The Impact of Communication on the Future of Reconciliation and
Peacebuilding in Papua: Understanding the Meaning of Special
Autonomy in Papuan Perceptions
Handrini Ardiyanti
1
and Ilya Revianti Sudjono
1
1
University of Indonesia, Indonesia Department of Social and Political Sciences
Keywords: Special autonomy for Papua, Papua, West Papua, reconciliation, relations between central government and
provincial government.
Abstract: Communication is the key to reconciliation between divided communities because it can build or undermine
perceptions of shared purpose or connection. This research explores the future of reconciliation and peace
building between the central government of Indonesia and leaders of the province of Papua. The research
uses in-depth interview with the chairman and members of the Papua House of Representatives and the
Papuan People's Assembly in the work period of 2009 to 2014 to explore how Papuan legislators perceived
the central government introduction of Special Autonomy provisions for the province. The finding suggests
that the Papuan leaders see that central government only understands the issue of autonomy from their own,
Jakarta-based perspective. This understanding is acquired because of a lack of communication between
central government and leaders of the province of Papua. Therefore Indonesia’s central government needs to
perform dialogue for peacebuilding and facilitates discussion on the role of opinion leaders in peace and
reconciliation efforts and the effectiveness of two-stage communication in the discussion.
1 INTRODUCTION
The relationship between Papua and the central
government of Indonesia can be considered as a
serious political struggle. The struggle has drained a
lot of social, economic, political and cultural costs.
The problematic situation has taken place since
Indonesia declared sovereignty over Papua. One of
the efforts to end the struggle is by issuing a special
autonomy Papua policy (Yusman Conoras, 2008).
Indonesia's central government in the era of
President Abdurrahman Wahid or Gus Dur had
established Irian Jaya Province as a special
autonomous region. The policy regarding this matter
can be found in the Decree of People’s Consultative
Assembly, MPR RI, Number IV/MPR/1999, also on
Indonesia's Broad Outline of State Policy (or known
as GBHN) in the year of 1999-2004, Chapter IV
Letter G, Point 2. Following the mandate released by
People’s Consultative Assembly, Indonesia’s House
of Representatives approved and enacted Law No.
21 of 2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua Province
(Special Autonomy Law) as stipulated in the State
Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Year 2001
Number 135. Following that, on 21 November 2001,
House of Representatives Decree was approved. The
law marked the changes made Indonesian Central
Government in adopting new approaches to
addressing problems in Papua by prioritizing
security, stability, and social welfare (Musa’ad,
2011)
In the perspective of the central government, the
policy was released to promote regional
development especially in the four prioritized
sectors, which are the economy, education, health,
and infrastructure. The regulation for the special
autonomous region or province (hereafter referred to
as Autonomy) was created as a step to align Papua
with other areas in Indonesia as well as to strengthen
the protection of fundamental rights of indigenous
Papuans, as since the integration with the Republic
of Indonesia, their fundamental rights tend to be and
marginalized (Laurens, 2015).
There have been many studies on the Papua
problem. Papua as a special autonomous region,
according to the author, can be observed from
various perspectives. The following list is a
comparison list of research about the Papua special
autonomy:
1474
Ardiyanti, H. and Sudjono, I.
The Impact of Communication on the Future of Reconciliation and Peacebuilding in Papua: Understanding the Meaning of Special Autonomy in Papuan Perceptions.
DOI: 10.5220/0009930414741481
In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Recent Innovations (ICRI 2018), pages 1474-1481
ISBN: 978-989-758-458-9
Copyright
c
2020 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved
Table 1: Papers discuss about Papua’s Special
Autonomy
Reference Analysis Results
Katharina,
Riris, 2017
(Khatarina,
2017).
Analyzed the
formulation of
Papua’s Special
Autonomy
policy as
outlined in Law
No. 21/2001
based on
deliberative
public policy
theories.
The
implementation
of Papua's
special
autonomy has
failed to use a
deliberative
approach. The
application of
Papua's special
autonomy only
shows false
participation.
Furthermore,
the formulation
of Papua's
special
autonomy has
been made
without
Papuan's active
involvement.
Bhakti,
Ikrar Nusa
and Pigay,
Natalius
(2012)
(Ikrar
Nusa
Bhakti,
2012).
Finding the
Root of
Problems and
Solutions to the
Papua Conflict
(grounded
research)
The central
government’s
policy
regarding
Papua is very
inconsistent.
M
usa’ad,
M
.Abu
d
(2009)
(Musa’ad,
2
011).
