Courting Violence: Opportunistic Parties and the Politics of Religion

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Abstract: In 2016, the Islamic Defenders Front, Front Pembela Islam (FPI), a violent Islamic group, managed to gather hundreds of thousands of people in a series of rallies in the Indonesian capital city. The rallies had two important consequences: on one side, they influenced the election by swaying the voters’ preferences; on the other side, they marked a turning point in the interactions between violent Islamic organizations and political parties. Although FPI had campaigned and organized similar rallies to oppose the Christian governor since 2014, only in 2016 that this issue was picked up by the public, which helped FPI to mobilize them in large numbers. This suggests that there are conditions under which FPI is able to mobilize the public, which were not there in 2014 but evidently were there in 2016. In this paper, I used network analysis and computational content analysis on more than 25,000 news articles published between 2008 and 2018 to examine why the same issue championed by FPI saw different levels of public and political party engagement in 2014 and 2016. Furthermore, I employed network analysis to illustrate the changing relationship between FPI as a violent group with political parties over the years.

1 INTRODUCTION

In 2016, the Islamic Defenders Front, Front Pembela Islam (FPI), a violent Islamic group, managed to gather hundreds of thousands of people in a series of rallies in Jakarta, the Indonesian capital city. This peaceful protest was a shift from FPI’s tendency towards raids and physical attack in the previous decade. Rallies attendees accused Basuki ‘Ahok’ Tjahaja Purnama, Jakarta’s Christian governor at that time, of blasphemy towards the Islamic holy book, and pressured the government to arrest him under the nation’s anti-blasphemy law. In one of his speeches, Ahok had said that there were people who misled the electorates by citing a Quranic verse to stop them from voting for him in the upcoming elections. The public’s participation in the rallies and their impact on the election changed Islamic organizations and parties’ political strategies in a more sweeping way. The rallies had two important consequences: on one side, they influenced the election by swaying the voters’ preferences; on the other side, they marked a turning point in the interactions of violent Islamic organizations and political parties. In an attempt to secure popular support, political party elites began to court violent Islamic organizations by attending rallies held by FPI (Kompas Cyber Media, 2017). Although the governor did not mean to vilify the Islamic holy book, FPI alleged that the governor’s words were an insult to the Holy Quran, framing them as blasphemous (BBC Indonesia, 2016). Several political party figures attended these anti-Ahok rallies in an effort to capture the Muslim electorates’ popular support in the upcoming Jakarta gubernatorial elections. By the end of the elections, a candidate who frequented FPI’s rallies came out victorious, while the Christian governor was imprisoned for blasphemy. The media has regarded the governor’s imprisonment as a result of FPI’s power in influencing the electorate to vote for certain candidates, as well as in swinging the public political discourse by framing their political opponent as a potential threat towards Islamic values (New York Times, 2017; Time, 2017).

Although FPI had campaigned and organized similar rallies to oppose the Christian governor since 2014, only in 2016 that this issue was picked up by the public, which helped FPI to mobilize them in large numbers. This suggests that there are conditions under which FPI is able to mobilize the public, which were not there in 2014 but evidently were there in 2016. When those conditions appeared and FPI was able to mobilize the masses, this led to political parties becoming interested with the group.
Political party elites’ attendance in FPI’s rallies in 2016 also marked the first time since the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1998 that political parties publicly engage violent Islamic groups. At the span of two years between 2014 and 2016, with the same anti-Christian governor issue, FPI managed to mobilize hundreds of thousand people and attract political party elites to attend their rallies.

I used network analysis and computational content analysis on more than 25,000 news articles published between 2008 and 2018 to examine why the same issue championed by FPI saw different levels of public and political party engagement in 2014 and 2016. Furthermore, I employed network analysis to illustrate the changing relationship between FPI as a violent group with political parties over the years.

First, I present the methodology used in this study. Afterwards, I explore how discourse around FPI changes over time as they shift from violent attacks to peaceful protests and show the evidence of convergence between FPI and political parties. Finally, I discuss how a violent Islamic group such as FPI converged with political parties and I explore what happened in 2016, and how political parties began engaging violent Islamic groups. The final section will conclude the paper by discussing whether the convergence between FPI and political parties means that violent Islamic groups are gaining power in the national politics.

2 METHODS

I used network analysis to understand how different political actors in Islamic organizations and parties relate to each other over a ten years time period. This highlights how FPI as a violent group rose to power by mobilizing other Islamic groups and engaging parties. I also employed computational content analysis to process a large amount of data and highlight discursive patterns arising throughout time.

