New Computing Model for Securing Mobile Agents in IP Networks
Jean Tajer, Mo Adda and Benjamin Aziz
School of Computing, Portsmouth University, U.K.
Keywords: Mobile Agent, Encryption, Trusted Nodes, Integrity, Performance Analysis.
Abstract: This paper deals with the prevention of security issues on mobile agents in IP Networks. We propose a new
security computing model based on trusted server to avert Eavesdropping and Alternation attacks. The new
protocol will be implemented using IBM mobile agent platform, Aglet. The new framework consists of
components that provide support to the mobile agent while it is touring hosts in the agent space. It also protects
the confidentiality and integrity of parts of the mobile agent. We conduct performance analysis over different
types of mobile agents over a real IP Traces under malicious actions.
1 INTRODUCTION
Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are designed using
independent, autonomous known as agents which can
perform their tasks independently or collectively in
different types of environments. The agents can be
considered as processes with the ability to perform an
action on the environment on behalf of user. These
systems allow distribution of complex tasks amongst
agents. One of the basic properties of multi-agent
system is its ability of self-organization which makes
it utterly desirable for autonomous and flexible
system designs such as graphical applications,
logistics, transportation, search engines, network
management etc .
Mobile Agent Systems can be divided based into
programming language by which they are developed
and use: Java and non-Java based. Around 85% of
Mobile Agent systems available today are built using
Java, due to its inherent support to Mobile Agent
programming.
Mobile Agents are becoming a focus of modern
research because of their applications in distributed
systems which are replacing traditional client-server
architectures rapidly. However, one of the key
concerns in practical implementation of Mobile
Agent is the lack of protection against any threats.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Related work is provided in section 2. Section 3
provides the security issues that a Mobile Agent can
counter while visiting another host in the network.
The proposed approach design is explained in section
4. In section 5, we present our experimental works
and check the capability, reaction and performance of
the mobile agents based on the developed design.
Finally in section 6, we present the conclusion and
our future work.
2 RELATED WORKS
Several researches have been conducted over mobile
Agents.
Some Articles showed what exactly it is makes
Java such a powerful tool for mobile agent
development, also it highlighted some shortcomings
in Java language systems that have implications for
the conceptual design and use of Java-based mobile
agent systems.
Other studies concentrate their work on the fault
tolerance techniques in mobile agents, network
management applications based on mobile agent
technologies and how the fault tolerance techniques
can improve their performance.
Other articles worked on an agent-based
intelligent mobile assistant for supporting users prior
to and during the execution of their tasks.
In addition, some works have been performed to
integrate the mobile agents with the e-commerce.
Some technical relevant issues are well presented.
Some researches concentrated their work on
security concerns (i.e masquerading, denial of
service, unauthorized access and repudiation) of
mobile agents and how to protect them by several
techniques like for example providing logical
framework designed to support large-scale
232
Tajer, J., Adda, M. and Aziz, B.
New Computing Model for Securing Mobile Agents in IP Networks.
DOI: 10.5220/0006283502320238
In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Internet of Things, Big Data and Security (IoTBDS 2017), pages 232-238
ISBN: 978-989-758-245-5
Copyright © 2017 by SCITEPRESS – Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved

heterogeneous mobile agent applications, on safe
code interpretation, digital signatures, path histories,
State Appraisal and Proof-Carrying Code (PCC).
In this paper, we will provide a brief about the
security threats that a mobile agent can counter while
hosting other hosts in the network. A new approach
for preventing against these attacks will be proposed
based on trusted server. It consists of components that
provide support to the mobile agent to secure its
mission in the agent space. It also protects the
confidentiality and integrity of parts of the mobile
agent. We will conduct performance analysis over a
real IP Traces integrated with these attacks
3 SECURITY ISSUES AND
COUNTERMEASURES
Security is one of the key factors of MAS. In fact, a
MA is one of the potential threats to computer
systems and vice versa, from the host system to the
MAS itself. In this part, we will talk about the main
security issues related to MAS.
