RESEARCH ON THE BAYESIAN LEARNING MODEL FOR
SELECTING ARGUMENTS ON ARGUMENTATION-BASED
NEGOTIATION OF AGENT
Guorui Jiang, Xiaoyu Hu and Xiuzhen Feng
School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Technology
No. 100 Pingleyuan, Chaoyang District, Beijing, P.R. China
Keywords: Argumentation-based negotiation, Agent, Selecting arguments, Bayesian learning.
Abstract: In the Argumentation-based negotiation of agent, it is important to enhance the agent’s ability according to
the environment, which would improve the argumentation efficiency significantly. Introducing Bayesian
learning model to select arguments in Argumentation-based negotiation, the agent is able to learn and adjust
itself according to a dynamic environment. This helps in making more rational and scientific choice for
advancing efficiency of argumentation, when it is facing a variety of options for sending arguments. Finally,
an example was presented for showing the rationality and validity of the model.
1 INTRODUCTION
As a widespread and important phenomenon in the
society, negotiation not only brings opposition to all
parties as they hold differences, but also makes them
dependent on each other as they all commit
themselves to consistency. With the rapid
development of economic globalization and market
networking, the traditional business negotiation has
been replaced by e-business negotiation because of
the shortcomings on the efficiency and effectiveness.
In order to improve the decision-making of
participants more scientifically and reasonably
during the negotiation, the theory and technology of
agent in Artificial Intelligence have been introduced;
such as Game-theoretic approaches, Heuristic-based
approaches and Argumentation-based approaches
(Rahwan et al., 2003). However, in most game-
theoretic and heuristic models, agents are not
allowed to exchange any additional information
other than what is expressed in the proposal (i.e.
potential agreements or potential deals) itself;
another limitation of the two approaches is they both
assume that agents’ utilities or preferences have
been fixed, which means that one agent cannot
directly influence another agent’s preference model,
or any of its internal mental attitudes (e.g., beliefs,
desires, goals, etc.) when it is generating its own
preference model. Therefore, more and more
researchers are contributing their study on
Argumentation-based negotiation of agent in the
field of e-business negotiation.
The selection of argument is one of the hot topics
on studying Argumentation-based negotiation of
agent. Kraus studied this topic much earlier with all
argument types from the weakest one to the most
aggressive one. The mechanism of selection is that
the agent will first try to use the weakest argument.
If it does not succeed, it will go further with the
following stronger arguments (Kraus et al., 1998); in
this case, we could see that the agent has to face
varied negotiation environments when it was ready
to send an argument. Obviously, the rules proposed
by Kraus can not be universally applied. Recently,
many researches have been focusing on evaluating
the strength of various arguments and making the
final choice with the comparison among all
evaluation results. The representative one is the
evaluation model contributed by Amgoud (Amgoud
et al., 2004; Amgoud et al., 2005). An extended
model in order to select sending argument is
present, which makes the evaluation of strength as a
core of the selection, chooses the certainty level (or
priority level) of the knowledge and goal related to
the argument as the main influencing factors of the
strength; and for the vague and qualitative
characteristics of evaluation of above factors,
introduces some methods of representation and
measurement in fuzzy mathematics; finally, makes
the comprehensive evaluation as the scientific basis
317
Jiang G., Hu X. and Feng X. (2010).
RESEARCH ON THE BAYESIAN LEARNING MODEL FOR SELECTING ARGUMENTS ON ARGUMENTATION-BASED NEGOTIATION OF AGENT.
In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Artificial Intelligence, pages 317-322
DOI: 10.5220/0002727603170322
Copyright
c
SciTePress
for the selection of the argument’s type and content
(Guorui Jiang et al., 2009). However, the values of
the main influencing factors of the arguments’
strength in the whole argumentation interaction are
fixed, and they do not fully take into account the
dynamic of the actual negotiating environment, as
well as how the agent can adapt to its dynamic
environment.
To solve the problem mentioned above, a
representative study is the models of opponent
agents proposed by Carabelea (Carabelea, 2002);
agents can adjust their strategy for argumentation
through building and modifying models of
opponents during and after the negotiation process.
