Reconfiguring Post-Ahok Populism,

Post-Truth, and Cyberspace in Indonesia

Kuno Yoseph Genta

1

and Wihartono

2

1

Graduate School of Asian and African Studies, Kyoto University, Japan

2

Faculty of Social Science and Political Science, University of Indonesia

Keywords: post-truth, populism, Islamic populism, social media, political communication

Abstract: The current political tension in Indonesia has fuelled speculation that the political orientation in Indonesia

itself is moving from the democratisation characterised by the paradoxes in various realms which degrade

the subsistence quality of its democracy (Hadis, and Robison 2005; Mietzner 2011; Okamoto and Rozaki,

2006), to the contestation among distinct streams of populism (Hadiz and Robison 2017; Perastyawan 2018;

Djani and Tornquist 2017). Furthermore, it is observed as the global phenomenon that cyberspace has

become a significant site for such contestation, where disinformation and hate are frequently rampant

(Bradshaw and Howard, 2017). In particular, Indonesia has recently witnessed the rise of political figures

who embrace the aspiration of dissatisfied people; of these an Islamist group is one of the notable

contestants among others attacking each other in cyberspace by frequent use of social media and fake news.

This paper will, firstly, describe the nature of such populist cyber activities in the Indonesian political

context, drawing primarily on that of the opposition parties’ supporters in facing the 2019 presidential

election, and, secondly, discuss the validity of the populist force in navigating Indonesian political

dynamics, namely in terms of whether it will be a new political model or end up as a brief phenomenon

empty of significance.

1 INTRODUCTION

Researchers have not found a firm interpretation of

political orientation in Indonesia since

democratisation. In general, democratisation has

resulted in paradoxes in various realms which

degrade the subsistence quality of its democracy

(Hadiz, & Robison 2005; Mietzner 2011; Okamoto

& Rozaki, 2006). At the same time, populism is

increasingly becoming a global phenomenon,

including in Indonesia. In the West, recently, such

populist spirit is exuded in events such as Brexit and

Trump's victory. In the context of Southeast Asia,

Thaksin began it in 2001 in Thailand, and was also

followed by Duterte, the penal populist, in The

Philippines in 2016. One of the most prominent

events in Indonesia was the political situation since

the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. The election

gave rise to seemingly new elements in electoral

politics, such as identity politics, hate and fake news,

social media, and Islamist mass mobilisation.

That is to say that cyberspace is becoming a

frontier of political communication in Indonesia. It

facilitates a space for and amplifies many styles of

populist political mobilisation, especially the recent

Islamist one. Looking closer into each case of such,

one may find an indication that the Indonesian

political orientation is now moving from this

peculiar place into a post-truth model. Indeed,

Islamist activities in cyberspace depict the logic of

emotions, sensation, and belief rather than

accountability and rationality. Moreover,

transformation from cyber populism into post-truth

politics can be explained in terms of rapid

circulation of information and less mediated

aspirational grounds that break the conventional

political legitimacy.

However, it must be considered carefully, for

populism is theorised as a temporary political

strategy in nature, and post-truth might be an

Genta, K. and Wihartono, .

Reconﬁguring Post-Ahok Populism, Post-Truth, and Cyberspace in Indonesia.

DOI: 10.5220/0008816600470058

In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Contemporary Social and Political Affairs (ICoCSPA 2018), pages 47-58

ISBN: 978-989-758-393-3

Copyright

c

47

unjustified speculation on uncertainty. Polarisation

since Jakarta’s 2017 gubernatorial election has

intensified and resulted in domination of political

discourses based on religious identity and

deterioration of Joko Widodo (henceforth Jokowi)

electability. The narrative of current Islamist

populism on social media also describes that

continuity. However, if this was dichotomised, it

could be seen namely as encompassing the

supporters of Basuki Tjahaja (henceforth Ahok) and

Jokowi, with the reformists as rational participants,

and those of the opposition as irrational masses of a

post-truth kind. This may lead to fail to capture the

ambivalent and immanently polarised masses that

connect in the political sphere through cyberspace.

The series of aksi during and in the aftermath of

Jakarta’s election explained the capability of

discourses in cyberspace to materialise. Clearly, the

event has signified the role of cyberspace and

somewhat became a moment of the rise of

proliferation of intentional engineering of political

environments in cyberspace. However, still, the

events have not yet given solid ground for claiming

that there is an ongoing rigid political change. Thus,

it is neither about internet-literacy of the majority of

users in Indonesia nor how much fake news and

disinformation influence reality. But it is the matter

of how cyberspace has been politicised. For

instance, the formerly recognised status of Islamic

populism in Indonesia is that it, “has continued to

falter within and outside of the state…. [and] is

doubtful that Islamic populism is a transforming

force within Indonesian politics” (Hadiz & Robison,

2017, p. 498). However, after Ahok’s blasphemy

case, it is indeed unintuitive to consider this to be the

case.

For these reasons, relatively new constituents of

populism, post-truth, and cyberspace should be

carefully considered, and translated into the context

of Indonesian politics.

Firstly, the global rise of populism is often

captured as a result of the failure of the neoliberal

system. However, in many localities, “the roots are

likely to be thick tangles of economic, cultural,

existential, and other factors… [that] are not always

directly traceable to the neoliberal system” (Postill,

2018, p. 756). Furthermore, contestation among

distinct streams of populism in Indonesia is not new.

