Multi-Concerns Engineering for Safety-Critical Systems

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Abstract: Modern cars are equipped with a large number of electronic assistance systems such as Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) to improve road safety and driving comfort. These systems require a complex cross-linking, both inside and outside the vehicle, e.g., by means of bus systems or wireless interfaces like Bluetooth. Thus, safety of road users can endangered if the communication between these systems failed. Communication failures can be affected by hacking attacks, e.g., delayed decelerating of an ACC system, thereby presenting a security and timing vulnerability endangering safety of road users. Hence, in this paper safety is considered as primary goal. Goals that contribute to achieve the primary goal can be in contradiction to each other under certain circumstances. Therefore, an approach is proposed to model Safety, Security and Timing (SST) constraints to guarantee maximum safety. Furthermore, a preventative risk assessment of the individual concerns including a tradeoff analysis is performed to enable the development of Safety-Critical Systems (SCS).

1 INTRODUCTION

The development of safety critical embedded systems involves the consideration of certain requirements and objectives. Objectives include essential safety, security and real-time demands, which do not only vary in their importance, but usually are even partially conflicting. Consequently, amendments made on behalf of a safety or security target possibly introduce or intensify other threats. Thus, fixing a safety or security vulnerability might introduce significant safety problems. For instance, modern vehicles are equipped with various wired and wireless interfaces. According to the automotive industry, wireless communication of vehicles will increase tremendously in the future by introducing car-to-car and car-to-infrastructure communication. By broadcasting most current and very important information to neighboring vehicles, e.g., hazard warnings, weather conditions or traffic news, road safety can be increased significantly. Wireless communication comes at the cost of a massive risk of hacking attacks, representing a severe issue for security as well as safety, since the majority of car functionalities are highly safety critical. Even a minor interference can result in serious consequences, due to strong functional interdependencies [Nilsson et al., 2008]. Although wireless car-to-x communication can provide a significant safety improvement it also introduces new security and safety issues by increasing the vulnerability for hacking attacks. Amend-

ing the problem by using a secure encryption for the wireless communication might jeopardize timing constrains, since encryption comes at the cost of additional processing load. When confronted with such conflicting SST objectives, it is most important to analyze proposed solutions comprehensively and to take all potential side effects of a particular design into account. This might reveal unresolvable contradictions, affording a transparent and traceable tradeoff analysis. In the course of this paper an approach is presented to analyze SST issues systematically, structuring them hierarchically and performing a tradeoff analysis on them.

2 APPROACH

The Multi-Concerns Engineering (MCE) process is relevant in the design phase of SCS, when important design decisions regarding unresolvable contradicting SST issues have to be evaluated. In this paper we propose a comprehensive process of trading off conflicting SST requirements:

1. Devise potential alternative system designs

2. Identify and structure SST objectives

3. Perform a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

4. Apply an MCDA to find the safest solution

When confronted with contradicting SSTs in the design phase of an SCS, several competing system models are developed. This approach helps to evaluate the alternative solutions regarding potentially conflicting SST issues, to identify the best tradeoff and to reveal individual vulnerabilities of a solution. For instance, when trying to find the best solution for a vehicle's ACC, one might consider several sensor types, data encryption mechanism or maximum allowed cruising speeds.

Subsequently, these insights are transferred into a standardized Safety Goal Hierarchy (SGH), which builds the basis for the actual FMEA risk assessment. For a clear graphical representation, the SGH makes use of the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) as proposed by Tim Kelly and Rob Weaver in [Kelly et al., 2004]. The strength of GSN is to present the goals while preventing various possible failures in a standardized, structured and understandable manner, emphasizing their relationships and revealing potential goal conflicts.

A promising approach for resolving goal conflicts in the design of safety critical systems is to rate safety as primary goal and considering security and timing objectives as subordinated goals that might affect safety concerns. Therefor an SGH is always initiated with a top-level goal: *Assuring that the system is acceptably safe* which has to be decomposed into more concrete subgoals regarding the system under development, usually including security requirements and real-time constraints.

Based on the definition of different solutions the potential risks of failure for each alternative have to be identified by means of the FMEA. The FMEA is a well accepted method for identifying and preventing or reducing potential risks of failure associated with an arbitrary system or process preemptively. [Liu et al., 2016] It's first step is to answer the following questions: "What can go wrong?", "Why did this failure occur?" and "What would be the impact of the identified failure?" After having identified potential failure modes and their causes, they are integrated into the SGH already prepared. Possibly the SGH designed in advance has to be extended to include aspects that have not been considered so far. That means, refining the SGH until each potential failure mode is represented by a goal on the lowest level (1). Note that the goal structure can be arbitrarily complex and nested, while always ending at the Single Point of Failures (SPOFs).

