acted and conducted the project in accordance to the 
approved drainage plan, the disaster would be able to 
be avoided. The approved drainage plan was found to 
be implemented up to only 10% out of the whole plan, 
despite the defendants reported to the authorities that 
the approved drainage plan was complied with and 
implemented entirely. 
It is obvious from the case and the judgment of the 
Court that the defendants, inclusive of the contractor, 
architect and engineer, failed to achieve the relevant 
standard of workmanship of the construction project. 
The sole motivation for the defendant to disregard the 
approved plan and the subsequent false notice of 
compliance was for prospective financial gains. In 
this regard, it prompted the then Justice James Foong 
to hold as follows: 
I have reiterated my strong sentiments against this 
type of attitude of professionals whose only 
considerations is to guard and secure their own 
interest rather than their duties and obligations to 
those closely affected and the public on which much 
faith and reliance are placed on them to carry out 
their professional duties. I need not elaborate further 
except to remind this defendant that he has to live out 
the rest of his life knowing truly well that he 
contributed to the tragedy of Highland Towers (Steven 
Phoa Cheng Loon v Highland Properties, 2000). 
In the Highland Towers, it is important to note that 
the High Court was very displeased as to the direct 
involvement of the defendants to the defects in the 
project. For example, there was evidence that the 
second defendant, as the engineer, did not exercised 
care in relation to the design and construct of the 
foundational structure as to accommodate lateral load 
while taking steps to guarantee the stability of the 
slope adjacent to the towers. Failure of the second 
defendant to do as required as the engineer and to 
exercise care not only was an obvious breach of duty, 
but proof of the fact that the defendant failed to 
achieve a proper standard of workmanship as required 
by the contract.  
Furthermore, in the Highland Towers case, the 
actions raised mainly from the basis of tort of 
negligence whereby the plaintiffs sued various 
parties, which contributed, either directly or 
indirectly, to the defective works. Contrastingly, in 
the High Court case of KC Leong Holdings Sdn Bhd 
v Datin Moh Lee Bing (2015), it features a contractual 
relationship between the parties, and consequently 
claims under torts, despite were briefly discussed, 
were dismissed. Damage suffered by the defendant in 
this case is in the nature of pure economic loss where 
the building is allegedly built defectively but caused 
no damage other than to the building itself. The 
defendant alleged that the buildings were constructed 
negligently and were not fit for the purposes of 
occupation. However, it is to be noted that the High 
Court has taken the view that the proper cause of 
action in this case should be premised under breach 
of contract instead of breach of tortious duty of care 
as alleged by the defendant. This is also supported by 
the fact that the defendant’s concluding submission 
featured a claim under s.74 of the Contracts Act and 
not one under tort of pure economic loss. The trend in 
this case is that there is an indication in the judgement 
of the court that it is recommended for claims on 
defective works to be based on breach of contract 
despite the convincing nature of tortious duty of care. 
It is refreshing to have a simple case like this which 
serves as a reminder that the first avenue of which the 
Court will scrutinize in the event of construction 
dispute involving defective work is the duty arisen in 
the contract between the parties and not the duty 
which may arise under tort. 
KC Leong Holdings Sdn Bhd v Datin Moh Lee 
Bing (2015) also touched on an important issue with 
regard to defective works. What happened if the 
defects are discovered after the defect liability period 
has lapsed? Firstly, is there a defects liability period 
clause? If not, then the Court will not ordinarily imply 
such a clause in the contract between the parties. 
Secondly, referring to a Court of Appeal case of Toh 
Ang Poo (t/a Poo Wah Enterprise) v Jasin 
Construction Development (M) Sdn Bhd (2014), the 
Court ruled that the right to claim under defects 
liability period clause do not supplant the right to 
claim for damages. They are, in fact, an addition to 
the right to claim for damages. Hence, Toh Ang Poo 
(t/a Poo Wah Enterprise) v Jasin Construction 
Development (M) Sdn Bhd (2014) did not generally 
establish that once defects liability period has lapsed, 
contractor’s liability for defective works would cease, 
and should there be defective works attributable to the 
contractor, the principal would still reserve the right 
to claim for damages within the limitation period 
prescribed by the Limitation Act 1953. 
In Toh Ang Poo (t/a Poo Wah Enterprise) v Jasin 
Construction Development (M) Sdn Bhd (2014), the 
Plaintiff in this case claimed for rectification costs for 
defective works which were discovered within the 
defects liability period. Defendant, on the other hand, 
claimed that there were no defects and even if there 
were any, it had been made good during the defects 
liability period. This is because the Plaintiff had 
certified all the Defendant’s works and made full 
payment. There were grave discrepancies in the 
allegation of defective works. For example the 
Plaintiff alleged in November 2007 that the manholes