

Traversal-aware Encryption Adjustment for Graph Databases

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Abstract: Data processing methods allowing to query encrypted data, such as CryptDB (Popa et al., 2011a) utilize multi-layered encryption and encryption adjustment in order to provide a reasonable trade-off between data security protection and data processing efficiency. In this paper, we consider querying of encrypted graph databases and propose a novel traversal-aware encryption adjustment scheme which trades efficiency for security. We show that by dynamically adjusting encryption layers as query execution progresses, we can correctly execute the query on the encrypted graph store revealing less information to the adversary than in the case of static adjustment done prior to execution.

1 INTRODUCTION

Data processing methods allowing to query encrypted data, such as CryptDB (Popa et al., 2011a) provide a powerful mechanism for security protection of data against server based attacks. In order to provide a reasonable trade-off between data security protection and data processing efficiency CryptDB utilizes multi-layered encryption and encryption adjustment. Multi-layered encryption allows to control to some extent the release of information about data elements required for a query execution. Highest level of protection can be achieved by the application of random layer of encryption (RND), meaning that even equal elements become different after encryption. However, if the query execution over encrypted data requires equality checks this cannot be done at random layer of encryption. In this case the encryption level should be adjusted prior to the query execution to the deterministic layer (DET) which allows for equality checks, but reveal no more information. In the original CryptDB approach several layers of different types of encryption organized into encryption onions have been considered alongside of SQL-aware encryption schemes, which revealed the necessary information to execute the various types of SQL-queries, still keeping data itself hidden. One particular challenge was to support join operations and that required introduction of a new cryptographic primitive.

In (Aburawi et al., 2018) a variant of CryptDB-like mechanism for graph databases has been proposed based on an original idea of relational CryptDB

(Popa et al., 2011a). Graph databases have recently become very popular. The graph structures with nodes representing entities and edges representing various connections between these entities constitute a convenient data model allowing to model all kinds of scenarios. Querying graph databases may also be more efficient as compared with relational databases, especially by data traversal queries. Several implementations of graph DBMS are available, including GraphDB, Neo4j, OrientDB, to name a few (Finley, 2011). In a work reported here Neo4j has been used, a Java-based open source implementation that provides persistence and high performance (neo4j, 2015). The query language that can be used to access data in Neo4j is *Cypher*, which is a declarative language capable to express the patterns of nodes and relationships in the graph to be matched during the query execution (Cypher, 2015).

The application of CryptDB principles in the context of graph databases brings challenges with the encryption layer adjustment similar to that of the original CryptDB. The fundamental characteristic of encryption adjustment is a selection of an appropriate encryption layer that reveals an information about an encrypted data that is needed for executing the query, but it does not reveal more information about the data than required. For example, for relational databases, it has been noticed in (Popa et al., 2011a) that there is a possibility to leak some unnecessary information (cross-column equalities) when applying DET layer during the execution of Join operator. A new Join-aware encryption scheme has been proposed to solve this issue (Popa et al., 2011a). In graph databases

no need to perform join (Robinson et al., 2013) and it is absent in the Cypher query language (Cypher, 2015). Nevertheless, as it was noticed in (Aburawi et al., 2018) the issue of unnecessary leaks remains for graph databases as well.

In this paper, we propose a novel encryption adjustment scheme which we call "traversal-aware". This scheme, when applied to graph database querying lead to demonstrably less unnecessary leaks of information. The scheme is dynamic and the encryption layer adjustment happens not before the query execution, but rather it gradually progresses alongside the execution.

This paper is organized as follows, in Section 2 the encryption layers and adjustment as proposed in (Aburawi et al., 2018) is presented. Section 3 then explains the CryptGraphDB. The next section, Section 4, presents the proposed traversal-aware encryption adjustment for graph database. Some conclusions and some suggested areas for future work are drawn in the final section.

2 ENCRYPTION LAYERS AND ADJUSTMENT

In this section we outline briefly the concepts of encryption layers and encryption adjustment in the context of encrypted databases querying. Onion Layers of Encryption considered in (Popa et al., 2011a; Aburawi et al., 2018) allow to change data encryption levels on demand in an efficient way. The main idea is to encrypt each data item in one or more onions, where each layer of each onion enables some kinds of functionality as explained in (Popa et al., 2011a; Aburawi et al., 2018). At the beginning, each data item in the database is encrypted in all onions of encryption, started with the most secure encryption scheme as outermost layers. At this point, the server can know nothing about the data other than the number of nodes, properties, and data size, whilst the inner layers such as OPE and DET provide more functionality. Depending on the requirements of a particular query for data access the level of encryption is adjusted before query execution. Different cryptographic algorithms are available to be cascaded into onion layers (as originally mention in (Popa et al., 2011a)):

- **Random (RND).** RND is a probabilistic scheme that provides the maximum security, when two equal values are encrypted to different ciphertexts. RND does not reveal any information on the plain text and does not allow any computation over the ciphertext.