Government
Structure and
Authority in the
Implementation
of Special
Autonomy in
the Papua
Province
reviewed by
using the
Contingency
Design Theory
(Randolph and
Dess 1984)
Gibson et al.
(1996) New
Institutional
Approach
(Robert E.
Godiri)
Papua Special
Autonomy has
resulted in the
structure and
authority of
government to
be the domain
of the trias
politica
institution.
Some people are still arguing that the
implementation of special autonomy of Papua has
failed. Member of the Special Autonomy Fraction of
the House of Representatives of West Papua,
Dominggus Sani revealed 47 reasons behind the
failure of Autonomy, or more widely known as
Otsus by the locals. Sani's statement about the
failure of special autonomy was based on the results
of his study of the Autonomy from the aspect of
jurisdiction. One of the reasons being mentioned is
the obligation of the local government to do a
consultation with the central government before
releasing a legislative product (Pasific Post, 2017).
The reason discussed above reflects that, despite the
effort to win Papuans’ hearts and mind, their voice is
still partly ignored by the government. Autonomy
itself is one of the ways to get a better understanding
of the Papuans, as it significantly affects
communication. In this case, perception and
communication are vital because communication is
central to many aspects of work in conflict and post-
conflict settings. Therefore, it is essential to
understand the perception of Papuan about the
Autonomy. After knowing Papuan’s perception
about special autonomy, the author used the
concepts of communication for peace to analyze the
future of reconciliation and peace building in Papua.
2 CONCEPT OF
COMMUNICATION FOR
PEACE
Efforts to achieve peace according to Shekinah
Jovan McCullum-Lawrence must really touch the
most basic aspects. Lawrence further argues that the
existence of the mediator is very important in the
effort to achieve peace. In competing arguments to
achieve reconciliation, both the mediator and the
parties to the conflict depend on the communication
skills they have (McCullum-Lawrence, 2014).
Therefore the concept of communication for peace
becomes relevant to be used as an analytical tool.
Julia Hoffman first introduced the
Conceptualization of Communication for Peace
(C4P) in 2014. C4P work has its roots in the
philosophy and practice of Communication for
Development. C4P is a potential starting point to the
concept of communication for peace and review the
development of ideas about peacekeeping and
building within the actor and other relevant actors,
paying attention to the role of communication and
media that has been carved out within their
activities. C4P inclined its focus on the role of
journalism and media representation of conflict
within communication science. According
Hoffman, C4P observes various aspects including
The Impact of Communication on the Future of Reconciliation and Peacebuilding in Papua: Understanding the Meaning of Special
Autonomy in Papuan Perceptions
1475
the effect of media coverage of on peace
negotiations, media development, journalism
education, post-conflict media regulation law, peace
journalism, "public information", effect on
audiences understanding, empathy, public opinion,
quantity and quality of the news, new media,
popular culture and representation of gender, 'race',
disability (Hoffmann, 2014).
Nevertheless, studies related to communication
for peace have been carried out before. One of the
examples of communication for peace reveals in a
study conducted by Kilonzo that uses an interactive
religious approach in communication. His study
finds that religious institutions have a forefront role
in a post-conflict situation to reconcile diverse ethnic
communities, and offer some lessons learned about
post-conflict peace communication (Kivinda, 2013).
Six years later, Mitra contributes to the
development of communication for peace by using
interpretative repertoire analyses. Mitra's study
shows a great deal of contribution by going beyond
the empiricist repertoires which governs the specific
practice and discipline in implementing
communication for peace. Based on his finding, the
researcher argues that approaches in communication
for peace are not as it seems to be. One should go
beyond the surface to find out a thorough
understanding in facilitating peacemaking dialogues,
hence should observe the perspective of the peace-
makers, journalists and the communication
professionals (Mitra, 2015).
Further thinking related to the concept of
communication for peace is the thought of Valentina
Bau. Bau expressed the idea of an inclusive peace
creation process which must begin with the
community. It was stated by Bau after seeing the
interrelationship between the three variables which
were interrelated, namely participatory
communication and civic involvement with the
reality of post-conflict peace (Baú, 2016).
