
information barriers or high costs existing in 
obtaining the internal information of an enterprise, 
the external capital market can not conduct 
continuous fine-tuning to the company based on the 
market conditions, while the internal capital market 
is superior in the authenticity, timeliness and 
accuracy of the information, and has an advantage on 
the adaptability to the market environment 
(Williamson, 1975). Myers and Majluf (1984), Stein 
(1997)  also provides the same evidences.  
Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994) built a 
model on the basis of Grossman and Hart ownership 
theory. They said that in the internal capital market, 
corporate headquarters (the investor) is the direct 
owner of the assets of divisions that utilize funds, and 
has residual control rights, while the investors of the 
external capital markets are not the direct owner of 
those assets. Due to this essential difference, the 
enterprise messaging, monitoring and incentives 
produce different results between internal capital 
markets and external capital markets. In the internal 
capital markets, the corporate headquarters with the 
residual control rights can better supervise and 
motivate departmental managers. 
When there is information asymmetry between 
external investors and company management about 
the company assets value and expected return on 
investment projects, the securities issued by high-
quality companies to finance investment projects 
may be undervalued, because companies may not 
obtain sufficient funds at a reasonable cost, they have 
to give up some projects with a positive net present 
value (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . Stulz (1990)  
pointed out that since the creation of a strong internal 
capital markets in diversified companies, it will 
effectively solve the problem of insufficient 
investment, so diversified business operations than 
single enterprises can make greater use of the 
investment opportunities that present value is 
positive, which will enhance corporate value. 
2.2  The Theoretical Basis for the 
Ineffective Internal Capital Market 
Due to the agency problem, influence costs and 
abuse of free cash flow, the internal capital market is 
inefficient or even ineffective in capital allocation. 
Scharfstein and Stein (2000)believed a good 
investment project suffers relative under-investment 
and a poor investment project enjoys over-
investment. With regard to the causes of "Company 
socialism", Scharfstein and Stein (2000) continued to 
analyze and found that this was due to the department 
manager's rent-seeking behavior. Rajan, etc. (2000)  
   
study have also reached the similar conclusion. 
Managers have the tendency of over-investment 
with the remaining cash flows (Jensen, 1986, 1993), 
and the organizational structure of large enterprise 
provides more cash flow for managers, which thus 
easily leads to over-investment. Free cash flow 
theory
  suggests that due to the temptation of a 
number of factors, entrepreneurs prefer to invest in 
the project that would not increase shareholder 
wealth as opposed to paying  the dividend, such as 
the money for its own on-the-job
  consumption 
(purchase of commercial aircraft), or the 
consumption for honor(for social contributions, etc.). 
2.3  China's External Capital Market 
Efficiency and the Empirical 
Evidences 
In China, the external capital market is inefficient, 
which has been proved by a large number of research 
literature. The first is the low efficiency of the 
banking system. Lu Jianxin(2008) argued that the 
bank-led financing model prevails in China, but for 
quite a long time, China's banking resource allocation 
is based upon the administrative relations. As the 
backbone of the banking system, state-owned 
commercial banks inject their credit facilities into the 
state economy whose economic contribution rate is 
not high. As a result, input and output are 
significantly mismatched, funding does not flow into 
sectors of high efficiency, and the allocation of 
resources is markedly ineffective. Second, the 
efficiency of China's stock market is rather low. Yu 
Qiao (1994) , Wu Shinong(1996), Chen Xiaoyue, et 
al (1997), Han Liyan and Cai Hongyan (2002), 
Zhang Bing and Li Xiaoming (2003), and Zeng 
Yamin (2004) have used different methods to study 
the stock market efficiency and reached the 
conclusions that China's stock market is ineffective 
or inefficient. 
3 EVALUATION MODEL 
SELECTION OF INTERNAL 
CAPITAL MARKET 
EFFICIENCY AND 
EVALUATION METHODS 
3.1  Internal Capital Market Efficiency 
Evaluation Model Selection 
Measurement methods of internal capital market  
   
IS INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKET OF CHINA LISTED COMPANIES EFFICIENT? - Empirical Evidences from Listed
Companies which Have Multiple Divisions in H-stock
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