The Impact of Ownership Structure, Independent Commissioners,
Audit Committees, and Audit Quality on Tax Avoidance
An Empirical Study of Non-Financial Firms listed on the Indonesia
Stock Exchange from 2013-2016
1
Linta Septiya and
1
Santi Novita
1
Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya, Indonesia
Keywords: Audit Committees, Audit Quality, Foreign Ownership, Family Ownership, Government Ownership,
Independent Commissioners, Tax Avoidance.
Abstract: This study aims to provide empirical evidence regarding the impact of family ownership, government
ownership, foreign ownership, independent commissioners, audit committees and audit quality on tax
avoidance. Tax avoidance is proxied by the Cash Effective Tax Rate (CETR), which is the ratio of cash tax
paid to pre-tax income. The sample includes 568 non-financial firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange
between 2013 and 2016 and is determined by the purposive sampling method. The impacts of family
ownership, government ownership, foreign ownership, independent commissioners, audit committees and
audit quality on tax avoidance were analyzed using multiple linear regression analysis with the help of SPSS
21 software. Based on the results, it can be concluded that independent commissioners, audit committees
and audit quality have no significant impact on tax avoidance; meanwhile, family ownership, government
ownership, and foreign ownership have a significant impact on tax avoidance. This indicates that higher
ownership of family, government, and foreign company will reduce tax avoidance practices.
1 INTRODUCTION
Minnick and Noga (2010) stated that firm
governance can affect how a firm manages taxes.
Tax planning depends on the dynamics of firm
governance within a firm (Winata, 2015). Tax
planning is defined as the process of organizing a
taxpayer's business in such a way that his tax
payable, both income tax and other taxes, are in a
minimum position, as long as this is made possible
by the applicable laws and regulations (Mangoting,
2004). A well-structured firm governance
mechanism in a given firm is directly related to its
compliance with its tax obligations (Winata, 2015).
The Indonesian government is always trying to
increase its tax revenue. However, as taxpayers,
firms use tax as an income deduction factor.
Accordingly, a firm will attempt to pay the smallest
amount of tax possible in order to generate
maximum profit. This difference of interests causes
firm taxpayers to reduce the amount of their tax
payments by means of tax avoidance. Taxpayers
commit tax avoidance not solely because of a lack of
intention to pay taxes, but also due to their
motivation to obtain financial benefits.
The phenomenon of tax avoidance in Indonesia
can be seen from the ratio of tax revenue. The tax
ratio shows the government's ability to collect tax
revenues or re-absorb GDP from the public by
means of taxes; accordingly, the higher a country’s
tax ratio, the better its tax collection performance.
Indonesia's tax ratios for the years 2010 to 2015
were 10.5%, 11.2%, 11.4%, 11.3%, 10.9%, and
10.8% respectively. There was an increase from
2010 to 2012, but then a subsequent decrease until
2015. While tax revenues themselves are increasing
every year, Indonesia’s tax ratio is relatively low
compared to that of other developing countries.
These results indicate that tax avoidance activities in
Indonesia are widespread, meaning that the State tax
revenue is still suboptimal.
Several major tax avoidance cases have been
undertaken by the Indonesian Directorate General of
Taxation, including Asian Agri, Bumi Resources,
Adaro, Indosat, Indofood, Kaltim Prima Coal (KPC)
and PT Airfast Indonesia (subsidiary PT Freeport
Septiya, L. and Novita, S.
The Impact of Ownership Structure, Independent Commissioners, Audit Committees, and Audit Quality on Tax Avoidance - An Empirical Study of Non-Financial Firms listed on the Indonesia
Stock Exchange from 2013-2016.
In Proceedings of the Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics Symposium 2018 on Special Session for Indonesian Study (JCAE 2018) - Contemporary Accounting Studies in
Indonesia, pages 77-83
ISBN: 978-989-758-339-1
Copyright © 2018 by SCITEPRESS – Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved
77

Mc Moran) (Rusydi, 2014). In the case of PT Asian
Agri Group, the taxpayer was suspected of storing
his wealth in a tax haven. The high number of tax
avoidance cases indicates that firm governance has
not been adequately implemented by public firms in
Indonesia. Moreover, the practice of tax avoidance
within a firm indicates that the firm has bad firm
governance (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006).
2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND
HYPOTHESES
Tax avoidance is based on the agency theory, and
the conflict that arises between managers and
shareholders is the result of an aggressive tax
planning strategy. Aggressive tax action can result in
costs due to issues arising from agency problems.
