SOCIAL ROBOTS, MORAL EMOTIONS
Ana R. Delgado
Universidad de Salamanca, Avda. De la Merced 109-131, 37005 Salamanca, Spain
Keywords: Artificial intelligence, Contempt, phenomenology, Moral emotions, Social robots.
Abstract: The affective revolution in Psychology has produced enough knowledge to implement abilities of emotional
recognition and expression in robots. However, the emotional prototypes are still very basic, almost
caricaturized ones. If the goal is constructing robots that respond flexibly, in order to fulfill market demands
from different countries while respecting the moral values implicit in the social behavior of their
inhabitants, then these robots will have to be programmed attending to detailed descriptions of the
emotional experiences that are considered relevant in the interaction context in which the robot is going to
be put to work (e.g., assisting people with cognitive or motor disabilities). The advantages of this approach
are illustrated with an empirical study on contempt, the seventh basic emotion in Ekman’s theory, and one
of the “rediscovered” moral emotions in Haidt’s New Synthesis. A phenomenological analysis of the
experience of contempt in 48 Spanish subjects shows the structure and some variations –prejudiced, self-
serving, and altruistic– of this emotion. Quantitative information was later obtained with the help of blind
coders. Some spontaneous facial expressions that sometimes accompany self-reports are also shown.
Finally, some future directions in the Robotics-Psychology intersection are presented (e.g., gender
differences in social behavior).
1 INTRODUCTION
“Our most ardent emotions are evoked not by
landscapes, spiders, roaches, or dessert, but by other
people.” (Pinker, 1997; p. 396)
Humanoid robots are being constructed with
various uses in mind. Evolutionary inspired
psychological research, which reverse-engineer
emotions, can be very useful to decide what
emotions must be programmed in order to reach the
relevant goals in different situations. If social robots
are to be created, then moral emotions should be
simulated, given that each one of these emotions
seems to be, among other things, the solution to a
social exchange problem from our evolutionary past
(Cosmides & Tooby, 2005).
My first proposal is that current psychological
theories on morality can help engineers to decide the
“proper” emotions for different human-robot
interaction situations by taking into account both the
evolutionary roots of each emotion and the
functionality of that emotion in the current
interaction context.
Impressive as they are, abilities of emotional
recognition and expression in robots are still very
basic ones. My second proposal is methodological:
in order to know the structure of emotional
experiences, descriptive phenomenology (also
known as heterophenomenology) can be of great
help. We can agree in that animation design and
robots that are to be marketed in a specific culture or
in a particular population stratum must take into
account people’s particularities. Thus, after deciding
what emotions need to be programmed, a detailed
description of the experiences and facial expressions
of people from the target culture or population
stratum in everyday life should be obtained for the
selected emotions. This is exactly what descriptive
phenomenology is useful for.
2 SOCIAL ROBOTS
Social robots are being constructed so that their
dispositions or behaviours take the interests,
predicted intentions or needs of human beings into
account.
According to Salichs et al. (2006), the long-term
goal of the most part of research in Robotics is to
develop a social robot that can interact with humans
263
R. Delgado A. (2009).
SOCIAL ROBOTS, MORAL EMOTIONS.
In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems - Artificial Intelligence and Decision Support Systems, pages
263-270
DOI: 10.5220/0001830202630270
Copyright
c
 SciTePress

and participate in human society. This type of robot
must have effective and natural interfaces with a
high level of robot autonomy. There are various
robotic platforms that have been built to study
human-robot social interaction. Kismet is probably
the most popular one (Breazal & Brooks, 2005).
Other social robots are RUBI (Fortenberry, Chenu
& Movellan, 2004), Feelix (Cañamero & Fredslund,
2001), and Maggie (Salichs et al., 2006), to cite just
a few.
It is important to note again that social behavior
and moral emotions are intrinsically related. Known
to the researcher or not, moral values are implicit in
many social customs. Obviously, it is not easy for us
to perceive how it works in our own culture, given
that we are part of it, and so the implementation of
capabilities of expression and recognition of the so-
called moral emotions in robotic platforms could
also help to make explicit some values that are
implicit in the social interaction but sometimes
remain unseen even for the trained eye.
