International Environmental Non-Government Organization

(IENGO) Diplomacy in Emerging Countries

The Cases of China, Brazil, and Indonesia

Irfa Puspitasari

, Masitoh Nur Rohma

, Kartika Yustina Mandala Putri

, Dinis Cahyaningrum

Department of International Relations, Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya, Indonesia

Keywords: International Environment Non-Government Organization (IENGO), diplomacy, Indonesia, China, Brazil.

Abstract: The International Environmental Non-Governmental Organisation (IENGO) has become increasingly

influential since the Rio Jeneiro conference in 1992. This paper seeks to investigate the pattern of NGO

diplomacy in three countries, namely China, Brazil and Indonesia. Transnational advocacy networks apply

boomerang pattern strategies to pressure governments by carrying out information politics, symbolic

politics, political leverage and accountability politics. This strategy is also implemented by environmental

NGO networks, for example, to drive a soy moratorium in Brazil aimed at mitigating the deforestation of

the Amazonian rainforest. In one of the cases in Indonesia, the barriers to cooperation between the

government and NGOs, as well as differences in the values and information held between the respective

global and local perspectives involved in conservation management, resulted in unjust conservation policies.

1 INTRODUCTION

Studies regarding compliance alongside the current

environmental condition state that democracy can

provide more freedom for NGOs, enabling the

organisation to establish its formation and to

strengthen transnational coalitions in order to

influence governmental compliance efforts toward

international agreements (Jacobson & Weiss, 1998).

The recognition of the legitimacy of NGOs by the

United Nations has made it easier for it to move

within an international scope and this also facilitates

the position of NGO Diplomacy in international

negotiations. NGO’s diplomacy efforts are reflected

in its varied activities, ranging from the most subtle,

namely care and welfare, to the more provocative

ones aiming to achieve change and development

(Ball & Leith, t.t). The recognition of NGO in

international relations has contributed to various

roles related to the establishment of environmental

policies. People are beginning to realise that to come

up with an effective global action requires the

involvement of stakeholders in policy establishment

and their international implementation (Gemmill &

Bamidele-Izu, 2002). Some of the roles played by

NGO in the Global Environment Governance

(Gemmill & Bamidele-Izu) include expert advice

and analysis, intellectual competition against the

government, the mobilisation of public opinion,

representation for the voiceless, service provisions,

monitoring and assessments, and the legitimisation

of global-scale decision-making mechanisms.

Betsill limits the definition of NGO influence in

terms of international negotiations into two

dimensions:

 The way NGO diplomats communicate with

other actors during the negotiation process,

and

 Behaviour changes from the actors in response

to the communications.

To analyse the first dimension, identifying the

specific content in the NGO’s communications with

other actors should be carried out, while the second

dimension can be analysed by evaluating the

achievement of the NGO’s objectives and

identifying the response of the other actors

according to their behaviour changes.

320

Puspitasari, I., Rohma, M., Putri, K. and Cahyaningrum, D.

International Environmental Non-Government Organization (IENGO) Diplomacy in Emerging Countries.

DOI: 10.5220/0008821003200324

In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Contemporary Social and Political Affairs (ICoCSPA 2018), pages 320-324

ISBN: 978-989-758-393-3

2 DISCUSSIONS

2.1 Greenpeace and Brazil’s Soy

Moratorium

With the deforestation issue and the power

concentrated in the domestic government as the

starting points, the role of Greenpeace as an NGO

has emerged. Greenpeace, in collaboration with

local communities in the Amazon, has performed its

investigations since 1998. In 2004, Greenpeace

began documenting the impact of industry

emergence on the destruction of the Amazon

rainforest, especially in the Santarem region,

published in a report entitled Eating Up Amazon.

Initially, Greenpeace took note of the soy export

data to Liverpool in 2005 from the port of Santarém,

Brazil; 340,000 tons, with the other ports in Brazil

not included. Greenpeace then investigated soy

exports and it was determined that it was not only

Liverpool, but also Amsterdam, which had become

the two biggest soy importing cities. Soy is used as

livestock feed and is considered to be cheap with

sufficient nutrition. The increasing level of soy

exporting through Santarém resulted in the

conclusion by Greenpeace that the establishment of

Cargill in Santarém and of farmers in the

surrounding areas was closely related to soy

production and Amazon rainforest deforestation.

Europe is heavily dependent on soy imports for its

livestock production. This makes Europe a soy

importer, bringing in both seeds and the pulp. Brazil

replaced the United States as the world's largest soy

exporter in 2003, and in 2004, Brazil made up 63%

of the European Union countries’ total soy imports

(Dros, 2004). The soy trade chain is global; exported

in the form of soybeans or as livestock feed. Soy and

soy-based products have connected producers,

traders, and crushers in Latin America to the

crushers, food industries, livestock industries,

slaughterhouses and retailers in the United States, as

well as to European consumers (ISTA &

Hadiprayitno, 2010).