The security threats for MASs could be divided as
follows:
• Agent Protection: A remote host can threaten
an agent; for example an untrusted host could
execute an agent, observe its data and make
some changes to them. Moreover, the threat
could be from another agent in the domain,
agent to agent threaten. Also unauthorized third
parties threaten an agent. Through the agents
communications a malicious entity may
captures these messages and alter them.
• Host protection: An arriving malicious agent
might threaten a host, the agent can access
other data and files on the local host and might
induce a serious damage. The other threat of
the host is from unauthorized third parties; it is
possible to send a host many spam agents that
stress the host and take all its available
processing power.
• Network protection: Incoming malicious
agents threaten the network; in this case, the
agents can clone themselves and flood the
network with an excessive number of agents.
Possible attack here is called denial of service
attack (DOS).
There are many security services that can be used
for securing the agents systems, for example;
authentication, integrity, confidentiality and
authorization.
In case of the authentication, the host needs to know
the sender of the delivered agent. The agent
authentication process includes verifying the entity
that programmed the agent and also verifying the
entity that dispatched it to the host. Basically, the
agent and the host need to know with whom they are
talking and dealing with, here the public-key
encryption or passwords can be used.
For integrity, checking the integrity of the agents is
a technique that makes sure no one has made any
changes to the agents, the agents travelling form on
host to another, and communicates and exchanges
their data with other hosts and other agents. In this
case, we need to make sure that the agents have not
been tampered with in relation to their state, code or
data. Moreover, the agents could carry different types
of data, for example some private data. These data
should only be readable from a specific host or
agents. This technique is very important to avoid an
eavesdropping threat.
The last service which helps to protect the agents
and the hosts is authorization; the incoming agents
should have a specific right to access the host
information, so different agents have different
authority, to protect the hosts and also to protect
themselves.
4 NEW PROPOSED APPROACH
Our proposed countermeasure is based on trust. A
mobile agent can host either blind folded, based on
policy enforcement, or based on control and
punishment.
A blind folded is the Mobile Agent which “simply
need to trust its entertaining host”. The host is free to
do whatever it wants while giving services to the
Mobile Agent. But it is trusted that it neither has
malicious behaviour nor collaborate with other
hostile hosts that perform some bad actions on the
agent.
Policy enforcement is another trust. In this case, the
Mobile Agent and the host have a prior contractual
relationship in the form of policy. Both parties need
to sign for their rights and obligations.
The last trust is control and punishment. There is no
needed policy to be signed between the two parties as
well as there is no contract signed. The trust assumes
that hosts are not by nature malicious and give them
a chance to behave accordingly. But it still uses
control mechanism to punish the host if found guilty
of misbehaviours.
Our solution is a combination of policy
enforcement and on control and punishment.
The below section outlines the guidelines used to
develop the countermeasure.
New Computing Model for Securing Mobile Agents in IP Networks
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4.1 Proposed Countermeasure
Mobile Agents are subjected to any type of attacks
because they are a lonely figure once sent to the agent
space. Hence, the proposition modifies the computing
model of the mobile computation in order to address
hostile host threats.
Figure 1 shows an overview of the mobile
computing model. It is mandatory that the home or
owner of the Mobile Agent has a public-private key
pair at its disposal, the public key is published to the
world so that the Mobile Agent could retrieve this key
while it is visiting hosts. These keys are used by the
security protocol to protect the confidentiality and the
integrity of parts of the Mobile Agent.
Figure 1: Proposed new model.
The proposal modifies the way by which the
mobile computation is done. The arrows dictate that,
the Mobile Agent first goes to the trusted node,
creates a temporary storage element called active
storage element (ASE), then moves to the first host to
be visited. It goes there, sends the information it has
retrieved from the corresponding host to be stored
temporarily at ASE. The trusted node accepts the
information and stores it. Each Mobile Agent that has
a trust relationship with this node does the same,
creates its own ASE at the trusted node and uses it to
store the partial information it retrieves from each
hosts. At the end, the Mobile Agent returns back to
the trusted node and asks the corresponding ASE to
hand it over the results it has been accumulating so
far, carry back the result to its home as if it has been
doing the job alone.