But how to build and modify the opponent’s model
was not specifically explained in the paper. In
addition, we can find in Agent-based negotiation,
through giving agents certain ability to learn, to have
access to more information of opponents’
preferences and the negotiating environment during
the negotiation interaction, you can effectively
improve their self-regulating capacity to the
dynamic environment, so as to achieve the purpose
of improving the efficiency of the negotiations.
Bayesian learning method is common in traditional
e-business negotiation (Zeng et al., 1998), it mainly
focus on learning to the feedback of negotiating
opponent, but the research on its use in
Argumentation-based e-business negotiation is
unusual now. Saha first proposed a Bayesian
network approach to build opponents belief model to
help agent to select a more effective argument.
Unfortunately, the paper only demonstrated the
possibility of the method, but it did not give an
opponent model which can be updated in the true
sense (Saha et al., 2004; Saha et al.,
2005).Vreeswijk and Nielsen also introduced
Bayesian network to generation or comparison of
arguments(Vreeswijk, 2005; Nielsen et al.,
2007).But we can find, these research mostly
focused on traditional social Argumentation-based
negotiation, not the Multi-issue e-business
Argumentation-based negotiation; and the agent’s
belief model (including information about
opponent’s goals and the negotiation environment)
can not be specifically formalized, thus can not
effectively influence the strategy for argumentation
like selection of arguments in negotiation.
Based on the background upwards, in this paper,
we will introduce Bayesian learning to
Argumentation-based negotiation. The agent is
empowered the ability of learning and adjusting
itself according to a dynamic environment, which
helps in making more rational and scientific choice
when it is facing a variety of options for an
argument. In this way, the efficiency of the
argumentation will be improved. At the same time,
in order to be easy understood, we verify the
rationality and validity of the model with calculation
and analysis of an example at the end of the paper.
2 CLASSIFICATION OF THE
ARGUMENTS
2.1 Threat
During a negotiation an agent A can force another
agent B to do α by threatening to do an action β, to
achieve the goal himself. A threat is then made up of
three parts: the knowledge relative to this threat (the
threat itself), the goal that A wants to achieve, and
finally the goal of the threatened agent B (Amgoud
et al., 2004; Amgoud et al., 2005).
Example 1 During an e-business negotiation, the
buyer agent A wants the seller agent B to lower the
price (LowPri) in a proposal, but it was refused. In
this status, A may put forward that it will choose
another seller (ChosAnoSel) as the threat to make B
modify his beliefs and accept the proposal as soon
as possible. And this threat can formally be
expressed as follows:
{},,
t
A
LowPri ChosAnoSel LowPri ChosAnoSel
=
¬ >
2.2 Reward
During a negotiation an agent A can entice another
agent B to do α by offering to do an action β as a
reward, to achieve the goal himself. A reward is then
made up of three parts: the knowledge relative to
this reward (the reward itself), the goal that A wants
to achieve, and finally the goal of the rewarded
agent B (Amgoud et al., 2004; Amgoud et al.,
2005).
Example 2 During an e-business negotiation, the
buyer agent A wants the seller agent B to lower the
price (LowPri) in a proposal, but it was refused. In
this status, A may put forward that it will buy some
other related products (BuyOthPro) from B as the
reward to make B modify his beliefs and accept the
proposal as soon as possible. And this reward can
formally be expressed as follows:
{},,
r
A LowPri BuyOthPro LowPri BuyOthPro
=
<→ >
2.3 Appeal
During a negotiation, an agent A may refer to some
positive or negative facts as examples to persuade
another agent B to do the business with it as an
ICAART 2010 - 2nd International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence
318
appeal, to achieve the goal himself and the biggest
profit of both of them (Amgoud et al., 2005; Jinghua
Wu et al., 2006). Besides, we found that the appeals
also concern the goals of the receiving agent like
threats and rewards. So, in this paper we extend the
definition of Appeal proposed by Amgoud. An
appeal is made up of three parts: the knowledge
relative to this appeal (the appeal itself), the goal
that agent A wants to achieve, and finally the goal of
the appealed agent B.