Afterwards the risk associated with each SPOF has to be evaluated. The FMEA measures this risk by three factors, denoted as OSD in the following: the **Occurrence (O)** is the likelihood of a failure to oc-


Figure 1: Exemplary SGH.

cur, the **Severity (S)** the impact a failure can have and the **Detection (D)** denotes the probability that a failure will be detected. Each of these criteria is assigned an integer value between 1 and 10, whereas 1 stands for the lowest probability of occurrence, the lowest impact or the highest probability of detecting the failure (vice versa for 10). The detailed ratings and their interpretations can be looked up at [Bundesministerium des Inneren, 2017]. Then the risk evaluation of OSD is aggregated to a Risk Priority Number (RPN) by multiplying the ratings: $RPN = O \times S \times D$. Although this simple aggregation has been reasonably criticized, e.g., in [Bowles, 2003], the RPN evaluation is a compulsory requirement of software development for the automotive industry. A more sophisticated aggregation mechanism will be presented in 3.1. According to the RPN potential failures are classified into risk levels. For RPNs of 50 or more, actions on behalf of risk mitigation or risk reduction are mandatory, this usually means to change the system design or exclude potentially dangerous use cases. These changes might introduce new threats or intensify existing ones. Therefore the whole FMEA has to be repeated to assure that the amended system accomplishes an acceptable risk level. [Bundesministerium des Inneren, 2017]

In order to identify the safest, realizable implementation, an adapted version Saaty's Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) [Saaty, 1990] is applied to the SGH. The AHP is a Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) method, that calculates the best compromise based on a structured goal hierarchy and comparison matrices, that asses the relative importance of the goals for their common super-ordinated objective. Creating a comparison matrix (also called pairwise ratio matrix) means to rate the relative importance for every pair of subgoals, when they are directly compared to each other. The AHP proposes to set ratings between 1 and 9, where 1 means that the two compared subgoals are equally important and 9 means that the objective rated with 9 is extremely more important for it's super-ordinated goal than the other one [Saaty, 1990]. Inconsistent ratings can be introduced eas-

ily, for example by setting non-transitive comparison judgments. However, the ratings are not required to result in a fully transitive judgment, since this can hardly be achieved for more than three subgoals by human decision making and usually is impossible for the whole number of ratings. Therefor, only a certain degree of consistency is required, the so called Consistency Ratio [Saaty, 1990]. In literature several algorithms for identification of inconsistent ratings can be found, e.g. [Harker, 1987].

Based on the pairwise comparison matrix, local priorities, i.e., the importance of subgoals contributing to their super-ordinated objective, can be calculated using the eigenvector of the matrix AHP. These local priorities are used to calculate the global priorities of the single points of failure, meaning the absolute importance of the objectives on the lowest level for reaching the top-level safety goal. In the next step we have to determine how well the alternative solutions fulfill the objectives of preventing SPOFs. Since this has already been evaluated with the FMEA, having ratings between 1 and 10 for failure OSD, FMEA judgments only have to be transfered into suitable AHP pairwise comparison ratios which can be done automatically. Two suitable transformation methods, namely RPN Comparison Method (RCM) and Pairwise Comparison Method (PCM), will be presented. Thereby RCM directly uses the RPN calculation. Therefor, the FMEA ratings of alternative solutions are compared by normalizing their inverse ratios. The resulting local priorities in form of percentages of importance, can be used directly by the AHP to calculate global priorities for proposed alternative solutions. The result is a weighted prioritization of the alternative solutions, identifying the one which best fulfills the SST objectives.

$$
\begin{array}{c}
\begin{array}{cccc} O & S & D & RPN \end{array} \\
\begin{array}{c} S_1 \\ S_2 \\ \vdots \\ S_n \end{array}
\left(
\begin{array}{ccc|c}
o_1 & s_1 & d_1 & r_1 \\
o_2 & s_2 & d_2 & r_2 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
o_n & s_n & d_n & r_n
\end{array}
\right)
\end{array}
$$

For RCM, a vector of RPNs $a = (r_1, r_2, ..., r_n)$ is extracted from the matrix above. Subsequently, the inverse vector of a is created: $a^{-1} = (r_1^{-1}, r_2^{-1}, ..., r_n^{-1})$. Then, a^{-1} is normalized by the formula: $\alpha = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{i=n} r_i^{-1}}$. Finally, the local priorities $\pi(S_i)$ for every alternative solution S_i are derived by: $\pi(S_i) = r_i^{-1} \cdot \alpha$.