It has been observed as a phenomenon that has

occurred at least since the 2014 presidential election

and also has roots deeper than merely the emerging

popular powers riding on a democratising wave

(Hadiz & Robison 2017; Djani & Tornquist 2017;

Mietzner, 2015).

Secondly, the fusion of populist and cyber

activism or what Gerbaudo (2017) labeled “cyber

populism” is a “new wave in the late 2000s and

2010s, that has been shaped not just by … shift from

web 1.0 to the web 2.0 of social network sites but

also by changes in the ideology of connected social

movements” (Gerbaudo, 2017, p. 487). In this sense,

Indonesia is important because, the Indonesian

internet population is one of fastest growing and

highest in the world; during 2016, there were more

than 27 million new users (We Are Social, 2017).

On the other hand, dynamics of political

communication in cyberspace among Indonesians

also falsified the monolithic notion of cyber

populism. It means that, in relation to cyberspace, it

is said that populists define cyberspace as a fountain

of popular power, and non-traditional grounds for

aspiration which they seek to occupy to serve the

purpose of popular mobilisation against

neoliberalism (Gerbaudo, 2017). However, many

“establishment politicians have been as adept as

their populist rivals in the use of social media,” as

exemplified by various cases across the countries,

“from Obama in the United States to Prabowo in

Indonesia or Rajoy in Spain” (Postill, 2018, p. 756).

Thirdly, Corner (2017) explains that post-truth is

a concept that is interconnected with fake news. For

instance, what Trump has uttered during many of his

campaigns or on Twitter is called false speech, and

is processed into fake news by the mass media, but

is still able to gain a lot of support. The advantage

for Trump was that he sought to aspire to the

majority of voices who felt disadvantaged. These are

circumstances which turn emotional appeals on, as

factors that are more important than the truth itself.

In Indonesia, Ahok’s case of blasphemy was the one

that may most examplify this. The public pressure

for Ahok to be punished gained legitimacy while it

was still debated whether it was defamation or not

by academics, considering that religion is the most

important thing and there is a taboo in terms of

criticising it. Furthermore, how the case was

publicised depicts that process of viral reality

affecting most of society. Blackal (2017) adds that

the post-truth phenomenon in mass media is related

to journalism. News today rarely demonstrates how

a news story is tested to deliver replication results,

meaning that it does not provide space for testing the

reported facts.

Furthermore, in order to avoid ambiguity in

ICoCSPA 2018 - International Conference on Contemporary Social and Political Affairs

48

navigating the political dynamics in Indonesia,

relationships between populism, post-truth, and

cyber space that have simultaneously become

prominent should be clarified. This paper will do

that by considering the context of Indonesia's post-

democratisation political dynamics. Moreover, in

doing so, this paper not only offers a contextual

understanding of the abovementioned global

political elements, but also exposes each element

with questions and points to be monitored further.

2 POPULISM AS POLITICAL

STRATEGY IN INDONESIA

Populism has become an important word in

capturing the defects of democracy in modern-day

Indonesia. What has been observed in terms of past

political dynamics was the institutional or structural

creed that gives rise to some political powers or

conflicts that degrade the quality of democracy. In

terms of populism, the source of agitation is neither

the friction between elites nor hyper-sympathetic

groups but it is an anonymous and seemingly

indiscriminate crowd. Speaking of which, populism

itself, regardless of its high exposure to historicism,

and contestation, tends to be defined by the

association with “the people”. For example, “in the

United States, the word populism remains associated

with the idea of a genuine egalitarian left-wing

politics in the potential conflict with the stances of a

Democratic Party whereas in Europe has been

regarded as technocrat” (Müller, 2016, p. 8).

Moreover, its understanding and usage have been

ambiguous as early attempts at defining populism as

such were seen as attempts that failed to illuminate

the concept itself. There is similarity in the criticism

of these early attempts in that the definitions try to

cover the wide extent of the phenomenon that might

be captured as populism; they then leave no crucial

point in the definition (Deiwiks, 2009).

Such a problem is also apparent in the

accumulated literature on populism where “there

exists at least four central approaches to populism –

as ideology, logic, discourse and

strategy/organization” (Moffitt, & Tormey, 2014, p.

383). However, Deiwiks (2009) further assesses that

the relatively long remain effort is the definition by

Berlin et al. (1968) which emphasises the elements

of the people (Gemeinschaf) and rejection of politics

(Deiwkis, 2009, p.2). Recent attempts are

characterised by careful emphasis on the element of

“people” as Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008, p.3)

define it as an ideology which pits a virtuous and

homogeneous people against a set of elites and

dangerous ‘others’. Furthermore, the literature on

populism has also identified many characteristics.

For Taggart, those are the stance of anti-

representative politics, the tendency of heartland

narratives, a lack of core values, sense of crisis, and

self-limiting (Taggart, 2004, pp. 273-276). From a

different view point, Laclau adds that populist

practice is covered by a lens of dislocation within

which there is a process whereby the hegemonic

identity becomes an order of empty signifier that in

itself embodies an unattainable fullness (Gauna,

2017).

On the other hand, a determinant of populist

uprising is that sense of disappointment at the

performance of politics, to recover from certain

conditions that damage the established social order.