2.1 Human-Robot Interaction
Evolutionary inspired research shows that the
human selective sensitivity to features in the human
face that convey information on sex, age, emotions,
and intentions is applied not only to other human
beings or animals, but also to artificial structures,
such as cars. (Yes, others do it too!) When people
are asked to report the characteristics, emotions,
personality traits, and attitudes they attribute to car
fronts, automotive features and proportions are
found to covary with trait perception in a manner
similar to that found with human faces (Windhager
et al., 2008). There is a consistent association
between certain emotion expressions and the
inference of some personality traits that designers
had implicitly known and used –e.g., from the
expression of contempt, together with some postural
gestures, people make the inference of shyness
(Arya, Jefferies, Enns & DiPaola, 2006). In
animation design and Robotics, this information is
useful to create affective production systems.
Cañamero (2005) has reviewed the reasons why
it would be convenient to have robots with affective
capabilities. A common (and reasonable)
assumption in the field is that displaying emotions
and recognizing and responding appropriately to the
emotional states of humans will make users more
prone to accept robots and engage in interactions
with them. In fact, expressive facial animation
synthesis of human-like characters is already being
approached with good results (see, e.g., García-
Rojas et al., 2006).
In the Artificial Intelligence field, researchers
have devoted much effort to solving the problem of
emotion recognition and expression; psychological
and even neuropsychological theories of most of the
basic emotions –fear, sadness, surprise, happiness,
anger, and disgust– are well known by many, and so
I will not insist on them. I would just like to point
out that the communicative function of emotions
(Darwin, 1872), has been highlighted by Adolphs
(2006) as one of the two future trends in the
scientific study of emotion. (The other direction has
to do with the use of neural and psychophysiological
measures.)
Even though the instruments derived from Paul
Ekman's theory –such as the JACFEE test
(Matsumoto & Ekman, 2004)– have been decisive
in the scientific advances in the study of emotional
expressions, a methodological change leading to
more naturalistic, less caricaturized stimuli, is now
required. According to Adolphs (2006), context
effects and individual differences will have to be
taken into account in future research projects in the
Neurosciences, whose current procedures are
focused on very simple prototypes. Adolphs’s
suggestion could be applied to Robotics word for
word.
2.2 Moral Emotions
“People are selfish, yet morally motivated. Morality
is universal, yet culturally variable. Such apparent
contradictions are dissolving […]” (Haidt, 2007; p.
998)
Evolutionary theories inquiring into the origins
of morality have focused on the study of reciprocal
altruism (Cosmides & Tooby, 2005; Haidt, 2003;
Trivers, 1971), a strategy that can be biologically
successful only when participants have both the
motivation to cooperate and the motivation to avoid
or punish cheaters (Trivers, 1971).
Knowledge of the latest theories on the so-called
moral emotions is not common among AI
researchers. Actually, neither is it among
psychologists, given its novelty. Psychological
research on morality had traditionally focused on the
study of moral reasoning and on two of the moral
emotions: guilt and empathy. A simulation of
empathy seems to have been the dominant strategy
in social robotics. However, in the last few years,
increasing attention has been paid to other emotions
such as contempt, although the interest in anger and
disgust has somewhat obscured the role of
contempt. The CAD (Contempt, Anger, Disgust)
ICEIS 2009 - International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems
264

hypothesis of Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haidt
(1999), associates an emotion to each one of the
violations of community morality. Contempt is the
emotional response to the violations of duties
associated with some social hierarchy, while anger
and disgust are linked to violations of autonomy and
purity, respectively.
Actually, in Haidt’s New Synthesis, the
building blocks of human morality are the emotions,
and moral intuition is considered as previous to
moral reasoning. Various psychological
foundations, each with a separate evolutionary
origin, seem to support moral communities
constructed by human cultures. Moral reasoning can
override moral intuition, but it is usually performed
with social goals in mind, i.e., to avoid being the
target of gossip.
The study of the moral role of emotions such as
contempt, anger and disgust, typically considered as
negative, is one of the most novel and promising
fields in Psychology (Haidt, 2007).
3 ON CONTEMPT CONSIDERED
AS ONE OF THE MORAL
EMOTIONS
The expression of contempt, characteristically
asymmetrical, is the least studied of the basic
emotions in Ekman’s theory and the most variable
one with respect to cultural context (Elfenbein &
Ambady, 2002).
