Setting Up a Center for the Study of Political Parties and Local

Government

Can We Work Together?

Nazrina Zuryani, Muhammad Ali Azhar and Tedi Erviantono

Udayana University, Sudirman Campus, Denpasar, Bali

nazrinazuryani@unud.ac.id

Keywords: The Center for Study on Political Parties and Local Government, Three Universities in Denpasar (Udayana,

Unwar and Undiknas), AIPI, Political Parties Clinic.

Abstract: Last April 2017, Udayana University initiated a Focus Group Discussion for establishing a political parties

clinic in Denpasar. Two other universities (Warmadewa and Undiknas), 3 political parties, the AIPI (Asosiasi

Ilmu Politik Indonesia) plus a number of selected NGO are participated. However, the political parties as a

group showed no enthusiasm: only seven political party cadres participated. Following the FGD failure, the

research team decided to conduct a related survey in May-June 2017, and interviewed 61 cadres from eleven

political parties. The findings of this survey, 31 cadres wrote that a clinic is necessary and 30 cadres wrote

either unnecessary or do not know. Mietzner (2008) defines political actors in authoritarian or illiberal

regimes, crucial institutions such as the military, political parties and that bureaucracy are often dependent on

financial patronage, they are reluctant to get financial audit, be cleaner and act as agent of change. The findings

of the FGD and of the follow up survey show that whatever the academics might do to embrace political

parties, they ignore and disequilibrium all collaborative work. Instead of talking of “clinic”, it would be

probably better then to set up a center for the study of political parties and local governments.

1 INTRODUCTION

Last mid-April to June 2017, a team of researchers

from the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences

Udayana University plus Warmadewa University and

Undiknas/University of National Education

conducted a Focus Group Discussion/FGD followed

by a survey on political parties related to the

formation of political party clinics in Denpasar City.

The FGDs, accompanied by a survey, were

unexpectedly negative, means that social and political

organisations such as military, political parties and

those bureaucracy as Mietzner (2008) proclaim they

undermine their own professionalism, functional

effectiveness and internal coherence, and obstruct

Indonesia's process of democratic consolidation.

FGD results indicated that the general view of the

public regarding political parties has been declared as

not transparent and accountable, was denied by FGD

participants from two political parties cadres who

describing their party as transparent, accountable and

not using political dowry.

Academics focus of attention in this research tend

to seek for the future existence of a political party

clinic in a sense of political parties to be transparently

and accountably managed. According to the parties

cadre presence in the FGD, it has been done during

the internal meeting of political parties. From their

point of view, that way is enough to run transparency

and accountability. While at this moment, the general

public wants more published financial report, a clear

working program with operational guidelines that

take the interests of the people. Political cadres see no

such interest in publications nor to form public

perception on what are transparency and

accountability of political parties mean for public.

According to the cadres presented, all these

functions have been running well. However, some of

them stated that there are still political parties that

have not performed these functions well. The collapse

on the institutional function of the Political Parties

having impacts in all directions has been rejected in

this focus group discussion. According to their

cadres, the demise of these functions is more due to

the current regulatory rules related to the problems in

the elections. Regulations that allow free fighting

systems such as those that are currently running make

political parties difficult to perform their functions

well. Thus, for them the greatest error that exists

today correlate to the system of regulation that

governs the political party in the election process.

Zuryani, N., Azhar, M. and Erviantono, T.

Setting Up a Center for the Study of Political Parties and Local Government - Can We Work Together?.

In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Sociology Education (ICSE 2017) - Volume 2, pages 5-9

ISBN: 978-989-758-316-2

2 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

BASED ON DATA

The question is why since the beginning neither the

political parties cadres play fair election nor their

members sitting in the chamber and parliament trying

to improve the condition. So that changes in the

composition of seats acquired in the 2009 and 2014

elections in Bali can also be the material for analyzing

the expected lacking of quality among cadres. Seats

available were 55 as remain the same from 2009 to

2014 for DPRD/Bali province (all districts and a city

of Denpasar).

The number of seats located for 2014 election has

changed in Badung, Tabanan, Buleleng, Karangasem

and Gianyar. Buleleng on the other hand got 2 more

seats in comparison to previous election and also one

additional seat for Karangasem. However, each of

Badung, Tabanan, and Gianyar electoral districts get

one seat less. Before 2014 election time, some mass

organisations from Buleleng (affiliated as

Buldog/Buleleng dogen) and Karangasem tried with

all means to elect their cadres as winners.

