes for Each Candidate Pairs

in West Aceh Regional Head Election 2017

No. Candidate Pairs The number of Votes

HT Alaidinsyah/

H Kamaruddin

48.201 (45.93 %)

H Ramli MS/

Banta Puteh Syam

52.538 (50.06 %)

Fuad Hadi/

Muhammad Arif

4.213 (4.01 %)

Source: KIP of West Aceh

5 DISCUSSION AND

IMPLICATION

Since decentralization policy, regional autonomy,

and special autonomy in 2005, bureaucracy in West

Aceh level is in the form of patrimonial bureaucracy,

which is even worse than that in the New Order era.

Patrimonial bureaucracy is characterized by (1)

regional officials are selected based on personal and

political criteria; (2) position or function is regarded

as a means to accumulate wealth; (3), the officials

control everything, both political and administrative

function.

A phenomenon appears after special autonomy in

West Aceh is that bureaucracy and the bureaucrats are

politicized and mobilized only for political interest,

for instance, in the last 2017 regional head election,

bureaucracy and the bureaucrats separated into two

parts, those who supported Ramli MS (the regional

head in 2007-2012) and those who supported

T.Alaidinsyah (the regional head in 2012-2017). In

other words, both of them were incumbent and owned

their masses even in bureaucracy. In 2017 regional

head election, bureaucrats were forced to make

transparentchoices in order to survive and did not lose

their position in the future.

The relationship built in the bureaucracy during

the direct regional head election in West Aceh was

informal, personal, and caused several informal

habits. Many official dismissals prove it before the

election which followed by the emergence of some

unusual special staff positions. Special staff positions

are a subtle term for dismissing bureaucrats from their

duties as civil servants. It might happen because they

give their support to another politician in the election.

Therefore, the regional head election becomes the

occasion for a career promotion or position discharge.

An interview with one of the elementary school

principals (48 years old) on November 12

th,

2017 in

West Aceh confirms this matter.

“In the regional head election period, we are on

the horns of a dilemma. If our supported candidates

win, we will get an important position, well at least

we get transferred. However, if they lose, we should

be ready to get transferred to remote areas.”

The bureaucrat-politician relation indicates a

political intervention. Theoretically, political

intervention is a close relationship between

bureaucrats and politicians. There are some causes

why this might occur.

Figure 1: The Causes of Cozy Relationship between

Bureaucrats and Politicians

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1500

There are six reasons for the close relationship

between bureaucrats and politicians.The first is a

robust political primordialism, where kinship, ethical

politics, desires to develop family-based government,

seeking security, and opportunist behavior of the

bureaucrats exist. Second, check and balance

mechanism has not been well-implemented yet.

Third, the politicians’ power tends to corrupt, as

stated by Lord Acton. Fourth is the low maturity of

the political parties and high dependency towards

bureaucracy. Next, the low welfare of the bureaucrats

or civil servants in the remote area is likely to rise

rent-seeking activities through covert political

activities in order to gain additional income. The last

is the obscure and easy to politicized regulations, such

as the vulnerable instruments for employee

development, and ethic codes that have not been

institutionalized, the existence of status for the

regional head as staffing coach, and double position

of the head region and the political party’s chairman.

Viewed from Weber’s professional bureaucracy

concept, this close relationship does not fulfill the

criteria. A very cozy relationship between bureaucrats

and politicians during and after the head regional

election might cause a patrimonial bureaucracy. As

expressed by Eisenstadt in Latuconsina, patrimonial

bureaucracy is characterized by: first, official

recruitments are based on personal and political

criteria; second, positions are regarded as the source

of wealth and benefit; third, the officials control both

political and administration functions; and fourth,

every activity is directed by personal and political

relation. This situation could construct the official

behavior which is inclined to devote themselves to the

power (Latuconsina, 2008).

The normal relation after the implementation of

special autonomy is the dynamic one between

politicians and bureaucrats without omitting relation

balance between them. The balanced relation is not

the one that co-opts or collaborates for their interests

by discarding society interest. After the election is

over, the co-opting relation can be identified through

lobbying practices for seeking positions, political

intervention in the regional political arena. The

selection of public officials, such as Regional

Secretary (Sekda) and Head of Department and other

regional government officials, are not conducted

based on skills and competencies, but on political

party supports and personal closeness.

The cozy relationship between bureaucrats and

politicians is indeed a serious issue in developing

bureaucracy’s professionalism. The West Aceh

regent election also becomes an event for huge

interest battle, and instead of a political party, the

bureaucrats are frequently employed as a political

machine by politicians to win the election. The

increase of domination of political institution like

Partai Aceh, West Aceh Regional Parliament, and the

elected West Aceh Regent, towards bureaucracy

could perform control to the bureaucracy,and the

bureaucracy enjoys the control. On the other hand, the

masses outside bureaucracy are politically and

economically passive, so it makes their roles weak to

control the deviant behavior of the political

institutions and bureaucracy. When politics-

bureaucracy relations do not develop into a synergy

towards development in West Aceh and only focus on

the issue of position and project distribution, the

district economic growth will stagnate.Regarding the

topic, Junaidi (42 years old), a civil servant in West

Aceh on September 20

th,

2017, said:

“The loyal ones will get a promotion, and those

who are disloyal, no matter how good their

achievement is, will be discharged from their

position.”