- **Homomorphic encryption (HOM).** HOM is a method of encryption that allows to perform calculations on encrypted information without decrypting it first.
- **Deterministic (DET).** DET generates the same ciphertext that correspond to the same plaintext, DET was implemented to let the equality checks to be performed.
- **Order-preserving encryption (OPE).** OPE is a scheme that produces ciphertexts that preserve the order of their plaintexts, and allows to perform comparisons between data values based on their encrypted versions.
- **Word search (SEARCH).** SEARCH allows to execute searches on encrypted text.

3 CryptGraphDB

In (Aburawi et al., 2018) a proposed approach for graph database inspired by CryptDB was reported whereby executing a cypher query over an encrypted graph database as if it was executed over a plain graph database. Therefore, the typical processing of a query in CryptGraphDB can be performed as follows:

1. The application issues a query, which is rewritten and anonymizes each label, node, and relationship name, and encrypts each constant in the query with an encryption scheme that allows the required operation.
2. By using multi-layered encryption and encryption, adjust encryption layers before executing the query if DBMS needs to do. If so, issues an UPDATE query to adjust the encryption layer of the appropriate node, while the semantics of the query are preserved.
3. The encrypted query is sent to the DBMS server to be executed by using standard Cypher and return the encrypted results.
4. The server returns the encrypted result of the query, then the proxy decrypts and returns to the application.

To illustrate how CryptGraphDB processes the cypher query, consider an example scenario as can be seen in Figure 1, consisting of a graph database label `Person`, which has ten nodes of interest: `name` and `age` as properties. Initially, each property in this graph database is adapted in onion of encryption with RND as outermost layer. At this stage, the server (or rather an attacker taken over the server, or curious administrator) can recognize nothing about the data con-

tent other than the number of nodes, properties, and relationships.

To illustrate the adjustment of the onion layers the following query is considered:

```
MATCH (A:person)-[:Knows]->(person)
WHERE A.name = "Tom"
RETURN person
```

In this query an adjustment for name is required to level DET. Accordingly, an update query is needed to UPDATE Label:person to person1 by decrypting the name property to DET layer, UPDATE person1 SET P-Onion = DECRYPT-RND(P-Onion). DBMS decrypts entire name property to DET layer. Then, execute the encrypted query:

```
MATCH (A:person1)-[:Knows1]->(person1)
WHERE A.name1 = "D1"
RETURN person1
```

Where D1 is an encryption of Tom. The outcome of this query will be X77, X33, and X88 as the encrypted RND of Smith, Smith, and Lee, respectively. The encrypted results are returned to the user; they can be decrypted in transit by a proxy.

In this way CryptGraphDB, similarly to CryptDB could use various encryption schemes that support several operations, such as check the equality, order comparisons and some arithmetic calculations. As encryption layer adjustment concerned, in both, original CryptDB and CryptGraphDB it happens *before* query execution. It has noticeable consequences in the context of CryptGraphDB. The required adjustment is performed everywhere in the database instance. So, for example, if the query requires access to equality of values for any property, the encryption layers for this property values are adjusted in *all nodes* where the property is present. As we will see that may lead to unnecessary information leaks. In the next section we present an approach which allows to reveal less information when performing an encryption adjustment at least for some types of queries.

4 TRAVERSAL-AWARE ENCRYPTION ADJUSTMENT

The idea of traversal-aware encryption adjustment is quite natural and simple. For some types of queries, the processing can be naturally split in a well-defined sequence of stages. That is true for example for path, or traversal queries, like the following:

A. Bounded traversal

```
MATCH (a)-[:RELASIONSHIP*1..n]-(b)
WHERE a.name = 'Value' AND ...
RETURN b
```

B. Unbounded traversal

```
MATCH (a)-[:RELASIONSHIP*]- (b)
WHERE a.name = 'Value' AND ...
RETURN b
```

In both cases during the query execution the paths starting with nodes with particular names values and progressing alongside specified relationships are traversed. The execution may perform additionally checks of some properties of encountered nodes if required by conditions following AND in the above queries.