On April 6th, 2006, the same day as the

publication of the Eating Up Amazon report, several

groups of people dressed in large chicken costumes

and entered McDonald's in seven major cities in the

UK (Eisenberg, 2006). It was a protest against food

producers; chickens symbolise the livestock which

consumed soy as the result of deforestation.

Greenpeace is targeting the cessation of the

Amazonian deforestation. This demands cooperation

from the companies involved in the food chain to

commit to boycotting soy deforestation products.

One of the voluntary commitments proposed by

Greenpeace was the Soy Moratorium, which is a

mechanism to monitor and evaluate soy plantations

in the Amazon. The Soy Working Group is a

monitoring mechanism that was established as a

result of the Soybean Moratorium.

In its initial campaign, Greenpeace proposed the

idea of establishing a working group consisting of

soy traders, producers, NGOs and the government to

come up with an action plan. Greenpeace’s

advocacy in relation to mobilising the public opinion

is comprehensive as it does not only involve support

from the community and the consumers, but it also

brings in the local producers.

Greenpeace invited a number of companies with

large purchasing power, such as Cargill, ADM,

Bunge, Dreyfus and Amaggi, to attend and negotiate

together about the threat posed to the survival of the

Amazon rainforest (Greenpeace, 2006).

Greenpeace's proposal received support from WWF,

which considers that the circulation of soy farming

businesses can be safe if accompanied by transparent

land use planning, supervision and government

policy support.

The willingness of McDonald’s to cooperate

with Greenpeace constituted a turning point for

Greenpeace’s diplomatic power. By cooperating

with McDonald’s as a representation of large food

companies, it became easier for Greenpeace to gain

support from other food companies. This is proven

by the support of Alpro, ASDA (Wal-Mart), El

Corte Inglés, Lidl, Marks & Spencer, Morrisons,

Ritter-Sport, Sainbury's, Tegut, Tesco and Waitrose.

Alongside this increasing support, Cargill and other

companies, which are members of ABIOVE and

ANEC as soy trading companies, were forced to

evaluate their production system. The willingness of

McDonald’s became an entry point to the

negotiation agenda.

The approval of the Soy Moratorium in July

2006 by ABIOVE and ANEC was unpredictable. In

October 2006, the Soy Working Group was

established to ensure the implementation of the

moratorium consisting of soy companies,

environmental NGOs and civil society groups. Upon

the achievement of the Soy Moratorium agreement

in July 2006 and the establishment of the Soy

Working Group in October 2006, a meeting between

the representatives of the Brazilian Government and

the Soy Working Group was held in April 2007. The

Brazilian government was represented by Dilma

Rousseff, the Chief of Staff, responsible for the

implementation of the National Plan against

Deforestation.

International Environmental Non-Government Organization (IENGO) Diplomacy in Emerging Countries

321

2.2 NGO’s Boomerang Pattern

Strategy in Influencing China’s

Position in relation to the

Construction of the Three Gorges

Dam in 2000

A massive petition was held focused on requesting

compensation for the construction of TGD, resulting

in the imprisonment of the petition perpetrators by

the Chinese government. He Kechang, Ran

Chongxin, Jiang Qingshan, and We Dingchun have

been detained by the Chinese government since

March 2001 due to the petition that they led (Friends

of the Earth, 2002). Amnesty International took part

in the demand to free the four Chinese citizens and

to ensure their access to their families, doctors and

lawyers regarding their case.

Attempts to prevent the government from

building the dam was supported by academics and

experts including hydrologists, historians and

environmentalists. Student organisations even

attempted to build a diaspora and international

network.

On the international scale, various protests

emerged. These protests included a coalition of US

wilderness observers and a lawsuit in the United

States district court to block the participation of two

federal agencies in contributing to the planning and

construction of the TGD. (Zhu, t.t). In addition,

more than 60 environmental groups worldwide sent

a letter of protest to the Canadian Prime Minister for

his financial support toward the TGD’s development

(Probe International, 2008).

On March 25

-27

, 1999, Chinese President,

Jiang Zemin paid a visit to Switzerland in

connection with the TGD. A few days prior to his

arrival, Amnesty International, the Berne

Declaration, and several human rights groups held a

march and sent an open letter to the Chinese

president stating their strong opposition to the

involvement of companies, banks and the Swiss

government in the TGD project.

Friends of the Earth managed to convince the

U.S. Export-Import Bank not to fund the TGD

project (Beijing Energy Efficiency Center, n.d).

Friends of the Earth also assisted Chinese anti-dam

groups, allowing them to gain more publicity in

domestic China. This allowed them to obtain

representation in environmental and social projects

and to provide guidance to the government staff on

the potential impact of the dam’s construction. The

same action was performed by the International

Rivers Network. On May 1996, the U.S Export-

Import Bank eventually issued a statement that they

would not provide a warranty to the US companies

wishing to establish contracts in the TGD project.

The success of International Rivers Network in

lobbying the U.S. Export-Import Bank did not affect

the companies that dominated the TGD’s funding,

namely Chinese International Capital Corporations.

Approximately 35 percent of the funds in the

Chinese International Capital Corporations

controlled by the TGD project were owned by

Morgan Stanley. The International Rivers Network

finally decided to walk out of the negotiation

process and declare a boycott of the customer

service of Chinese International Capital

Corporations.