Miller (1997) has described the subtle ways in
which contempt serves in signalling and maintaining
distinctions of rank, which is consistent with the
CAD hypothesis. In hierarchical societies, contempt
is shown as an assertion of the lack of importance of
the other, who would not even deserve a strong
feeling such as anger. In more egalitarian societies,
however, contempt is felt for those who do not
measure up either to social position, or to the self-
claimed level of prestige. According to Miller
(1997), a common phenomenon in democratic
societies is “upward contempt”, such as the
contempt of students for teachers or daughters for
mothers.
From the scientific –not literary, philosophical
or legal – point of view, contempt has hardly been
investigated. In the context of emotion theories,
some authors had considered contempt to be a
variant of disgust (Ekman & Friesen, 1975), anger
(Lazarus, 1991), or a mixture of these emotions
(Plutchik, 1980). Ekman and Friesen (1986)
included contempt in their list of basic emotions,
and recent cross-cultural studies indicate that, when
a matching procedure is used, contempt is
recognized nearly as well as the remaining basic
emotions (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999).
Thus, it seems that methodological factors were in
part responsible for the confusion between disgust
and contempt in previous studies.
More corroborating evidence can be found in a
recent neuropsychological experiment: disgusted
faces elicited greater activation than contemptuous
faces in the insula and contemptuous faces elicited
greater activation than disgusted faces in the
amygdala (Sambataro et al., 2006); the amygdala
seems to be especially involved in processing face
cues that are socially relevant.
3.1 Meaning and Use
There is no controversy concerning the meaning of
the term "contempt" (the Spanish "desprecio", the
French "mèpris", or the Italian "disprezzo"). It
implies a feeling of superiority over someone who is
negatively considered (Izard, 1977; Darwin, 1872,
Ekman & Friesen, 1986). For instance, the meaning
of the Spanish term has not changed for centuries, as
registered in the successive dictionaries of the
Spanish Royal Academy.
By using frequency as an indirect indicator of
the use of the term "desprecio", it has been found
that contempt is an especially salient emotion in
Spain, in contrast with other Spanish-speaking
countries. In a study carried out on a representative
corpus composed of 103,184 basic emotion terms
with the objective of deciding the verbal labels for
the seven basic emotions in Spanish, a consistently
ordered sequence was discovered –fear, sadness,
surprise, happiness, anger, contempt and disgust–,
both diachronically and synchronically (in
Colombia, Cuba, Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru,
Puerto Rico, Spain, USA and Venezuela). Even
though consistency was nearly perfect, there was an
anomaly: in Spain, the Spanish term for contempt is
more frequent than the Spanish term for anger, that
is to say, contempt was the fifth and not the sixth
term of the ordered sequence, contrary to the rest of
the Spanish-speaking countries (Delgado, 2007).
Concerning action tendencies, contempt is a cold
emotion (Darwin, 1872; Izard, 1977), which makes
it easier for a robot to express it. Contempt does not
motivate fight or flight, but promotes cognitive
changes so that its object is treated in a less
considerate way in future interactions (Oatley &
Johnson-Laird, 1996). This is probably why
SOCIAL ROBOTS, MORAL EMOTIONS
265

contempt is usually evaluated as a negative emotion.
However, there might well be situations in which
people intuitively feel contempt for someone and
consider it the morally appropriate answer to a
social behavior (or lack of it).
3.2 The Experience of Contempt
“It seems to me that this is why, although statistical
methods were highly productive in early
experiments on animals, they rarely led to good,
new ideas about the levels at which only people can
think. This is why I want to emphasize the
importance of trying to classify the Types of
Problems that people recognize […]” (Minsky,
2006; p. 252)
Descriptive phenomenology is one of the
expanding methodological perspectives in
Psychology (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003). The procedure
begins with a description of an experience to be
understood psychologically which is usually
obtained by means of an interview and becomes the
raw data of the research. Meaning units are first
established and later transformed into
psychologically sensitive expressions. Finally, the
structure is determined.
Lacking an external and objective measure of
emotional experience, the analysis of the patterns of
what people say about their feelings and mental
representations seems to be the best point of
departure. It is well known that self-reports do not
reveal causal information, but they are essential for
revealing the ontological structure of consciousness
(Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner & Gross, 2007). Even
though “qualia” are not themselves causal, they are
informative indicators of causal core states; in fact,
conscious states are the only indicators we have of
any overall core state (Edelman, 2006).