3 RESEARCH METHOD AND
DESIGN
This research consists of an exploratory study carried
out using qualitative methodology with a case study
approach. Procedures for conducting a case study are
as follows; first, researchers determine if a case study
approach is appropriate to the research problem. The
second step is to identify their case or cases and
focused on a case or an issue (intrinsic, instrumental)
(Stake, 1995); (Yin, 2003). The data is collected
through observations, interviews, documents, and
literature study. In the final interpretive phase, the
researcher reports the meaning of the case, whether
that meaning comes from learning about the issue of
the case (an instrumental case) or learning about an
unusual situation (an intrinsic case) (Creswell, 2006).
The fieldwork was conducted in Papua. This
research aims to contribute a better understanding of
the ways to understand the impact of communication
in reconciliation and peacebuilding in Papua.
Specifically, through understanding the meaning of
Autonomy from Papuans’ perceptions. At the same
time, it lays the academic foundations for further
studies that aim to create more targeted designs for
communication interventions in peacebuilding and
reconciliation programming.
4 THE PAPUA HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (DPRP)
As mandated by Law No. 21 of 2001 on the
Provision of Special Autonomy for Papua Province,
and based on Letter of the Minister of Home Affairs
of the Republic of Indonesia Number 161.81/1034/
SJ dated May 3rd, 2005, the Provincial DPRD of
Papua changed its name to the House of
Representatives of Papua (DPRP). Based on the
provisions of Article 6 Paragraph (4) of the Special
Autonomy Law, it is stated that "The number of
members of the DPRP is 1¼ (one and a quarter)
times of the total members of the Provincial DPRD
as regulated in legislation.” Hence, the number of
members of the DPRP Period of Year 2009 to 2014
was 56 person. Furthermore, in accordance with the
provisions of Article 37 Paragraph (4) of the House
of Representatives’ Procedure of 2009, the
composition of the factions in the House of
Representatives of Papua was arranged as follows;
Golkar Party with fifteen persons, Demokrat Party
factions with twelve persons, PDI-P Party with
seven persons, six persons were from PKS Party,
nine were from Pikiran Rakyat Party, and the rest
seven persons are from Papua Bersatu Party.
5 THE PAPUAN PEPOPLE’S
ASSEMBLY (MRP)
By the provisions of Article 1 Letter G Law No. 21
in 2001, the MRP is a cultural representation of
indigenous Papuans, who have certain powers in the
context of protecting the rights of indigenous
Papuans based on respect for customs and culture,
women's empowerment, and the consolidation of
religious harmony. Government Regulation No. 54
of 2004 on the Papuan People's Assembly mentions
ICRI 2018 - International Conference Recent Innovation
1476
that MRP’s function is to give consideration and
approval in the formulation of regional policy, in the
framework of equality and diversity of life of the
people of Papua while also preserving the culture
and natural environment of Papua. Therefore, MRP
is not a political institution and government involved
three social elements to run the institution, namely
traditional leaders, women leaders and the religious
figure. The plan is to establish MRP as a capable
body to represent the people of Papua.
6 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH
FINDINGS
The Papuan legislators argued that the Central
Government did not wholeheartedly grant the
Special Autonomous Region to Papua. Central
government only granted the special autonomy fund
to the provincial government and did not give the
recognition needed by the local government. The
local legislators believed that they should be given
the authority to govern their province and should get
better assistance in accelerating Papua’s social and
economic development. Local leaders thought that
central government only consider their own
perspective when it comes to the implementation of
the Autonomy in Papua. It is because of lack of
communication between central government and
leaders of the Province of Papua. Papua legislators
thus encouraged the revision of the Law regulating
the Autonomy to meet the expectations of the
Papuan. Papua legislators also requested the central
government to initiate a dialogue process that would
include all Papuans, including those who support the
movement for independence for West Papua.
(Golkar, 2011)
From the interview result, we can also conclude
that all respondents who came from the DPRP
expressed doubts about the validity of the Act of
Free Choice (locally known as Pepera) which was
held in 1969. They considered it as one of the major
obstacles in the relationship between Jakarta and
Papua. As we know, the final result the Act of Free
Choice was accepted by the United Nations General
Assembly and following that West Irian officially
became the 27th province of Indonesia on 19
November 1969. The doubt arose because Pepera
was done by using the method of predetermined
delegation system in which the delegates decide
unanimously to join the Republic of Indonesia on 15
August 1969. (Golkar, 2011) (Party, 2011) (PDI-P,
2011) (Rakyat, 2011) (B.Watory, 2011)
Another legislator mentioned that the Autonomy
gives many problems to Papua, it is because the
central government only focuses on the distribution
of the Special Autonomy Funds without putting
much attention to the implementation of the rules
and regulation governing the Autonomy. Hence, the
fund is only circulated among the bureaucrats (PDI-
P, 2011). It means that the central government does
not seriously support the implementation of the
Autonomy itself.