For instance, Taggart (2000) mentions that the

emergence of populism is the result of a structural

transformation in society. This, however, contradicts

with another characteristic of populism as episodic

and discontinuative political mobilisation.

Alternatively, Panizza (2005) explains that populism

is much more a form of the reactions to a situation of

vast change in society, than that of macro structural

transformation, by pointing out that such triggers

might not only happen in the form of an economic

crisis but also a civil war, a corrupt government and

a natural or man-made disaster.

Considering this, it must be noted that the recent

rise of populism in Indonesia is not a serial

sequestration or a result of worldly transformation.

Furthermore, out of all these different

understandings, this paper sees populism as one of

the ways of political mobilisation as Weyland (2001)

defined populism: a “political strategy through

which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises

government power based on direct, unmediated, un-

institutionalized supports from large numbers of

mostly unorganized followers” (Weyland, 2001, p.

14). Basically, the term populism is not only

theoretically problematic as described above, but

also, realistically, it is problematic as it can be

applied in Indonesia. Current figures, neither

Prabowo, Jokowi, nor leaders of the anti-Ahok

movement, can be fully qualified as populists. There

is a lack of at least one of the conventional elements

of populism, namely anger, anti-foreign sentiments,

political outsiders, or clear differentiation between

Reconﬁguring Post-Ahok Populism, Post-Truth, and Cyberspace in Indonesia

49

elite and non-elite. Thus, if any of the political

figures in Indonesia may be categorised as populist,

it is through the character of his/her way of mass

mobilisation, and the attachment established with

potential voters. Speaking of populism broadly in

terms of “people worshipping”, it is possible to say

that the political climate of Indonesia has long been

frequently coloured by the style of that sort of

behaviour. As Farid & Fauzi (2017) wrote in their

brief historical account, in Indonesia at least, since

the first crossroads of the 20th century, the term

little people or wong cilik exerts a strong political

charm. Thus, the little people might be separated

from the elite circle but, at the same time, have a

strong and popular agency that can sometimes be

linked with the established ruler in a symbiotic

relationship, or it might sometimes be exploited by a

certain moment of political contestation as a source

of influence. Politics in Indonesia has been

characterised also by the management of latent

political mass. In a new order era, there was an

unofficial manifesto preventing the floating masses

from participating in practical politics and joining

political parties, by creating networks of buffers

consisting of “quasi-official, expendable enforcers

such as preman” (Azali, 2017, p. 8). Accordingly,

the recent rise of populism in Indonesia may indicate

that there has been change in the relationship

between political elites and this floating mass.

However, to address this point, one must consider

the dynamics of politics in post-authoritarian

Indonesia.

Törnquist made a concise intellectual map of

interpretations of post-authoritarian Indonesian

politics by dividing them into three general

perspectives. Firstly, the liberal account says that

Indonesia shows a hope for further democratisation

where the matter of substantiality is not so

problematic compared to other countries in the

global south. Secondly, there is an analysis from a

structural perspective in which the conservative

position argues that democratisation raises

corruption and conflict, thus, in essence, requires a

solid state and government building prior to

democratisation, whereas the radical position says

the system's drivers are still controlled by the old

players, and additionally, leave opportunities wide

open for the private sector to state resources leading

to the formation of oligarchic democracy. Finally,

observers from the perspective of social democracy

put the democratisation in Indonesia as a shift from

dictatorial to opportunist rule based on an agreement

between moderate actors and old regime actors by

excluding hardline supporters of the new order and

popular movement (Törnquist, 2014).

Furthermore, another point which arises from the

debate on the status of Indonesian democracy, is the

long strong presence of clientalism in the Indonesian

political realm. The significance of this system, even

after democratisation as the engine of the inner

working of politics, is admitted by any perspectives,

and, indeed, the interpretation of its consequence

becomes a point of debate among them. However,

political mobilisation based on clientalism has

become stagnant recently and there is a need for

other ways to invite more independent voters.

Consequently, one of the fairly common rationales is

implemented which elaborates that “a central post-

clientelistic technique is populism, and politics

conducted through a relatively direct relationship

between a charismatic leader and the people”

(Törnquist, 2014, p. 25). This is to say that populism

as a post-clientalism strategy, is the result of the

growth of the middle class as well as being

widespread – through various media and forums – in

public opinion that is critical of the corrupted

administration of many sectors, making the voters

and sources of political influence increasingly

distant from any sort of conventional political

affiliations. Hadiz & Robison (2017) argue that 2014

marked the coming of a new era of Indonesian

politics by political outsiders, both Jokowi and

Prabowo representing a different tone of

secular/nationalist-populism, in their presidential

campaigns. Furthermore, they explain that one

unique character of Indonesian populism at a

regional level is the competition among different

kinds of populism. In addition to the competition

inside the secular/nationalist circle, Islamic

populism also has a strong presence in the arena.

Similarly, Mietzner (2015) categorises Jokowi as a

technocratic populist who did not propose radical

transformation of the established system, and also

created enemies. Pragmatically, the image that he

presented to the public was that he was the one who

could make good governance work under the

system. On the other hand, Prabowo was an ultra-

populist, who was more matched with the

conventional definition of populists, because he

created political enemies, offered a strongman image

and represented anti-foreign sentiment.