Table 1: Dapil/electoral districts and Parliamentary

(DPRD) Seats Available for Bali Province in 2014

Source: KPU Province Bali, 2014.

The KPU data in table 1 presentation above is

aiming for justifying that as soon the available seats

released in each Dapil, then hundreds of cadres may

run for wining. Despite their lack of political

integrity, nor they have political will to educate

themselves as Mietzner (2008) said even in the era of

Suharto (New Order) political party is weakened by

bureaucratic institution through authoritarian rule,

pressure of economic interest and corruption attitude.

Furthermore, in Post Suharto era, political party

condition did not go far. The attitude of political party

actors tend to enrich themselves as the accumulation

of political capital and still collaborate with

bureaucrat (executive).

3 DATA FINDINGS

FGD carried out earlier than the survey activities add

to the strong argumentation that shows political party

has not changed. Political parties in Indonesia in

general from time to time, since the regime of the new

order era until the era of reform at present cannot

change themselves, thus allowing themselves to be

hijacked by the power of the political oligarchic elites

to come to power and treat the political party as their

own.

Regardless of these research team findings,

another failure is the inconsistency in showing

identity of political cadre as a fighter of public

interest. Political parties are always among the

interests of desires to continue to stand up as an

opposition or driven to rotate the direction and find

shelter under the armpits of the ruling regime. So that

the Political Parties cannot be independent and

always be under and intervened by the executive.

As further elaborated by Mietzner (2008) that the

political parties, on the other hand, had been

institutionally weakened by 40 years of authoritarian

rule, making them vulnerable to external pressure,

economic interests and corruption. In addition, the

decision of President Habibie in June 1998 to lift all

restrictions immediately on the establishment of

political parties created by political actors, forcing

them to raise funds quickly to create their own parties.

The bureaucracy, for its part, had a long tradition

of financing itself through huge numbers of off

budget accounts, filled with monies derived from

political patrons, entrepreneurs and corrupt practices.

In short, the deeply entrenched habit of illicit fund-

raising in the military, the parties and the bureaucracy

posed a serious challenge to Indonesia's post-

authoritarian governments, with each of these three

actors playing an important role in determining the

success or failure of the democratic transitions.

It can be understood as well that the political

party's unwillingness to attempt the establishment of

the Clinic of political parties and the failure of the

party to reform itself because it is more to the question

of whether this will benefit them or not. As it is

commonly known the nature of political parties will

pursue power and even accumulate power as much as

possible. Such testimony can be felt in the

phenomenon of the presence of political parties in

various aspects of power. The phenomenon or more

precisely we call this "political party octopus" as we

almost find from all the joints of the nation's life. Any

Dapil and DPRD Kab/Kota in 2014 based on

SK KPU No.109/Kpts/KPU/year 2013

Dapil Seats

Bali 1 Denpasa

Bali 2 Badun

Bali 3 Tabanan 6

Bali 4 Jembrana 4

Bali 5 Buleleng 12

Bali 6 Bangli 3

Bali 7 Karangasem 7

Bali 8 Klungkung 3

Bali 9 Gianyar 6

9 55

ICSE 2017 - 2nd International Conference on Sociology Education

follow-up cannot be separated from the interference

of political parties. Octopus figure of Political parties

aims at getting into the niche of the nation's life, as

seen by several attempt to weaken the KPK (Komisi

Pemberantasan Korupsi/Eradication Commission of

Corruption) by Political party who disrupt the

bureaucratic system via its ‘hak angket/parliament

enquire’.

3.1 Survey Results

Referring to the result of the survey by the research

team, after the validity test and the reliability of the

instrument passed in the initial model of SEM (Figure

1) there is a score value that varies after the items of

the question are combined. This survey analysis

proceeds to the second part of SEM/ Structural

Equation Modeling that is the measurement model

(Figure 2) to describe the variables of regulation and

change financial statements as a reflection of the

latent variables of democracy and the need for clinic

of Political Parties.

In the following initial SEM analysis, the

variables shown are represented as:

Regulation is the average scores of questions in

var A which covering score (1 to 5) in understanding

of the rules of the game (Institution) and regulation of

information for the public.