It is assumed that the agent space is divided into
regions, within each region a node called trusted
server is setup. These servers provide various services
to the Mobile Agent while the agent is in the agent
space. The Mobile Agent supported by these trusted
nodes should be able to avert some of the evil acts
from hostile hosts. The division of the agent space
into regions is analogous to the cells in the mobile
communication systems.
Nowadays, it is familiar to introduce trusted
server setup in a network handled by a third party.
Plenty of servers deployed in the internet word uses a
trusted server like Web servers, mail servers and
Domain Name Services (DNS) servers. Trusted
servers do not have the right to modify the Mobile
Agent’s content, as web servers do not modify the
web page they host. But here the security protocol
provides further protection to the Mobile Agent
content at the trusted server. It is such a similar
concept that the proposition wants to exploit. The
nodes and the trusted servers could be set up, in a
similar style as nodes of root Web servers, by the
Mobile Agent user community.
In sections to follow, we will take a look at the
main components of the proposed countermeasure
approach and how should the components interact
according to the security protocol.
4.2 Components of the Proposed
Countermeasure
Figure 1 shows the overall view of the proposal shows
that the countermeasure constitutes various
components at various degree of multiplicity. Below
is the component of our proposed approach:
 Home of the Mobile Agent
 Mobile Agent (MA)
 Trusted Node
 Active Storage Element
 Home
4.2.1 Home of the Mobile Agent
It is the computer running Mobile Agent platform and
has sent the Mobile Agent to carry out a task on its
behalf. It can also be defined as a computer running a
Mobile Agent based distributed application. The
Mobile Agent after completing its task will return to
the home carrying the result.
4.2.2 Mobile Agent
It is a program that migrates from one node to another
node in a computer network to accomplish a given
task.
4.2.3 Active Storage Element
It is a temporary storage element created by each
Mobile Agent, at the trusted server. It actively
participates in the process of temporary information
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storage and handing over of all the information to the
Mobile Agent.
4.2.4 Host
It is a computer in the agent space running Mobile
Agent platform and entertains any visiting Mobile
Agent which would like to gather information from it.
This component is at the center of the controversy,
which could be hostile. The host provides all the
necessary resources for the agent to execute there.
4.3 Security Protocol
A security protocol defines how components of the
system (Home, Trusted Nodes and Active Storage
Element) should interact with each other as well as
what are the necessary tasks need to be performed at
each level in order to secure the network from any
malicious actions.
The security protocol is free to take or alter any
action on the Mobile Agent. While the Mobile Agent
is travelling between its home and trusted nodes the
usual composition is deemed. But when the agent is
visiting different nodes, it is assumed to be composed
of only the two out of the three components that is
usually associated with: code and state, to give hostile
hosts no chance of disclosure of information collected
from previous hosts.
Another function of the security protocol is to
develop a mechanism that lets the user of the Mobile
Agent to digitally sign the list of destinations it wants
the Mobile Agent to visit. After creating the list of
destination, it digitally signs the destination object
using its private key, then the destination object is
passed down to the Mobile Agent. The Mobile Agent,
upon its arrival at each host in the network, verifies
that it has a valid copy of the destination object before
putting that object into use. By this, the Mobile Agent
avoids the possibility that it would be directed to visit
other hosts by altering the list of paths it has carried
from its home, as any malicious host could not forged
the digitally signed destination object.
We can find below the security protocol in action
in every step in the agent step. It is assumed that, the
home node has a public-private key pair (HPubK-
HPrvK).The public key could be retrieved by the
hosts from relevant authorities.