ICoCSPA 2018 - International Conference on Contemporary Social and Political Affairs

50

3 CYBERSPACE AND

DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA

Cyberspace that absorbs people directly into the

political realm can be treated positively in terms of

democracy because it may break the inefficient

intermediaries, such as a patron-client relationship in

the context of Indonesia. On the other hand, the

negative effect is the possibility of the unfiltered and

concurrent political participation to stimulate

“Internet-led mobbing” (Kim 2008). For the latter

context, Bulut & Yoruk (2017) show how the

political troll fin twitter can act on behalf of the

establishment, and creates a digital culture of

lynching and censorship in Turkey (p. 4093).

Similarly, Bradshaw and Howard (2017) found that,

since 2010, there have been growing numbers of

organised social media manipulations employed

either by government, the military or political parties

in countries across the world.

For the Indonesian context, Suharto’s regime

could not fully supervise the coming of the global

technology called the Internet in the late period.

Thus, cyberspace at the beginning, by notorious

popularity of internet cafes (warnet), became a kind

of space free of the authoritarian oppression on

speech (Lim, 2006). The fall of Suharto and also the

development of an online environment later,

provided a suitable condition for rising Islamic

fundamentalists to operate as can be seen from the

creation of Laskar Jihad Online in 2000 as one of the

earliest forms of online-supported radicalism that

now states it is combatting tough surveillance and

counter-discourses (Candra, 2017). Not only on the

radicalism front, but also cumulatively, as the

number of users in Indonesia becomes globally

significant (We are social, 2017), the government’s

concern about vast cyberspace has grown. In

general, this concern has been demonstrated in the

creation of laws on Electronic Information and

Transaction, and on Pornography in 2008. It then

continued with the development of the Ministry of

Communication and Information Technology’s role

in blocking the “illegal websites”, and most recently

we witnessed the creation of the National Cyber and

Cryptograph Agency in 2017. On the other hand,

although there is a skeptical account on the

capability of the internet, especially social media, to

mobilise the Indonesian masses (Samuel, 2017, p.

214), political interest also radiates around

cyberspace. This can be observed from intense

utilisation of YouTube videos and other platforms

on social media during the Jokowi presidential

campaign as well as that of vlog and online-

supported direct aspiration namely sistem lapor in

almost every body of his administration that have

somehow marked the stance of the serving

government from 2014. This dynamic of politics and

cyberspace in Indonesia echoes with Gerbaudo

(2017)’s argument that political activities in

cyberspace now have changed from underground

political communication to activities that are more

oriented toward popular mobilisation.

Such a tendency has been intensified recently as

Gunawan & Ratmono (2018) see cyberspace is

problematised as a site of black-campaign by any

sort of affiliation and as the magnitude of

misinformation, trolls and hate speech is spreading.

Furthermore, the case of the anti-Ahok Islamist

movement during Jakarta’s 2017 gubernatorial

election has chiefly exemplified how online political

contention can be materialised into physical mass

movement on the streets. The series of Aksi Damai

Bela Islam at the time that polarised Jakarta as well

as the foundation of the 211 reunion association later

and continuous Islamist online activities in facing

the 2019 presidential election may inspire anyone to

link current Indonesian politics with post-truth

politics headed by Islamic populism. However, if

that is done ahistorically, the specific importance of

cyberspace as well as Islamist elements in current

political dynamics might be ignored.

A long debate on Islam and politics in Indonesia

since democratisation relates to explaining the low

performance of Islam in politics, particularly the

decline of Islamist parties, in the face of the

Islamically-socialised vast majority of

citizens/voters (Feillard, 2017). Multiple factors can

be identified, from the depoliticalisation and

nationalisation of Islam during the new order, the

gradual deterioration of traditional religious powers,

to the Islamisation of secular/nationalist parties

(Heryanto, 2015; Miichi, 2015). Furthermore,

although Islamist mass mobilisation has been

rampant since the demise of the Suharto regime, the

influence on electoral politics was not crucial.

However, the recent Islamist political mobilisation

stimulated by a discourse war on cyberspace is

contradictory in terms of the formerly recognised

state, in the sense that the vast Muslim masses that

used to be a-political are now clearly showing the

opposite character. Additionally, it is also important

because the anti-Jokowi sentiments or # ganti

Reconﬁguring Post-Ahok Populism, Post-Truth, and Cyberspace in Indonesia

51

presiden that spread in cyberspace are seemingly a

continuation from the Ahok case. If this is so, it

means that Islamist populism in cyberspace is much

more than the result of political figures freeriding on

accidental and uncertain viral discourses. Rather, it

may have some agency.

4 CYBERSPACE AND POST-

AHOK POPULISM

Recently, various organisations ranging from

governmental agencies to civil society, started to

capture undemocratic and uncivil online activities

such as fake news, hate speech, and internet

lynching, under the jargon of “negative contents”.

Many of the items they collected can be categorised

as or associated with populist political discourses. In

other words, these negative contents are said to be

commonly used by the populist interests to fight

against their opposition in a way that is triggered by

the political figure, underground movement, and

finally shared by much larger society itself.

Furthermore, Allcot & Gentzkow (2017) explain that

fake news is news that is proven to be a mistake, that

is purposely made to mislead the reader. Fake news

is similar to a hoax, but the hoax is not entirely false

news; rather it uses manipulated facts that

potentially mislead the reader. Meanwhile, hate

speech is an utterance that aims to strengthen hatred

and racism among people or groups of people

including areas such as race, nation, ethnicity,

country, and religion (Gelber & Sarah, 2007, p. xiii).