3.2.1 Objective
The objective of this empirical reseach was to
describe the structure and some variations of the
experience of contempt by analyzing a corpus of
interviews, as well as showing spontaneous facial
expressions that sometimes accompany self-reports.
3.2.2 Methodology
Some forty-eight University students in their early
twenties volunteered as participants.
Data were saved on a MacBook by means of an
iSight webcam oriented to the participant (see in
Figure 1 how the screen is oriented to the
interviewer so that she can control the image). To
store, edit and analyze the videotaped interviews,
Quicktime and iMovie were used.
As to the procedure, participants were
interviewed about (a) their general idea of contempt,
(b) a typical contempt episode, and (c) a personal
episode. Later on, they fulfilled tasks of emotional
perception and production whose results are
reported elsewhere.
A descriptive phenomenological analysis was
then carried out in order to learn the structure of the
experience and categorize the answers following a
bottom-up, inductive approach. The general idea of
contempt was found to be composed of some
qualitative elements that could be coded as present
or absent and then added up to make a contempt
definition score.
Figure 1: A simple data-collection instrument.
Both the prototypical and personal episodes were
categorized by means of two concurrent category
systems each, describing the objects and reasons of
contempt. In order to avoid expectancy bias, results
were quantified with the help of two “blind” coders.
3.2.3 Qualitative Results
Contempt was associated to (a) an avoiding attitude,
(b) a negative experience, and (c) a feeling of
superiority, which is consistent with the
psychological literature on the topic, although the
avoiding attitude was mentioned more often than
expected for a “cold” emotion. In fact, rejection (or
some sort of avoiding) was the most mentioned
element, followed by the negativity of the
experience.
Contrary to descriptions of contempt as an
emotion that serves mainly in signalling and
maintaining distinctions of rank, superiority was the
ICEIS 2009 - International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems
266

least mentioned element.
As to the prototypical episode, subjects often
described situations in which a person feels
contempt for another who has done something
wrong to a third party, i.e., altruistic contempt,
although contempt as prejudice was modal. Only
three participants told a story in which the motive
for contempt is self-serving (e.g., person A feels
contempt for person B who has done something
wrong to A).
Exemplar 1: feeling contempt for someone who
has bothered the subject.
Exemplar 2: feeling contempt for someone who
has commited a terrorist act.
Exemplar 3: feeling contempt for people of a
different race.
More variability was found for the personal
episode. Unexpectedly, many participants began
telling a story in which they were the “receiver” of
contempt (a fact that could be of clinical
significance). This is not semantically wrong, but it
is not what was wanted, and thus they were asked to
report an experience in which they were the
“sender” of contempt.
The phenomenological analysis shows that the
structure of the personal contempt experience is
mostly associated with situations in which someone
has done something wrong to the participant,
although situations in which contempt is felt for a
person who had done something wrong to a third
party or whose characteristics are disliked were also
described.
Exemplar 1: feeling contempt for a friend who
has despised me.
Exemplar 2: feeling contempt for a person who
has done something unfair to a third party.
Exemplar 3: feeling contempt for a person
because I dislike her clothing style.
Both the prototypical and personal episodes were
categorized by means of two concurrent systems
each, describing the objects and reasons of
contempt.
Concerning the object of contempt, the category
system divides the domain into three: intimate,
social and abstract.
As to the reasons for contempt, they are also
classified in threes: something that the object has
done to the subject of contempt, something that the
object has done to a third party, and something that
the object of contempt is (race, social role, personal
characteristics...). These reasons have been labeled
as self-serving, altruistic, and prejudiced,
respectively.
3.2.4 Quantitative Results
Two trained observers, blind to the objectives of the
study, used the previous systems to code the
transcriptions and get frequency data. Inter-observer
agreement was 97%.
When asked for their general idea of contempt,
participants responded with at least one term related
to a negative experience, an avoiding attitude or a
feeling of superiority. These elements were coded as
present or absent and then added up to make a
contempt definition score. Table 1 shows the
distribution of answers with one, two or three coded
elements, as well as the frequency distribution of
scores.
