The Implementation of China Peaceful Rise in The IMF Reform

Mahfudz Ibnu Romadhon

, Moch. Yunus

Department of International Relations, Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya, Indonesia

Keywords: China Peaceful Rise, China Peaceful Development, IMF Reform, Role-Bargaining Theory

Abstract: China’s Peaceful Rise is a policy orientation established back in the Hu Jintao administration in 2003. This

concept was created to gain interest through peaceful and non-confrontational means. The IMF's reform is

one of the major agendas in IMF, containing the IMF's attempt to reform itself in two rounds: a major

reform of the quotas by changing the composition of the quotas themselves and the voting rights of its

members, and by changing the position of the government structures within the IMF itself. On October 14th

2014, the IMF Reform faced a problem in the United States. The USA, the only country that has the veto

ability, blocked the outcome of the IMF Reform. Because of this rejection, European constituents put

forward a confrontational effort by not involving the USA in the reforms. Regarding this background, this

research study has tried to explain the application of CPR in the IMF Reform. From the research results, it

was found that the application of CPR in the IMF Reform was done by overcoming the US allegations

against its currency manipulation policy (RMB) and gaining a legitimate role in the context of the IMF

Reform. In addressing the allegations of RMB manipulation, China demonstrated a commitment to the IMF

Reform by signalling China's expenditures in the IMF Reform and showing there to have been direct

monitoring of the IMF on RMB through multilateral surveillance and SDR monitoring. Second, China

gained legitimacy concerning its demands by utilising G-20, BRICS and its executive directors who served

as voices, suppressors and framers of the IMF Reform. In addition, China also visited the United States as

part of an agreement to ratify the IMF reforms.

1 INTRODUCTION

In 2003, President Hu Jintao's government released a

white paper which explained the direction of his

policy on a peace named “China’s Peaceful Rise”

(CPR). CPR is a policy designed to re-show China's

identity in an era of peace and prosperity, which

seeks to offer changes through peaceful and non-

confrontational means. It was intended to avoid the

aggressive label inherent in a country with rapid

economic development which is often coupled with

a revision of the existing order.

After the implementation of CFR, China had a

relatively high GDP growth rate. In 1984, China's

GDP had the highest growth amount of 15.14

percent and China's GDP in 1993 had a growth rate

of 14.2 percent (World Bank, tt). China's GDP rank

increased from ten in 1978 to six in 2003 and

continued to increase over the following years.

China defines CPR as “China should develop itself

through upholding world peace and contributing to

world peace through its own development; it should

achieve development through its own efforts and by

carrying out reforms and innovation. At the same

time, China should learn from other countries. It

should seek mutual benefits and common

development with other countries in keeping with

the trend of economic globalisation, and it should

work together with other countries (Ministry, 2007).

The relationship of CPR and international

organisations is linked through China's government

to the IMF. President Hu Jintao also has the "big

idea" of creating a peaceful and prosperous

condition through the use of a "peaceful

development" approach in reaching his interests. As

expressed through Xiaochuan, the Governor of the

Central Bank of China, in 2006 the G20 forum

stated the following: "If we (China) do not choose to

follow fair rules in international organisations, then

the situation becomes chaotic and inefficient” (Dorn,

Romadhon, M. and Moch. Yunus, .

The Implementation of China Peaceful Rise in The IMF Reform.

DOI: 10.5220/0008820903130319

In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Contemporary Social and Political Affairs (ICoCSPA 2018), pages 313-319

ISBN: 978-989-758-393-3

313

2006). This statement was a response to the

involvement of China in the IMF Reforms that

began to be discussed in 2006. This reform is an

important reform for China, because China is the

single most disadvantaged country ranked 6th with a

quota of 2.98 percent. China's economic

performance was ranked 3rd with a quota of 6.39

percent after the United States and Japan during the

IMF's Reform (IMF, tt). Concerning the

implementation of CPR, it was a challenge to show

the nature of China's compliance, coordination and

their status as a responsible stakeholder to

international organisations and to China itself. It was

a great opportunity to internationalise the renminbi,

to expand its financial influence and to become a

major player in IMF decisions by having the right to

vote a separate executive. The IMF's revisions

contain the IMF's attempts to reform itself in two

rounds. The first round of reforms was

operationalised in two attempts. The first was with

the addition of the total quota value of 188 member

states, making it USD $659 Billion up from the

previous of USD $329 Billion. In the second round,

the reforms were carried out by abolishing the direct

appointment function of the IMF Executive Director.