Example 3 In the same negotiation stalemate
mentioned above in Examples 1 and 2, the buyer
agent A may refer to some interests (SelfValue) that
the seller agent B doesn’t know but these behaviors
may bring to such as many other agents will come to
buy this product after seeing it through the use of A
to persuade B to accomplish the business, and that
will also achieve the goal of high buying quantity
(HigBuy) of B. This appeal can formally be
expressed as follows:
3
{},,
a
A SelfValue LowPri LowPri Higbuy=< >
3 FORMAL MODEL OF
EVALUATION ON THE
ARGUMENTS’ STRENGTH
AND SELECTING
ARGUMENTS
During the course of evaluation, we can conclude
three main factors influencing the argumentation
strength: the certainty level of the knowledge related
to the argument, the priority of the goal that the
agent sending argument wants to achieve, and the
priority of the goal that the agent receiving argument
wants to achieve. However, evaluation on these
factors can be hardly found with accurate value in
practice, it could be “very high” or “high”,
“Medium” and other vague concepts. Problems
related to those vague concepts can not be solved by
the traditional mathematics and statistics.
Accordingly, we would introduce the methods in
fuzzy mathematics to quantify the qualitative
factors, and make the comprehensive evaluation
finally. The details of the model mentioned above
can be found in the previous study (Guorui Jiang et
al., 2009).
4 BAYESIAN LEARNING MODEL
FOR SELECTING
ARGUMENTS ON
ARGUMENTATION-BASED
NEGOTIATION
4.1 Bayesian Learning Model
The essence of the Bayesian learning model consists
of using the Bayesian formula to processing the
received information to amend the prior knowledge
of learning objects. The Bayesian formula can be
expressed as follows:
There is a set of events A
1
, A
2
… A
n
concern with
event H set:
1P (A
i
)>02A
i
A
j
=
φ
ij3
(A
i
) =,
Where P (A
i
) is priori probability; is the union of
events A
1
, A
2
…A
n
.
The Bayesian formula is defined as follows:
1
(/) (/)()/ (/)()
n
iiiii
i
PA H PH A PA PH APA
=
=
(1)
Where P (H/A
i
) is conditional probability, which
means that the probability of occurrence of event H
on the condition of the occurrence of event A
i
; P
(A
i
/H) is posterior probability, which means the
understanding of learning objects after revising.
4.2 The Basic Contents of Bayesian
Learning Model on
Argumentation-based Negotiation
In Argumentation-based negotiation, the basic
framework of Bayesian learning model can be
summarized as follows:
Learners: participating agents; in this paper, we
stand on the buyer agent’s point of view as the
learner.
Learning objects: the information of opponent’s
preferences and negotiating environment. In
this paper, they are referred to the main factors
of the assessment of argument’s strength,
namely, "the certainty level of knowledge in
argumentation" and "the priority level of
related goals of negotiating partner in
argumentation".
Priori knowledge: the sample space and
distribution of probability of the two main
factors mentioned above.
Information: the interactive information of
learning object received during the course of
negotiations. In this paper, the information is
RESEARCH ON THE BAYESIAN LEARNING MODEL FOR SELECTING ARGUMENTS ON
ARGUMENTATION-BASED NEGOTIATION OF AGENT
319
the responded message as accepting or
rejecting from seller agent after receiving an
argument.
Bayesian beliefs: in this paper, it refers to the
estimate of the seller’s responded policy of
after receiving an argument; it is the basis to
obtain the conditional probability. For
example, in the buyer’s opinion, the higher the
priority level of seller’s related goals in the
argument is, the higher the probability of the
argument’s acceptance by the seller will be;
On the contrary, the lower priority level is, the
lower probability of acceptance will be.
Posterior knowledge: after obtaining the
conditional probability, combined with a
priori probability, the posterior probability is
calculated by Bayesian formula, which is the
updated knowledge of learning objects after
the buyer agent’s Bayesian learning.
4.3 The Process of Bayesian Learning
for Selecting Arguments
In e-commerce negotiations, the buyer sends an
argument to the seller firstly, the seller would make
a decision to accept or reject after the assessment of
the intensity of the argument. The buyer receives a
response message and analyzes it, updating
information of negotiating partner’s preferences or
the information of negotiating environment by
Bayesian learning Model. This paper updates the
certainty of relevant knowledge that concerns with
the argument and the priority of relevant objectives
of seller. The buyer will make assessment of
arguments with different types or contents according
to the updated value of intensity factors, and then
sends a new argument.