2.1 Dataset

I obtained the articles from English language Indonesian news websites. I chose articles between 2008 and 2018 as in this period social movement organizations flourish without the authoritarian regime’s control. In addition to that, at this time parties have had a decade of habituation to the new democratic setting (Slater, 2015). This created a dynamic political landscape that opened up possibilities for interaction between the social movement and parties.

While there is a lack of self-documentation by the organizations regarding their activities, the stories that are reported in national newspapers often signal the events’ significance to historians (Bingham, 2010). Thus, newspaper content analysis is suitable to gauge how the media portrays different Islamic groups and records their political activities throughout time. This allowed me to examine the shift in discourse regarding the Islamic social movement in Indonesia.

I focused on four election cycles. By looking at different time periods I inferred the network’s temporal dimension and shows how the Indonesian political constellation changes over time (Padgett and Powell, 2012). The elections that I looked at in this paper are: 1) the 2009 Legislative and Presidential Elections (2008-2009); 2) the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial elections (2011-2012); 3) the 2014 Legislative and Presidential Elections (2013-2014); and 4) the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial elections (2016-2017). Although the second and fourth election cycles are at the provincial level, Jakarta politics is often used to gauge a party’s positioning in the national polity. By looking at the elections as a cycle—each consisting of two years beginning from the year prior to the election—I captured the social game leading up to the vote. By doing so, I observed the time where political parties were scouting for viable coalition partners and courting social movement organizations to gain popularity among the electorates. Furthermore, by focusing on different time periods, I compared FPI’s different levels of mobilization over the same issue in the third and fourth election cycles.

2.2 Methods: 1. Network Analysis

The main idea of my methodology is to identify actors in Islamic social movement and political parties and count the actors co-occurrence in the news articles. First, I drew an actor-to-actor graph to show the relations between individual organization and party actors. Then, I aggregated each actors to their respective groups or parties to form organizational nodes. In the organization-to-organization graph, the weight of each organizations’ ties are the aggregate of their actors’ co-occurrence values. To introduce time dimensionality, I repeated this for all election cycles between 2008 and 2018. However, this method could fail to capture smaller groups and parties. Political actors in smaller groups and parties
sometimes are not mentioned in news articles. Instead of the actors, the articles usually refer to the group or party’s name. To capture them, I used the group or party’s name and treated them like individual actors in other groups or parties.

To compare the networks, I measured network centralization. Centralization describes the extent to which the level of cohesion in a network is organized around a particular node (Freeman, 1978; Scott, 2000). I used betweenness centrality measure to calculate network centralization based on the shortest paths between two nodes in a graph where the sum of the weights of its constituent edges are minimized (Brandes, 2001; Freeman, 1978). When a node has a higher centralization score, it signifies higher leadership, influence, and control in the social movement and party fields (Diani 2003; Diani and McAdam, 2003; Osa, 2003).

2.3 Methods: II. Computational Content Analysis

To explore the narrative between the actors, I combined various computational methods to analyze the text. Firstly, I used Word2Vec to project words into vector spaces and determine certain words’ closeness to different political actors: FPI, Muhammadiyah, and Nahdlatul Ulama as the three largest Islamic organizations in terms of tie counts to other groups and parties. Then I used POS tagger to elicit precise claims in the text regarding these organizations. Finally, I counted the violent words frequency to show the shift in FPI’s preferred political tactic. These computational content analysis methods complement the network analysis by providing context. Moreover, they were able to show a shift in media discourse regarding FPI and other Islamic groups.

Word2Vec is a group of linguistics models used to produce word embeddings. Its main idea is that words are characterized and contextualized by other words around it (Firth, 1957). Word2Vec takes a large text corpus as its input and produces a vector space with each word in the corpus being assigned a corresponding vector in space. In the vector space, the word vectors that share common contexts in the corpus are located close to each other.

Using Word2Vec, I compared FPI with Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama by contrasting them on their preferred political tactics dimension. I measured the words’ vector similarity by using the cosine similarity—a measure that calculates the cosine angle between words in different vectors. By doing so, I identified which words are the most and least similar to each other. Finally, I used cosine similarity to project these word vectors to arbitrary semantic dimensions. For instance, I explored words that are related to FPI and Nahdlatul Ulama—which are the semantic dimensions that I wanted Word2Vec to project the words unto—to see how the two organization’s preferred political tactics differ.