DRP members also proposed that the regional
government should be elected by the DPRP because
as it is clearly stated in Law No.21 about Special
Autonomy that the head of local government should
only be elected by the DPRP so that the fund
allocated for the direct election can be further
assigned for the benefit of the people (PDI-P, 2011).
The obligation to consult all Papuan legislative
law products to the central government also becomes
a problem. A DRP member from the Demokrat Party
faction mentioned that consulting the draft of
Raperdasi and Raperdasus to central government has
always been a controversy since it contradicts the
local government’s intention to strengthen the local
legal instrument to support the implementation of
the Autonomy. The central government is said to be
only considering Indonesia’s condition as a whole
while the DPRD members try to formulate the draft
based on the real situation in Papua. The revision
given by the central government sometimes
contradicts the spirit of Autonomy. For example, the
case of a mutually agreed MRP, that there is only
one MRP. However, the central government actually
takes a decision which opposed the signed
agreement along with forming a new MRP (Party,
2011).
The respondents who are members of the DRP
from the Democratic Faction then affirmed the
formation of the MRP of the West Papuan, one
example of the Indonesian central government being
reluctant in the implementation of the Autonomy.
The informant mentioned as follows;
“There will be two MRPs, thousand people
demonstrations which result in the death of many,
meaning that it’s over.” (Party, 2011).
The informant further added that Autonomy is
the win-win solution for the central government and
the locals who want independence of Papua. At the
time of its release, the people of Papua disapproved
the Law No.21 Year 2001 as previously the Special
Autonomous Region status was given during
Suharto’s era but failed to be implemented properly
(Party, 2011).
The improper implementation of the Autonomy
can be seen from the current condition of the
education sector in Papua. During the hearing
meeting of the Papuan and West Papuan People’s
Assembly on 23 to 25 July 2013, it was revealed that
although the Gross Enrollment Rate (APK) in the
education sector in Papua reached 95% but in reality
The Impact of Communication on the Future of Reconciliation and Peacebuilding in Papua: Understanding the Meaning of Special
Autonomy in Papuan Perceptions
1477
numerous problems were still prominent. The
problems encountered including low attendance rate,
overcapacity of schools, low number of students
who continue education, high drop out rates, and
low literacy rates. These problems arise because of
the lack of supervision, lack of teachers and
problems of teacher’s placement, insufficient
infrastructure and facilities (Simbiak, 2013).
Another problem that must be communicated
openly according to the Papuan People's Assembly
(MRP) is the Act of Free Choice (Pepera) in 1969.
Just as the opinion of the DRP, MRP considers
Pepera 1969 to be a collective wound of Papua
which will continue to trigger protests and social
opposition from the Papuan. (Marey, 2011) (Awi,
2011)
According to respondents who are members of
the MRP and DRP, the obstacle to the validity of the
Pepera was strengthened in the Second Congress of
Papua. It was based on the results of the History
Search Commission which found several main
points related to the formulation of Pepera are
formulated, namely in Article XVII Paragraph D in
the New York Agreement. The article stipulates that
self-determination must be carried out by every
Papuan adult male and female who were the resident
of Papua at the time when the New York Agreement
was signed. This provision is not implemented
because self-determination is carried out by the
representative of each district in the Papua region
(Marey, 2011) (Awi, 2011).
However, in the view of the central government
of Indonesia, the issue of the validity Papua’s
integration into Indonesia has been resolved
properly. The central government believed that the
procedures which involved Papuan participation had
been implemented and the advice, assistances from
the United Nation had also completed the process.
Thus, The Act of Free Choice is not flawed and it
had been documented by the Directorate of
International Organization of the Department of
Foreign Affair ((MRP), 2013).
Therefore, the future communication and peace
building in Papua will be depend on the conflicts
experienced by the involved parties. The community
still strongly believe in the opinion of the leader of
indigenous community and religious group. Hence,
it is very important for C4P to include the role of
opinion leaders in the discussion, as observed in the
study conducted by Karadakal (2015) (al, 2015).
Therefore, in the future it is important for MRP
to invite the relate stakeholders and conduct a
dialogue with the figures who understand the current
situation and also the issues related to Pepera. For
this reason, the central government is expected to
provide a detailed and clear explanation of the
evidence that can prove the credibility of the central
government. Hence, able to convince the MRP about
the validity of Papua’s integration to Indonesia. If
MRP is convinced then the central government can
request MRP assistance to make a systematic
program to explain about the issue to Papuan people.
