Mahmud v PP (2010) 7 MLJ 789, where the court 
found the accused guilty, as he criminally intimidated 
the complainant with injury when he threatened her 
with a parang and was sentenced to a fine of RM7000, 
which in default, would result in six months 
imprisonment. In PP v Kenneth Francisco (2000) 
MLJU 102, the defendant was charged with putting 
the victim in fear of injury by threatening to stab the 
latter. The court however acquitted and discharged 
the accused without his defence being called, as the 
prosecution had wrongly drafted the charge against 
him.
 
Apart from Section 503 on criminal intimidation, 
Section 351 on criminal assault and Section 354 on 
assault or using criminal force to a person with intent 
to outrage her modesty may also be applicable in 
prosecuting stalkers and cyberstalkers. If found guilty 
under Section 354, the offender shall be punished 
with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to 
ten years or fine or whipping or with any two such 
punishments. To date, there are about forty-seven 
cases reported under Section 354. An example of such 
cases is Sha’Aribin A. Samat v PP (2017) MLJU 5 
which is concerned with the outrage of modesty of a 
schoolgirl by her teacher. The Sessions court found 
the defendant guilty and sentenced the defendant to 
three years of imprisonment. In another case of PP v 
Mohd Rosli bin Ishak (2017) 1 LNS 1390, the 
defendant was charged with Section 354 for outraging 
the modesty of his daughter by putting his hands in 
her underwear. The court sentenced the defendant for 
nine years and eleven months imprisonment and 
twenty-one strokes of rotan. However, there has been 
no prosecution for stalking or cyberstalking in both 
cases. 
Section 233 of the CMA 1998 may be available to 
prosecute cyberstalking cases. Such section is 
concerned with acts and behaviours, whether 
continuous or repeated or otherwise, which are 
carried out through any network facilities, network 
services or applications to make, solicit or initiate the 
transmission of any comments, suggestions or other 
communication, which is obscene, indecent, false, 
menacing or offensive with the intent to annoy, abuse, 
threaten or harass another person (233(1)(a) CMA 
1998). Section 233(1) (b) further provided that a 
person who initiates communication by using 
application services whether continuously or 
repeatedly, without disclosing his identity with the 
intention to annoy, abuse, threaten and harass any 
person at any number or electronic address may be 
found guilty under the said section.  The penalty 
under Section 233 (3) of the CMA is a fine not 
exceeding fifty thousand ringgit or imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding one year or both. A person can 
also be further fined for one thousand ringgit for 
every day during which the offence continued after 
the conviction (Section 233(3) CMA 1998).
 
Despite the availability of Section 233 to 
prosecute the perpetrators of cyberstalking, up until 
today, no prosecution has been brought before the 
court for such cases. To date, there are only three 
cases that have been prosecuted under the said 
section. In the case of Rutinin b. Suhaimin v PP 
(2014) 5 MLJ 282 the defendant was found guilty 
after he had published a comment via his Internet 
account that states, “Sultan Perak Sudah Gila.” 
However, the decision was overturned as there was 
evidence that anyone can access the defendant's 
account as his computer and his Internet account was 
accessible by other persons and on the day mentioned 
in the charge. In a recent case of Nik Adib bin Nik Mat 
v PP (2017) MLJU 1831, the accused was charged 
under Section 233(1)(a) of the CMA 1998 for posting 
pictures and comments regarding certain leaders on a 
website, which were offensive and false. The judge 
found the accused guilty and sentenced him to 1-week 
imprisonment term and a fine of RM3000. Another 
recent case is Mohd Fahmi Redza bin Mohd Zarin v 
PP (2017) MLJU 516 where the accused was charged 
for sending a false communication for the purpose of 
annoying others by using his Instagram account. 
However, the accused challenged Section 233 as 
unconstitutional, and the matter was postponed until 
the constitutional question was settled in the Federal 
Court
. 
Despite the utility of Section 233 in governing 
cyberstalking, it does not provide the necessary 
protections for the victims such as the protection 
order, restraining order, injunction, or any civil 
remedies, which are currently provided by the 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (PHA1997) in 
England and Wales.  Also, this section does not 
identify or define the acts and behaviours that 
constitute cyberstalking or provide any instances of 
the impact of the stalkers’ behaviour on the victim 
such as that provided under Sections 2A and 4A of 
the PHA 1997. In a Singaporean case of PP v Colin 
Mak Yew Loong (2013, Unreported), the defendant 
who had been sending threatening e-mails and voice 
messages for more than 6 years to the victim, 
including threats of violence by using an Ak-47 rifle 
and a lead pipe, was charged with criminal 
intimidation under Section 503 of the Singapore 
Penal Code and was sentenced to three years of 
imprisonment and SGD5000 fine under Section 506 
of the Penal Code. This case had happened before the