I also used POS tagging to parse precise claims in my news corpus using the Stanford POS tagger and the Penn Treebank tag set to discover particular word’s linguistic role in a sentence (Toutanova et.al., 2003). This method extracted different parts of speech most related to a keyword. For example, when I chose ‘FPI’ as a keyword, I extracted adjectives that describes or proper nouns that relates most to FPI.

Finally, I counted violent and protest words to show the trend for FPI’s preferred political tactic. I compared the result with the way FPI is portrayed in the media throughout the four election cycles to see whether FPI’s change in tactic align with their portrayal in the media. I examined whether parties cooperate with them despite the persistence of their violent label and how FPI framed their issue differently in 2014 and 2016.

3 RESULTS

While the convergence between FPI and political parties peaked in the 2016 - 2017 election cycle with the Christian governor’s prosecution, the events leading up to his removal from office started much earlier. After the authoritarian regime’s fall in 1998, Islamic social movement organizations and political parties interact in a dynamic political landscape. Within the first decade after the regime’s fall, a number of Islamic groups that resorted to terrorism and violent attacks emerged. Only after 2008 that the government managed to tackle these terrorist groups. Despite often engaging in violent attacks towards minority groups and raiding entertainment venues deemed unfit for Islamic values, the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration (2004 - 2014) deemed that FPI is still less dangerous than other Islamic terrorist and paramilitary groups (Hasan, 2006; Kersten, 2015). Thinking that FPI is still under control, the government was being lenient towards them. However, FPI soon grew out of hand.

While the government has managed to keep terrorism down, this leniency has sown seeds of intolerance within the Muslim community. With the background of this rising intolerance, FPI’s shift
towards less violent tactics and their successful issue framing regarding their opposition to Ahok attracted public support in 2016. This section presents my findings to explain the events leading up to FPI and political parties’ convergence in the 2016 - 2017 election cycle.

3.1 Network Analysis

Within the social movement network three organizations appeared to consistently have the highest number of ties (see Table 2). While Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama had more ties with political parties, FPI had more ties with more Islamic organizations.

In the social movement network (grey nodes) we can see that FPI, Muhammadiyah, and Nahdlatul Ulama consistently had the highest number of ties over the four election cycles. However, it is evident that the three organizations have shown a divergent pattern. Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama consistently had higher or the same number of ties with political parties than with social movement organizations. Meanwhile, FPI always had a higher number of ties with other social movement organizations than with political parties. I explored the difference between FPI, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama with computational content analysis in the next section.

Amongst all other Islamic organizations in this study, FPI consistently had the highest betweenness centrality score. This means that FPI had a higher level of leadership, influence, and control in the multi-organizational social movement and political party field (Diani, 2003). The evidence also shows that FPI had more ties with other social movement organizations than any other Islamic groups, which inferred FPI’s ability to mobilize resources from other organizations within the movement. Thus, despite their violent tendencies, FPI had was more capable to mobilize resources than any other Islamic groups that are not violent.

3.2 Computational Content Analysis

Using Word2Vec, I projected action words that represent various political tactics, ranging from contentious ‘street’ politics such as protests that are preferred by social movements to forming coalitions preferred by political parties (Heaney and Rojas, 2015). The result suggests that FPI is more confrontational than Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. For instance, words such as attack, raid, protest, vigilante, and rally are associated closely with FPI. Meanwhile, more collaborative words such as speech, coalition, and support are related closer to Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. When I projected the political tactics dimension into ‘social movement’ and ‘political party’, the result suggests that social movements generally adopt more confrontational tactics such as protest and raid while political parties prefer more collaborative tactics such as forming coalitions or campaigning for the party or the candidate. The result suggests that Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama adopts a similarly collaborative tactics as parties while FPI generally takes more confrontational tactics than Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, or parties.

Despite being consistently described by the media as more violent and aggressive than other Islamic organizations, political parties still form ties with FPI. Unlike, the adjectives that remained consistent throughout the four election cycles, the verbs that are closely related to FPI changes over time. In the 2008 - 2009 election cycle, FPI had more aggressive verbs such as attack, prosecute, and disband. This pattern recurred in the 2011 - 2012 and 2013 - 2014 election cycles with verbs such as threat and force. However, in the last election cycle verbs related to FPI were less aggressive than the previous time periods. This result suggests that while FPI may change their preferred political tactic, their violent image stayed with them throughout the four election cycles.