Likewise, the problems associated with the
implementation of Papua's special autonomy are
expected by Papuan leaders and communities to be
further deepened and clarified by the various aspects
of their expected achievements. By doing so, it is
expected that the reconciliation between Papua and
central government of Indonesia can be achieved
soon.
Thus the authors conclude that it is not enough to
observe C4P issues should be further observed by
using several other theories such as, the role of
elements as proposed by Kilonzo (2009), and the
discussion of interpretive repertoires initiated by
Mitra (2015). Thus important discussion is crucial in
the two-stage communication in C4P to make it
relevant to the real condition in Papua.
Therefore, as stated that the root of the main
problem of Papua is marginalization, discrimination,
including the lack of recognition of Papua's
contributions and services to Indonesia as stated in
(Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, 2012), then it becomes important
to place a Papuan opinion leader role consisting of
DPRP and MPRP as one of the crucial aspects in the
effort to achieve peace in Papua.
Therefore, in the long run the government needs
to build dialogue and negotiations towards
reconciliation. Gradually or simultaneously it is
necessary to seek dialogue spaces to prevent
widespread suspicion and mistrust, especially
between migrants and indigenous Papuans and
between the authorities and the community. The
gradual dialogue effort needs to be discussed with
leader opinions and involves active participation
from opinion leaders from Papua.
Thus the idea of involving active participation
from Papuan opinion leaders is in line with Bau's
idea that the process of achieving peace must begin
with the community. (Baú, 2016). The placement of
Papuan opinion leaders as one of the important
aspects in a series of two-stage communication
processes in an effort to realize Papuan peace must
be accompanied by a number of other important
things. Among the other important aspects is the fact
that the elimination of the identity of the Papuan
people, especially during the Trikora, UNTEA and
before PEPERA, is actually part of a process that
has led to the maturation of Papua's nationalism.
Therefore, the Central Government of Jakarta should
appreciate the demand for strengthening Papuan
identity, among others, by putting Papua's opinion
leader position as one of the important aspects that
ICRI 2018 - International Conference Recent Innovation
1478
determine the efforts to realize peace efforts in
Papua.
The existence of Law No. 21 of 2001 concerning
Special Autonomy for Papua is the commitment of
the government and all the people of Indonesia to
adopt a new perspective in addressing various
problems that have so far colored the life of the
Papua Province, but until now it has been proven
that the settlement of Papuan is still far from
expectations. For that reason, the central government
has time to review various aspects that are
considered unsatisfactory from the law from the
perspective of the Papuan people by involving active
participation from Papuan opinion leaders in an open
dialogue full of togetherness and mutual
understanding.
Regarding the role of the MRP with the DPRP, it
has been running well in Papua. One example, when
MRP proposes with what is referred to as Decree 14
or SK14, the decision is supported by the DPRP.
The MRP's decision stating that the Governor and
Deputy Governor are indigenous Papuans, including
the Mayor and Deputy Mayor must also be Papuans
accepted by the DPRP. The MRP itself gets these
aspirations directly from community groups. The
relationship between the DPRP and MRP and the
community is due to the fact that the Papuan people
in general are inseparable from culture. In each
problem, they will always solve it with adat and
entrust their problems to the elites, both through the
DPRP and MRP (Katharina, 2011).
The implementation of the MRP's role with the
DPRP in voicing the aspirations of the Papuan
community needs to be further appreciated. In line
with the provisions in Article 122 of the 2009 DPRP
Code of Conduct which states that the draft Perdasus
that has been approved with the DPRP and the
Governor before being determined to be Perdasus
submitted to the MRP for discussion to get
consideration and approval, more appreciation must
be given. The consideration of the MRP which is a
form of agreement between the Papuan people who
always solve every problem that they meet in a
customary manner also needs to be adopted as one
of the provisions in every discussion of
reconciliation efforts in Papua. Therefore, it is
necessary to review the provisions of the 2010
Article DPRP Rules which have caused the MRP's
role to weaken.
With regard to reconciliation efforts, it is time
for the central government to open their ears to hear
what the Papuan people hope for. Various events
that are considered to be hurting the people of
Papua, such as when the DPRP came to Jakarta to
meet with the Minister very difficult, should not be
attempted again. Jakarta and Papua must sit together.