4.3.1 At Home
The user of the MAS specifies the address of the list
of hosts that will visit using the Agent Based
Application (ABA).
The ABA takes the list and forms a destination
object. The destination object contains the list of hosts
to be visited, the address of the trusted server (TS) and
the home. The ABA then digitally signs the
destination object and passes it to the MAS. The MAS
accepts the signed object. By using HPubK, the MAS
verifies that it has the right un-signed destination
object from which the address of the next node to be
visited is determined and dispatches itself to that
node, as pointed out in the previous section it goes
first to the Trusted Node, Figure 2.
Figure 2: Proposed model at home.
4.3.2 At Trusted Server
The MAS arrives at the TS. It creates its own Active
Storage Element (ASE). The MAS passes down the
necessary information to the ASE so it can
communicate with it. The MAS retrieves the public
key of the home, HPubK. Using this key, the MAS
un-signs the digitally signed destination object and
determines the next node to be visited. In this case, it
is the first host in the list and the MA Dispatches itself
to that node, Figure. 3.
Figure 3: Proposed model at Trusted Server.
4.3.3 At Trusted Server, After the Reach of
the Nth Host
The MAS arrives at the TS. It asks the corresponding
ASE to hand it the information it has been
accumulating (a pair of HPubK(SymK_i) and
SymK_i(Info_i) retrieved from each host), and takes
these information. After un-signing its destination
New Computing Model for Securing Mobile Agents in IP Networks
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object, it looks for the address of the next node to be
visited. In this case for sure it is the home node and
the MAS dispatches itself to its home, Figure 4.
Figure 4: Proposed Model at Trusted Server, after the reach
of the Nth Host.
4.3.4 At Home
The MAS arrives back at home after completing its
mission. The MAS contains a pair of encrypted
information. The MAS hands the overall information
to the ABA. For each pair of encrypted information
retrieved from each host, the ABA does the
following:
- First, using its private key (HPrvK) to
decrypt the encrypted symmetric key,
HPubK (SymK_i) ,
- Second, using the decrypted symmetric
key, SymK_i, it decrypts the
information which is encrypted using
the same key, SymK_i (Info_i),
The ABA does the same process for each pair of
information retrieved from every host the agent goes
to collect information. At last the ABA displays the
result to the user, Info_i.
4.4 Security Protocol Summary for N
Hosts
You can find below a summary for the security
protocol:
 N hosts addresses digitally signed by the home
node.
 One ASE created at TS.
 N symmetric random keys generated at each
host.
 N information retrieved will be encrypted by the
corresponding N symmetric keys.
 The N symmetric keys will be encrypted by the
public key (RSA) of the home.
 The encrypted N information and encrypted keys
stored at the ASE.
 Decryption at home node and displaying the
plain text result to the user.
5 EXPERIMENTALS RESULTS
In this section, we present the result of the
implementation of the security policy as well as the
result of the performance comparison between
different types of mobile agents.
The following techniques and tools are used: Two
workstations with 8 GB and 768 MB of RAM
respectively, which run Windows Server 2003 and a
number of Mobile Agents (Proposed MA, DS MA
and Normal MA) as described below, are used.
 Normal Mobile Agent (Normal MA): An Agent
that executes mobile computation in the usual
way
 Proposed Mobile Agent (Proposed MA): A
Mobile Agent which is directed by the security
protocol mentioned in section 4.
 Digitally Signed Mobile Agent (DSMA): A
Mobile Agent that supports digital signing of
the destination object while still performing
computation.
We have considered the above describe mobile
agents will have to execute the similar path.
To measure the capability of the proposal towards
eavesdropping threat, a test environment is set up
using the above mentioned computers as shown in
Figure 5. Computer A is considered to act as trusted
server (TS) and computer B runs many host nodes
simulated through various port numbers as well as the
home node in a virtualized mode. Wireshark Network
Packet Analyzer will be running regularly over
computer A. its job is to capture, sniff packets in a
network and store them.