Shareholders act to reduce a firm’s tax burden and
maximize profit after tax in order to meet the firm’s
objectives; on the other hand, managers (agents)
tend to behave opportunistically by maximizing their
own interests. This can reduce the transparency of
the firm and create a moral hazard. As revealed by
Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency conflict arises
due to the separation between ownership and control
of the firm.
In this study, the implementation of firm
governance will be examined through the
mechanisms of ownership structures (family
ownership, government ownership, and foreign
ownership), independent commissioners, audit
committees and audit quality. Hanlon and Heitzman
(2010) argue that ownership structure is an
important factor that can affect the degree of tax
avoidance while Lanis and Richardson (2011) state
that family members who occupy the board of
directors are capable of encouraging management to
take aggressive tax action. Both Martinez and
Ramalho (2014) and Bauweraerts and Vandernoot
(2013) state that family ownership positively affects
tax avoidance. It can be concluded that the higher
the degree of family ownership, the lower the tax
avoidance rate of the firm.
In firms with government ownership, the
potential for tax avoidance benefits seems to be
higher than the costs associated with tax avoidance
(Salihu et al., 2014). A study by Zhang and Han
(2008) found that government ownership is
positively and significantly related to firm tax
avoidance. Moreover, DeBacker et al. (2015) state
that foreign-owned firms in the United States whose
owners are from countries with higher rates of
corruption tend to commit more tax avoidance.
Annuar et al. (2014) contend that foreign ownership
affects the tax avoidance of Malaysian companies.
However, Hasan et al. (2016) argue that foreign
ownership has a negative effect on tax avoidance
The relevant hypotheses to be tested are as follows:
H
1a
: Family ownership has an impact on tax
avoidance.
H
1b
: Government ownership has an impact on
tax avoidance.
H
1c
: Foreign ownership has an impact on tax
avoidance.
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the existence
of independent commissioners will result in more
effective board monitoring and restrict managerial
opportunism. Richardson et al. (2013) examined the
impact of board composition and tax aggressiveness
and found that the addition of a large number of
independent commissioners reduces the probability
of aggressive tax planning. The existence of this
independent board of commissioners may reduce
agency problems related to the degree of tax
aggressiveness (Armstrong et al., 2015).
Independent commissioners have been found to have
an effect on tax avoidance (Kantudu and Samaila
(2015). The relevant hypothesis to be tested is as
follows:
H
2
: Independent commissioners have an impact
on tax avoidance.
Richardson et al. (2013) state that if a firm has
independent audit committees, it is less likely to
engage in aggressive tax practices. Audit committees
have proved to have a significant impact on tax
avoidance, since if the number of audit committees
is not in line with Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX)
regulations, it will improve management actions to
minimize the firm's profit for tax purposes (Annisa
and Kurniasih, 2012). The relevant hypothesis to be
tested is as follows:
H
3
: Audit Committees have an impact on tax
avoidance.
The quality of auditors can also affect the
aggressiveness of tax strategy (Kanagaretnam et al.,
2016). Francis (2004) argues that the so-called ‘Big
Four’ Public Accountant Firms on average, provide
a higher quality audit report than non-Big Four
KAPs. The higher audit fees charged by the Big
Four can result in better audit quality through greater
audit efforts and superior auditor expertise.
According to Cai and Liu (2009), if the amount of
tax to be paid is too high, a firm will be forced to
commit tax avoidance. The more qualified the audit
of a firm, the less likely a firm will be to manipulate
JCAE Symposium 2018 – Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics Symposium 2018 on Special Session for Indonesian Study
78

earnings for the benefit of taxation. The relevant
hypothesis to be tested is as follows:
H
4
: Audit quality has an impact on tax
avoidance.
This study uses the control variables of firm size
(size), profitability (ROA), and leverage. The use of
firm size as a control variable is to control the effect
of size on tax avoidance activities (Lanis and
Richardson, 2011). Large firms are expected to
reveal more information than small firms to reduce
the problem of information asymmetry (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). The use of leverage as a control
variable is based on the idea that firms with more
debt tend to disclose more information. Saputra et al.
(2016) state that profitability affects tax avoidance.
Firms that earn profits are assumed not to commit
tax avoidance because they are better able to manage
their income and tax payments.
3 METHOD AND ANALYSIS
3.1 Sample Approach
This study employs a quantitative approach using
secondary data in the form of financial statements.
The populations are all non-financial firms listed on
the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) between 2013
and 2016. The data was collected by accumulating
secondary data in the form of financial reports,
which became the research sample. The sample was
then selected based on predetermined criteria using
purposive sampling, with 568 observations in total.