When executing such queries over encrypted graph database in the original CryptGraphDB, the encryption layer adjustment may be required for the properties of all nodes which may be encountered during traversal, if conditions checks are present in the query. As before query execution it is not generally possible to identify nodes that will be traversed, the encryption adjustment will be done everywhere (all nodes) where the properties required for checks are present.

We propose, instead of such oblivious and static adjustment to perform dynamic traversal-aware adjustment, following the simple principles:

- Encryption adjustments and traversal query execution are interlaced;
- The adjustments happen in between of traversal steps;
- The adjustment is performed to *enable one step of traversal* using all information accumulated to this step, in particular the set of nodes traversed so far.

Intuitively, it is plausible that following these principles we have a chance to do more focused adjustment, not everywhere, but just along the query execution path. We confirm this intuition in the following subsection by considering a case study.

4.1 Case Study

For the case study we consider a particular graph database instance presented in Figure 1. In this example scenario we have nodes with the label Person, and two properties of interest: name and age. Consider the following Cypher query:

```
MATCH (x: person)-[:Knows]->(y)
WHERE x.name = "Tom" AND y.age = "22"
RETURN y
```

We consider the execution of this query in three modes: 1) non-encrypted; 2) encrypted using original CryptGraphDB adjustment; 3) encrypted using traversal-aware adjustment.




Figure 1: Data layout at the server of the graph database.

4.1.1 Non-encrypted Mode

WHERE clause consists of two conditions: initially, WHERE name = "Tom", when this part is executed it leads to have three nodes to be traversed/checked: {Smith, 22}, {Smith, 35}, {Lee, 18} (these are reachable from {Tom, 29} node in one step via Knows relation). Then check the second part of the query which is the age = 22, based on the previous result, this execution showed that the final result is: {Smith, 22} node.

4.1.2 Original CryptGraphDB Adjustment

Initially, each property in the graph is dressed in onion of encryption with RND as outermost layers. At this point, the server can learn nothing about the data content other than the number of nodes, properties, and relationships. To execute the query over encrypted store it is required to lower encryption of name and age to level DET (as we need equality checks). In this case, an update query is required UPDATE Label SET P2 Onion1 = DECRYPT RND, and then RETURN P1, P2, P3, etc., WHERE P1 = "D1" AND P2 = "G83", where D1 and G83 are an encryption of Tom and 22, respectively. The results are decrypted and return them to the user.

More details on this follows. In step (1), proxy sends to the DBMS: UPDATE Database, SET Property1 = DECRYPT RND(Property). Because all the database properties on RND layer, as illustrated in Figure 2. DBMS decrypts entire name and age properties to DET layer: Dec.P, Eq, RND (X11) = D1, Dec.P, Eq, RND (G71) = G68, Dec.P, Eq, RND (X77) = D6, and so on. Proxy updates its internal state to log that entire name and age properties are now at DET layer in the DBMS, as can be seen in Figure 3. In step (2),

proxy encrypts Tom and 22, to their Equality onion, DET layer encryption value of D1 and G83. Proxy generates query and sends it to DBMS:

```

MATCH (x: person1)-[:Knows1]->(y)
WHERE x.name1 = "D1" AND y.age1 = "G83"
RETURN y
  
```

and in step (3), proxy sends decrypted result Smith and 22 to the application.

We notice that with this encryption adjustment procedure after the query execution the equality of {name, age} for each node becomes apparent. This information on equality is not related to the result of the query and is not strictly necessary for computing the result, as these nodes are not connected to node Tom.

4.1.3 Traversal-aware Encryption Adjustment

Consider the example schema shown in Figure 1. Initially, each node and each property in the graph is dressed in equality onion of encryption, with RND as outermost layers, as shown in Figure 2. At this point, the server can learn nothing about the data values. Return now to our running query example Q:

```

MATCH (x: person)-[:Knows]->(y)
WHERE x.name = "Tom" AND y.age = "22"
RETURN y
  
```

In order for this query to be executed one needs first to adjust the encryption of name to layer DET. To do so, the query UPDATE Label SET P1 Onion1 = DECRYPT RND is issued, where P1 corresponds to name. Then we execute the query Q1 performing the initial search for nodes when the path required in the original query Q may start:

```

MATCH (x: person1)-[:Knows1]->(y)
WHERE x.name1 = "D1"
RETURN y AS result
  
```

Here result variable is used to store the result of Q1, property name1 corresponds to name, and D1 is




Figure 2: The nodes created at the DBMS server. The encryption is set at RND layer everywhere. Ciphertexts shown are not full-length.