The POS tagging that I used revealed the Islamists political power in the elections. In the 2008 - 2009 election cycle, the voters were described as Muslim electorates that are eligible to vote. In the next cycle, the word registered describes the voters. These two election cycles does not seem to show any strong characteristics of the voters despite that they are eligible Muslim voters. However, in the 2013 - 2014 election cycle, the adjectives that are used to describe the voters began to shift. Aside of being described as Muslim voters that are eligible to vote, they are also described as young, undecided in political matters, and thus they are potential allies for political parties. Finally, in the last election cycle the voters were described as intimidating, which suggests the extent to their political power. This result suggests that the Islamists are a viable political ally for political parties due to their electoral power.

Finally, to examine a shift in FPI’s discourse further, I counted words such as protest, violence, and vigilante in articles regarding FPI. The trend shows that between 2008 and 2013 the mention of
both attack and violence were higher than rally and protest (Figure 1). This trend was reversed after 2013. This result suggests that FPI has preferred to engage in rallies and protests than in attacks and violence as in 2008 - 2013. This shift in preferred political tactic opened up a point of convergence between political parties and FPI. As FPI tempered their political tactics, parties are more likely to be engaged with them than when they were violent.

Despite their violent tendencies and their enduring violent image, FPI has adopted a less violent political tactic, which opened a point of convergence between the movement and political parties. Yet, it is not only because FPI has shifted their political tactic that political parties were keen to form ties with them. The network analysis in this study has revealed that FPI had more ties with other organizations, which demonstrated their capacity to mobilize people and resources. This suggests that political parties in opposition engage Islamic groups to gain popular support amongst the Islamists. The discussion section will explore how FPI’s shift in tactic, their discourse framing, and the parties’ search for electoral support made the convergence between a violent Islamic social movement organization with political parties possible.

4 DISCUSSION

The evidence I presented in the Findings section suggests that FPI’s success in garnering support and engaging parties was due to their shifting tactics, from violent actions towards more peaceful protests. However, FPI’s shifting tactics were not sufficient to mobilize the public and other Islamic groups, and engage parties. In 2016, FPI framed its anti-Ahok issue in a way that resonates with the majority of the electorate, which are the more moderate Muslims. FPI broadened their issue by using discursive conflation methods (Mische, 2003), framing it as a defense from threats to Islamic values rather than pushing its narrower agenda of opposing the Christian governor. By adopting less violent political tactic and carefully framing their issue, FPI engaged the wider public, other Islamic groups, and parties who might be averse to participating in violent actions.

The year 2008 marked a decade of FPI’s existence. Since the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1998, FPI has taken a role of moral police to enforce Islamic values. Between 2008 and 2009, FPI members were often found raiding bars and nightlife venues, citing these venues ‘unfit for an Islamic majority country’. Despite having to deal with the police and threats of disbandment by the government, FPI retained their preference for vigilantism to institute what they consider as Islamic practices into the society. FPI’s hard-line stance on Islam’s role in the public life causes other Islamic organizations to denounce FPI and distance themselves from FPI (Kersten, 2015). Their engagement in vandalism, violence, and attacks towards non-Muslims and the Ahmadiyya minority group furthered their radical brand.

Figure 1 shows the number of word counts for ‘attack’, ‘violence’, ‘rally’, and ‘protest’ in articles mentioning FPI over the four election cycles. The word frequency suggests that while FPI is still associated with the word ‘attack’ and ‘violence’ in the 2016 - 2017 election period, but the word ‘rally’ and ‘protest’ exceeds their count. This suggests the shift in FPI’s tactic from violence to relatively peaceful protests. These protests are often joined by other Islamic groups, thus forming organizational ties between FPI and other groups in the social movement network. This is evident in the rising number of organizational ties in 2016 - 2017 (Table 1). By adopting less violent political tactic, FPI engaged the wider public who might be averse to participating in violent actions. However, their shift in tactic alone was not enough to garner the masses. FPI’s preference towards protest was also coupled with a shift in the way they frame their issue.