This was conducted by five largest shareholder

countries in the IMF and through the shareholder's

position on the basis of the change (IMF, tt).

Like the WTO accession, China was tested for its

commitment and statements to the non-

confrontational approach of CPR, among others.

This is because China became a country accused by

the United States. In the interview with

therealnews.com, they said: “The law is clear. If

China is manipulating its currency, then you're

supposed to designate them. Other than the fact that

that would make them really mad, and they are

cheating less, why haven't you carried out an

existing law in designating China as a currency

manipulator?” (Desvarieux, 2014)

This challenge strengthened when the United

States became the only country that could determine

the progress of the Reformation by having a de facto

veto. The 3rd Article of Agreement in the 2nd

paragraph states that "An eighty-five percent

majority of the total voting power shall be required

for any change in quotas" (IMF, tt). While the

United States had 17.46 percent of the vote, the

United States did not ratify the outcome of the IMF

Reform until there was an emergence of non-

confrontational reactions from various members of

the IMF, including Japan. Japan wanted a reformed

design without including the US as an anchor of this

decision (Arifin, 2004). This decision referred to an

interim solution or an interim step. As expressed by

Taro Aso, Japan's representative at the IMF: “On

strengthening the IMF’s financial resources, the

2010 Reforms are the one and only existing package

that was agreed upon by all member countries, and

its realisation is critical... Japan firmly believes that

it is critical that the quota shares of members under

the “interim solution” should be implemented within

the vicinity of the final results of the 2010 Reforms”

(Aso, 2013)

Despite the confrontational situation, IMF's

reaction was finally inaugurated on 26th January

2016, with the results of the reform as planned and

approved by the United States on 18th December

2015. With the implementation of the IMF Reform,

it becomes to know how China got through the

confrontational situations and helped the IMF

reform succeed despite the fact that CPR is still

being implemented. While China itself has its own

complexities when regulating its economy as China

has one currency, with two different values for the

onshore renminbi and offshore renminbi due to its

semi-open policy, China is also often accused of

manipulating currency values to increase the

competitive level of trade. In addition to this, up

until 2014, China had never released any of its

economic data including interest rates, inflation and

capital development and lastly, China also has

control of foreign and local companies within its

territory.

2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

2.1 Role-Bargaining Theory

In discussing the problems encountered before, the

authors have adopted the theories offered by Kai He

and Stephen Walker in their research titled "Role

Bargaining Strategies for China Peaceful Rise". It

describes China's accession to the WTO. If the IMF

accuses China of being a country that manipulates

the value of its currency, then the WTO of Tiongkok

can be accused of frequent dumping. Based on the

similarity of this context, the author adopted the

theory of role bargaining as a lens through which to

see the application of CPR in the IMF reform. In

international relations, the theory of rational

bargaining suggests that a bargain between countries

is a determination of war and peace (Tingley, 2013).

In theory, it explains the two barriers that affect the

success of bargaining in overcoming problems of

information and commitment. Information problems

are defined as the circumstances where there is

ICoCSPA 2018 - International Conference on Contemporary Social and Political Affairs

314

asymmetric information in the process of bargaining

between several countries (Tingley, 2013). The

commitment issue occurs because the country makes

a dubious promise that is to be kept in a certain

period of time caused by the overtime changes of the

initial incentive (He & Walker, 2005). Furthermore,

the rational bargaining theory suggests two

strategies to overcome the problem of cost signalling

and self-restraint. The cost signalling strategy shows

that the actor incurs costs related to the desired

proposal that is put forward to the other actors,

especially when it is to a superior country given its

position in an international system (Sulivan, 2014).