It can be seen that rejection or some kind of
avoiding attitude was the most mentioned element,
doubling in frequency the superiority aspect.
Table 1: Contempt Definition Elements and Score.
Avoiding Negativity Superiority Score Frequency
1 0 0 1 13
0 1 0 1 8
0 0 1 1 6
1 1 0 2 12
1 0 1 2 5
0 1 1 2 2
1 1 1 3 2
When describing a typical contempt episode,
65% of the subjects narrated events that can be
thought of as prejudiced, implying the feeling of
contempt for something that the other is (race, social
role, personal characteristics...).
Some 29% told episodes in which a person felt
contempt for another who had done something
wrong to a third, i.e., altruistic contempt. Notice that
the 95% confidence interval for this proportion goes
from .16 to .42, not including zero.
Table 2 shows that only three participants
attributed direct self-serving motivations to the
subject of contempt.
Abstract referents (a person, someone…) were
described by 85% of the sample, and only seven
subjects mentioned a contempt object with which
the subject had a social (but not intimate)
relationship.
SOCIAL ROBOTS, MORAL EMOTIONS
267

Table 2: Typical Contempt Episode: Reason by Object.
Intimate Social Abstract Total
Self-serving 0 0 3 3
Altruistic 0 0 14 14
Prejudiced 0 7 24 31
Total 0 7 41 48
When describing a personal episode, there was
more variability in the narrated events (see Table 3).
Two subjects insisted that they had never felt
contempt for anyone. Of the remaining forty-six,
half described self-serving situations in which the
objects of contempt were diverse (close friends and
loved ones were mentioned five times in this kind of
episode).
Table 3: Personal Contempt Episode: Reason by Object.
Intimate Social Abstract Total
Self-serving 5 8 10 23
Altruistic 1 3 7 11
Prejudiced 0 3 9 12
Total 6 14 26 46
Some twelve subjects (26% of the sample)
described episodes that can be coded as prejudiced,
and eleven, or 24% of the sample, described
altruistic episodes (the 95% confidence interval for
this proportion goes from .12 to .36, not including
0). The object of contempt was abstract in 57% of
the episodes, social in 30%, and intimate in 13% of
them.
3.2.5 Spontaneous Facial Expressions
Some participants showed clear expressions of
contempt while narrating their experiences. These
expressions are more ecologically valid than the
usual, posed ones.
The characteristical assimetry of contempt,
described by Darwin as “a slight uncovering of the
canine tooth on one side of the face” (Darwin, 1872;
p. 255), and considered by Ekman and Friesen
(1986) as a pan-cultural expression of emotion, can
be seen in Figure 2.
According to Darwin (1872), another common
method of expressing contempt is by slightly turning
up the nose, which apparently follows from the
turning up of the upper lip. This is the expression
showed by the participant in Figure 3.
Figure 2: A spontaneous contempt expression.
Figure 3: A spontaneous disgust-as-contempt expression.
Darwing himself indicated that mouth and nose
movements such as those in Figure 3, when strongly
pronounced, express disgust. Current emotion
classifications, not taking into account either the
intensity or the context of the expression, would
label Figure 3 as a disgust expression.
4 CONCLUSIONS
The structure of the contempt experience was
extracted from the analyses of answers to three open
questions. First, when asked for a definition of
contempt, participants responded with at least one
term related to a negative experience, an avoiding
attitude or a feeling of superiority. Rejection or
ICEIS 2009 - International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems
268

some kind of avoiding attitude was the most
mentioned element, more than expected for a “cold”
emotion.
When describing a typical episode, subjects
seldom mentioned episodes related to reciprocal
altruism. More often, they narrated episodes in
which a person felt contempt for another who had
done something wrong to a third party, i.e., not a
self-serving situation, but an altruistic one.
However, experiences reflecting prejudice –feeling
contempt for something that the other is– were
modal.
Finally, when describing a personal situation,
there were mainly self-serving episodes that can be
related to reciprocal altruism, although both
prejudiced and altruistic contempt appeared in
similar proportions. It must be noticed that whether
the moral role of contempt is salient in subjects’
self-reports (and not only in the theorist’s mind) is
an empirical question for which this study has found
a positive answer.