In 2014, FPI began to organize protests against the appointment of a Christian governor of the capital city. Citing a verse in the Quran that forbids Muslims to have non-Muslim leaders, FPI refused to acknowledge him as a governor. FPI branded him as an infidel and appointed their own Muslim governor (Tempo, 2014). However, FPI’s attempt to frame Ahok as an infidel did not resonate with the public and other Islamic groups that took a more moderate stance than FPI. Nahdlatul Ulama, a pro pluralism Islamic organization, openly denounced FPI’s actions as they perceive FPI’s politics as divisive (Kersten, 2017). Nahdlatul Ulama believes that Islam is a message of peace and unity, and thus prefer to promote religious tolerance. This ideology is not shared by FPI who took a more radical approach to strive for the institution of Islamic values in public life.

Only in 2016 did FPI’s issue resonate with the public and other Islamic groups. In 2016, shortly before the Jakarta gubernatorial election is set to take place, a video of the Christian governor’s allegedly blasphemous speech went viral in Facebook. In his speech, the governor mentioned
that the voters are being misled by people who used a Quranic verse to justify opposing him as a governor. The video was edited in a way that changed the meaning of the governor’s words, making it seem like he said that the Quranic verse is deceiving voters. A public outcry spread in Facebook and Twitter as the governor’s words were deemed as an insult to the Islamic holy book. This opportunity is quickly picked up by Islamic social movement organizations to bolster their agenda.

Leveraging on the public sentiment and shifting up the discourse to include a wider range of audiences, FPI formed an alliance with other Islamic groups, framing their political agenda as a religious ‘fight to defend the Quran’. These discourse conflation mechanisms (Mische, 2003) engaged the more moderate share of Muslim, while also retaining FPI’s radical stance. By doing so, FPI framed its issue as a defense of Islamic values rather than just a protest against the Christian governor. This also allowed FPI to frame the government as a threat to all Muslims.

The issue resonated with the public and other Islamic groups, and thousands of people attended a series of rally to demand the governor’s incarceration. In the first rally of the series in October 2016, 25,000 people gathered in the capital city’s mosque before marching towards the city hall. By December 2012, the number of people who attended FPI’s rally peaked at an estimated number of 1,000,000 people (CNN Indonesia, 2016). This number is remarkable, considering FPI’s violent image and their protest attendance record that seldom exceeded hundreds of people. The large number of attendants and the participation of other social movement organizations in the rally signalled FPI’s potential in mobilizing people and resources. Yet, this success is not solely attributed to FPI’s mobilization capabilities.

Although the campaign to oppose the Christian governor had begun since his appointment in the fourth quarter of 2014, only in the October 2016 was the protest event attended by tens of thousand. FPI’s agenda hardly changed, but FPI changed the way they framed the issue. Figure 3 shows internet search engine trendlines for specific keywords between 2008 and 2018 that were accessed from Indonesia. Internet search engine trend reflects public interest in a certain topic. Thus, it shows how engaged the public is with FPI’s issue. In 2014, FPI branded Ahok as an infidel who is not fit to lead the capital of a Muslim majority country. As seen in Figure 3, the trendline for the term *kafir* (infidel in Indonesian) rose only marginally in 2014 when FPI launched the initial campaign. This suggests the issue’s lack of resonance within the wider public or other Islamic groups. Meanwhile, following Ahok’s speech in 2016, the search for both *penista agama* (blasphemer in Indonesian) and *kafir* saw an exponential increase. The trend lines suggest that FPI’s political framing caught up with the wider public much more successfully in 2014. Calling the governor an infidel to justify refusal to acknowledge him had a divisive and exclusive tone to it, which is perhaps why FPI’s issue did not resonate with the public as much as in 2016. However, by using the term blasphemer, FPI broadened the discourse they used to present their issue by framing the governor’s speech as an attack to Islam. This in turn justifies opposition to the governor and calls to convict him for blasphemy. This success is evident in Figure 3 where the trend line for the term *penista agama* remained flat before it peaked in 2016 when FPI blew up the blasphemy allegations through a series of anti-Ahok rallies.

Unlike Heaney and Rojas (2015) who suggested that social movements have to moderate their issue stance to engage political parties, the evidence from this study suggests that they might not need to moderate their issue position. In this case, FPI did not moderate their issue position, but they shifted their framing regarding the anti-Christian governor issue. As FPI’s campaign attracted tens of thousand in its first rally of the series in October 2016, political parties began to look at FPI as a viable political ally for the 2017 elections. At the second rally of the series in November 2016 who was attended by 100,000 protesters, elites from at least three parties in the government opposition attended the event and publicly supported the cause by endorsing it in news interviews. At this point, it is apparent that the candidates that attended FPI’s rallies set themselves as the incumbent governor’s opposition and attempted to leverage on the Islamic movement’s support in the elections. Following the victory of Gerindra’s candidate, both Demokrat and Gerindra elites stopped attending the rallies.