However, it seems that there is not yet a rigid

consensus among the organisations regarding

differences between types of “negative contents”

including the abovementioned hoaxes, fake news

and hate. Moreover, it must be noted that some

cannot be considered automatically as political

content, and most importantly, the categorisation of

such itself is a political construct these days. For

instance, the Ministry of Communication and

Information Technology reports, in 2018, that

complaints of negative content in 2017 increased

900% on 2016 (Kompas, 2018). Nevertheless, the

trend is clear as Mafindo (Masyarakat Anti Fitnah

Indonesia – Anti-hoax Organization), reports that, in

2017, there were 76,195 pieces of hoax-related news

recorded.

Mafindo’s report provides us with better grounds

for assessing how disinformation shapes the current

Indonesian political situation. Mafindo created a

report on media news addressing hoaxes in social

media, including topics such as hoaxes on Facebook

(21%), Jokowi’s persuasion on the fight against

hoaxes (18%), regional elections vulnerable to

hoaxes (16%) and so forth. It also depicts that the

presence of hoaxes in the media peaked in January

during the campaign period for Jakarta’s

gubernatorial election, and gradually relaxed later

but sustained its numbers at around 50.

Figure 1: “Hoax” related news in Media during 2017

(Source: Mafindo, 2018)

This is to say that online populism had gained

significance by cultivating a political moment in

2017. Since that time, disinformation became a

realistically as well as a politically significant mode

of information. On the one hand, in a realistic sense,

harms that so-called negative contents may bring to

civil society and also democracy cannot be ignored,

but on the other hand, although the black campaign

is not new in Indonesia, it is conceived as being an

altering force, because the last gubernatorial election

showed something different, i.e. social media, and

Islamist mass mobilisation. Furthermore, according

to AJI and Dewan Pers, the top three issues that

were addressed by the hoax in 2017 were: (1) social

politics (91.8%); (2) SARA (88.6%) and; 3) health

(41.2%). Research done by Gunawan & Ratmono

(2018) shows that these so-called negative contents

are spread by the organised syndicate that operates

systematically to create and share certain interest-

laden content by using social media. One notable

case, that of Saracen, a professional account that

spread the provocative news, stated that there are

specialists of facts and opinion manipulation in

cyberspace that are hired by actors that have

political and economic interests. However, if the

moment at which online disinformation broke out

intersected with Ahok’s blasphemy case in 2017, it

is inevitable to consider the degree to which such

endeavours may influence mass political attitudes. In

ICoCSPA 2018 - International Conference on Contemporary Social and Political Affairs

52

other words, it is a question of whether

disinformation is one inherent constituent of the

post-Ahok political attitude of identity politics or

merely a slight phenomenon of hyper-sympathetic

actors or political troops who went online, to

participate in a discourse war.

This is also where Islamic politics and cyber

populism are linked, because one of the most

debated issues since the event is religious

intolerance in a political context or the rise of Islam-

led identity politics. The Wahid Institute (2017)

reports that 39.3% - 47.9% of Muslim respondents

are against a non-Muslim becoming president, vice

president, governor, or regent. The report argues that

the public now tends to choose their leader based on

his/her religion, not because of his/her capability,

personality, or even background.

Based on this data, one may predict that

cyberspace is the site where such discourses of

identity politics are shared. However, the report also

states that respondents obtain knowledge of Islam

that is spread 24.59% in mosques, 28.61% through

religious sermons on TV, 18.03% by

preachers/clerics and 1.05% on social media

(Facebook and YouTube). This is contradictory with

online Islamic preaching that has also been growing

recently (Husein & Slama 2018).

Furthermore, Molaei (2017) shows that 97.9 %

of respondents in his research on Indonesian

Facebook users, use the internet weekly to get

political news. What can be seen here is that, firstly,

Islamic and political information are, in many cases,

perceived by individuals as different things. And,

more importantly, as Johansson (2016) proves, since

the 2012 election campaign, social media has

become the domain of political communication that

is alternative to traditional media controlled by

conglomerates and thus, it is inevitable that

cyberspace will become a vehicle for recent identity

politics, no matter if there is concrete prospect of

participants or not. Essentially, Islamic knowledge

and political knowledge are circulated in different

epistemic bases; however, if they are fused into

identity politics, they also have to blend their bases.

However, it is hard to see such bridging as totally an

automatic process, and it must be accompanied by

intentional signification made by certain actors who

are masked as online moral entrepreneurs.

In this sense, the rise of identity politics may be

related to the demise of the secular public sphere,

clearly marked by the fall of Suharto. Heryanto

(2015) explains that, after the fall of the New Order,

a great spirit for the rise of Islamic influence in

various aspects of Indonesian society emerged. As

one of these penetrates into the political sphere,

religious purity begins to be applied in various

aspects of life. In this contemporary era, people who

pursue religious purity meet with various things

relating to modernity but on the other hand which

are also desirable. In some ways, religious purity can

be reconciled with those things of modernity. Unlike

the New Order era, now religion has begun to merge

overtly as a political instrument. Hadiz (2016) adds

that it is relevant to the rise of Islamic populism in

Indonesia. Islamic politicians, who are the

opposition of a moderate government, use the issue

of religion for political purposes. In addition, there is

an anxiety built on the emphasis on Islamic religious

issues and indigenous people (pribumi) being

marginalised by governments and foreigners, the

government allegedly doing so for foreign interests.