The RCM directly reflects the RPN values in the tradeoff analysis and its calculation is quite simple, whereas PCM is much more related to AHP. Moreover, it does not depend on the flawed RPN calculation, as it is directly based on OSD ratings, whereas

PCM allows a much more flexible and accurate consideration of FMEA judgments. For the PCM, first of all the FMEA ratings for OSD of the potential failure modes have to be judged in their relative importance for the criticality of a failure. Therefor we define a so called *OSD-Matrix*, that is kept constant for all SPOFs. It is a simple judgment matrix comparing the importance of OSD on behalf of safety. By default it is an all-one matrix, which would imply that OSD are considered equally important. In a second step, the FMEA ratings for the alternative solutions have to be transformed into judgment matrices. Since the values of OSD are multiplied with each other to determine the RPN, higher ratings result in exponentially higher RPNs. To reflect this characteristic in the matrices of pairwise ratios a cubic function is used to transform OSD ratings: Let X be one of the ratings $X \in \{O, S, D\}$ and $x_i \in \{o_i, s_i, d_i\}$ for $i \in \{1, 2, ..., n\}$, then each rating is transformed by $x_i' = x_i^3$ for all x_i. By raising the rating to the third power, the multiplication that would have been made when calculating the RPN is approximated. Again the inverse ratios of the transformed judgments have to be used, since higher OSD ratings represent a higher risk of failure and though a worse, i.e., a lower, AHP judgment. The three pairwise ratio matrices are calculated as follows:

$$
\begin{array}{c}
\begin{array}{cccc} S_1 & S_2 & \cdots & S_n \end{array} \\
\begin{array}{c} S_1 \\ S_2 \\ \vdots \\ S_n \end{array}
\left(
\begin{array}{cccc}
1 & \frac{x_2'}{x_1'} & \cdots & \frac{x_n'}{x_1'} \\
\frac{x_1'}{x_2'} & 1 & \cdots & \frac{x_n'}{x_2'} \\
\vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\
\frac{x_1'}{x_n'} & \frac{x_2'}{x_n'} & \cdots & 1
\end{array}
\right)
\end{array}
$$

Figure 2: PCM: Goal Hierarchy Extension.

Obviously, this is a consistent reciprocal matrix. To determine the local and global priorities with the AHP, the goal hierarchy has been extended at every SPOF (2). The regular AHP algorithm can be applied on this extended goal hierarchy to find the safest tradeoff between evaluated alternative solutions.

3 EVALUATION

In this section the position paper brings a real application example that includes the whole approach

of the tradeoff analysis more closer. Furthermore, a szenario based evaluation is performed that covers three szenarios applying the approach presented in this paper.

3.1 Application Example

The tradeoff analysis is operated by means of a self-developed Eclipse plugin enabling automated calculations and graphical visualizations. The work flow presented in 2 thereby serves as a basis. It is analyzed which kind of ACC system, the ACC with a maximum permissible speed of 210 km/h or 160 km/h, complies the safety requirements more. With common sense it can be concluded that the ACC with a maximum permissible speed of 160 km/h is safer than the other one. Thus, the alternative solutions are extended to an *ACC (210 km/h) with Radar + Camera and 256 bit Encryption* as well as an *ACC (160 km/h) with Radar and 128 bit Encryption*. The next step includes designing (sub-)goals and SPOFs for an ACC being acceptably safe. For that purpose subgoals are designed aiming at correctly working sensors, actuators, software and the communication between them. All these subgoals are split in two or more SPOFs. For instance, in case of subgoal *ACC Actuators are working correctly* there are two SPOFs: *Brake failure is sufficiently mitigated* as well as *Engine failure is sufficiently mitigated*. The complete goals as well as all associated SPOFs (marked with the individual concerns) are illustrated in a GSN hierarchy (3) where each of the SPOFs is connected with the two aforementioned alternative solutions.

For each SPOF, it is mandatory to perform FMEA risk assessments, i.e., RPN values must be calculated based on OSD probabilities. The exemplary assessment of the SPOF *Missing an obstacle can be ruled out with sufficient certainty* is listed in 1. All determined RPN values can be found in 3 assigned to the respective SPOF. Since there are SPOFs with associated RPNs values that will endanger safety risk significantly, improvements according RPN calculations have to be performed.