In self-restraint, the actors invite agencies to monitor

the issues and release the results to the international

community (He and Walker, 2005).

Meanwhile, role theory initially shows that

everyone plays a particular role in society and the

society functions as a network of individual roles.

Role theory further focuses on the convergence or

different conceptions of the role of the agents

against the expectations of the role of other agents.

This is as well as the demands of the system. When

analysing an actor and the role that they want to

achieve, there are three factors to note (Drezner,

2010). First, the agent (Chinese) needs to define its

new role through its own conception, which is what

China wants to do in the international community.

Secondly, there is China's expected role according to

other agencies (other countries). Third, is the 'role

demands' system from the international community

to China. When it comes to making credible

demands and legitimising them, role theory provides

two role-diversification and alter-casting strategies.

The role-diversification strategy is the strategy used

to vary the actors according to their role inside and

outside of international organisations in order to gain

better acceptance opportunities from other countries

(He and Walker, 2005). The second strategy is alter-

casting. It can be used by rising powers to make real

and legitimised role demands (He and Walker,

2005). Alter-casting shows the weak actors in the

international system.

2.2 The Implementation of Role-

Bargaining Theory in the IMF

Reform

There are two costly sacrifices that are being

pursued by China during the IMF reforms. The first

aimed to assist the IMF in helping the member

countries during the 2008 crisis and the second is

related to the costs incurred while carrying out

China's economic reforms. The IMF estimated that

US and European banks lost more than $1 trillion in

assets from bad loans between January 2007 and

September 2009. The loss is estimated to be $2.8

trillion between 2007 and 2010. US bank losses

were estimated to be $1 trillion and European bank

losses reached $1.6 trillion; The IMF estimated that

in 2009, US banks lost about 60% of their total cash

reserves and British and Euro-area banks lost about

40% (Reurters.com, tt). Upon this occurrence, in

April 2009 at the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh, the

UK G-20 leaders committed to increasing the Fund's

basic resources of USD $500 billion to help

countries hit by the crisis. After the outcome of the

first meeting, the IMF issued bonds for sale to

member countries. China became the first buyer of

the bond by purchasing the equivalent of $50 billion

(New York Times, 2009). In making this decision,

China chose to announce it together with the BRICS

countries (Brazil, Russia China, South Africa) in the

G-20 forum in 2009, and stated that they will donate

funds to the IMF through a mechanism that allows

for the temporary purchase of IMF bonds. BRICS

raised the IMF capital by adding US $150 billion

through bond purchases, with China giving the

biggest amount of USD $50 billion. Other countries

each bought US $25 billion. China also took the

unusual step of paying for the IMF bonds with

payments of 341.2 billion yuan instead of dollars, as

used for most trades and other foreign transactions

(Glosny, 2010).

In the domestic realm, China helped to reform its

market as a way to adapt to the economic system

offered by the IMF. Starting from 2005, Wen Jiabao,

in his meeting with the US delegation, stated his

intention to reform the renminbi currency. On July

21st 2007, the People's Bank of China, the central

bank of China, announced that the Chinese currency,

RMB, would trade at a rate of 8.1 per US dollar.