For example, let
{ 1, 2,..., }RRii n== be the
assuming set relating to the priority of the seller-
related goals of the buyer agent. Based on their prior
knowledge, each hypothesis has a probability
estimate, constitutes a probability
set
() {( ) 1,2,...,}PR PRi i n==
, which satisfy
with
1
()1
n
i
PRi
=
=
. Subsequently, the buyer will
receive the feedback signal e from the seller (this
shall be accepted or rejected), according to the
current observed domain knowledge, the buyer
assumes a priori for each conditional
probability
()PeRi . At this point, the buyer
generates hypothetical posterior probability based on
the Bayesian learning model as:
1
1
1
()( )
()
()( )
ti i
ti
n
tk k
k
PRPeR
PRe
PRPeR
=
=
(2)
where
()tiPRe
indicates the probability of iR in the
interaction of t-th round of argumentation, after the
buyer agent receives the seller's feedback e.
Therefore, in the t-th round, the buyer will re-predict
priority of target related of the seller as:
1
1
Pr ( )j
n
gti
i
PReRi
=
=
×
(3)
The updated value of the corresponding intensity
factors will also be applied to evaluate the strength
of the optional arguments, and thus choose to send a
new round of argumentation. The details on the
evaluation and selection can be found in (Guorui
Jiang et al., 2009).
5 ANALYSIS OF AN EXAMPLE
5.1 Negotiation Parameters and Basic
Assumptions
This paper discusses mainly the buyer's selection on
sending in Argumentation-based e-commerce
bilateral negotiations. The main negotiation terms
are price, quality and delivery time.
The buyer agent will first estimate the certainty
level of knowledge and the priority level of the seller
agent’s goals related to the optional
arguments(initial beliefs).Here, we will explain this
by an example, suppose the buyer sends the first
argument as “a reward , if the price is cut by seller,
the buyer will buy more such products from him";
Table 1 shows the buyer’s priori probability
estimation of the priority level of the seller agent’s
goals related to the argument; Table 2 shows the
priori conditional probability when the seller accepts
or rejects the argument based on table 1.These priori
knowledge are all gained by the past online
transactions between the buyer and the seller. For
example, in the buyer’s common cognizance, the
higher the priority of seller’s related goals in the
argument is, the higher the probability of the
argument’s acceptance by the seller will be; On the
contrary, the lower priority level is, the lower
probability of acceptance will be.
ICAART 2010 - 2nd International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence
320
Table 1: The buyer’s priori probability estimation of the priority level of the seller agent’s goals related to the argument.
The priority level of the
seller agent’s goals
related
R1:
very low
R2:
low
R3:
lower
R4:
medium
R5:
higher
R6:
high
R7:
very high
Probability P
0
(Ri) 0 0 0 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2
Table 2: The priori conditional probability when the seller accepts or rejects the argument.
The priority level of the seller
agent’s goals related
The seller’s response to the argument
Acceptance Rejection
Very low 0.125 0.875
Low 0.25 0.75
Lower 0.375 0.625
Medium 0.5 0.5
Higher 0.625 0.375
High 0.75 0.25
Very high 0.875 0.125
5.2 The Process of Bayesian Learning
for Selecting Arguments
During e-business negotiation, the proposal given by
the buyer agent A is quite different from the
expectation of the seller agent B, for its profit, B
may reject, which may bring the negotiation into a
stalemate. In this situation, to guarantee the profit of
both of them and the negotiation to be continued
successfully, A will send argument to B to persuade
it make some concession, suppose there are three
optional arguments including:
(1) price cut, A will
purchase more such products from B if the price
cuts, (2) improve the quality, A will purchase more
such products from B if the quality improves, (3)
shorten the delivery time, B has promised A to
shorten delivery time in the past; the above optional
arguments can formally be expressed as follows:
1
{},,
A
LowPri BuyMorePro LowPri BuyMorePro=< >
2
{},,
A
HigQua BuyMorePro HigQua BuyMorePro=< >
3
{},,A PastPromise ShortDelivery ShortDelivery Hi
g
Rep=< >
A send the first argument
1
, then receive the
acceptance by B to
1
.Based on the feedback by B
and the priori knowledge of B(for example as Table
1 and Table 2), A use Bayesian learning model to
update the belief on the certainty level of the
knowledge and the priority level of the seller agent’s
goals related to
1
.Here, we explain this by showing
updating of the priority level of the seller agent’s
goals related to
1
as follows: according to formula
(2) and data from Table 1 and Table 2, we can
achieve the results after calculation, for example,
04 4
14
7
0
1
()( )
()
()( )
0.1 0.5
0.1 0.5 0.3 0.625 0.4 0.75 0.2 0.875
0.07
ii
i
PRPeR
PRe
PRPeR
=
=
×
=
×+×
in it,
14()PRe indicates the buyer A’s posterior
probability to
4R after it received the acceptance of
1
from B. Similarly, there are
15 16 17( ) 0.263, ( ) 0.421, ( ) 0.246PRe PRe PRe≈≈
and
01 0 2 03() () () 0PR PR PR
=
== because
of
01 0 2 03() () ()0PR PR PR
=
==.