4.1 Amin Rais: A Peculiar Free Rider?

Amien Rais is one of the interesting figures who has

represented an extreme kind of populism after the

anti-Ahok movement in 2017. He openly campaigns

politically in places of worship to try to stop people

from re-electing Jokowi as president in 2019. This is

also campaigned for by other leaders of opposition

groups, for example Habib Rizieq, though he is not a

professional politician, but his solicitation for a non-

Muslim as a leader was also influential in the

election of the Governor of Jakarta. Amin Rais said

religion should be a guide in every line of life in the

world. "Recitation should be inserted politically, if

not, it's funny". Whatever his personal rationale,

Amien Rais, by joining in line with Habib Rizieq,

and expressing sentiments against current

government, is clearly, and beneficially followed by

the assembled Islamist mass from the post-anti Ahok

movement.

The spread of political discourse based on

religious identity is certainly becoming more

massive through cyberspace, especially social media

such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and also mass

media. Some of the things highlighted by Islamic

figures are not far from such an issue. All the

elements, public figures, masses of ordinary users,

and conventional media, have reacted to each other

and co-constructed a viral reality of identity politics

which they are all affected by.

The Islamist mass after the anti-Ahok movement

in 2017, upon which figures like Amien Rais gained

Reconﬁguring Post-Ahok Populism, Post-Truth, and Cyberspace in Indonesia

53

influence, was indeed created by such a process. The

case of Ahok's “defamation of religion” started from

a video uploaded on Facebook by Buni Yani with

transcripts of the text and captions that emphasised

that Ahok was deliberately insulting Islam. The

uploaded video soon became viral after being liked

and shared by netizens and sparked outrage among

the masses of influential Muslim figures. Some of

the Islamist figures such as Habib Rizieq, amplified

the issue into several contexts like political, racial,

and economic ones. This led to a series of demos

with the theme of the Aksi Damai Bela Islam I - VII

that also became viral in the mass media, demanding

the police and the state to implement a legal process

against Ahok. The mass protest finally got a

response from President Jokowi on 5 November

2016 at 00.00; to immediately settle the case, on

May 9, 2017, the North Jakarta District Court

sentenced Ahok to two years in prison for religious

blasphemy.

Since the event, use of social media as a means

of political expression has become more prominent.

Both sides, Jokowi supporters and those opposed to

Jokowi do the same, of course, by carrying out their

discourses along with religious issues. However,

what has been significant is the presence of public

figures. For instance, Pro Jokowi academic figures

such as Ade Armando (using Facebook) or new

opposition politicians Jokowi like Ahmad Dhani

(using Twitter) did not miss the opportunity to join

provocative speeches in their respective social

media, as shown below. In this context, it is related

in the statement; the intended religious insult is

Ahok, while henchmen of religious insults are

people who still support Ahok.

Figure 2: Ahmad Dhani Provoke Tweet (2017)

Figure 3: Ade Armando Provoke on Facebook (2017)

Here it can be observed not only that is social

media now being used by any sort of populist groups

but, both figures from Ahok’s side, and Anies’s side,

have expressed sentimentalised opinions. For

instance, Ade Armando supported Ahok with a

provocative statement on Facebook (Figure 3).

Recalling the discussions on Amien Rais's actions as

an oppositional figure, he also said a statement

which became viral. He divided the party between

the party of Allah and the Party of Satan (CNN

Indonesia, April 13, 2018). The Allah party in

question was Amien Rais's own party, namely PAN,

then its allies, Gerindra and PKS, while he did not

mention Satan's party specifically, but in the same

place and time, he made a criticism of the Jokowi

government and wanted the removal of Jokowi as

president. Amien Rais also said that he did not agree

with the current government, because he considered

that Jokowi's government separated religion from

politics. This indicates that his neologism of “Satan's

party” is aimed at parties that support the current

government that in his narrative, is secular.

The other action of Amien Rais that went viral

took place at the National Coordination Meeting of

alumni of 212. There, by pointing to Jokowi's photo

on the podium, he said that he strongly believed that

Jokowi would be overthrown by God. From the

maneuver of AmienRais, it can be observed that

there is a driving force in the Islamist mass to sync

their purpose, after having had achievements in

navigating Jakarta’s politics, with that of the coming

national one. Amien Rais is the personification of

such drive, and he himself, in becoming so,

affectively interacted with his supporters and

assembled different sentiments into that particular

context.

ICoCSPA 2018 - International Conference on Contemporary Social and Political Affairs

54

4.2 Internet Mobbing:

Voluntary or Syndicate?

One of the political activities related to cyberspace

that became rampant after Ahok’s case is persekusi.

Persekusi refers to hunting of social media accounts

that reveal discourse contrary to morality especially

that defined by Islamist groups. Once they have

found the target, they can attack the target virtually

as well as physically.

Between January and June 2017, 59 cases of

persecution against alleged critics of Islam and FPI

(Islamic Defenders Front) were reported in

Indonesia. In May 2018, police arrested several

people who are identified as Muslim Cyber Army

(hereafter referred as MCA) members, a virtual

organisation that operates in social media to conduct

persekusi in terms of carrying out surveillance and

also making and spreading fake news. They not only

participated in a campaign against Ahok but later

worked to engage in various issues, ranging from

anti-LGBT, anti-PKI, to a Starbucks Boycott

(Safenet, 2018). Apparently, police and media tried

to portray them as a group of experts with an

organised funding source.