Renminbi anchors on USD, diverted to a basket of

foreign currency managed on the basis of supply and

demand (China Embassy.org, tt). In May 2007,

China expanded the daily trading band of renminbi

against the dollar to 0.5 percent from 0.3 percent

(Qing and Magnowski, 2012). In July 2008, China's

central bank effectively pegged the renminbi against

the dollar at 6.83 to help its economic rise through

the worst global financial crisis. In July 2009, China

took a step towards internationalising the renminbi

by launching a pilot program that allowed selected

Chinese regions to pay imports and exports with the

renminbi. In June 2010, China continued the reform

of the renminbi exchange rate and increased its

currency flexibility, which effectively permeated the

two-year anchorage against the dollar imposed

The Implementation of China Peaceful Rise in The IMF Reform

315

during the global financial crisis. In February 2012,

the renminbi reached a record high of 6.2884 per

dollar. In March 2012, China increased its efforts to

internationalise the renminbi by allowing all

companies in the country to pay their imports and

exports in renminbi '; In April 2012, China expanded

its trading band for the renminbi against the dollar to

1 percent up from 0.5 percent (Qing and

Magnowski, 2012). Due to the reforms in the

renminbi currency, China cannot manage its

finances at a low value without IMF approval. This

is related to the IV article agreement. The value of

the renminbi itself experienced a natural

appreciation of about 25 percent to the dollar

(brookings.edu, tt). The value of the appreciation

continued into 2014. Between 2008 and 2011,

China's trade surplus fell by almost half from $298

billion to $155 billion. The IMF, in 2015, declared

its currency to be "fairly valued" and in that year, the

IMF no longer accepted there as being problems

between the US and China. This was announced on

the official website of the IMF. In addition to a

reduction in the trade surplus, China also spent USD

$94 billion in reserves to keep its currency in August

2015, and its total reserves fell by about USD $400

billion from year-on-year usage and peaked a year

ago (reuters.com, tt).

China strongly opposed the surveillance decision

in 2006, as stated by the Governor of PBoC in an

inter-IMF committee meeting stating that "in

strengthening surveillance, the Fund should be

realistic and not overestimate the role of exchange

rates. Biased advice would damage the Fund's role in

safeguarding global economic and financial

stability". In 2012, China experienced a drastic

change in attitude toward its oversight function. At

the IMF Annual Meeting in 2012, Yi Gang, the

alternate IMF Governor Council for China, accepted

both bilateral and multilateral surveillance which

was then called integrated surveillance through its

statement as follows: “We welcome the adoption of

the Integrated Surveillance Decision by the IMF, as

a step in a positive direction to enhancing the

effectiveness of Fund surveillance through the better

integration of bilateral and multilateral surveillance,

together with a broadened focus on macroeconomic

policies” (Qu, tt)

The second monitor was invited by the Chinese

government directly in order to apply renminbi as

SDR basket currency. In 2006 at the IMF spring

meeting, the Governor of the People's Bank of

China, Zhou Xiaochuan, remarked on the need for

reforms in the currency reserve of SDR. At the IMF

in March 2015, Li Keqianag asked the IMF to put

the renminbi into the basket of SDR as follows:

“China hoped to, through the SDR, play an active

role in international cooperation to maintain

financial stability and promote the further opening of

China’s capital market and financial area. China will

push forward financial reform for the real economy

and the prevention of risk. China will develop

private, small and medium banks to provide better

support for small businesses.” (Gang, 2012)

To be a contributor of the renminbi currency in

the SDR basket, China needs to meet two general

criteria: 1) the exported currency being proposed

must be the currency with the greatest export value,

and 2) it must be free-usable, i.e. there is the use of

the currency widely in international transactions and

in foreign exchange trading by other countries in the

international currency market through the

assessment of the Executive Board as well as the

IMF board (IMF, tt). In the first criterion, China has

become an active country in international trade. The

IMF's board of directors and executive directors

noted that the ranking of the largest exporters

remained unchanged since the last review in 2005.

China has recorded an increase in world trade, such

as imported product figures from ASEAN member

countries of 33.1 percent, Japan by 27.3 percent,

India by 80 percent, the EU by 28 percent and the

US by 31.8 percent and an overall increase in world

trade between 7.7 percent and 10.5 percent (IMF,

2010). The second criterion is still encountering

problems. In 2010, the Executive Board undertook

an SDR assessment and concluded that four

currencies (U.S. dollars, euros, yen, and pounds)

remain the currencies in the SDR basket. At that

time, Chinese yuan was not considered to be used

freely and needed to reform the policy. Over 5 years,

China has become a country monitored in the

context of both fiscal and monetary policy, by the

IMF, specifically to meet the criteria of having a free

usable currency.

