
 
Even  before  the  “Russian  spring”,  the  elites 
ceased  to  play  any  independent  political  role  in 
Russia.  This  gave  Putin  the  opportunity  to  “short-
circuit” his power “directly” to the “masses”. There 
was a link between the leader and the masses, which 
is  now  almost  impossible  to  open.  In  this  direct 
communication  of  the  leader  with  the  masses  – 
bypassing the  elite –lies, today,  the  main secret  of 
the  stability of  the  regime,  which  explains,  among 
other things, record high voting figures for Putin and 
record  low  voting  figures  for  his  opponents in  the 
March, 2018 elections. 
Militaristic ethics always competed with liberal 
ones.  In  Russia,  one  can  say,  there  is  a  struggle 
between  militaristic  ethics  and  the  remnants  of 
liberalism. 
2.4   Erdogan in Turkey 
The  presidential  elections  in  Turkey  ended  in  the 
victory of R.T. Erdogan, and all the forecasts for a 
possible  second  round  were  untenable  even  before 
all  the  votes  were  counted.  Immediately  after  the 
announcement of  the  results,  June 25,  the  new-old 
ruler of Turkey said that his victory was “the victory 
of  the  Turkish  people,  all  oppressed  in  our  region 
and all oppressed in the world” (vesty.co.il). 
The victory of Erdogan was the final stage of the 
long  reform  carried  out  by  the  Turkish  leader  for 
many years. He managed to gradually concentrate in 
his  hands  such  a  volume  of  power,  that  foreign 
analysts started  talking about  almost the  beginning 
of a dictatorship. 
Recep  Tayyip  Erdogan  turned  Turkey  into  a 
presidential  republic,  cutting  down  the  powers  of 
parliament and subjugating the government and the 
army. The post of prime minister will be abolished, 
and  the  appointment  of  cabinet  members  will 
become the prerogative of the president. 
Populism began to occupy more and more places 
in  Erdogan's agitation.  The  latest  example was  the 
readiness  prepared  by  the  president  after  the 
elections to consider the possibility of abolishing the 
state of emergency in the country (tass.ru, 2018). 
Opponents and critics of Erdogan are convinced 
that  he  has  concentrated  too  much  power  in  his 
hands  and  almost  abolished  the  system  of  checks 
and balances that can support the democratic balance 
in the state. 
As  for  foreign policy,  many  observers  are  also 
not  inclined  to  optimistic  forecasts.  Most  likely, 
Erdogan  will  continue  the  populist  course,  which 
strengthens  the  position  of  Islamists;  the  issue  of 
closer  interaction  with  the  EU  will  also  not  have 
priority  on  his  agenda.  His  pro-Palestinian  stance 
and  Erdogan's  populist  rhetoric  are  well  known  to 
Israeli  diplomats.  Relations  between  the  two 
countries, for a long time, have been at a level close 
to crisis. 
The collective West is certainly dissatisfied with 
the haste of the Turkish leadership. For the EU and 
the  US,  Erdogan's  Turkey  –  a  mixture  of 
nationalism, Islamism, pan-Turkism, an emphasis on 
sovereignty,  Islamic  populism  and,  finally,  anti-
Western  behaviour  –  is  absolutely  unacceptable 
(ria.ru, 2018). 
3  CONCLUSION 
As the well-known British Sociologist, Z. Bauman, 
noted  “Populism  offers  unrealistic  methods  for 
solving real problems. The danger of populism in the 
disregard  of  the  rules  of  democratic  play,  the 
reduction  of  politics  to  the  struggle  between  good 
and evil” (Bauman, 2008, p. 211). 
In  our  days  both  in  developed  and  developing 
countries there is clearly a tendency for politicians to 
rise from social movements. Of course, this is not a 
new  phenomenon.  With  each  crisis,  various  social 
movements have emerged in democracy, and always 
a  populist  politician  has  emerged  from  such 
movements. Right-wing and left-wing populists are 
everywhere today. On the one hand, they create new 
conditions  for  new  politicians,  including  heads  of 
state;  on  the  other  hand,  they  introduce  huge 
uncertainty. 
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Bauman, Z., 2008. Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity. 
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Bryant,  J.,  Thompson,  S.,  2004.  Fundamentals  of  media 
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Burton,  M.,  Higley,  J.,  1998.  Political  Crises  and  Elite 
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Judis,  J.B.,  2016.  The  Populist  Explosion.  New  York: 
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