3.2 Operational Definitions
Family ownership (SHMKEL) is measured using the
percentage of shares owned by the family as a
proportion of total outstanding shares. The firm is
said to have family ownership if the composition of
family ownership is the largest and holds more than
20% of the outstanding shares and/or the CEO or the
board of directors are family members (Villalonga
and Amit, 2006). Government ownership
(SHMPEM) is measured using the percentage of
shares owned by the government as a proportion of
total outstanding shares of the firm (Annuar et al.,
2014). Foreign ownership (SHMASG) is measured
using the percentage of total shares owned by
foreign investors as a proportion of total outstanding
shares of the firm (Al Farooque et al., 2007).
Independent commissioners (KOMIND) are
measured using the percentage of the number of
independent commissioners as a proportion of the
total number of members of the board of
commissioners (Sari, 2014).
The Audit Committee variable (AUDIT) is
defined by counting the number of audit committees
excluding the independent commissioner as a
proportion of the total number of audit committees
of the firm (Swingly and Sukartha, 2015).
Audit quality measurement (AUDITOR) uses
dummy variables, which are set at 1 if the firm is
audited by a ‘Big Four’ KAP (i.e. Deloitte,
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), Ernst & Young
(E&W), and KPMG), and set at 0 if the firm is
audited by a KAP that is not a member of the Big
Four (Saputra et al., 2016). Tax avoidance is
measured using Cash Effective Tax Rate (CETR).
CETR is defined as cash tax paid to pre-tax income.
The Cash Effective Tax Rate is expected to be able
to identify the aggressiveness of firm tax planning
that is conducted using fixed differences as well as
temporary differences (Chen et al., 2010). Firm size
(SIZE) is the size of a firm calculated from the total
logarithm of total assets owned by the firm (Annuar
et al., 2014). The profitability is proxied using ROA,
which is defined as pretax income to total assets
(Richardson et al., 2013). Leverage (LEV) is
measured by total debt to total assets (Annuar et al.,
2014).
3.3 Analysis Technique
This study uses a multiple linear regression analysis
method. The multiple linear regression equation in
question is:
CETR = α + β1 SHMKEL + β2 SHMPEM + β3
SHMASG + β4 KOMIND + β5 AUDIT +
β6 AUDITOR + β7 SIZE + β8 ROA + β9
LEV + β10YD + β11 ID + e (1)
The Industry Dummy variable (ID) is used to
classify the types of industries in non-financial firms
based on the industry sector classification set by the
Indonesia Stock Exchange. According to Achmad
(2012), Tjondro et al. (2016), and Butje and Tjondro
(2015), the industrial sectors are assigned a value of
1 for related sector and a value of 0 for other. These
sectors includes the mining sector, basic industries
and chemical sectors, miscellaneous industry
sectors, consumer goods industry sector, property
sector, real estate, building construction, trade and
services sector, and infrastructure, utilities, and
transportation sectors. The Dummy Years variable
(YD) consists of 3 ‘dummy years’, in this case 2014,
2015 and 2016.
The Impact of Ownership Structure, Independent Commissioners, Audit Committees, and Audit Quality on Tax Avoidance - An Empirical
Study of Non-Financial Firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2013-2016
79

4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Results
Descriptive statistical results are provided in Table
4.1. In addition, the total frequency for audit quality
variables in this study amounted to 568; of these,
non-Big Four KAP audits numbered 296 (52.1%),
while Big Four KAP audits numbered 272 (47.9%).
This study uses multiple linear regression
analysis with a significance level of 5%. Test results
in Table 4.2 illustrate that the variables of family
ownership, government ownership, and foreign
ownership have an impact on tax avoidance,
meaning that H1a, H1b, and H1c are supported. On
the other hand, the independent commissioners,
audit committees, and audit quality have no
significant impact on tax avoidance, indicating that
H2, H3, and H4 are not supported.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
.
N
Minimu
m
Maximu
m
Mean Std. Deviation
CETR 568 .0001 .9810 .284615 .1674753
SHMKEL 568 .00 98.18 30.6774 30.83096
SHMPEM 568 .00 90.03 5.9152 18.37567
SHMASG 568 .00 97.98 20.2746 30.22556
KOMIND 568 .00 .83 .3926 .11001
AUDIT 568 .00 .80 .6460 .09964
Valid N
(listwise)
568
Table 2: Multiple Regression Analysis Results.
Model Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
T Sig. Collinearity
Statistics
B Std.