During China's monitoring, there were at least 7

successful financial reforms and capital controls

executed in China (IMF, tt). The first increase of the

“klirink” bank quotas for offshore exchanges was in

accordance with the value of the onshore interest

rate. Secondly, the corporate cross-border cash

pooling arrangement was expanded. The third was

when the Chinese authorities also recapitalised the

data based on the liquidity of their currencies by

introducing an average amount for the reserves in

each bank operating in China. The fourth was on

September 23rd, 2015. PBoC approved the issuance

of RMB securities by foreign financial institutions in

the inter-bank bond market of China. Fifth, a cross-

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316

border inter-bank payment system was launched in

October 2015. The new system provides an efficient

platform to clarify and finalise cross-border RMB

payments, and ultimately, also provides access to

offshore transactions. Furthermore, PBoC liberalises

the overall domestic interest rate. The full

liberalisation was announced on October 23rd, 2015

and resumed in August, with a ceiling of the one-

year time deposit interest rate removed later in June.

Major banks were allowed to issue negotiable

deposit certificates to household agencies and non-

financial corporations with a 'market price' and

annual target quotas. Finally, there was the opening

of access for reserve managers and their agents to

domestic fixed income and foreign exchange (FX)

markets, now fully implemented. Separately,

Chinese authorities have also made important strides

in data acquisition and disclosure. While not a

formal criterion for currency inclusion in SDR

baskets, the currency publishers generally meet the

high data transparency standards. The Chinese

Authority in 2015 took several steps forward in this

area, including (i) announcing their subscription to

the IMF's Special Data Dissemination Standard; (ii)

issuing quarterly real levels of real GDP for the first

time; (iii) following the monitors in the trade of

goods and services and currency trading by COFER,

which is the Currency Composition of Official

Foreign Exchange Reserves reports (for the first

time including the composition of currencies). They

are committed to improving; (iv) reporting data for

the first time to BIS on any international banking

liabilities, and also confirming their intention to join

the international banking statistics in December

2015 (IMF, tt).

There are two methods of applying role

diversification in the IMF reform. The first is the

implementation of the internal structure of the IMF

and second, is the external application of the IMF

reform. Implementation in the internal structure of

the IMF is done through the utilisation of the Chair

of the Executive Director and external managerial

candidates through BRICS and G-20 in 2011. China

has one executive director's seat, allowing them to

choose the equivalent of one-seat states. After his

visit to Beijing, Lagarde listened to China's wishes

in his nomination. Lagarde, in Beijing, the last tour

of his world tour, sought support for his IMF's

candidacy. He said that he supported the decision to

increase China's voting rights in the IMF from 3.65

percent up to 6.4 percent, and he also said that the

organisation would help Beijing to internationalise

the yuan currency (chinadaily.com, tt). After

speaking with Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan

and central bank chief Zhou Xiaochuan at the

meeting, Lagarde signalled that there was room for

further reforms at the IMF to provide greater

economic levels.

Following the election, Lagarde appointed two

Chinese deputies, Zhu Min and Zhang Tao, and took

Lin Jianhai on as general secretary. Not only that,

Lagarde actively pressed the US for the ratification

of the results of the IMF reform as follows: “The

2010 governance and quota reform is an absolute

must. It has to be implemented and everybody

knows that it is currently stuck before the US

Congress. Now this should not have happened. [The

reform] was due in 2012, and it was overdue in

2014. I strongly hope that under President [Barack]

Obama’s leadership, with the right understanding of

the parties involved.” (Giles, 2014)

In relation to the external actors, China also used

its role as a G-20 member country and BRICS to

fight for IMF reform. In July 2015, during the

seventh BRICS Summit, Chinese President Xi

Jinping issued a statement that BRICS members

should keep pushing with events for the realisation

of the IMF reforms. One way of doing this is by

increasing the representation and unity of both

BRICS members and developing countries. In

addition to BRICS members, China also approved

and encouraged G-20 members to support the IMF's

reform discourse. China's active role in stimulating

the IMF's reform discourse in the G20 can be seen in

the 7th G20 Summit of 2005 in Xianghe. At the

same time, President Hu Jintao also called for

respecting and understanding different development

models in different countries at the forum.