Before A receives the feedback from B to
1
, its
belief about the priority level of the seller agent’s
goal (as buy more such products) can be calculated
by formula (3) as follows:
1
7
0
1
Pr ( )
0.1 (0.4,0.45,0.55,0.6)+0.3 (0.55,0.6,0.7,0.75)
+0.4 (0.7,0.75,0.85,0.9)+0.2 (0.85,1,1,1)
=(0.655,0.725,0.805,0.845)
g
i
PRi Ri
=
×
××
During this, we have used knowledge in fuzzy
mathematics, the detail can be found in (Guorui
Jiang et al., 2009). Similarly, after A receives the
feedback, its belief about the priority level of the
seller agent’s goal will be updated as follows:
1
7
1
1
Pr' ( )
0.07 (0.4,0.45,0.55,0.6)+0.263 (0.55,0.6,0.7,0.75)
+0.421 (0.7,0.75,0.85,0.9)+0.246 (0.85,1,1,1)
=(0.67645,0.75105,0.82645,0.86415)
g
i
PRi Ri
=
×
××
And, the probability distribution of the priority level
of the B-related goal "buy more products
(BuyMorePro)" will be updated as Table 3:
RESEARCH ON THE BAYESIAN LEARNING MODEL FOR SELECTING ARGUMENTS ON
ARGUMENTATION-BASED NEGOTIATION OF AGENT
321
Table 3: The updated probability distribution of the priority level of B’s related goal.
The priority level of the
seller agent’s goals related
R1:
very low
R2:
low
R3:
lower
R4:
medium
R5:
higher
R6:
high
R7:
very high
Probability P
1
(Ri) 0 0 0 0.07 0.263 0.421 0.246
After the buyer agent respectively updated the
certainty level of the knowledge and the priority
level of the seller agent’s goal related to
1
, it will
evaluate the strength of the rest optional arguments
according to the updated values of the main
influencing factors, and thus choose to send a new
argument. The details can be found in (Guorui Jiang
et al., 2009). In the example, as an agent can not
allowed to send two same arguments continuously,
so
2
A
and 3
A
are the new optional arguments, we
finally select to send
2
A
in a new round after the
evaluation. We can find that it is precisely because
the priority level of the B-related goal "buy more
products" has been updated after the first round,
while this goal is also B’s related to
2
A
, allowing
2
A
be the better choice; also the choice is more
effective and scientific because of update of agent’s
belief on the dynamic negotiation environment.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a Bayesian learning model has been
introduced along with Argumentation-based
negotiation, and the process of Bayesian learning for
argument selection has been analyzed with an
example. This could make more scientific and
rational choice of different types and contents of
arguments and increase the possibility of acceptance
of arguments. It gives an agent a certain ability to
learn by Bayesian learning model. So that it can be
continuously adjusted according to dynamic
environment, self-awareness, and effectively
improve the efficiency of argumentation. It
overcomes shortcomings of argument selection
followed a static environment in the previous study,
and appears to be more practical and effective.
But, in the model, more complete prior
knowledge is needed and the reasonableness and
accuracy of prior distribution also need to be further
improved. At the same time, more information from
the opponent and the negotiation environment
should be considered into the learning object of the
agent, to help it to greatly improve its self-adaptive
ability to the dynamic negotiation environment.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work is supported by the National Natural
Foundation of China (No: 70940005).
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