However, such a label is not confirmed, for the

MCA is also said to be an unstructured hub of

accounts and affiliated groups who identify

themselves as moral and religious defenders. A

member said that “MCA has no leader, no central

office, and no source of income. The MCA has an

array of affiliated groups, with names like the

Srikandi Muslim Cyber Army, the United Muslim

Cyber Army, the Legend MCA, Muslim Coming

and many others” (Juniarto, 2018). The ambivalence

of MCA’s status offers an overview of a network of

discourse war machines, in which some are experts,

and some are self-claimed.

The experts of discourse war are not limited to

buzzers, but also includes “real” action takers. One

of the most notable events of persekusi was the case

of a 15-year-old Chinese boy being physically

intimidated by FPI members. He shared offensive

content relating to Habib Rizieq on Facebook, then

mobs of adults visited the boy’s house and took him

away to be judged and intimidated. This shows that

the mobs have the capability to track someone they

deem to be offensive on mass media. This

phenomenon tends to occur only in a case where

some of the most respected religious leaders are

insulted. The message is clear, however, that if

anyone dares to say anything critical of Islam on

social media, then mobs are ready to take action.

From this perspective, it can be said that

persekusi of this kind is an extension of the activities

of vigilante groups which have been rampant reality

socially in post-Suharto Indonesia. In addition,

persekusi is said to have an organised way of

operating involving action often being taken by

vigilante wings of Islamic mass organisations. The

members of groups monitor social media, and when

they find targets, they visit his/her house so that they

can directly force him/her to apologise. On the other

hand, it is considered to be an organised operation

also because, unlike collective vigilantism or street

justice that is spontaneous, many persekusi have

been carried out by utilising existing socio-judicial

mechanisms in a way that suits their purpose. For

example, in the case of the 15-year-old boy

mentioned above, FPI members met their suspect

after informing the local neighborhood leader of

their intentions. In addition, most cases have also

been attended by police officers who have led the

apology request processions (Jeffrey & Mulyartono,

2018).

Furthermore, this also exemplifies the argument

of Trottier (2017, p. 68) that digital vigilantism is an

act in defiance of the police, and police typically

condemn and prosecute vigilante activity. Yet these

relationships may resemble a more nodal form of

governance. Digital vigilantism is concerned with

both the spread of information as well as punitive

desire. Cases of persekusi also showed both:

participants try to get a suspect’s apology and in so

doing, they deter specific suspects they face directly

and also, indirectly, they give a message to other

people who might post materials in cyberspace

insulting their morality. Furthermore, this is not a

phenomenon which is exclusive to Indonesia; it is a

global one, in which social media visibility

delocalises the sphere of everyday moral policing.

For instance, in Thailand, since 2010, online

vigilante groups have been operating to expose

political opponents by accusing them of lèse-

majesté, and social media has also been used as a

tool of mobilisation for state-sponsored mass events

by the authoritarian regime (Schaffar, 2016, p. 215).

Meanwhile, digital vigilantism in Indonesia or

persekusi was fuelled by the post-Ahok political

situation as the number of incidents of persekusi

intensified after Habib Rizieq was made the suspect

of pornographic action by the police. Therefore, it

depicts the moment when vigilante wings of Islamic

mass organisations started to define cyberspace as

Reconﬁguring Post-Ahok Populism, Post-Truth, and Cyberspace in Indonesia

55

one of their battlefields. As in the case of

conventional vigilantism, the state itself which is

represented by the police is balancing its relationship

with these groups, between preserving due process

in terms of justice and taking majority moral appeal

into account.

5 RECONFIGURING POST-

AHOK POPULISM, POST-

TRUTH, AND CYBERSPACE

Having examined the current situation in Indonesian

politics, in this section, the authors try to provide a

brief outline of the connection between post-Ahok

populism and post-truth politics. In order to do so, it

is inevitable to clarify how populism and post-truth

are linked and exist in cyberspace. Indeed, for that

reason, cyberspace became politically important, yet

in the Indonesian context it did so because

cyberspace provided a space for direct participation

as well as access to the masses. This situation which

the masses face has historical roots, and most

importantly, by considering that historical context,

the state of such political masses, namely any sort of

cyber warriors being “the people” and how certain

political figures gain advantage in such

circumstances, can be addressed.

To begin with, Maldonado (2017) explains that

the rise of populism, the post-truth politics, and

expansion of cyberspace are interrelated in a sense

that they strengthen each other. That is to say,

“populism is strengthened by digiticization and

affectively charged; sentimentalization is facilitated

by digiticization and expresses itself in populism;

digiticization shows an important expressive-cum-

performative dimension and paves the way for a

populist way of communication” (Maldonado, 2017,

p. 10). In other words, cyberspace is a suitable site

for both populists to appear and post-truth narrative

to be circulated.