Furthermore, in 2010, the Governor of the People's

Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan, at the G20 Summit

in Seoul, also publicly stated that the outcome of the

IMF reform will not only benefit China, but also

developing countries which have been under-

represented while undergoing significant economic

development at a global level. From these meetings,

the G20 members agreed, in some respects, on

improvising the governance structure of the IMF.

First, should be the transfer at least 5% of the votes

from over-represented countries to under-

represented countries (Kirton, 2016). Second, the

next general quota review should be sped up. Third,

would be the disconnection of the election of the

IMF regional executive director. Fourth, would be

putting forward sound and quota reforms.

There were two applications of Chinese alter

casting in the IMF Reform using different platforms.

The first is at the annual and spring meetings and the

second is at the bilateral US and Chinese

The Implementation of China Peaceful Rise in The IMF Reform

317

negotiations. At the annual meeting and in spring

2006, China advised on the implementation of a

medium term strategy that was the forerunner of the

IMF Reform to help legitimise the IMF that failed to

overcome the crisis from 1997 at the 2007 annual

meeting. China suggested a quota calculation with a

PPP indicator (Purchasing Power Parity), linking it

as a solution representing emerging countries that

constituted 80% of IMF members in 2008. China

advised on adding a 5.4% quota, adding to the

representation of poor countries and the seat of the

executive director for Africa (IMFC, 2008). In 2009,

China again gave advice, this time with the

suggestion of the implementation of the merit-based

system. This refers to the position of the managing

director from the beginning of the formation of IMF

when it was occupied by the Europeans. In 2010,

China called on member countries and developed

IMF Reforms that benefit all parties. This refers to

the 2008 crisis that hit the countries of Europe and

the US. With the IMF reforms, Tionkok, along with

other developing countries, can help developed

countries to restore their economic markets while for

developing countries, the IMF reforms allow them to

get a bigger vote for decisions undertaken by the

IMF. For IMF itself, its legitimacy can be better

backed. In 2011, China also put forward a similar

invitation for the solution of the crisis as being the

IMF Reform. In 2012, with a call to help a country

still affected by the crisis in 2014, China invited the

US to ratify the legitimacy and credibility of the

IMF (IMF, tt).

Two months before the US ratification decision

relating to IMF reforms on 18th December 2015,

President Xi Jinping paid a visit to the United States

to discuss matters relating to the relationship

between the two countries. Both countries agreed to

ensure that there was an inclusive, robust and ever-

increasing international economic architecture to

address current and future challenges. As for the

IMF-related reforms, China and the U.S. committed

to strengthening their cooperation at the IMF and to

continue improving the IMF quota and governance

structure (usa.chinadaily.com, 2015). China and the

United States were committed to strengthening their

cooperation at the IMF and continued to improve the

IMF quota structure and governance. The US is

committed to implementing the IMF 2010 quotas

and government reforms as soon as possible and also

seek to reaffirm that quota distributions should

continue to shift to emerging markets involving

dynamic and developing countries to better reflect

the relative weight of IMF members in the world

economy. In addition, the US welcomed China's

commitment to releasing their economic data

following the IMF Special Data Dissemination

Standard (SDDS) at the end of the year and further

welcomed China's efforts to continue to improve

transparency.

3 CONCLUSION

From the above descriptions, the authors conclude

that there have been at least eight attempts by China

to assist in generating IMF reforms through four

efforts to adjust the IMF requirements and four

negotiation efforts outlined through the role of

bargaining theory. First is by changing the attitude

of the IMF monitors, second is by inviting the IMF

monitors directly, the third helps the IMF to provide

funds for the crisis-affected countries of 2008, the

fourth matches money and capital markets in a free-

usable and wide-usable form, the fifth is by choosing

Christine Lagarde as the managing director and

helping to pressure the US, the sixth is by letting the

voice of the IMF reform be heard within BRICS and

G20, the seventh is by emphasising on the mutual

benefits at the IMF's annual and spring meetings and

last, is by negotiating directly with the US. After all

of these efforts have been made by China for them

to get the legitimacy of its position as the third

largest IMF shareholder country validated. This is

evidenced by the recognition of the US and IMF

concerning the negotiations being undertaken by

China.

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