These results are in concordance with Haidt’s
New Synthesis, in which contempt is the emotional
response to the violation of some social duties.
According to Haidt (2007) the moral domain of
educated Westerners is more focused on principles
of no-harm and fairness than it is in the rest of the
world. However there are still other psychological
foundations of morality; one of them, having to do
with intuitions of ingroup-outgroup dynamics and
the importance of loyalty, is clearly behind many of
the situations that have been described by
participants in this study. Moll, de Oliveira-Souza
and Zahn (2008) have proposed that truly moral
choices lie in doing something “right” (including
punishment or avoiding of norm violators) when
more immediate selfish motives would tell the agent
to do otherwise. There is usually no direct benefit in
despising terrorists or feeling contempt for people
who mistreat other people, and thus the conception
of altruistic contempt seems to be supported by our
data.
5 FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The next step is to begin new rounds of interviews
with other population strata, such as old people.
Following the trends in qualitative sampling, using
an extreme comparison group would help to falsify
(or else corroborate) conclusions on the structure of
the experience of contempt.
Pursuing the study of sex-related differences in
contempt is another unquestionable fruitful
direction, because morality theorists as well as
psychologists have found some such differences in
both morality and social communication (e.g., Hall,
2006; Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). Given our evolutionary
past, sex-related differences in social cognition have
also been predicted (Kimura, 1999; Geary, 2006).
Thus, the lack of differences in current studies could
be attributed to procedures not taking into account
contextual factors (Fischer & Roseman, 2007).
Other variables such as personality type could
also be taken into account in future studies. In any
case, it has been shown that it is possible to
investigate the moral concepts and expressions that
characterize a target group by means of a very
friendly procedure. This information should be of
use to those who wish to market more versatile
social robots while respecting the moral values
implicit in the customs of the target population.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research was funded by MEC EXPLORA
action SEJ2007-29492-E. The author wish to thank
Felix Inchausti and Margarita G. Marquez for acting
as blind coders.
REFERENCES
Adolphs, R., 2006. Perception and emotion. How we
recognize facial expressions. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 15, 222-226.
Arya, A., Jefferies, L.N., Enns, J.T., DiPaola, S., 2006.
Facial actions as visual cues for personality. Computer
Animation and Virtual Worlds, 17, 371-382.
Barrett, L. F., Mesquita, B., Ochsner, K. N., Gross, J. J.,
2007. The experience of emotion. Annual Review of
Psychology, 58, 373-403.
Breazal, C., Brooks, R., 2005. Robot emotion: a
functional perspective. En J.M. Fellous & M.A. Arbib
(Eds.), Who needs emotions? The brain meets the
robot (pp. 271-310). New York: Oxford University
Press.
Cañamero, L., Fredslund, J., 2001. I show you how I like
you: Can you read it in my face? IEEE Transactions
on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part A, 31, 454–
459.
Cañamero, L., 2005. Emotion understanding from the
perspective of autonomous robots research. Neural
Networks, 18, 445-455.
Cosmides, L., Tooby, J., 2005. Neurocognitive
adaptations designed for social exchange. In D. M.
Buss (Ed.), Evolutionary psychology Handbook (pp.
548-627). New York: Wiley.
SOCIAL ROBOTS, MORAL EMOTIONS
269

Darwin, Ch., 1872. The Expression of the Emotions in
Man and Animals. London: John Murray.
Delgado, A. R., 2007. Spanish basic emotion words are
consistently ordered. Quality&Quantity. DOI:
10.1007/s11135-007-9121-3
Edelman, G.M., 2006. Second nature. Brain science and
human knowledge. London: Yale University Press.
Ekman, P., Friesen, W. V., 1975. Unmasking the face.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Ekman, P., Friesen, W. V., 1986. A new pan-cultural
facial expression of emotion. Motivation and Emotion,
10, 159-168.
Elfenbein, H.A., Ambady, N., 2002. On the universality
and cultural specificity of emotion recognition: A
meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 128, 203-235.
Fischer, A.H., Roseman, I.J., 2007. Beat them or ban
them: The characteristics and social functions of anger
and contempt. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 93, 103-115.
Fortenberry, B., Chenu, J., Movellan, J., 2004. RUBI: A
Robotic Platform for Real-time Social Interaction.
Third International Conference on Development and
Learning (ICDL'04).