Democracy is a composite of the average score in

var B which covering score (1 to 5) Party's bargaining

position and understanding of the positions of parties

(democracy).

Finance is a combination of the average score in

var C which covering score (1 to 5) in understanding

of financial governance and Financial Report.

Clinic of Political Parties is the level of clinical

importance of political parties in var D which

covering score (1 to 5) negative to positive level of

need for political parties clinic for all 61 respondents.

Figure 1: Initial model of SEM.

Diagram above shows the average coefficient of

a combined score of questions around regulation

(variable A) for setting up a clinic for political parties

(variable D) is very significant (P< 0,01) to reject the

null hypothesis that is political parties don’t need a

clinic that is formed by three universities in Denpasar.

Meanwhile a combined score of regulation (variable

A) with report score and financial management

(variable C) brings out P count= 0, 11 that means

there is significance connection to receive a working

hypothesis. Significant coefficient P> 0,01 receives

working hypothesis that is political parties need a

clinic on a combined score of the change of financial

report (variable C) with political parties shows P

count= 0,41.

Direct connection of regulation (variable A) with

finance (variable B) brings out P count = 0,11 that

means a weak connection. SEM analysis for a

combined score of regulation (variable A) to a

combined score of democracy (variable B) shows P

count = 0,05 with negative P alpha value, example -

0.19 indicates a significant rejection on the null

hypothesis that the research said that the political

parties don’t need a clinic. The value of P < 0.01 with

negative alpha~ (030) the average of a combined

score of regulation (variable A), finance (variable B)

and democracy (variable B) as the part of

measurement model to set up a clinic for political

parties (variable D) the significant coefficient has

rejected the null hypothesis. Variable B is the average

score combination of the answers of questions around

democracy with count score of significant coefficient

of a clinic for political parties is very low (p< 0.01)

that rejects the need of a clinic of political parties.

Maybe the democracy variable in the questionnaire

becomes the most difficult question for political party

cadres who become the respondents of this research.

The result of survey to 61 respondents that is the

political party cadres in Denpasar aims to answer the

persistence of self-determination principle which

implies the political party cadres involved in the

survey. From 61 respondents, in questionnaire

number 25, that is the opened question of the political

party cadres perception about the importance/need of

a clinic od political parties, fifteen respondents said it

is very needed, sixteen respondents said it is needed

and other thirty respondents stated it is not needed or

they don’t have idea. This survey answers the worries

of researchers from three universities in Denpasar on

the implementation of FGD initiated with Association

of Political Sciences Indonesia/AIPI branch Bali on

20 April 2017. Therefore, we run another

measurement model to get an insight of the data.

Setting Up a Center for the Study of Political Parties and Local Government - Can We Work Together?

Figure 2: Measurement model.

The above model shows that the financial

variables do not have direct influence on the

importance of political parties clinic, but must be

through democracy variable (democracy variable is

the mediator variable between the financial variables

to the political party clinic). While SEM analysis for

the combined score of regulation (var A) to the

combined score of democracy (var B) shows that

count alpha = 0.065 with value of alpha negative

coefficients, value of -0.19 indicate a significant

rejection. It shows that variable B (democracy)

becomes a mediator variable.

As a variable mediator, variable B (democracy)

has a negative coefficient with variable A

(regulation). This shows that the high score of

variable A reduces the score of variable B. This can

be understood that given the relation of variable A to

the level of clinical needs of the party is

unidirectional. The opposite relationship occurs in

variable C (financial governance and financial

reporting) that has a positive coefficient to variable B

(democracy), it shows that the higher the score of

variable C, the higher the weight of variable B

(democracy).

The above measurement model explains the

relationship between variables as follows:

 Variable A (regulation of institutions and

information to the public) has a significant and

tighter relationship to the level of clinical needs

of political parties

 Variable B (democracy) has a significant direct

relationship to the level of party clinical needs,

but not in the same direction. This means that

the higher the variable B score, the more

reduced the level of clinical needs of the party

 Variable C (governance finance and party

financial reporting) does not have a direct

relationship to the level of clinical needs of

political parties, but must be through variable B

(democracy) as a mediator variable, these two

variables have direct relationship.