Figure 5: Experimental Lab.
The Figure 6 shows analysis of the packet captured
while the Normal MA and DS MA are in execution.
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236

As it is shown, in either cases it is possible to
eavesdrop what information is retrieved and
exchanged at each host: “OS Architecture: x86; OS
Version: 5.2”.
Figure 6: Captured packet analysis for DS MA and normal
MA.
Figure 7 shows analysis of the captured packet
while the Proposed MA is in operation. As it can be
seen from the figure, unlike the above case since the
information is sent to the TS in encrypted form, it is
not possible to look into its content. Hence, the
security protocol provides the required
confidentiality of the information while it is being
stored at ASE.
Figure 7: Captured packet analysis for Proposed MA.
A different type of attacks is performed: Alteration
threat. The similar test environment as in the above
case is used, except that all of the nodes are simulated
in computer.
A malicious node is interfering on a different port
number in the Computer B. This node is planned to
behave maliciously towards the Proposed MA; its
goal is to supply a wrong public key to the MA as it
arrives there and is in the process of un-signing its
digitally signed destination object. But fortunately the
MA cannot un-sign the signed object using the public
key just supplied. This is because the destination
object is signed by the private key of the home node,
not by a private key which corresponds to the public
key supplied by the hostile node. Therefore, any
attempt of alteration of destination object will be
detected by the MA.
Performance Comparison:
To measure the performance of every mobile agents
(Normal, DS, Proposed MA) a similar test
environment as above is used. Their performance is
compared in terms of their average turnaround time,
measured in milliseconds (ms).
This performance parameter is the average time in
milliseconds (ms) each Mobile Agent requires to do
the job, after dispatched till it returns and handovers
the result to the user.
As expected DS Mobile Agent takes in between of
the two. Comparing the execution time of the Normal
MA with the Proposed MA, the Proposed MA needs
approximately 5x more time as shown in Figure 8.
This substantial amount of time is a price to pay to
achieve the corresponding security: Generation of the
keys, encryption of partial information, verification
of destination object at each visited host and at last
collecting the results back to the Mobile Agent from
the TS all add up to form a big turnaround time.
Figure 8: Performance Comparison Between Different
Types of Mobile Agents.
Comparing the performance time between DS
MA and Proposed MA, the DS MA needs less time.
This is due to the fact that DS MA does not carry out
some of the functions the Proposed MA performs
like: Generation of keys, Encryption. It takes time
since it verifies that the destination object is valid
copy on its arrival at each and every host.
Figure 9 compares the execution time for all
Mobile Agent cases. As the number of nodes to be
visited is steadily increased, we notice that the
turnaround time increases. This is tribute to the fact
that there are more jobs to be done.
Figure 9: Performance time trend as the number of nodes
visited increases.
New Computing Model for Securing Mobile Agents in IP Networks
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6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a new framework based on
trusted server and developed by IBM platform Aglet
to prevent security issues over mobile agents. The
proposed approach evaluated how different types of
mobile agents can react based on real traces with
attacks. Our experimental results show that the
proposal mobile agent needs approximately 4x more
time than a normal agent to execute its job. This is
cause of the Generation of the keys, encryption of
partial information, verification of destination object
at each visited host and at last collecting the results
back to the Mobile Agent from the TS all add up to
form a big turnaround time. Indeed, we compared the
execution time for all Mobile Agent cases. As the
number of nodes to be visited is increased, we notice
that the turnaround time increases. This is tribute to
the fact that there are more jobs to be done.
In our future work, we will focus on detecting
flooding attacks over mobile agents. We will propose
a new framework for the detection of flooding attacks
by integrating Power Divergence over Sketch data
structure. The performance of the proposed
framework is investigated in terms of detection
probability and false alarm ratio.
We also intend to provide a method for reducing the
amount of monitoring data on high speed networks,
and to analyze the impact of sampling on the
precision of this divergence measure.
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