Figure 3: The encryption is adjusted to DET layer.

the encryption of Tom. The outcome shows that there are only three nodes as the outgoing of Tom node. Before processing the second part of the query Q , that is `WHERE y.age = "22"`, lowering encryption of age property of nodes in result is needed to level DET, as illustrated in Figure 4. Then we execute the query Q_2 , implementing the next step of Q execution:

```
MATCH (x: person1)-[:Knows1]->(result)
WHERE result.age1 = "G83"
RETURN result
```

Finally, Proxy receives encrypted result D6 and G83, decrypts them and sends decrypted result Smith and 22 to the application.

Notice that unlike in the original encryption adjustment procedure, the equality of age property for both {Perry, 38} nodes is not revealed here, as it kept at RND layer at G36 and G72.

4.2 Discussion

The advantage of the proposed approach was that it would not reveal the information that come from DET layer more than necessary. To demonstrate this Figure 3 and Figure 4 show a significant difference in the results when apply both the original CryptGraphDB encryption adjustment strategy and the traversal-aware encryption adjustment strategy. We notice when original strategy is applied it reveals more information than necessary, such as the age of other nodes that are not connected to Tom. By contrast, when traversal-aware encryption strategy is applied, it reveals only the information that required to execute the query. We observe from Figure 4 that not all age property values are adjusted to DET layer, but only required values are adjusted, while the rest are still at RND layer. Our technique shows a clear advantage by dynamically adjusting encryption layers as query execution progresses. In this way less information is revealed to the potential adversary overseeing the execution of the query on the encrypted store.




Figure 4: Traversal-aware encryption adjustment. Ciphertexts shown are not full-length.

5 RELATED WORK

In this section, we compare related work with our approach. Some of the mechanisms used in traversal-aware encryption adjustment are built on prior work from the cryptographic collection.

CryptDB is an approach (Popa et al., 2011a) that has completely explored access control for SQL queries on encrypted relational data. The CryptDB architecture supposes a proxy between the users and the server. The basic idea is that by selecting an appropriate encryption scheme, at the server side no need to decrypt the data that stored on the database server in an encrypted form, not even during the execution of the queries. One of the CryptDB advantages is that no need to change the server software. All process is implemented by intercepting users queries, rewrites them and passes to the server for execution. In (Popa et al., 2011a; Popa et al., 2011b) The issue of information leaks during encryption adjustment in relational databases is discussed and special Join-aware encryption scheme to reduce the leaks is proposed.

In more recent work (Sarfranz et al., 2015) the idea of CryptDB has been further developed to include fine grained access control using advanced cryptographic primitives. The proposed encryption adjustment procedure takes into account the data requirements of the query as well as particular, users and groups of users access rights.

In (Aburawi et al., 2018) the original CryptDB approach has been transferred to the context of graph databases. The basic idea is the same as in relational CryptDB: the execution of the graph query is achieved after translating the query into an encrypted form, which later executed on a server without decrypting any data. Each encrypted result then is sent back to the user where they are finally decrypt-

ted. The proposed design is implemented for Neo4j graph DBMS and Cypher as a query language. It has been confirmed that SQL-aware encryption schemes can be smoothly reused as Cypher-aware encryption schemes, together with keeping the benefit of the performance of traversal graph queries over equivalent relational ones. The mechanism presented in (Aburawi et al., 2018) reported the efficiency of query implementation for different types of queries on encrypted and non-encrypted Neo4j graph databases. The simple strategy of encryption adjustment prior to the query execution has been proposed. While efficient in execution it may reveal more information about the data than necessary. In this paper we show how to reveal less information using dynamic encryption adjustment.

6 CONCLUSION

In this paper, we proposed traversal-aware encryption adjustment for graph databases, a novel solution that supports executing cypher queries over encrypted graph databases. We have shown that when querying encrypted graph databases, dynamic traversal-aware encryption adjustment provides with better security protection of database content, as compared with the static adjustment performed before query execution. Our current and future work includes implementing traversal-aware encryption adjustment for CryptGraphDB, and empirical evaluation of related trade-off between security and query execution efficiency.

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