The government also has time to invite the Papuans
who reject Papua's special autonomy. The attitude
shown by the center so far which is afraid to open a
dialogue forum with those who reject Papua's special
autonomy should be eliminated.
At a time when Papuans showed an attitude of
refusal to engage in dialogue with the Center they
called Jakarta, various approaches taken by the
central government, such as those carried out in the
time of President Gus Dur, were exemplary. At that
time President Abdurahman Wahid or Gus Dur, who
as head of state officially apologized publicly to the
people of Papua for human rights violations
committed by the TNI in the past on a visit to Irian
Jaya on 1 January as well as formally agreed to
change the name of Irian Jaya to using the name
Papua.
Related to the material of dialogue, a common
understanding should be sought regarding the
referendum. If all this time the central government
considers the discussion of referedum to be taboo
because the stage has been exceeded in the previous
phase. But for Papuan leaders and people, history In
May 2000, for example, at the time of the Second
Papuan People's Congress and the Third Papuan
People's Congress in October 2011, there were still
demands for an independent Papuan state in federal
form. Not only that the issue of demands for
independence "Merdeka" and doubts about the
history of Papuan integration are still being raised by
the Presidium of the Papuan Council and the Papuan
Customary Council. Therefore, it is time for the
central government to pay more attention to doubts
about the history of disintegration of Papua into the
Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia by
explaining various facts and data related to history
that exist to traditional leaders, government figures
and the Papuan people continuously by prioritizing
the principle of parallel relations and partnerships to
achieve the same understanding of the same history
of Papuan integration between the two parties.
Therefore the central government has time to
make an inventory of various things that are
considered "taboo". In addition, the central
government must strive to create compromises
between the two parties in order to achieve
recalibration or re-frame the relationship between
Jakarta and Papua so as to create integration or the
realization of a force that binds and suppresses
differences between the two parties in order to reduce
uncertainty in a relationship. dialogic and striving for
more communication that seeks to achieve a common
perspective related to various things that have been
considered taboo by involving active opinion leader
participation. In turn, Papuan opinion leaders then
gave an explanation of the various results of dialogue
to the Papuan people so that the same understanding
The Impact of Communication on the Future of Reconciliation and Peacebuilding in Papua: Understanding the Meaning of Special
Autonomy in Papuan Perceptions
1479
was reached in relation to various problems that had
been the obstacle related to Papua's special
autonomy.
Thus the central government needs to do an
interpersonal approach to traditional leaders as well
as various opinion leaders in Papua. In addition, the
central government also needed to find opinion
leaders from Papua who were able to become
mediators such as the role played by Muhammad
Jusuf Kalla, who at the time of negotiations in
Helsinki served as Vice President during a peaceful
settlement between Indonesia and Aceh.
Another important step, the central government
must be able to maintain partnership relations with
Papua by communicating with Papua so that a
common understanding is achieved in the
community. By conducting dialogues by placing
Papua opinion leaders in equal positions with the
central government of Jakarta, there is a willingness
from the Central Government to understand the issue
of special autonomy in Papua from the point of view
of the Papuan people.
7 CONCLUSION
From the findings of the research on Papuan
legislative perceptions as part of the Papua provincial
government on their views on the Autonomy, we can
conclude that there is no intensive communication
between the central government and the provincial
government of Papua on the implementation of
Autonomy which has led to poor perceptions of
Papuan legislators. Therefore, it is necessary to
conduct a special and intensive dialogue to create a
better flow of communication between the central
government and the provincial government of Papua
is horizontal and continuous. This will significantly
affect the implications for the creation of
reconciliation and peace in Papua. The central
government should provide a complete explanation
and communicate on the various issues that are
questioned by the Papuan leaders.
Communication as the central process of human
interaction, a good communication is the root of
conflict prevention which eventually can result in a
reconciliation towards a more conducive and peace
condition. On the other hand, based on studies
conducted Kilonzo (2009) religious institutions have
the potential to communicate the message of peace.
Many of them can be used to develop the people and
help them to advance their community. As well as in
case of Republic of Indonesia, especially for the
benefit of the people of Papua itself.
From this study we can also draw the conclusion
that conflict resolution and reconciliation depend on
the conditions of the conflicted parties. Regarding to
the influence brought by the leader, it signified the
study on the role of leaders in the communication for
peace building in Papua is vital and relevant.
Looking at the interview result with the local
legislators, it seems that the central government
should open a discussion and build a better
understanding regarding the Autonomy. When the
local legislators and central government shared the
view then reconciliation and peace building process
can be brought into realization
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