García-Rojas, A., Vexo, F., Thalmann, D., Raouzaiou, A.,
Karpouzis, K., Kollias, S., Moccozet, L., Magnenat-
Thalmann, 2006. Emotional face expression profiles
supported by virtual human ontology. Computer
Animation and Virtual Worlds, 17, 259-269.
Geary, D.C., 2006. Sex differences in social behavior and
cognition: Utility of sexual selection for hypothesis
generation. Hormones and Behavior 49, 273 – 275.
Giorgi, A.P., Giorgi, B.M., 2003. The descriptive
phenomenological psychological method. In P.M.
Camic, J.E. Rodes & L. Yardley (Eds.), Qualitative
research in Psychology. Expanding perspectives in
methodology and design (pp. 243-273). Washington,
DC: APA.
Haidt, J., 2003. The moral emotions. In R. J. Davidson, K.
R. Scherer & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), Handbook of
affective sciences (pp. 852-870). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Haidt, J., 2007. The new synthesis in moral psychology.
Science, 316, 998-1002.
Hall, J.A., 2006. Women's and men's nonverbal
communication. Similarities, differences, stereotypes,
and origins. In V. Manusov & M.L. Patterson (Eds.),
The Sage Handbook of Nonverbal Communication
(pp. 201-218). London: Sage.
Izard, C. E., 1977. Human Emotions. New York: Plenum
Press.
Jaffee, S., Hyde, J.S., 2000. Gender differences in moral
orientation: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin,
126, 703-726.
Kimura, D., 1999. Sex and cognition. Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press.
Lazarus, R. S., 1991. Emotion and adaptation. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Matsumoto, D., Ekman, P., 2004. The relationship among
expressions, labels, and descriptions of contempt.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87,
529-540.
Miller, W. I., 1997. The anatomy of disgust. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Minsky, M., 2006. The Emotion Machine. Commonsense
Thinking, Artificial Intelligence, and the Future of the
Human Mind. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Moll, J., de Oliveira-Souza, R., Zahn, R., 2008. The
neural basis of moral cognition. Sentiments, concepts,
and values. Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences, 1124, 161-180.
Oatley, K., Johnson-Laird, P. N., 1996. The
communicative theory of emotions: Empirical tests,
mental models, and implications for social interaction.
In L. L. Martin & A. Tesser (Eds.), Striving and
feeling: interactions among goals, affect and self-
regulation (pp. 363-393). Hillsdale, NJ: LEA.
Pinker, S., 1997. How the mind works. New York: Norton
& Company.
Plutchik, R., 1980. Emotion: A psychoevolutionary
synthesis. New York: Harper & Row.
Raouzaiou, A. Karpouzis, K., S. Kollias, S., 2004.
Emotion synthesis in virtual environments. In ICEIS
2004, Proceedings of the 6th International Conference
on Enterprise Information Systems. Porto, Portugal.
Rozin, P., Lowery, L., Imada, S., Haidt, J., 1999. The
CAD triad hypothesis: A mapping between three
moral emotions (contempt, anger, disgust) and three
moral codes (community, autonomy, divinity).
Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 76, 574-
586.
Salichs, M. A., Barber, R., Khamis, A.M., Malfaz, M.,
Gorostiza, J.F., Pacheco, R., Rivas, R., Corrales, A.,
Delgado, E., García, D., 2006. Maggie: A robotic
platform for human-robot social interaction. IEEE
International Conference on Robotics, Automation
and Mechatronics (RAM 2006). Bangkok. Thailand.
Sambataro, F., Dimalta, S., Di Giorgio, A., Taurisano, P.,
Blasi, G., Scarabino, T., Giannatempo, G., Nardini,
M., Bertolino, A., 2006. Preferential responses in
amygdala and insula during presentation of facial
contempt and disgust. European Journal of
Neuroscience, 24, 2355-2362.
Trivers, R. L., 1971. The evolution of reciprocal altruism.
Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35-57.
Windhager1, S., Slice, D.E., Schaefer, K. Oberzaucher, E.
Thorstensen, T. Grammer, K., 2008. Face to face. The
perception of automotive designs. Human Nature.
D.O.I.: 10.1007/s12110-008-9047-z
ICEIS 2009 - International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems
270