 Variable D (the need of political parties clinic),

can be summarized as not yet necessary. Go

back to raw data of survey, 31 respondents

wrote that political parties clinic is necessary

while 30 cadres as respondents wrote either

unecessary or do not know.

4 CONCLUSIONS

In summary, there are communication problems that

are less good, so in preparing clinic for political

parties must include all political parties elites as

without those elites, political party clinic will not

have much impact for non-elitist cadres in each

political parties. More effective communication is

needed in order to involve more party

members/cadres in the decision-making process, so

that party clinics can be perceived as beneficial to all

members of Political Parties. Perhaps the variable of

democracy in the questionnaire becomes the most

difficult questions posed for the cadres of Political

Parties who become the respondents of this research.

Their back ground, as Hadiz (2010: 29) explained on

Gede Winasa as a former bupati/governor of

Jembarana was rather as a new local strongman so as

Suryawan (2013) see it as an interconnection within

elites. Similar to Schiller (2009: 157) assertion on

local majorities of cadres (in this case Baladika Bali,

Laskar Bali and Pemuda Bali Bersatu so as Buldog

and other small mass organizations in Bali) as

Nugraha et all, also point out the strength of those

political cadres principle of wanting to win, only

winning the power. They do whatever they can do to

impress the community but most of people get scared

(Purnama, Sunu and Sanjaya, 2014, Sukma, 2013 and

Suryawan, 2013) if they are winning.

The team of research sees the reluctant of political

cadres to increase their quality as their own symptom

of those political parties cadres involved in the

survey. They are more likely to be opportunists.

Therefore, it is time for three universities in Denpasar

to work together and form a center for political parties

and local government research as suggested by

Aminnudin (2017) from CIPR (Consortium of

Indonesian Political Research). Also Gadjah Mada

University had the idea of running the clinic of

political parties but they found similar problem like

in Bali. This evidence based research is enough to

strengthen the idea of setting up a center for the study

of political parties and local governments in

Denpasar.

ICSE 2017 - 2nd International Conference on Sociology Education

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We thank to the parties that support the writing of

“Political Parties Accountability” text book mainly

Ditbinlitabmas and Kemeristek Dikti through LPPM

as well to all the leaders of Udayana University. They

are providing research funds for excellent writing of

text books and internship program for FISIP students

(grant of Competence/Hibah berbasis Kompetensi)

for almost three years. Our sincere thanks also go to

pak Faishal Aminudin for supporting the idea of the

center through CIPR (Consortium of Indonesian

Political Research). Also to the students who were

participated from FISIP Udayana University and to

all social and political institutions in Denpasar. There

are names of lecturers from other universities that

also stick to make our book published that cannot be

mentioned one by one, thank you as well as apologize

for this collaboration is still far from perfect.

REFERENCES

Hadiz, V.R 2010. Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian

Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective. California:

Standford University Press.

Mietzner, M. 2008. Soldiers, Parties and Bureaucrats: illicit

fundraising in Contemporary Indonesia. South East

Asia Research, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 225-254

Nugraha, et al. 2016. Dinamika Organisasi

Kemasyarakatan di Kota Denpasar. Jurnal Humanis,

Fakultas Ilmu Budaya Unud. Volume 16, No.1.

Purnama, C., Sunu, I., Sanjaya D. B. 2014. Fungsi, Hak,

dan Kewajiban Organisasi Kemasyarakatan Dalam

Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Pada Reformasi (Studi

Kasus Pada Ormas Baladika Bali di Desa Pakraman

Peguyangan). Jurnal Jurusan Pendidikan PKn.

Volume 2, No.1.

Schiller, J. 2009. Electing District Heads in Indonesia,

Democratic Deepening or Elite Entrenchment?. In Erb,

M and P. Sulistiyanto (eds.) Deepening Democracy in

Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders

(Pilkada) (pp. 147-173), Singapore: ISEAS.

Sukma, I.P.W. 2013. Eksistensi Organisasi

Kemasyarakatan (Ormas) Dalam Partai Politik di

Kecamatan Sukawati. Jurnal Jurusan Pendidikan PKn.

Volume 1, No.1.

Suryawan, I. N. 2012. Sisi dibalik Bali Politik Identitas

Kekerasan dan Interkoneksi Global. Denpasar:

Udayana University Press.

Setting Up a Center for the Study of Political Parties and Local Government - Can We Work Together?