Meanwhile, post-truth and populism would both

be causes and consequences of each other. This

tangled dynamic can be observed in post-Ahok

identity politics in Indonesia. On the one hand, the

Ahok blasphemy case triggered the rise of Islamic

populist figures such as Habib Rizieq, and Anies

Baswedan. On the other hand, led by them, non-

factualist, and sentimentalised narratives are

increasingly proliferated especially in cyberspace by

various actors ranging from voluntary participants in

discourses of war, to organised factories of fake

news and hate. Then, the post-truth narratives that

have accumulated in cyberspace are expressed by

other freeriding figures, in the hybrid form of

particular discourses. This is exemplified by Amien

Rais who simultaneously conveys sentiments that

rarely appear in the same context. In retrospect,

Ahok's case, which is seen as a source of all the

problems after, was also the beginning of the post-

truth phenomenon intensified by the tension of a

particular political moment and the digitalisation of

the public sphere. From this perspective, not only is

there an ambiguity of interpretation in terms of the

content of video posted on social media, where

Ahok is captured insulting Al-Maidah 51, the

decision taken by the criminal justice system also

reveals socio-political logic based on non-factual

reasons. To put it briefly, criminal justice agencies

issued a sanction that is in accordance with Islamist

sentiments, i.e., imprisonment of a former governor.

However, Buni Yani, an Islamist academic who

uploaded the video, was also sentenced to jail for

committing “treason”, and Habib Rizieq, who is the

leading figure in the Islamist mass protest, was also

made a suspect in a totally unrelated case of

“pornographic action” by the police, based on the

contents of his personal mobile communication that

oddly spread on social media. This result of justice

is peculiar in many senses, depicting a judicial and

governmental apparatus that is negotiating with

emotional and sentimentalised appeals both from

Ahok supporters as well as Islamist groups.

The important element in this case is the fact

that the masses become the actor as well as the

audience in cyberspace. In the context of Indonesian

political history, during the authoritarian regime, the

masses were made a-political. Masses were defined

as a functional element of the state that should be

guided, which was the idea also often referred to as

floating mass. However, after democratisation, civil

society exploded, but the democratisation at the time

only spread, and could not penetrate deeply

(Wirasenjaya, 2015). As a result, many uncivil

elements in civil society, as well as local bosses

emerged under the oligarchic system established

since the Suharto regime (Beittinger-Lee, 2013;

Okamoto & Rozaki; Bertrand, 2006). That is to say

that the euphoria of democracy felt by civil society

cannot embrace all civil circles and the old regime

system remained strong. Thus, not all of those

excluded from practical politics under more than 30

years of authoritarian rule could be recalled after

regime change. However, the rise of populist politics

through Jokowi who represents reformists and

former oligarch Prabowo publicised more direct and

two-sided political participation. Here it must be

ICoCSPA 2018 - International Conference on Contemporary Social and Political Affairs

56

noted that the masses seem to have been polarised

ever since this period. They were both interested in a

populist technocrat as well as ultra-populism, yet

less so for the latter because the urgency for change

was not realistic (Mietzner, 2015). In addition, we

must consider another kind of mass group, namely

the Muslim masses. The Muslim masses were also

oppressed and made to "float" by the secular-

developmental Suharto regime. But unlike the

others, the Islamic traditional political apparatus did

not enjoy resurrection after democratisation; instead

they deteriorated. Besides, the general public has

been increasingly Islamicised through networks and

socialisation orientation outside the conventional

circle (Miichi, 2015). Furthermore, recalling Hadiz

& Robison’s (2017) discussion on Islamic populism,

they also argue that Islamic populism can be, at

least, traced back to organisations that have emerged

in a mid-new order, consisting of the urban middle

class. After new order emerged, it further branched

off; however, due to the strong influence of

oligarchy and absence of leftist politics, it tended to

focus on social justice aspirations. In other words, it

might succeed in promoting cultural resources under

the notion of “unified ummah” to act “against elites

identified as secular, ethnic Chinese, or foreign”

(Hadiz, & Robison, 2017, p. 498), but still,

eventually, it is absorbed into the established

structure. Therefore, in terms of our discussion, it

created great potential without solid shade, yet

always exposed with practical politics after

democratisation.

In 2014, the Islamic masses, as the majority of

the population of Indonesia is Muslim, could, at the

same time, be bound to the populist agenda whether

a technocratic version of Jokowi or ultra-populist

version of Prabowo. But, identity politics marked by

Ahok's case, in 2017, can be said to have attracted a

portion of the Islamic masses who used to be

attracted to reformist agendas offered by figures

such as Ahok and Jokowi. Cyberspace makes this

"floating" subject an actor as well as a spectator in

political contestation. Cyberspace can swallow an

apathetic subject into the part of political mass, and

can also lead already incorporated subjects to sink

deeper into their echo-chambers. Emergence of

types of cyber troops such as the MCA, conventional

vigilante wings of mass organisations going online,

and general polarisation in social media, seem to be

inevitable consequences, since, is the masses are

already polarised between spectators and actors, as

well as secular and Islamist individuals. However,

the most important point that should be highlighted

is that such post-truth dynamics in cyberspace can

clearly be utilised further by populist political

figures. It has, for example, also been said that the

opportunity has been opened wide for Islamic

populism to “align with oligarchy while mobilising

popular support on the basis of an ummah-based

political identity” (Hadiz, & Robison, 2017, p. 498).

However, based on the above discussion of the

situation of politics in the aftermath of Ahok’s case

in 2017, the dynamics are such that both are

approaching one another as a result of their desire to

take a portion of the masses that have activated due

to the viral realities of identity politics.

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