Table 1: FMEA risk assessment of the SPOF.

	O	S	D	RPN
ACC 210 km/h	1	9	6	54
ACC 160 km/h	2	8	6	96

With the completion of the risk assessments it is necessary to rate (sub-)goals and SPOFs by their importance according to the AHP algorithm in [Saaty, 1990]. The AHP rating of the top goal can be seen in 2. It can be observed here that *ACC communication is acceptably reliable* is more important than all the other goals. Hence the local priority for the communication (Comm. in 2) is better than for the sensors, actuators (Act.) and software (SW). Since the resulting maximum consistency ratio has not been exceeded, no further improvements are required.

Table 2: AHP rating of the goal *ACC is acceptably safe*.

	Act.	SW	Sensor	Comm.
Act.	1	1	1	$\frac{1}{2}$
SW	1	1	1	$\frac{1}{2}$
Sensor	1	1	1	$\frac{1}{2}$
Comm.	2	2	2	1
Local Prio.	20%	20%	20%	40%
Consis. Rat.:			0%	

Finally, the tradeoff analysis can be done comparing local priorities of the RCM and PCM method (4). By applying the PCM the judgments of OSD were changed according to 3.

Table 3: OSD Matrix of the PCM.

	O	S	D	Local Priority
O	1	2	5	58,2%
S	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	3	30,9%
D	$\frac{1}{5}$	$\frac{1}{3}$	1	10,9%

The results show that the *ACC (210 km/h) with Radar + Camera and 256 bit Encryption* is safer than the *ACC (160 km/h) with Radar and 128 bit Encryption*. As can be seen there is no significant difference between the two methods.

Table 4: Global priorities of the alternative solutions.

Alternative Solution	**RCM**	**PCM**
ACC 210 km/h	54,4%	56,2%
ACC 160 km/h	45,6%	43,8%

3.2 Szenario based Evaluation

Three additional scenarios are evaluated:

1. The approach is also compatible with other risk assessment methods than FMEA. Therefore, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) has been analyzed.

2. Changes on the system model effect changes on the approach. Therefore, the ACC system is complemented by a Lane Assist (LA) system. It is evaluated which parts are concerned and how to solve upcoming problems.

Figure 3: Abstract goal hierarchy of the application example.

3. The approach is scalable as required, i.e., the SGH and alternative solutions are expandable. For evaluation alternative solutions will be modified.

The fundamental difference between FMEA and FTA is that FMEA lists the probability of OSD based on a SPOF whereas FTA lists all events that lead to a SPOF. This means that FMEA calculates the risk top-down whereas FTA calculates the corresponding risk bottom-up. Another difference is, that FTA determines the percentage probability that the corresponding SPOF applies whereas FMEA determines the resulting RPN. As stated in 2 there are two methods for calculating the tradeoff: RCM and PCM. If the RCM method is applied with FMEA the tradeoff is calculated based on the ratio between the current RPN and the maximal possible RPN whereas for FTA this is done based on the ratio between the current probability and the maximal possible probability that the SPOF occurs. Even though the PCM algorithm is applied the tradeoff can be calculated using FTA risk assessment. In contrast to FMEA, FTA does not need any priorities for calculating the tradeoff, i.e., a classic AHP can be performed for calculation. It is therefore possible to apply any other risk assessment method if probabilities are assigned to the SPOFs.

The second scenario proves stability if some changes on the system model are made, i.e., impact analyses must be performed [Langermeier et al., 2015]. Due to the rapid development in the automotive industry, new assistance systems occur from time to time and hence, new hardware and software must be installed in the car. This involves changes ton the system model and thus also the safety risk

which makes it necessary to update the SGH. Assuming there is an additional LA system, a new subtree *LA is acceptably safe* with all its subgoals and SPOFs must be created. In the same way as the ACC the LA considers goals and SPOFs with respect to sensors, actuators, software as well as the communication between them. Pairwise comparisons as well as the risk assessments must be performed in accordance with 2. Finally, a new top goal *ACC and LA are acceptably safe* must be created that combines the two subtrees, including a pairwise comparison between the ACC- and the LA subtree.

In practice, there are some regulations regarding software and hardware that are given by certification authority, impacting the SGH or alternative solutions [Langermeier et al., 2015]. Scenario 2 already covered scalability of the SGH indirectly, hence, objective of this scenario is to change alternative solutions and to evaluate it. Assuming there is an SGH covering an LA system, the certification authority stipulates the minimal resolution of the installed cameras. Thus, alternative solutions have to be adapted with the new resolution and risk assessments between all SPOFs and the updated alternative solutions must be set again before calculating the updated tradeoffs.