It makes bureaucracy as an instrument of power

which is inseparable from the source of power itself.

The changes of private interests will influence

bureaucracy activities. Bureaucracy as political

power is full of political interests, such as

maintainingpower. The officials of local bureaucracy

in the government always conduct numerous

strategies and innovations to protect their agents and

political position. Three strategies can be used to

achieve their political goals, they are, doing

advocacy, decision making, budget-cutting, and

performing innovation to anticipate the situation and

condition as well as the processes faced by the

government organizations (Wilson, 1989).

Bureaucrats-politician relation here shows the up-

down pattern of relation, where bureaucrats act as

subordinate. The political officials use this situation

to manipulate them. The regional head could issue

any policy towards bureaucracy which is a

bureaucratic work area. Ramli MS, the Regent, could

include and place his people from Partai Aceh or

those linked with GAM to work in the bureaucracy.

Individual autonomy, at last, generates new ‘kings’

who act freely to control bureaucracy. If the

commands or instructions are not executed, it is

common to transfer, recruit, or even place new trusted

people as the replacement for the old bureaucrats.

Yusaini MS, S.Sos or Abu Yus, the head of Partai

Aceh West Aceh, frequently asserts through the

members of Partai Aceh during campaign period of

the election that civil servants who did not vote for

Ramli MS—who are supported by Partai Aceh—

must be ready to be downgraded or transferred or

moved to the remote area in West Aceh.

“So manteng yang hanapileh partai nanggroe

akan kamoe pinah” which means, anyone who does

not choose Partai Aceh will be moved or transferred.

Transactional practices in the election and

placement of bureaucratic officials in West

Cozy Relationship between Bureaucrats and Politicians in West Aceh Regent Election

1501

Acehcompound the inferiority of bureaucrats. They

offer a position with some particular deals which

often cause the chaos in career coaching and create a

primitive and disproportionate bureaucracy.

It is undoubtedly unfortunate because special

autonomy aims to advance West Aceh with its

efficient governance. However, what happens, in

reality, is the contrary. Bureaucrats that are expected

to become the spearhead of the central government

regarding implementation of regional autonomy,

including the management of special autonomy

budgets that reach seven trillion per year, are shackled

by political interests and together with politicians in

the implementation of government.

This condition isunbearableto handle by the

Supervisory Committee of West Aceh District

because it is not the area forregional head election’s

law enforcement and also the weakness of authority

owned by the committee. The engagement of

bureaucracy in politics has driven apart this

institution from the vision of developing a

professional bureaucracy post-Reformation era. The

findings in the election of the 2017 West Aceh Regent

provide substantial grounds for rebuilding the civil

servants’ neutrality as before. From the findings, it

can be concluded that the relationship of bureaucracy

and politics is a cozy relationship, where both

bureaucrats and politicians are reciprocal, which

means the relationship makes both parties politically

support each other, both from the politicians and

bureaucrats. Politicians need bureaucracy as a

political machine and bureaucrats need the support of

politicians as a means of jumpstarting their careers.

6 CONCLUSIONS

Bureaucrats and politicians are two crucial elements

in the formation of political systems in a nation.

Politicians occupy the position of regional heads,

deputy heads of regions, and leaders and members of

the DPRK (regional parliament) who act as

policymakers while bureaucrats act as policy

implementers. Arrangement and policy-making are

political processes while administrative processes are

the responsibility of bureaucrats. So, the position of

bureaucrats and politicians are equal and

complementary and do not co-opt each other, let

alone create a cozy relationship to gain advantages,

such as positions.

In the election of 2017 West Aceh Regent, the

cozy relationship between bureaucrats and politicians

was stable. Bureaucracy is as if present to assist the

process of winning the candidates, it is either

incumbent or the other candidates. This relationship

is in the form of bureaucratic support to the victory of

candidate pair of regents in the election. It is evident

from the transfers before and after the election that

does not reflect the aspect of professionalism but

merely reflects the patrimonial relationship between

bureaucrats and politicians. Another indication is the

use of resources owned by the region to build the

excellent candidate's image either overtly or covertly.

There are two attempts in the rules enforcement of

neutrality for civil servants. First,the rules that bind

and limit the bureaucrats in political involvement,

that is by giving sanctions for those who commit it.

Furthermore, the sanctions do not only apply to civil

servants who campaign openly but also for those who

support candidates covertly. Second, sanctions

should be right on target. So, the cozy relationship

between bureaucrats and politicians cannot happen.

The service to the community becomes maximal

because of every position in government occupied by

individuals who are competent in their field.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work was supported and financed by the BUDI

DN-LPDP (Scholarship Fund Management

Institution). All opinions, findings, and conclusions

are derived from the research and do not reflect the

BUDI DN-LPDP.

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