The interaction between the pro-dam and anti-

dam sides resulted in a network that had the

potential to influence the Chinese government's

political policies.

Figure 1: MSG’s Boomerang Pattern Strategy

China joined the WCD membership as an

attempt to follow some of the international

development standards. China's adjustment to the

standards set by WCD in relation to the dam

construction process reflected China's position,

which began to change. China's membership in the

international community was at a crucial point,

given how the state viewed the dam’s development

through an international viewpoint. The government

agreed to make improvements in the calculation of

economic risks based upon the results of an

evaluation conducted by WCD (Allin, 2004).

Moreover, the Chinese government was also willing

to conduct a basic watershed ecosystem survey,

which was initially not a concern of the Chinese

government. Economic risk calculations and a basic

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watershed ecosystem survey were attempts made by

the Chinese government to create a win-win solution

between its economic interests and environmental

sustainability.

2.3 NGO and Conservation in

Indonesia

Cooperation was established between the Indonesian

government through the Directorate General of

Forest Protection and Nature Conservation and The

Nature Conservancy (TNC) through a memorandum

of understanding (MoU), number

4578/IV.Sek/PA/02 on the assignment of TNC

assisting the Komodo National Park in carrying out

conservation and community empowerment around

the Komodo National Park area.

Figure 2: Timeline of TNC in Komodo National Park

The achievement of this collaboration was in the

form of a tourism concession company that was a

Joint Venture of ‘PT. Putri Naga Komodo’ (PNK).

In the Joint Venture, 60% of its funding came from

TNC and 40% came from the Indonesian tourism

company, PT Jaytasha Putrindo Utama (JPU). The

Joint Venture set out to increase the tourism

infrastructure by collecting tourism revenues of

which some was used for Komodo National Park

management. Furthermore, some of the revenue was

used to fund community development programs. The

Joint Venture was summarised in a document called

the Komodo Collaborative Management Initiative

(KCMI) (Fajarudin, 2009).

The World Bank, the Global Environmental

Facility (GEF) and The Nature Conservancy

provided US $10 million over a seven-year period to

cover the initial cost, as well as the operational and

management costs of the national park. During this

period, Komodo National Park generated ecotourism

revenue for management and the district, provincial

and central government revenue was nearly US $8

million. By the end of the seventh year, Komodo

National Park was expected to be financially

independent in order to generate an operating budget

of US $2 million/year.

Tension came from the envious officers of the

Komodo National Park regarding the involvement of

the TNC staff, considered to be new parties in the

area. This was worsened by the TNC personnel

earning a higher income. Problems among the

leaders also caused the performance of TNC to

decline, which eventually caused tension, namely

the worsening relationship between the head of

Komodo National Park and the leader of TNC. This

lead to several of the programs proposed by TNC

not getting approval. In addition, problems with the

TNC’s leader caused delays in funding and delays in

realising activities, which resulted in increased

tension within the community.

This triggered an increasingly complicated

conflict. It caused the government to heavily

highlight the existence of TNC as one of the

stakeholders and the founder of PNK. At the same

time, it highlighted its position as an NGO, which in

accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding

(MoU), meant that it was not allowed to profit from

its operations (Agroindonesia, 2009).

When TNC conducted fish cultivation in Loh

Mbongi, TNC handed over the facility to PT.

Keramba to manage. In accordance with the MoU,

Loh Mbongi was a local asset, so it should be

handed over to the local government (Pos Kupang,

2006). By transforming itself into PT. PNK, TNC

was violating the MoU (Amiwijaya, 2003).

People were marginalised in their own area.

People were oppressed due to the existing

regulations and they felt disadvantaged. They

considered TNC to be responsible for a situation that

harmed the community. Security operations were

carried out by TNC in the Komodo National Park

area. This safeguarding approach was considered to

be a repressive method, since there were many cases

of fisherman being shot dead in the Komodo

National Park area without the incidences being

legally resolved.

In the Komodo National Park Management

Planning, it was explained that zoning must be

approved by the community and the related

authorities (The Directorate General of Marine and

Fisheries Resource Surveillance). However, TNC

was considered to have taken shortcuts when setting

the zoning policy, without consent from the local

community and with a lack of socialisation. The

TNC programs that were socialised are not well-

implemented. It was often delayed in that TNC was

considered to have deceived the community.

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3 CONCLUSION

Various studies regarding NGOs in Brazil, China

and Indonesia show that as a non-state organisation,

NGO has an influence related to its access to

funding as well as its influence as a transnational

advocacy network. The presence of NGO can

provide benefits in terms of democratisation, but at

the same time, it can also be a threat to the economy

of the local community and also weaken the position

of the state as the primary policy maker. In the case

of Brazil, Greenpeace was even able to change the

state’s policy. In the case of China, the NGO had an

influence, as it established a transnational advocacy

network despite its scope. In the case of Indonesia,

the existence of the NGO colonised the local

community interests and minimised the authority of

the state as a manager.

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