4 RELATED WORK

In this section, related publications and projects will be presented and compared with the approach of a tradeoff analysis on SCS.

4.1 Safety Assessment with the AHP and the FMEA

The AHP by Thomas L. Saaty [Saaty, 1990] is used for making decisions regarding safety in various domains, e.g., in [Jianbin et al., 2009], [Wang et al., 2011] and [Cheng et al., 2011]. However, the AHP is also used for making decisions based on security concerns, e.g., in [Ji et al., 2010] and [Taha et al., 2014]. A tradeoff analysis on behalf of safety, considering security and timing concerns as well as functional demands does not seem to have been evaluated scientifically before and is therefore unique in literature. Although the AHP is also used for making decisions on security concerns, e.g., [Jianbin et al., 2009] and [Taha et al., 2014] a tradeoff analysis on behalf of safety, taking security and timing issues as well as functional demands into account doesn't seem to have been evaluated scientifically before and is therefore unique in literature. A fairly similar approach, performing a tradeoff analysis on behalf of safety that combines the FMEA with the AHP, is the work of [Zhao et al., 2013]. They focus on analyzing the reliability of manufactoring processes by means of the Process Failure Mode Effect and Critically Analysis (PFMECA), enhanced by the AHP. This method has solely been designed for analyzing safety in manufacturing processes. The method proposed in this paper can be applied to any SCS, product or process.

4.2 Related Projects on Safety and Security

There is a project which is important to be considered: SESAMO (**Se**curity and **Sa**fety **Mo**delling). Although it pursues quite similar objectives, it focuses on safety and security requirements, aiming *"to develop a component-oriented design methodology based upon model-driven technology, jointly addressing safety and security aspects and their interrelation for networked embedded systems in multiple domains."* [SESAMO, 2015]. One major objective has been developing procedures for integrated analysis of safety and security demands, focusing on identifying hazards to facilitate an informed tradeoff between contradicting safety and security demands. One goal is to provide convincing evidence, justifying *"that the risks associated with the system are as low as reasonably practicable"* [Paulitsch et al., 2012]. Stating that a system cannot be safe without being secure, the SESAMO project supports the position of considering safety as the top-level goal, that can be affected by security issues. [Paulitsch et al., 2012] In contrast to this paper, the SESAMO project does not

provide a competitive tradeoff analysis by a systematic method like the modified AHP combined with the FMEA. Moreover, the results of the tradeoff analysis as proposed by SESAMO are not fully compatible with the FMEA. However, the FMEA is a compulsory part of the certification requirements in the automotive industry [Paulitsch et al., 2012]. Moreover, there is another project called SafeCer (**Safe**ty **Cer**tification of Software-Intensive Systems with Reusable Components). It aims to increase *"[...] efficiency and reduce(d) time-to-market by composable safety certification of safety-relevant embedded systems."* [SafeCer, 2015] The project focused on providing methods and tools composing safety arguments for a system by reusing already established arguments and proven properties of the subsystems. This project share the goal of providing means (architectures, tools, processes or standardization) to enhance efficient safety assurance and certification. However, this project doesn't explicitly aim to support a MCDA taking safety, security and timing issues into account, as it has been proposed in this paper. [SafeCer, 2015]

5 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK

In this paper an approach has been presented how to combine SST concerns for the development of safety-critical systems. Thereby, safety issues with a maximum degree of safety are of primary importance. For that purpose, an SGH has been introduced which is based on GSN. This SGH contains all safety-, security- or timing goals and SPOFs within a hierarchical structure. Furthermore, it contains alternative solutions, in order to calculate a tradeoff. Additionally, it has been demonstrated how to perform risk assessments of the SPOFs using the FMEA technique. The tradeoff in itself is calculated by means of two possible methods: The RCM and the PCM. The basis for the calculation is either the FMEA technique or the AHP algorithm. Furthermore, the approach has been evaluated based on an application example comparing two different ACC systems by means of three selected scenarios with respect to stability and adaptability of applied techniques. For further work, it would be useful to cluster some goals and to perform the tradeoff analysis in an abstract manner. Thus, it would be possible without any effort to check if a system component is profitable or not. Another aspect that has not been considered in this paper concerns product line engineering. In those days there are numerous configuration options of an automotive vehicle. Hence, a product line approach will be developed contemporary.

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