Yet, FPI’s convergence with parties does not suggest Islamic violent group’s acceptance and rise to the national politics. After the elections in 2017 and Ahok’s imprisonment, FPI attempted to broaden its issue. Instead of just defending the Quran, they framed defending the *ulama* (Islamic scholars or community leaders) as a part of defending Islam against its aggressors.

Like the anti-Christian governor rally series, FPI organized a number of protests in defense of the *ulamas*. Yet, instead of seeing a high number or
attendants as in 2016, the number of protester continually declined and party elites rarely attended the rallies between the second half of 2017 and 2018. This suggests that the public and other Islamic organizations’ attendance in FPI’s rallies does not mean that they are supporting FPI but rather only some of their causes. Furthermore, as party elites stopped attending and endorsing FPI’s rallies, the convergence between FPI and political parties seems to be waning. FPI’s convergence as a violent Islamic group with political parties and its resonance with the wider public only happened under favourable conditions, which were at the time when they framed their issues in a way that appeals to the public, when FPI is engaged in peaceful tactics that allows political parties and more moderate Islamic groups to join them, and during a period where Islamic social movement’s support is needed by political parties.

5 CONCLUSION

An intersection between party and social movement may occur, when they serve one another’s needs. Yet, due to tensions caused by differences in social movement and party’s approach to politics, collaboration between them might not happen. Usually, social movement carries political agenda that lies at an extreme end of the political spectrum, but parties tend to broaden and moderate their issue position to engage the majority of the voters. Thus, social movement organizations often had to moderate their issue to engage political parties (Heaney and Rojas, 2015). Yet, in this case, due to careful issue framing and skilled use of discursive conflation mechanisms FPI did not need to moderate their issue upon their convergence with political parties.

FPI used discourse conflating mechanisms to move between higher or lower levels of abstraction regarding the generality or inclusiveness of identity categories within a movement, from framing the issue as an anti-Christian leader towards a defense against Islam’s aggressors that resonated with the more moderate public rather than just the radical niche. Thus, FPI could target different segments of the population: the more radical Islamists to the more moderate Islamic groups, political parties, and the public. The way FPI slide between the general—a religious defense—and the particular—anti-Christian leader—works to build relations in a public arena, while also maintaining FPI’s latent particularistic identity as an Islamic radical group. By carefully framing their discourse, FPI is able to engage and mobilize a wide range of actors and organizations in the social movement network, which then attracted political parties to converge with them despite their violent tendencies.

Despite FPI’s violent tendencies, they had more ties with Islamic groups than with parties. This exhibited FPI’s ability to frame a discourse that resonates with a wide range of audiences and FPI’s ability to mobilize their audiences. Furthermore, FPI’s success in framing their issue to engage Muslim voters attracted parties who wished to appeal to this demography in the upcoming election.

However, FPI’s success in instituting their demand to impeach the Christian governor should not be taken as a sign that social movements have a direct effect towards the country’s governing body—which is the judicial body in this case. FPI’s success operates through their ability to mobilize a large number of people, which demonstrates an attention-grabbing show of political opinion through an exponential increase in protest activity and attendees. FPI’s capability to mobilize protesters consisting of the public and other Islamic groups, informed the ruling government—and also political parties—of the electorate’s desires, which then responded to FPI’s demands. This is consistent with Burnstein and Linton’s (2002) study that argues that organizational activities that respond to the politicians’ electoral concerns—which is informing them about the electorate’s opinion and potentials in the upcoming elections—are more likely to have an impact. This suggests that social movement’s impact is contingent upon their ability to serve the ruling elite or party elite’s interests: violent Islamic groups will attract political elites only to the extent that their activities provide these elites with information and resources relevant to their electoral prospects.

REFERENCES


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Table 1: Number of Islamic Social Movement Organization Ties.

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Table 2: Number of Islamic Social Movement Organization Ties.

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Figure 1: Trend Line for Word Mentions in FPI News Articles.
Figure 2: Number of Attendees in FPI Protests, Rallies, or Raids.

Figure 3: Internet Search Engine Result Trend Line for ‘Infidel’ and ‘Blasphemous’