Error
Beta Tolerance VIF
1
(Constant) .078 .172 .452 .652
SHMKEL .001 .000 .172 2.418 .016 .289 3.462
SHMPEM .002 .000 .214 4.086 .000 .534 1.874
SHMASG .002 .000 .275 3.743 .000 .271 3.688
KOMIND -.017 .061 -.011 -.276 .782 .897 1.114
AUDIT -.103 .069 -.061 -1.481 .139 .857 1.166
AUDITOR -.024 .016 -.070 -1.476 .140 .643 1.555
SIZE .010 .012 .040 .822 .411 .607 1.648
ROA -.271 .073 -.160 -3.715 .000 .792 1.263
LEV .168 .037 .188 4.515 .000 .838 1.193
Year2014 -.015 .018 -.038 -.819 .413 .664 1.507
Year2015 -.007 .018 -.019 -.392 .695 .654 1.528
Year2016 -.032 .018 -.084 -1.755 .080 .645 1.549
Agricultural .143 .034 .186 4.264 .000 .771 1.297
Mining .184 .030 .268 6.195 .000 .781 1.281
Basic_Chemical .094 .024 .183 3.884 .000 .656 1.524
Miscellaneous .123 .028 .197 4.430 .000 .737 1.357
Consumer_Goods.069 .024 .149 2.891 .004 .548 1.825
Infrastructure -.026 .026 -.045 -1.023 .307 .739 1.352
Trade .072 .021 .177 3.398 .001 .538 1.858
4.2 Discussion
Firms with higher family ownership tend to avoid
tax avoidance because these firms are more oriented
towards protecting the firm's reputation so as to
maintain its survival. Owners who are family
members are willing to pay higher taxes in order to
avoid the risk of fines, sanctions, and damage to the
reputation of the firm. In short, given the fines and
possible damage to the firm's reputation that can
result from aggressive tax action, a family firm will
tend to avoid tax avoidance practice (Chen et al.,
2010). Family firms have an incentive to protect the
firm's reputation because they generally regard the
firm as a legacy to be passed on to the next
generation (Casson, 1999).
These results are also consistent with research
conducted by Chan et al. (2013) stating that firms
with government ownership are less aggressive in
tax strategy. The higher the level of government
ownership, the more the firm will pay attention to
the long-term consequences of an aggressive tax
strategy. Zeng (2010) also believes that firms with
government ownership exhibit lower tax avoidance.
Chibber and Majumdar (1999) stated that a
higher number of foreign parties investing their
shares in the firm will improve firm performance.
The foreign party is generally considered to have
good management, technology, innovation, expertise
and marketing systems that can have a positive
impact on the firm. However, firms with foreign
ownership are usually more likely to encounter
information asymmetry problems due to
geographical and language barriers; therefore, firms
with large foreign ownership will be compelled to
report or disclose their firm information voluntarily
and more widely, including information on taxation.
Foreign ownership also has a higher concern for the
firm's reputation, so that they prefer to minimize
aggressive tax action (Rustiarini, 2011).
According to Darwis (2009), independent
commissioners exist only to comply with the
regulations of Capital Market and Financial
Institution Supervisory Agency BAPEPAM.
Independent commissioners do not perform their
monitoring functions properly and do not use their
independence to oversee the policies of the board of
directors. Hardiningsih (2010) states that, based on
the results of the Asian Development Bank survey,
the major shareholder/s (controller/founders) play an
important role, meaning that the board of
commissioners are not independent and their
oversight function (that should be the responsibility
of the board members) is ineffective. Thus, there is
no significant relationship between independent
commissioners and tax avoidance due to the
existence of affiliated parties within the firm
affecting the independence level of independent
commissioners. Moreover, the size of the
independent board of directors is not a major
determinant of the effectiveness of oversight of
JCAE Symposium 2018 – Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics Symposium 2018 on Special Session for Indonesian Study
80

corporate management. The effectiveness of the
control mechanism depends on the value, norms,
trust, and the role of the board of commissioners in
the activity of imposing controls on management
(Jennings, 2005).
In Indonesia, mandatory BAPEPAM regulations
are currently in place. In fact, firms tend to form
their main audit committees solely to meet these
regulatory requirements and thus avoid punishment
and sanction (Agustia, 2013). Consequently, the
number of audit committee members present within
the firm is set only to ensure compliance with
BAPEPAM regulations, which require the audit
committee to consist of at least 3 (three) persons
from independent commissioners and external
parties. Therefore, the performance of audit
committees is less effective in developing and
implementing oversight processes to minimize firm
tax avoidance practices.
Audit quality does not have an impact on tax
avoidance; this is due to improved audit quality in
the Big Four KAPs as a consequence of the
increasingly stringent BAPEPAM regulations, as
well as the possibility of Big Four firms providing
tax advisory services for audited firms to minimize
the amount of tax payable legally. The results of this
study are in accordance with Saputra et al. (2016)
and Hartadinata and Tjaraka (2013), who also argue
that audit quality does not affect tax avoidance.
Firm size also has no effect on tax avoidance.
This may be due to the fact that tax avoidance
efforts are made by both large and small firms in
Indonesia. The results of this study are in accordance
with Rusyidi (2014) and Cahyono et al. (2016), who
also state that the size of the firm does not affect tax
avoidance. In short, firm size is not a determinant of
corporate tax avoidance; large and small firms alike
will certainly be examined by the tax authorities in
cases where they violate the provisions of taxation
law, because paying taxes is a firm’s obligation.
According to Saputra et al., (2016) profitability
affects tax avoidance. ROA is an indicator that
reflects the firm's financial performance. A high
value of ROA generated by a firm can categorize the
firm's financial performance as good. Firms that earn
profits are assumed not to commit tax avoidance
because they are able to manage their income and
tax payments. Suyanto and Supramono (2012) stated
that as debt rises, taxable income becomes smaller
because of tax incentives related to interest expense
that result from larger debt. This brings up the
implications of the increasing use of debt by firms.
The Ozkan (2001) study provides evidence that
leverage affects tax avoidance. Firms that have high
tax payable will often choose to become indebted to
reduce taxes.
Furthermore, the year of data collection has no
impact on tax avoidance. The firm's opportunity to
practice or eschew tax avoidance appears to be the
same for each of the three years studied. However,
the agricultural sector, mining sector, basic industry
and chemical sector, miscellaneous industry sector,
consumer goods industry sector, trade and service
sectors do have an effect on tax avoidance. The
results indicate that these sectors are more tax-
conscious, or in other words, that their tax avoidance
rate is low. Infrastructure, utilities, and
transportation sectors were found to have no effect
on tax avoidance. According to Butje and Tjondro
(2015), each industry sector has different and unique
characteristics. Each sector has its own policies, tax
rates paid, different accounting assessments and
disclosure patterns.
5 CONCLUSION
The ownership structures of family ownership,
government ownership, and foreign ownership have
been shown to affect tax avoidance. Firms with
higher ownership structure tend not to avoid taxes
because the owners are willing to pay higher taxes to
avoid the risk of fines, sanctions, and damage to the
reputation of the firm; in short, they assess a lack of
perceived benefits for tax avoidance behavior.
Independent commissioners, audit committee and
audit quality have no impact on tax avoidance. This
may be because the existence of independent
commissioners and audit committees in the firm may
be solely to ensure compliance with regulations
established by BAPEPAM.
Audit quality does not affect tax avoidance due
to increased audit quality in non-Big Four KAPs as a
consequence of increasingly tight BAPEPAM
regulations, as well as the possibility of Big Four
KAPs providing tax advisory services for audited
firms so as to minimize the amount of tax payable
legally. Year of data collection proved to have no
effect on tax avoidance; a given firm's opportunity to
commit or avoid tax avoidance is the same across
those three years. The agricultural sector, mining
sector, basic industry and chemical sector,
miscellaneous industry sector, consumer goods
industry sector, trade and service sector have an
impact on tax avoidance, indicating that these sector
are more tax-conscious (or, in other words, that their
tax avoidance rate is low). On the other hand, the
infrastructure, utilities, and transportation sectors
The Impact of Ownership Structure, Independent Commissioners, Audit Committees, and Audit Quality on Tax Avoidance - An Empirical
Study of Non-Financial Firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2013-2016
81

proved to have no impact on tax avoidance. It can be
concluded that each industry sector has different and
unique characteristics; each sector has its own
policies, tax rates paid, different accounting
assessments and disclosure patterns.
On the subject of firms, they should enhance the
performance of their independent commissioners
and audit committees, as their function of overseeing
firm management should be made effective and
more improved. Regarding the government as a
policymaker, it is necessary to consider formulating
and introducing a statutory general anti-avoidance
rule in Indonesia’s tax law by taking lessons from
other countries that have applied similar provisions.
This is because the specific anti-avoidance rule in
Article 18 of the Income Tax Law cannot yet cover
all types of tax avoidance transactions given the
increasing complexity of current tax avoidance
schemes.
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